

**THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SRI RĀMĀNUJA
(VĪŚIṢṬĀDVAITA)**

BY

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P R E F A C E

Works on Viśiṣṭādvaita, the theistic system of Vedāntic philosophy propagated by Rāmānuja, are comparatively few. Though the tenets of this school are in close accordance with tradition and are entitled to universal popularity, they are not as widely understood as they deserve to be.

The main reason for this is that this system combines the two Vedāntas, Sanskrit and Tamil, and any one expounding it should be well-versed in both. The Sanskrit Vedas reveal the truth as much as they hide, they are both explicit and implicit. It is to the immortal credit of Saint Nammālvār, the greatest of Tamil mystics, that, divinely endowed as he was with deep devotion and insight, he was the chosen soul to reveal in lucid terms, the heart of the Vedas. To any one who has not studied the works of the Ālvār, particularly his Tiruvoimozhi, the Vedic texts will always remain a field of apparent conflict and their reconciliation and consistent exposition, a task of subtle wisdom.

To show that the "Tamil Vedas"—as the Prabandhas of the Ālvāra are called—clarify what is only implied in their Sanskrit original by citing texts from both in support, calls for separate and lengthy treatment. For the purpose of a preface, suffice it to give two or three illustrations.

On all the three fundamental topics of philosophy (*tatva*, *hita* and *puruṣārtha*) the truth, the means and the goal, what is suggested or implicitly stated in the

Sanskrit texts is made explicit and clear in the Tamil verses. Referring to the Jīva, the individual soul, the view of the Vedas is given in Vedānta Sūtra II-3-19 which states: "A knower only", meaning that that is the distinguishing feature of the soul, that it is neither mere knowledge nor is it jaḍa (non-intelligent). An equally innate character of the soul, namely, its subservience to Him (dāśya) is but faintly indicated in the Sanskrit texts of the Vedas, while it is made clear beyond doubt by Nammālvār, and in Rāmānuja's school, this characteristic of the Jīva is given more prominence than knowership. Secondly, reference may be made to the Vedānta Sūtra III-3-56. On the question whether all the Brahma Vidyās taught in the Upaniṣads are one or whether they are different, the Sūtra gives the conclusion: "They are different, for the words and the rest (describing them) are different." For holding one Vidyā different from another, among the tests to be applied are the words actually used in the text. The terms used in the Upaniṣads are "Veda", "upāsita" etc. The Taittiriya text, however uses the word "yuñjita" with reference to the Vidyā known as "*nyāsa*", thus distinguishing this Vidyā as different from others. In holding that this Vidyā is included within the scope of this Sūtra, Rāmānuja and his followers rely on the authority of Nammālvār, the foremost exponent of "*nyāsa-vidyā*" or the means of surrender. Finally, the concluding Sūtra IV-4-22, in which, basing on Śāstras, the text only asserts: "There is no return, there is no return, it being so stated in the Śabda (Vedas)". The mere statement of the Vedas, according to Rāmānuja, cannot bind the Supreme Being, a svatantra. And so, turning to the sayings of Nammālvār and quoting in support of the text of the Gītā, Rāmānuja asserts that it is

His will not to send a devotee back to this world. For, to do so, will nullify all the efforts taken by Him in search of a jñāni. Truly, one does not forsake what one has secured after a long quest. Thus, it will be seen that but for the light and leading provided by Nammālvār, Rāmānuja and his predecessors could not have explained the mystic texts of the Sanskrit Vedas in the way they have actually done.

The earliest exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaita have, therefore, freely called to their aid the works of the Ālvārs in Tamil, particularly Nammālvār, the chief of them, in comprehending the Vedic texts which presented difficulty in exposition. Following the line of these predecessors, Rāmānuja not only wrote his Śrī Bhāṣya, a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras of Vyāsa, but also studied, before expounding them, the work of Nammālvār, under an Ācārya of accredited authority. Hence, it is that Rāmānuja *by right*, and his followers down to the present day, *by courtesy*, are called “Vedamārgapratīṣṭhāpakas” and “Ubhaya Vedānta pravartakas” (the founders of the Vedic path, and the propagators of both the Vedas, Sanskrit and Tamil).

The author of this work, Srisaila Chakravarti Ācārya, is in a real sense, entitled to affix this twin honorific to his name. Not only did he possess a clear knowledge of the Upaniṣads, but he expounded them in the light of the Four Thousand Hymns of the Ālvārs in Tamil. An advocate by profession, he started his career as a lecturer in a local college, and having gained experience in the art of exposition, he took to the practice of law, but spent his leisure hours in making a special study under his father and under other accredited

exponents of Tarka, Nyāya and Mimāṃsā, preliminary branches of study, before turning to the Upaniṣads, the Gītā, the Vedānta Sūtras and the Sacred collect in Tamil. In this work, undertaken in amplification of his earlier but brief expositions of this philosophy (available in book form), he explains in easy English style, frequently blending into the colloquial, the philosophy of Rāmānuja, and at the same time, shows by comparison, where his interpretation differs from that of others and why and how it is entitled to preference.

It is, indeed, unfortunate that the author did not live to complete the work. Just a very small portion remained to be added. This addition has been made by the publishers, and how far this post-script from the pen of a different person, has foreseen the mind of the author, the plan of his work and his method of exposition, is for the readers to judge.

In conclusion, we should acknowledge our indebtedness to those who assisted us in bringing out this book. Though it was lying in manuscript for years after the death of the author, we, his sons, actuated by a sense of filial duty, have been cherishing the ambition of publishing it some time. But, for want of requisite facilities, the work could not see the light of day till now.

First and foremost, we are indebted to Mr. C. S. Parthasarathy Iyengar, B.A., B.L., an eminent scholar himself, who in 1944 persuaded our father to write a book on Viśiṣṭādvaita. Not only has he now come forward to complete the work but he has also assisted us in editing it, checking the proofs and adding an index to it. But for his assistance and encouragement, this work would not have come out.

We are equally grateful to Prof. K. Seshadri, Retired Professor of Philosophy of the University of Kerala at Trivandrum, South India, for his ready compliance with our request for an Introduction to this work. This would serve as a concise preliminary presentation couched in terms of current philosophic usage of the fundamentals of Rāmānuja's system, in the general background of Vedānta.

We also owe a deep debt of gratitude to Mr. C. Ramiah, sole proprietor of Bharati Vijayam Press, Triplicane, Madras, for the special care and attention, bordering on a deep sense of devotion, with which he undertook to bring out this book in its present form within a very short time.

Shortcomings and errors in printing are inevitable. We are aware of some of these in the present publication. We seek the indulgence of our readers and wish to assure them that these would be rectified in a second edition, should there be a demand for it.

24, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar Road, }
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 August 1, 1974.

V. S. R. CHAKRAVARTI
 V. S. V. CHAKRAVARTI
Publishers

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SRI RAMANUJA

(Visistadvaita)

By

V. R. Srisaila Chakravarti.

SOME OPINIONS.

The author Srisaila Chakravarti, an erudite scholar in Tamil Prabandha and Sanskrit lore, is remarkably equipped to explain the tenets of this school which is based on the Ubhaya Vedanta. We find the present work ably bringing out the abstruse philosophical arguments in an easy and convincing manner, appealing even to a lay man with no philosophical background. There is no ambiguity or confusion in the expression of ideas. Srisaila Chakravarti has an easy and pleasant style of exposition which, as the publishers have said, blends occasionally into the colloquial.

The work is a valuable addition to the literature on Visistadvaita. The printing and get up are pleasing.

Brahma Vidya—The Adyar Library Bulletin, Madras.

It is a valuable and sympathetic survey of the subject, and forms a useful addition to the literature on Hindu religious philosophy.

Prof. A. L. Basham—Canberra.

The book "The Philosophy of Sri Ramanuja" was very interesting to read.

A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami, Krishna Consciousness Center.

.....we have had to wait till now for this noteworthy contribution from the late Srisaila Chakravarti a scholar who chose to write for the average reader without over-simplifying in any way the noble theme.

The exposition is on traditional lines. Technical terms are sparingly used, and whenever they appear, they are clearly explained. The metaphysics of Visistadvaita is lucidly explained.

The Hindu, Madras.

The book sets forth lucidly the views of Visistadvaita, in such a way that I feel sure that this will be a most useful publication for the students of Indian Philosophy in the future.

Prof. John Brough—Cambridge.

The work under reference deals in a masterly way the Philosophy of Reality or Tattva according to Ramanuja..... The method of treatment is thorough and the style is simple and full of force. The printing and get up are excellent.

Bhavan's Journal, Bombay.

The style of the work is lucid and graceful..... It is remarkable that the author does not merely achieve, accuracy and precision, but incorporates into the body of the work the bulk of philosophical thinking that has gone to the formation of the school in the principal classics. He is also an energetic and accomplished dialectician. The book is a worthy statement of Sri Ramanuja's philosophy.

Swami Adidevanada, Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, Bangalore

Srisaila Chakravarti's work is substantial, citing original sources, and offers a lucid exposition of the whole field of philosophy and mysticism of Visistadvaita.

The Mail, Madras.

The book is singularly accurate, precise, methodical in presentation and conveys the profound thesis of Visistadvaita in an appropriately splendid style.....

Prof. S. S. Raghavachar, Mysore

A few books and several articles in English have appeared in recent years, explaining the several aspects of Visistadvaita philosophy. (V. K. Ramanujachari, P. N. Srinivasachariar, K. C. Varadachari, S. S. Raghavachar and others). The present book is easily the best for the general reader, conveying the thesis accurately, precisely and methodically, in an appropriately lucid and splendid style. Technical terms are sparingly used and authorities relegated to footnotes, so as not to impede continuous reading. Purely rational arguments are also used, to explain the correctness of the stand taken by Sri Ramanuja, besides indicating the different interpretations of particular texts by Sankara and Ramanuja.

Swarajya, Madras.

This is one valuable addition to the books on Ramanujacharya's Visistadvaita system of the Vedanta philosophy..... This work shows a mature study and exposition..... On the whole it is a lucid defence of Visistadvaita and the book is of great interest for the followers of Ramanuja as well as the general students of Indian philosophy.

Journal of the M. S. University of Baroda.

The treatment of each one of these realities is so comprehensive as to include discussion of other topics related to the main theme.The discussion of the problems here is exhaustive and lucid, and the academic perspective is always kept in view which is necessary particularly when the issues involved are to be presented from the points of view of Advaita and Visistadvaita,The author's analysis of the issues involved is clear, the presentation is cogent; and the discussion of the main theme is excellent.

The book under review testifies to the profound scholarship of the author not only in the *Prasthanatraya* but in the *Divyaprabandha* as well. Books of this kind in English are needed to popularise the teachings of this important school of Vedanta. For writing this excellent book, the world of scholarship, I am sure, will be grateful to Sri V. R. Srisaila Chakravarti.

Journal of the Madras University

The language is simple and elegant and being free from the technique of philosophical writing, is bound to be appealing to a layman and to arouse interest in him. Above all, the topics are well arranged and take the reader through them with sustained interest. Rarely, do we come across a book of this kind, presenting philosophy through English medium. The work is very useful both to the layman and a scholar.

Saptagiri Tirupati.

.....the public would otherwise have missed a really useful book which combines in it great learning and lucidity of exposition. It is a comprehensive work wherein all important aspects of Visistadvaita doctrine are very lucidly expounded, without losing sight of the advantages of a comparative study of them in relation to other parallel systems of Vedanta. The result has been very rewarding in so far as the general public interested in Vedantic studies gets in it a clear, comprehensive and well-written handbook on this system of Vedanta, which has not been adequately expounded by Indian scholars in the past.

Vedanta Kesari, Madras.

The present treatment runs smooth with an abundance of illustrations from the Epics and Scriptures, in a language that is fluent and understandable by the general reader.

ADVENT, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondichery.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SRĪ RĀMĀNUJA

(Viśiṣṭādvaita)

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ABBREVIATIONS USED

B. G.	Bhagavad Gītā
Br. Sūt.	Brahma Sūtra (or Vedānta Sūtra)
Br. (Bri.) Up.	Bṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad
Chh. Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Git. San.	Gītārthasaṅgraha
Kaṭha. Up.	Kaṭhopanīṣad
Kau. Up.	Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad
M. B.	Mahābhārata
M. (Manu) Sm.	Manusmṛti
Mun. (Muṇḍ.) Up.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
Praśna. Up.	Praśnopanīṣad
Sub. Up.	Subālopaniṣad
Sun. kāṇḍa	Sundara kāṇḍa of Rāmāyaṇa
Sv. (Sw.) Up.	Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad
Taitt. Āraṇ.	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
Taitt. Brāhmaṇa	„ Brāhmaṇa
Taitt. Nārāyaṇa	„ Nārāyaṇānurvāka
Taitt. Up.	„ Upaniṣad
Tat. Ch.	Tātparyacandrīka
Vāl. Rām.	Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa
Ved. San.	Vedārtha Saṅgraha
V. P.	Viṣṇupurāṇa
Yājñika Up.	Yājñika Upaniṣad

INTRODUCTION

I am grateful to the publishers of "The Philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja" for the opportunity given to me to introduce the work of a great scholar-devotee of Śrī Rāmānuja to the readers, by way of a brief, preliminary presentation of the meaning and relevance of Viśiṣṭādvaita as a system of Vedānta and as constituting the core of the teachings of Śrī Rāmānuja and the Āḷvārs.

Viśiṣṭādvaita is both philosophy *and* religion; and as a philosophy of religion it would serve the purposes of Vedānta as a whole, and would be acceptable to the systems of Vedānta in general. Indeed, Vedānta would appear incomplete without Viśiṣṭādvaita, for it provides a meeting ground for a variety of Vedāntic approaches. Viśiṣṭādvaita took shape, not as a result of any compromise or concession, but in response to a real need for a synthesis in the views and perspectives on Vedānta. It may well be described as a harmonisation of metaphysical fundamentals, such as the one and the many, the transcendental and the empirical, the Absolute and the Relative.

Viśiṣṭādvaita is essentially integral in aim and method, and any assessment of its worth must necessarily take into account the measure of its success in integrating principles and concepts, that avowedly owe their origin to the Upaniṣads, the Brahma Sūtra and the Bhagavadgītā. Viśiṣṭādvaitic synthesis springs from a self-authenticating vision and is, therefore, mystical in meaning. It is more than metaphysical synthesis, for it is at its source directly experienced and not merely

comprehended and formulated with reason and conviction. The finality of its declaration does not lie with metaphysics but in mystical intuition. Metaphysics prepares the ground for mysticism, and it also provides confirmation through reason for the original deliverances of mysticism. The entire edifice of Vedānta stands on mystical foundations, for Upaniṣadic utterances are revelations of authentic intuitions of sages and seers. While the core of Vedānta consists of occult intimations of ultimate Reality, its articulate expression is in consequence often elliptical, lacking syntactical completeness and calling for interpretative or commentarial elaborations. It is in the dimension of these commentaries and interpretations that metaphysical controversies, arguments and counter-arguments, come into play. Metaphysics cannot be a substitute for direct, mystical experience, though it may be necessary for conveying the intuited truths to other minds with conviction.

The metaphysics of Viśiṣṭādvaita is in a special sense rooted in its mysticism. Ātma-Jñāna, which is the purport of Vedānta in general, acquires a distinctive significance in Viśiṣṭādvaita with its emphasis on the Paramātmā as the One Self of all souls, that *belong* to the Supreme in an intimate, irrevocable relation and form part of its *Sarira*. The “*Sarira-Sariri*” relation is unique to Viśiṣṭādvaita, and its potentialities for the fulfilment of that superior role of harmonisation, which belongs to Viśiṣṭādvaita as a feature of its excellence, are almost infinite.

It is in such a concept that *Tattva* and *Puruṣārtha* are blended into a sublime, spiritual fragrance, without

relegating *Hita* to subordinate relevance or elevating it to an exclusive status. The realisation that one's status is essentially that of the *Śarira*, and that every other fellow-being is an equal participant in the privilege of divine Śarirahood, not only provides a perennial source of inspiration for dedicated action, but secures a deepening sense of freedom from all bondage, as one loses one-self and gets absorbed in the delights of dedication and devotion. Life reveals a new meaning to the awakened soul, when the awakening is to a profound sense of divine Śarirahood. In the all-absorbing awareness that, although one is essentially a soul distinct and different from one's own body constituted by a specific psycho-physical complex, the individual soul is itself part of the *Śarira* of the Supreme Over-soul, it experiences a fresh awakening in an inner dimension, where the burden of bearing a body is totally cast off and the bliss of a "divine belonging" is substituted. The Paramātman is the true Self of all souls, to whom belongs all that there is. It was a mystic awakening that made Jalaluddin Rumi declare :

"Thou art become my greater Self ;
Small bounds no more can me confine ".

That the highest *Puruṣārtha* is attainable only with the full realisation that the *Jivātman* (soul) is an inseparable, integral, part of the *Śarira* of the Paramātman (over-soul), who is the Soul of souls, is an essential feature of the teaching of *Viśiṣṭādvaita*. Such a realisation signifies an enduring state of *jñāna* as illumined self-awareness ; and in such a state, the awakened soul lives in constant awareness of its status as *Śarira* or part of the *Śarira* of the Supreme. That is how the *Tattva* of

Viśiṣṭādvaita blends with the *Puruṣārtha*, and it does not call for the annulment or the denial of the reality of the individual soul or of the field of its empirical functions.

The mystic vision of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is the vision of the Ultimate and the Supreme as at once revealing in itself the *Tattva* and the *Puruṣārtha*. It is also the vision of the *Tattva* as the “*Tattva-traya*” as *cit*, *acit* and *Iśvara*,—“the One-only-without-a-second” as substantially “the-three-in-One”. This was the revelation vouchsafed to the great Ālvārs, the God-intoxicated mystic saints of South India, no less than to the illustrious Ācāryas,—Nāthamuni, Yāmuna and Rāmānuja. What was given to the Ālvārs in the deepest moments of their inward illumination as the quintessence of Truth came also to the Ācāryas in a finished form as patterns of systematic exposition. Hence the great Nāthamuni not only collected the hymns of the Ālvārs, the ecstatic outpourings of illumined hearts, and set them to music, giving their intrinsic beauty an appropriate articulate expression, but also applied himself to a systematic study of the inter-relations of logic and mysticism in the specific context of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The inspiration that Nāthamuni initially provided was in a significant sense transmitted by Yāmuna to Rāmānuja.

The true Viśiṣṭādvaitin, —wedded to the principle of synthesis, intent on integration and harmonisation, — is a “Ubhaya Vedāntin” in an original sense, which symbolised the unity of “the Vedānta of the heart” and “the Vedānta of the head.”—“The Supreme is the Self, the Soul of thy soul, to whom all that thou art—body, mind and life—belong as body to the soul. Awaken into the awareness of this wisdom by conscious dedication in complete self-surrender.” That would in a way sum

up the Ubbaya Vedānta of Viśiṣṭādvaita, as it conveys the essence of the teachings of the Ācāryas, while echoing at the same time the substance of its truth as felt and experienced in the unfathomed depths of the heart of the Ālvārs.

The spirit of synthesis and harmonisation, so characteristic of Viśiṣṭādvaita, is seen well reflected even in its treatment of the Pramāṇas. The Pramāṇas are described as instruments of knowledge. Viśiṣṭādvaita, as propounded by Śrī Rāmānuja, recognises three such Pramāṇas, viz. Pratyakṣa or sense-perception, Anumāna or inference and Śabda or scriptural testimony. There is a gradation in the fore-going order of the presentation of the Pramāṇas. We move from the lower to the higher and then to the highest, in the order as given. The higher Pramāṇa is more comprehensive than the lower, but neither duplicates the other. The one reinforces and supplements the other. There can be no mutual conflict or contradiction. What cannot be established by Pratyakṣa or Anumāna has to be authenticated by Śabda. And it would be wrong to take Śabda as ever contradicting Pratyakṣa or Anumāna. That is the spirit of synthesis, which Viśiṣṭādvaita brings to bear on the structure and scheme of the Pramāṇas. In common with other schools of Vedānta, Viśiṣṭādvaita accords a special, superior status to Śabda as Pramāṇa. The recognition of Śabda as Pramāṇa is itself a distinctive feature of Vedāntic thought. While other systems of world philosophy—particularly those of the West—may be satisfied with sense-perception and logical reasoning as sufficient sources and instruments of valid knowledge, it is Vedānta that recognises a third instrument in scriptural testimony and regards it as higher than all

others. There are philosophies in the world — both oriental and occidental, — that acknowledge the importance of intuition, but to Vedānta belongs the unique distinction of assigning a superior importance to *scriptures* that embody spiritual intuitions of sages and seers. This is because Vedānta is no mere play of the intellect but contains the quintessence of profoundly consummate spiritual experience, which has not merely a capacity to carry conviction but a power to inspire and transform man at the deepest levels and in subtlest dimensions. Here lies the significance of Vedānta as at once both philosophy and religion.

The “tripod” of Scriptural testimony that supports Vedānta is constituted by the Upaniṣads, Brahma Sūtra and the Bhagavadgītā. The Brahma Sūtra is a highly condensed presentation of Upaniṣadic declarations and the arguments woven around and out of them. The Upaniṣads are esteemed as *Śruti Vākyas par-excellence*. But on a superficial view, they seem sometimes to be inconsistent with themselves and call for a kind of harmonisation through interpretations and elucidations. The classification of such *Vākyas* as *Bheda Śrutis* and *Abheda Śrutis* is itself an admission of their mutual incompatibility. Viśiṣṭādvaita plays a significant role in reconciling the apparent contradiction between the two sets of *Śrutis* with the aid of a third category namely *Ghaṭaka Śrutis*. The *Ghaṭaka Śrutis* that are invoked for the tasks of reconciliation and harmonisation also fulfil a deeper purpose in that they give a definite and positive lead in the shaping of the fundamental concepts of Viśiṣṭādvaita, which holds that both *Bheda* and *Abheda Śrutis* are equally authentic and the key to their harmonisation lies in a profounder

synthesis provided by the *Ghaṭaka Śrutis*. It is the need for such a synthesis that led to the revealing suggestion of the *Śarira-Śariri* relation.

The consequences of the revelation are far-reaching in the realm of mysticism, no less than in that of metaphysics, and deserve to be worked out fully and systematically by scholars engaged in the field. Srisaila Chakravarti Acarya's present work offers sufficient suggestive material for the purpose. Its range and sweep are extensive. Indeed, it is rich with a profusion of "raw material" for the scholar, carefully garnered and awaiting academic treatment.

Madras-600017 }
July 26, 1974 }

K. SESHADRI

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SRI RAMANUJA

(SRI VISISTADVAITA)

Meaning of Philosophy

The sages of Greece used to be called Sophs (= wise men); but Pythagoras thought the word too arrogant and adopted the compound 'philosophia' (I love wisdom), whence philosopher means 'one who loves or courts wisdom'. Philosophy thus means 'the science of wisdom'. What is wisdom or true knowledge? A distinction is drawn by Tennyson between knowledge and wisdom. The former is earthly, of the mind; but wisdom is heavenly, of the soul—(In Memoriam). Amarasimha says: "True and supreme knowledge is knowledge of deliverance; the other kinds of knowledge relate to other sciences and arts."¹ Mokṣa-Sāstra or science of deliverance is alone conducive to wisdom or true knowledge. The latest discoveries in sciences, construction of air-ships and destructive bombs and machines do not certainly constitute wisdom. Parāśara says: "That knowledge alone by which the spotless Supreme Being is known, seen and attained is true knowledge; and science and knowledge relating to other things is ajñāna or Nescience".² "That alone is vidyā or science which leads us to deliverance. The other sciences will make any one only skilful".³ Philosophy thus means, Ātma-Vidyā, Brahma-Vidyā or Science of the Divine.

1. मोक्षोपनिषद्निम् अन्यत्रविज्ञानं शिल्पशास्त्रयोः ।

2. संज्ञायते येन तदस्तशेषं शुद्धं परं निर्मलमेकरूपम् ।

संदृश्यते वाप्यविगम्यते वा तत् ज्ञानमज्ञानमतोऽन्यदुक्तम् ॥ V. P.

3. cf. या विद्या सा विमुक्तये विद्यान्या शिल्पनैपुणम् ।

The end and aim of supreme knowledge, according to Hindus, is the alleviation of pain and promotion of happiness. The other kinds of knowledge only subserve this end. Even works on grammar, medicine, etc., state that they subserve the attainment of mukti, or liberation and salvation. Vāgbhaṭa, in his treatise on Medicine says in the benedictory stanza: "Salutation unto the oldest and earliest physician, Dhanvantri, an avatār of Viṣṇu, who uproots all kinds of disease of the mind, namely, desire, anger and so on, which beget attachment, ignorance, aversion, etc.,—diseases which ever persist whichever body is assumed."¹ Evidently, the author prays to God for the complete annihilation of the ills of saṁsāra or wordly existence. The central motive which must govern the whole life, according to Hindu philosophy, is, how the soul may be freed from pain, how misery may be put an end to and how bliss may be obtained and perpetuated infinitely. The chief defect of western philosophy lies in the fact that it is divorced from dharma or religion-law, which, in its perfection and completeness, is the supreme science-knowledge, chiefly directed towards the achievement of desired happiness, here and hereafter, by means of suitable actions done here. This idea was, in a way, present in the mind of Socrates. Socrates was filled with the most intense conviction of the supreme and overwhelming importance of truth, of the paramount duty of doing the right because it is right, on every occasion, whatever may be the consequence. He gave his first and chiefest care to the perfection of his soul and those of others. His whole teaching rested on the doctrine, 'Virtue is knowledge'. And conversely, if

1. रोगादिरोगान् सततानुक्कान् औत्सुक्यमोहारतिदाम् जघान ।

अशोकप्रसूतानशेषान् योऽपूर्ववेद्याय नमोस्तु तस्मै ॥ १ ॥ ३ ॥

virtue is knowledge, vice is ignorance.* A man who knows what is right must always do the right. A man who does not know what is right cannot do the right. Knowledge is not a part, it is not even an indispensable condition, of virtue. It is virtue itself. The Mahābhārata says : ‘The aim of all knowledge is the formation of character and conduct.’ Unfortunately, western philosophy relegates this most important function to Theology or Ethics. But Hindu philosophy treats of metaphysics as pre-eminently goading us to action for reaching the goal. The comprehensive teaching of philosophy, in the Bhagavad Gītā, aims at the attainment of the Supreme Being, Brahman or Nārāyaṇa, by means of constant practice of bhakti or upāsana which can be achieved by karma, jñāna and vairāgya or disattachment, as beautifully summarised by Yāmūnācārya in the first stanza of his Gītārthasaṅgraha.’ In the opening sentence of his Vedārthasaṅgraha, Bhagavān Śrī Rāmānuja says : “You can reach God if, with intense love and devotion, you worship Him by mind, word and deed, by meditating on Him, by uttering His holy names, by offering flowers etc., by prostrating at His lotus-feet and so on, along with the performance of duties cast on you according to varṇa (caste) and āśrama, with the correct and true knowledge of the relation between the individual soul and the Supreme soul.” The idea contained in this sentence is developed throughout the whole work.

1. शीलवृत्तफलं श्रुतम् । M. B.

2. स्वधर्मज्ञानवैराग्यसाध्यमक्त्येकगोचरः ।

नारायणः परं ब्रह्म गीताशास्त्रे समीरितः ॥ Git-San.

3. जीवपरयायात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वकवर्णाश्रमधर्मेति कर्तव्यताक-

परमपुरुषचरणयुगलध्यानार्चनप्रणामादिः अत्यर्थप्रियः तत्प्राप्तिफलः ॥

॥ Ved. San.

Unable to bear the sight of the sufferings of millions of souls in this wordly existence, five persons who were the personification of mercy, love and pity, prayed for the complete annihilation of the ills of those souls. They are : (1) Sage Parāśara (2) King Ranti Deva (4) Saint Nammālvār, and (5) Bhagavān Śrī Rāmānuja.

(1) Parāśara prays at the end of Viṣṇupurāṇa : "Let Lord Hari bestow on all souls that plenty and prosperity which is free from birth, old age, death and other ills."¹

(2) Ranti Deva saw the sufferings of people during famine, cried aloud and prayed : "I do not desire to reach the place of the four-headed Brahmā with all the yogic powers of aṇimā, mahimā, etc. nor, do I covet that bliss called mokṣa from which there is no return. But I do long to be inside all the souls and get the transference of all the sufferings and miseries of all the embodied souls unto myself ; for, by my experiencing all their miseries, they may be freed from them."²

(3) Likewise, the Buddha said, according to Tantra-Vārtika : - "Let all the sins, miseries and sufferings of Kali age fall on my head and let the suffering world become free from them."³

(4) Similarly, Saint Nammālvār, in the first stanza of the first of his four works in Tamil, namely, Tiru-viruttam, prays to God and appeals to Him as follows : "Being unable to bear the sight of suffering millions, this is my petition to you, O, Lord ! Let us not get

1. प्रदिशतु भगवान् अशेषपुंसां हरिरुज्जन्मजरदिकं सन्निदिम् । V. P.

2. न कामयेहं गतिमीश्वरणां अष्टविद्युक्तामपुनर्भवं वा ।

आर्तिं प्रमथेऽखिलदेहभाजां अन्तः स्थितो येन भवन्त्यदुःखाः ॥

3. कलिकलुषकृतानि यानि लोके मयि निपतन्तु विमुच्यतां हि लोकः ॥

again the false knowledge, bad conduct and impure body, (i.e.) let us not get the miseries of births and deaths. This is my appeal to you on behalf of millions of sufferers."

(5) One of Śrī Rāmānuja's preceptors was Tirukkoṭṭiyūr Nambi. The guru tried the disciple eighteen times to ascertain if he was a fit recipient of the sacred mantra of eight letters. At last, the Nambi, in his grace, initiated him into the mysteries of the mantra and, at the same time, wrested a promise from Rāmānuja that he would not reveal the import of the mantra to others. Rāmānuja pondered over the mantra and its hidden meanings taught by his guru, over-night, and on the next day, thought within himself that he could remove all the ills of humanity by openly broadcasting the sacred mantra and its meanings to the suffering humanity. Accordingly, he collected several people on the next day and in front of the local deity at Tirukkoṭṭiyūr, preached to them the hidden meanings of the mantra. The guru heard of the disobedience of his orders, summoned Rāmānuja and asked him if that report was true. Rāmānuja replied that it was quite true. Then, the guru asked him if he knew the consequence of such a wanton disobedience. The disciple said: "Yes, I know that the worst of hells awaits me". "Why, then," the guru asked him, "did you court the worst of hells?". The reply given by Rāmānuja is most thrilling and discloses his universal love and mercy. He replied: "I alone shall go to hell as a result of my transgression of your command, while the rest of suffering humanity, by virtue of their connection with your holy feet (i.e.) by being virtually your disciples, will certainly reach heaven." The guru was amazed at the broad-mindedness, boundless love and mercy of Rāmānuja, which were denied to him (the guru), extolled and pardoned the disciple.

PRAMANA or Means of Knowledge.

The pramātā, knower or a person desirous of knowledge, has to get knowledge of things to be known, prameya, only through the means of knowledge called pramāṇa. The existence of knowable objects is determined by the means of knowledge, called pramāṇa.¹ According to Cārvākas, a school of atheists, the 'only means of knowledge is pratyakṣa or sensory perception. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists recognise anumāna or inference also. The Sāṅkhyas recognise, in addition, a third, namely āgama. A sect of Naiyāyikas follow the Sāṅkhyas. But another sect, namely followers of Udayana, add upamāna or analogy as the fourth. The Prabhākaras recognise arthāpatti as the fifth pramāṇa. (Devadatta who is stout and healthy does not eat during day. Therefore, he eats during nights. This conclusion is arrived at by arthāpatti). The Bhāṭṭas and Māyāvādins add abhāva as the sixth means of knowledge. They say that the particular sense-organ which cognises the presence of a particular object, also recognises its absence. The Paurāṇikas recognise two more, namely, sambhava and aitihya, and say that there are eight means of knowledge. The Vedānta school recognises only three of the above means of knowledge, namely, pratyakṣa or perception, anumāna or inference and āgama or Śruti, Smṛti, etc., and include the other five in one or other of these three means of knowledge. They include upamāna, arthāpatti, and sambhava in inference, abhāva in perception, and aitihya in āgama. By āgamas are meant Śrutis or Vedas, Smṛtis, Itihāsas, Purāṇas, Brahmasūtras, Pāncarātras, and the sayings of the

Tamil Ālvārs and saints. Of these three means of knowledge, namely, perception, inference and āgama, perception is authoritative only regarding things knowable by the senses; inference is authoritative regarding some unseen objects whose necessary concomitance, or vyāpti with the known object, is ascertained by sensory perception, as in the case of fire and smoke. But, in the case of things beyond the reach of the senses, āgamas or śāstras are the only authority.

The word Śāstra, is derived from the root śās, (anuśiṣṭau), to teach, to inform, to govern, to correct, to advise. Śāstra is that which teaches pravṛitti or action, and nivṛitti or inaction. Of all the Śāstras, Śruti or Veda is the foremost authority as it is self-authoritative, and does not depend upon any other thing for its being authoritative, unlike Smṛti, Itihāsa, Purāṇa, etc. which depend upon Śrutis or Vedas for their authority. The Śruti or Veda, unlike other śāstras, is not made by man or by any other being and therefore, it is eternal. That Śruti is eternal, is proclaimed in the Śruti itself'. The Vedas are not made by any being as they are eternal. The verses : "In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God and the word was God. The same was in the beginning with God", occur in the Gospel according to St. John. These verses will help us in understanding the eternity of the Vedas. Since they are not made by any being, the Vedas are free from any of the four defects—illusion, cheating, inadvertence and disability, to which man-made works are liable. No Śāstra is therefore, higher than Śruti. Veda Vyāsa says : "No Śāstra is superior to Veda". "This is called Veda

1. वाचा विरूपनित्यया ।

2. वेदशास्त्रात्परं नास्ति । ।

because it teaches.”¹ The former part or karma-kāṇḍa of the Vedas deals with karma or action, which is worship of God and the latter part, or jñāna-kāṇḍa deals with the nature of God. Thus, all the Vedas speak about God. The Lord of the Gītā says: “The subject-matter of all the Vedas is Myself”.² The Vedas cannot be understood by ordinary mortals. Only Ṛṣis or Seers can understand them. The meaning of the Vedas can be understood only from the upabrahmaṇas or elucidating supplementaries of Vedas, which are called Itihāsas and Purāṇas and which are the inspired writings of seers called Ṛṣis. The Vedas should be elucidated and supplemented by Itihāsas and Purāṇas. The Vedas are said to be afraid of a man of little learning. They are afraid of being deceived (i.e.) misinterpreted³. Itihāsas are ancient histories like Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata which relate to events of the long past. Purāṇas deal with evolution and involution of the cosmos, the several dynasties of kings, manvantaras and so on. The former part of the Vedas is elucidated mostly by Smṛtis, and the latter part mostly by Itihāsas and Purāṇas. The references to God and ātman in the Smṛtis are merely to show that karma is a form of worship of God, and references to karma in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are made merely to show that karma is an aṅga or auxiliary to upāsana.

What do the Agamas or Sastras Teach?

The teachings of the whole range of āgamas, Śrutis, Smṛtis, Itihāsas, Purāṇas, Brahmasūtras,

1. वेदन्तंति वेदः ।

2. वेदैश्चैवैरहमेव वेद्यः B. G. XV. 15

3. cf. इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृहयेत् ।

विमेत्यल्पश्रुतात् वेदः मामयं प्रतारिष्यति॥ इति॥

Pāñcarātra and sayings of Āṭvārs and saints may be summarised to cover three topics, namely, (1) *tattva* or truths, (2) *puruṣārtha* or the goal to be reached, and (3) *upāya* or means to attain the goal. What is, or rather, what ought to be our goal? Our goal is liberation from the bondage of material existence. Maitreyi, wife of sage Yājñavalkya, questioned him when he offered wealth to her at parting: "If all this earth with all its gems and wealth were mine without any dispute, can I become immortal?" And Yājñavalkya answered: "No, you could only live as wealthy persons live, and die as they die. Wealth does not bring immortality." Maitreyi said: "What shall I do with that which does not make me immortal? Tell me the means by which I become immortal, i. e. free from births and deaths." Indra, the king of the gods, found no pleasure in heavenly kingdom, and leaving it, studied *adhyātma-vidyā*, the science of self, for one hundred and one years at the feet of Prajāpati. Nārada, who was well-versed in all the Vedas, Itihāsas, Purāṇas, grammar, astronomy, mental and moral science, medicine, music, political science, and all other conceivable branches of learning, except *Atma-vidyā* or science of the self, in great grief for his ignorance in that branch of learning, approached Sanatkumāra and entreated him to initiate him into the mysteries of the self. (cf *Ch.* VII-i). Every one of us desires to get freedom from the cycle of births, deaths, rebirths and miseries of life and to get unalloyed bliss. The desire in some is very faint instinct-

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1. सा होवाच मैत्रेयी, यन्तु म इयं भगोः सर्वापृथिवी वित्तेन पूर्णा स्यात् :
 कथं तेनामृता स्यामिति । नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः ; यथैवोपकरणवतां
 जीवितम्, तथैव ते जीवितं स्यात् ; अमृतत्वस्य तु नाशाऽस्ति वित्तेनेति ॥
 साहोवाच मैत्रेयी, येनाहं नामृता स्याम्, किमहं तेन कुर्याम् । यदेव भगवान्
 वेद, तदेव मे ब्रूहि इति ॥ Br. Up. IV. 4.

inly; in others, it is of varying degrees, according as the self-consciousness is developed with the stage and grade of evolution and intelligence. In a few, it is very acute and marked. He in whom this desire is intense and acute, almost to the exclusion of other desires, is called a *mumukṣu*. A *mumukṣu* or a person longing for release from the bondage of *samsāra* or material existence must necessarily know the three truths. All schools of philosophy recognise this necessity and agree in saying that freedom can be attained only by the knowledge of the truths¹. A person knowing the three truths, the enjoyer (the individual soul), the enjoyed (matter) and the controller of these two, namely God, ingratiates himself into the good graces of the Supreme being and thereupon gets immortality.²

The three truths are: (1) cit or individual soul called *jīva*, *pratyagātmā*, *jīvātmā*, *kṣetrajñā*, *cetana* and so on: (2) matter, called *prādhānā*, *avyakta*, *prakṛti* *avidyā*, *māyā*, *acetana* and so on, and (3) *Īśvara* or the universal Soul, called *Parabrahman*, *Paramātmā*, *Parama-puruṣa*, *Nārāyaṇa* and so on. By cit is meant the object which is the abode of consciousness, *jñāna* or *caitanya*. By acit is meant the object in which consciousness or *jñāna* does not and cannot inhere. By *Īśvara* is meant the Supreme Being, God who controls these two.

I. Cit or Atman.

We first deal with cit or Atman. The word Atman is often used to denote the individual soul. The characteristics of the Atman or *jīva* are as follows: (1) It is distinct from the body, sense-organs, the mind, *prāṇa* or breaths and intellect; (2) It is *aśaḍa* or self-luminous. (3)

1. तत्त्वज्ञानात् मोक्षलभः ।

2. मोक्षा मोक्षं प्रेरितारं च भत्वा जुष्टतत्त्वेनामृतत्वमेति । (Sv. Up. I.vi)

It is ānandarūpa or blissful in essence. (4) It is eternal. (5) It is atomic in size (6) It is āyakta, invisible or imperceptible. (7) It is acintya or inconceivable. (8) It is niravayava or without parts. (9) It is nirvikāra or changeless. (10) It is the abode of jñāna or consciousness; and (11) It is in the relation of body to God, i. e. it is controlled, sustained and supported by God and subservient to Him.

What is Atman or the self.

“Know thyself” is a common saying, and it is the fundamental teaching in philosophy. No one doubts his self. No one questions, ‘Am I, or Am I not?’ Every one of us in the world referring to self says: ‘I’, ‘I’. This has been repeatedly said by thinkers of all ages and of all countries. The existence of the self is certain and indubitable. It is usually said: ‘I who played and slept as a child in my parents’ lap sixty years ago, have now grand-children on my lap’. Is there any persistent and unchanged particle of matter continuing throughout these years in the physical organism? What identity is there between the infantine body and this adult body? None. But the ‘I’ has not changed. It is the same. We are always enwrapping the ‘I’ in several sheaths: ‘I am happy, I am miserable, I am rich, I am poor, I am young, I am old, I am a god in my dreams, I am a man in my waking state’. These accidents and incidents denote the continuity of the ‘I’. They are passing and varying. But the ‘I’ remains the same. Conditions change, but they all surround the ‘I’. When you are questioned by your friend in the dark, “Who is it”, your first answer is: “It is I”. The impress of the ‘I’ is so strong. The manifestation of the ‘I’ is so common in all beings. The special naming and description, ‘I am Rāma’, ‘I am

Kṛṣṇa '. 'I am so and so ', follows only afterwards. The 'I' is so real that it expects others to recognise it. What is this 'I' or self? Is it the body or different from it? When the body comes out of the mother's womb, it is small. It then grows into a body, develops as youth, adult and old man, and finally decays and dies. Does the 'I' appear to grow, decay and perish? Or is it uniform and changeless and therefore, different from the body? It is patent that the body is a combination of several parts. If the body were the 'I' and if all parts thereof should possess separate consciousness, then there would appear several conscious beings in one and the same body; and there would be perpetual disputes between one part and another. But we see that there is only one conscious subject and that the parts have absolutely no quarrel among themselves. Moreover, in respect of those parts, the notion of self and the corresponding expressions, namely, " mine " *my* hand, *my* leg ", etc. would, in that case, be inconsistent as they imply a possessor and a limb possessed by him. If you should grant consciousness only to one of such limbs or parts and say that it is the 'I', in the event of any part being deprived, the other parts should not remember the previous experiences relating to that part, and if the 'I' related to the part deprived, it must cease to exist, and the idea and expression 'I' should terminate in consequence. Moreover, the experience of pleasure or pain all over the body, even in the absence of that particular part, would be inexplicable, for there is no 'I' to experience the pleasure or pain. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the body is not the 'I' or the soul.

The external senses cannot be the 'I' or the self, for one agent alone, different from the others, cognises the objects of these senses. None of these senses can be the

'I'. In common parlance we say, 'I saw' and not the eye saw ? The later recognition, namely, I, the person who saw this object some years before, now sees it, should not be experienced. If the sense of sight were the 'I', the person who became blind at a certain period of life should not remember colour or coloured objects, which had been experienced by him while his vision was full. If the organ of hearing were the 'I', the man who became deaf, should not remember the sounds experienced by him before he became deaf. And, similarly for the other senses, as there is no continuity of existence of the 'I' or self in those cases. Therefore, the sense organs cannot be the 'I'.

Nor can ahaṅkāra or the mind be the 'I' the self or the soul. For, the mind is used as an instrument by the agent or kartā for cognition of objects, means of perception, inference, etc. and for recognition or recollection of past experiences. You cannot say that the remembering agent is the mind itself, as there is no instrument for such agent, namely, the mind. Nor, can you say that it is both the agent and the instrument, for it is absurd to say so. If you say that something else is the instrument, what is that something else ? If it is any external sense, then a person losing it at a certain time should not remember the past experience relating to it. Therefore, ahaṅkāra or the mind cannot be the 'I'.

The prāṇas or the vital breaths cannot be the 'I', as they are a combination of parts, prāṇa, apāṇa, etc. each functioning in a separate manner. The arguments advanced against the body being the 'I' apply also here.

Nor can consciousness, jñāna or buddhi be the 'I'. For, our daily experience is that consciousness is momen-

tary and is the attribute of the 'I'. We say: 'I lost consciousness and regained the same half an hour later.' That the 'I' or self, unlike consciousness, is a permanent and abiding entity will be seen from our experience of re-cognition, such as: I, the person who saw this ten years ago, do not see the same thing again now.

For the above reasons, the self is different from the body, sense-organs, mind, breaths and consciousness which are cognised as being different from the 'I', as 'mine', my body, my sense-organ, my mind, my breath, my consciousness etc. For, the possessor is different from the object possessed, i.e., 'I' is different from 'mine'. Likewise, they are all cognised as *parāk*, 'this' 'that', unlike the self which is cognised as *pratyāk* i.e. 'I'. We say *this* body, *this* organ etc., as distinguished from 'I' or self. Moreover, the body and other things are cognised sometimes and are not cognised at other times, while the self is cognised at all times. That is to say, in waking state, the body etc., are cognised as if they are identical with the self as when we say 'I have become stout', 'I have become lean', etc. But they are never cognised in perfectly dreamless sleep called *suṣupti*. The 'I' or self, on the contrary, is cognised always, even in deep sleep or *suṣupti*. Waking after sound sleep, we say "I, who cognised all these things before going to sleep, did not know them during sleep, not even my body." The conclusion is, that the 'I' is different from the body. Likewise, the sense-organs of sight, hearing, etc., are not cognised during blindness and deafness. The mind is not cognised during swoon etc. Similarly, the breaths. And likewise, consciousness which is manifest during cognition of object at one time, does not appear at other times. We say: 'My eyes and ears were very powerful before, but now, I have become blind and deaf;

my mind was very clear and active before, but now, it is almost a blank.' 'I was breathless for some time, and now, I have recovered.' 'I had knowledge before, but now all that has vanished.' From the above experiences of ours, we have to conclude that the body and other things are cognised only sometimes, but are not cognised at other times. But the self, on the other hand, manifests itself at all times. The non-self appears as 'this'. The demonstrative, 'this', is used to denote the objective world and objects around us. 'I' on the other hand, denotes the subject. The cit appears as 'I'. The characteristics of the 'I' and those of 'this' are different. Sankara in the beginning of his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya says: "The 'self' is connoted by *asmāt*, i.e. 'I' and the non-self, by *yuṣmat*, 'this'. The self is the cogniser and the non-self is the cognised. Both are opposed to each other like light and darkness. Therefore, one cannot be the other. *A fortiori*, the characteristics of the one cannot be those of the other."¹ What varies not, nor changes, in the midst of things that vary and change is different from them. Thousands of scriptural texts teach us that the self which persists unchanged and as one, through all the diverse changes of the material body and its surroundings, is different from them all.

2. The cit or self is ajada or self-luminous.

The self illuminates itself without the medium of consciousness. It is said to be *svayamprakāśa* as opposed to *jaḍa*. In thick darkness you are not able to see the books and pencils placed on your table. The books and pencils do not shine forth for you; they do not manifest themselves to you. If you bring a lamp, its light makes

1. युष्मदस्मन्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः विषयविषयिणोः तमःप्रकाशकत्वं विरुद्धस्वभावयोः
इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायां तदमणित्वमपि सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः ।

them appear to you. The books and pencils thus depend upon the light for their appearance. They are, therefore, objects depending on other things for our cognising them. The lamp-light does not require any other light or any other object for our cognising it. The lamp-light not only makes other objects such as books, etc., manifest themselves to us, but, at the same time, it manifests itself to us without any medium. This analogy may, to a certain extent, help us to understand the expression *svayamprakāsa* or self-luminous object. Only 'to a certain extent', for the analogy is not quite apt and is not on all fours, because, the lamp-light or, for that matter, any visible worldly object is not *svayamprakāsa*. Sāstras say that the self, the Supreme Being and the Divine world, *aprākṛtaloka*, are the only *svayamprakāsa* objects. Strictly speaking, even a lighted lamp does not possess illuminating quality, for its light does not make objects manifest themselves. In every instance, it is our consciousness, *jñāna*, that makes objects appear to us. In spite of the presence of the lamp-light, the objects will not appear to us in the absence of *jñāna* or consciousness. Even the senses do not illumine objects. The senses only cause the origination of consciousness. The function of the brilliant light, such as that of an electric lamp, is only to help the senses which originate consciousness, by removing the obstacle for such origination, namely, darkness. In ordinary parlance, we say that a lamp illumines objects having regard to the help rendered to the organ of sight in the production of consciousness. Merely because the light removes the obstacle for the origination of consciousness, it cannot be said to illumine the object. That which is really conducive to *vyavahāra* or talk, does illumine objects, and that is, *jñāna* or consciousness. Therefore, consciousness alone illumines objects. Mere light does

not illumine objects. 'Therefore, light is not, strictly speaking, luminous; and much less, is it self-luminous. We shall deal with the attribute-consciousness at length later on. The self does not require even this attribute-consciousness for its illumination. It illumines itself. Therefore, the self is said to be self-luminous. The upaniṣad says: "The puruṣa or self is self-luminous."¹ We have already seen that the existence of the self is self-evident even in deep sleep.

3. The cit is anandarupa

Happiness, bliss, pleasure or delight is the essence of the self. It is *sukharūpa*. The words, *sukha* and *ānanda* are synonymous. The definition of happiness or bliss is given by Sāstrakāras as follows: Happiness is the object of a desire which does not depend upon any other desire. What is experienced as favourable to oneself is happiness or pleasure, as opposed to pain or misery which is experienced as being unpleasant or unfavourable to oneself. Happiness or favourable experience is desired for its own sake and not as a means for another desired end or for the removal of an unpleasant or unfavourable experience.² Let me explain this. Take a man who is walking fast in the hot sun. Why does he walk so fast? Is it pleasant for him? No, it is very painful to him. Nevertheless, he desires to walk fast. Why? Because he desires to reach his office in time. Why does he desire to reach his office in time? This desire depends on his desire to please his superior officer. Why should he desire to please his superior? Because he desires to continue in his appointment. The desire to hold the appointment

1. अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिः ।—Br. Up.

2. "इतरेच्छानधीनेच्छादिव्यक्तं सुखस्य लक्षणं अनुकूलतया वेदनीयं सुखं अनुकूलत्वं स्वतः इष्टत्वं नतु इष्टान्तरहेतुतया अनिष्टनिवृत्तिरूपतया वा इष्टत्वम् ।

depends on his desire to get his monthly salary. That again depends on his desire to get food-stuffs and other articles of necessity. Why does he desire to eat? Because he desires to satisfy his hunger. Why should he desire to satisfy his hunger? Because he desires to be free from the pain of hunger and to be happy. Why does he desire happiness? He desires happiness not for any other end but for its own sake. The desire to be happy is, therefore, the ultimate desire or motive power which goads him on to action. There is no further question why does he desire to be happy. Happiness, therefore, is the object of a desire which does not depend upon any other desire. In the same way, you call a doctor to get freed from your pain. Freedom from pain is not by itself pleasant or favourable experience. It is only a negative aspect. You want to get rid of pain because it is unfavourable experience. Freedom from pain is, by itself, neither favourably experienced nor unfavourably experienced. It is the state of being in *swarūpa* in its own nature. Action and other things which are not themselves happiness are not therefore pleasant or favourable experiences. Merely because action, effort or activity is intended for the achievement of happiness, it is not pleasant or favourable; but on the contrary such action is indeed unpleasant or unfavourable. Only because such action is conducive to happiness, it is desired to be undertaken, not otherwise.

The nature and essence of the self or *ātman* is bliss. The self itself will bear testimony to this fact.¹ In the embodied state, the *ātman* cannot appear in his true colours. His nature is concealed by his karma called *avidyā*. In the state of *mukti* or release, the self will

1. स्वात्मा स्वस्यानुकूले हीत्यात्म साक्षिक एव सः ॥

appear in its true colours. When the screen of karma is removed, the self shines forth in its true nature. No new qualities or attributes are acquired in the state of release. Only the temporary bad attributes acquired as a result of karma, disappear in that state. Omniscience, bliss and other qualities will shine forth in the state of release. Saunaka says : “ When an all-shining gem of purest ray is covered all over with dust and dirt, we only remove the dust and dirt ; but we do not create or produce any lustre in the gem. In the same way, no new knowledge is produced in the ātman, except the disappearance of the bad qualities which enwrapped it before. When we dig a well, we do not create any ether ; what is already there only manifests itself. In the same way, knowledge, bliss and other qualities only manifest themselves, but are not created ; for those qualities are eternal.”¹

Even in the embodied state, we can assert, the nature of ātman is happiness. Let us examine our experiences. When we wake up from deep sleep, we say “ I slept happily.” This is the experience of every one of us. The reason is that in deep sleep we have no experience of objects other than the ‘ self ’ i.e. we have no external experience. The self alone is experienced by itself. Therefore, the blissful state referred to by a person risen from sleep must be the *svarūpasukha*, or the blissful essence of the ātman itself. The sentence, ‘ I slept happily ’, cannot mean ‘ I slept in such a way that I feel happiness now, in my waking state.’ For, our

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1. यथा न क्रियतेज्योत्स्नामलप्रक्षालनान्मणेः । दोषप्रहाणाञ्जलानमात्मनः क्रियते
तथा ॥ यथोदपानकरणात् क्रियते न जलाम्बरम् । सदेव नीयते व्यक्तिमसतः
संभवः कुतः ॥ तथा हेयगुणध्वंसादवबोधादयो गुणाः । प्रकाशन्ते न जन्यन्ते
नित्या एवात्मनो हि ते ॥ Viṣṇu Dharma.

experience is not so. When we say : 'I went slowly,' 'He sang sweetly', we evidently mean slowness in the very act of going, and sweetness in the very act of singing. We certainly do not mean that there is slowness after the act of going is over, or that there is sweetness after the act of singing is over. Likewise, when we say "I slept happily", we mean that there was happiness in the very act of sleeping.

If really, the self cognises itself in deep sleep and enjoys happiness, how do you explain one's experience such as, "During these four hours of my sleep, I did not know anything at all."? The answer is, in that statement, the cognition of everything is not denied. The knower, the conscious self, is not denied as it persists throughout. What is really denied is the experience of the objective world. Then, how do you explain our experience and consequent expression of it such as 'During these hours I knew not anything, not even myself.'? Is the cognition of the self also denied in that statement? Since the self or knower persists in sleep, the svarūpa of the self, i.e., the entity namely the self, is not denied therein. What is really denied is the group of adjuncts or attributes of the self, cognised in the waking state, namely, caste, creed and other things. We have to scrutinise and analyse the concepts comprised in the judgment : "I knew not myself". By 'myself' is meant the collection of adjuncts of the self, namely, caste, creed, etc., cognised in the waking state. By 'I' is meant the self, known to abide and persist throughout even in deep sleep, but vaguely cognised for want of materials the presence of which would make the cognition vivid in the waking state.

The self persists even after *mukti* or release and is cognised as 'I', as it is self-luminous. If the self is not

favourable or pleasant, we should not love it. The love of self is patent and natural for all beings. Since the ātman or self is wonderfully blissful by nature, Lord Krishna refers to the nature of ātman to Arjuna: "A certain person sees this (soul) full of wonder; in the same manner, another also speaks of it as full of wonder; again, another hears of it as full of wonder"¹. The Lord extols the individual soul by declaring that persons competent to comprehend its real nature are but few. Since the soul is not perceivable by any of the means by which ordinary objects around us are perceived and since its characteristics are different from those of worldly objects, and are therefore not conceivable like them, it is full of wonder. Among millions of persons, a rare individual of great merit sees this wonderful self. Such a rare person alone tells others about it. And likewise, a rare person hears it, and a person rarer still, rightly understands it. In the first place, the seer of the self as distinct from the body is rare; and, need we say, a person who sees correctly is rarer still? Among the correct seers, he who truly describes it is rare; and a person who can speak about all the mysteries of the self is rarer. Even if we can find such a speaker, a person who will listen to him is very rare; and a person with all the qualities of a true disciple eager to listen to such teaching is rarer still. The nature of self, thus, is bliss and intelligence. Therefore, the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, that the ātman is jaḍa or a non-luminous substance, stands condemned.

1. आश्चर्यवत् पश्यति कश्चिदेन आश्चर्यवद्ब्रूयति तथैव चान्यः ।

आश्चर्यवच्चेन मन्यः शृणोति श्रुत्वाप्येन वेद न चैव कश्चित् ॥ (B.G. II. 29)

4. The self or ātman is eternal

Speaking of the ātman or self, the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad says: "It is the best of the eternal substances and the best of conscious subjects."¹ The Gītā says: "Know the self or ātman to be eternal. The whole cosmos of material objects is pervaded by the collection of jīvas or ātmans. Since the ātmans pervade their respective material objects, and are therefore subtler than the substances pervaded by them, they are incapable of being destroyed by any other substance."² For, other substances which are pervaded by the jīvas like the oil in sesame and like fire in a species of wood, are gross and cannot therefore destroy the jīvas. The destroyer, i.e., the destroying substance such as sword, water, fire, wind, first pervades the object to be destroyed and then destroys it. Instruments like a pestle, axe, and so on, create wind by their vehement force and, through the wind, destroy objects. The mere contact of the pestle with an earthen jar does not destroy the jar, as otherwise the jar when merely placed upon the pestle should be destroyed. Nor does force alone destroy it. The force of the pestle without its contact with the jar should then cause destruction of the jar. Nor does force and contact combined, cause destruction. In that case, vehement force of grass and contact should cause destruction. Nor does that contact of a particular object having strong force cause destruction; for we see that the contact of the other end, i.e. the wooden end of the pestle or axe does not cause destruction. Therefore, the contact with the particular end of the hard substance

1. नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानां ।

2. अविनाशि दुः तद्विद्धि येन सर्वमिदं ततम् । विनाशमव्ययस्यास्य न कश्चित् कर्तु-
मर्हति । (B.G. 2-17)

moved by vehement force, causes the destruction. The creation of a violent gust of wind is within our experience. That the wind enters into substances like jar, plank etc. and destroys them must thus be admitted. Compared with the jar, etc., the wind is subtle. As there is no substance subtler than the ātman, the ātman cannot be destroyed.

“The jīva is not born. He doest not die”¹ If the jīva is eternal, why is it said to be born and die in other texts such as, “The Creator created jīvas.”² “Whence these creatures are born, by which the creatures are enlivened.”³ The answer is that birth means becoming embodied, and death means being disembodied. According to Śaṅkara, the jīva is, in reality, identical and as such, co-eternal, with Brahman. What is meant by origination is merely the soul’s connection with its limiting adjuncts, and that connection, moreover, is illusory. According to Rāmānuja, the jīva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman eternally as an individual being and as a mode (prakāra) of Brahman. So, indeed, the material elements also. Yet, there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the jīva. Prior to creation, the material elements existed in a subtle condition in which they possessed none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience. Hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to

1. न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित् । Katha. Up.

2. प्रजापतिः प्रजा असृजत् । (Yajurveda 8-2-2)

3. यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि जीवन्ति । Taitt., Up.

originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential quality i.e. that they are cognizing agents. Only at each period of creation after a deluge, they are associated with bodies. and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikāsa) from the contracted state (saṅkōcha) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya (deluge). But this change is not a change of essential nature (svarūpa-anyathābhāva) and hence, we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities, from the material elements which, at the time of each creation and absorption, change their essential characteristics.

It may then be asked, if the jīvas are eternal and had existed before the 'creation of this universe, are the statements such as, "‘Sat’ alone was in the beginning” inconsistent? No. What is meant by ‘alone’ there, is this. This world which, now, owing to distinction of names and forms, bears a manifold shape, was in the beginning one only owing to absence of the distinction of names and forms.

If the eternity and immortality of the soul is not admitted, a difficult question arises which it is impossible to answer. Why should one soul suffer from birth to death all the possible miseries, while another soul is comparatively happy throughout? Why should some good men, with all merit to their credit, suffer in life, while some sinful men are comparatively happy throughout? Why should those wicked men escape punishment for their sins? How can these inequities in life be accounted for? If God created these inequities by freak or caprice, He must be deemed to be partial and irrational,

which He is not. Some basis for God to act upon must be granted, and this basis is karma. As a result of past actions, good or bad, a particular jīva is happy or miserable now. The past actions may relate to the immediately preceding birth or other previous births. We have therefore to admit immortality, for, we are otherwise driven to this absurdity, namely, that one soul reaps what he does not sow and that another soul does not reap what he sows.

Christian philosophy does not recognise eternity or transmigration of souls. There must be an incentive for a man to do good actions. The law of causation is of universal application. There must be a cause for every effect. The sufferings of some men and the happiness of others which we see in actual life, must be traced to some cause. You cannot trace them to God, for He is rational and impartial. To explain these iniquities in life as mere accidents does not satisfy our reason, for, it is against the law of causation. By the word, chance or accident, is meant only our ignorance of cause and effect. In our daily experience we see that several actions, good or bad, do not bear fruit in this life. We are not certain if they will bear fruit at all in this life. Owing to this uncertainty men may not do good actions, but may do bad actions, for, there is no incentive for them to do good only and to refrain from evil deeds. The charge levelled against Sāṅskṛit dramaturgy and the canons thereof by Western critics is that there are no tragedies among Sāṅskṛit dramas, as there are in English like 'King Lear', 'Othello' and others. What they call a defect in Sāṅskṛit dramas is really a merit. King Lear and other *dramatis personae* are made to suffer for no fault of theirs. Cordelia, a dutiful and ideal wife does not reap the

the fact is made to meet the fate of her
mother's spouse. What justification is
afforded to these dramatic personae?
by arguing that he has
lived to ideal life, and that
Hanskrit dramas, since
personae suffering for
ideal than Shakespeare has depicted
any in his tragedies. But how can
we draw any lesson to those
who suffer for no
moral taught to us by their
incidents of one single
life only, but the sufferings
never conceived of a
single life and the
background. But the
whole truth.
A single
moment of time and in the
Hanskrit drama-
to ignore the law of
moral truths. Since
this life has necessarily to
be depicted in a drama, and since
it can be connected as cause
in a drama for the purpose
truth, such as we must strive

for prosperous ends like Rāma, and not for a calamitous end like Itavama",¹ tragedies are purposely avoided in Sanskrit dramaturgy. The moral taught must serve as an incentive to do good actions. No such moral truth is taught by the Shakespearean tragedies and no incentive is created in the minds of readers or audience when those tragedies are read or staged. The Sanskrit dramas are free from this defect and possess the merit absent in English tragedy. The law of causation about our miseries and happiness is beautifully expressed in a couplet intended to inculcate the virtue of giving alms to the poor. "Know that a mendicant who goes from door to door to beg for alms really goes to every householder for the purpose of teaching him a moral lesson." The lesson which he teaches is this: "Do not become like myself a beggar, but try to become like yourself by giving alms." The beggar is deemed to say to the householder: "I did not give alms to anybody in my previous birth though I was able to do so. The result is, I am born a beggar in this life. On the other hand, you are now in a position to give alms to the poor; make use of this opportunity to give alms to the poor, so that you may be born again rich enough to help the poor." This simple couplet is intended to create an incentive for doing good actions the fruit of which we shall positively reap in the succeeding birth. From the above observations, we are driven to the necessity of granting the continuity of the existence of the soul, its immortality and its transmigration.

1. "मादिक इत्येवमेव प्रवर्तितव्यं न तु रावणादिवदनिष्टसाधने ।

2. अहं अहं अहं मिथुः शिष्यत्वेन न याचते । अदत्त्वा मादृशो माम् दत्त्वा त्वं शिष्यो भव ॥

5. The soul is atomic in size.

The soul is a monadic entity. The seat of the jīva is the *hridaya*, the heart. “The jīva is seated in the heart and there are one hundred and one nādis or arteries there.”¹ “There is jīva in the heart of every being, man, beast and other creatures.” Since scriptures speak about the departure, going and returning of the souls,² the soul is not all-pervading, but it is minute in size. It departs at the time of death, from the eye, head or from any other part of the body. Starting from this world, the jīva goes to the region of the moon and then comes back to the world of ours for doing karma. If it were all-pervading, the above-mentioned journey, to and fro, of the soul would be inconsistent and meaningless. Scriptures, moreover, specifically declare that the jīva is *anu* or atomic in size.³ “We have to understand the jīva as a part of the hundredth part of the point of hair divided a hundred times.”⁴

Śankara and Rāmānuja hold diametrically opposite views on this point. In spite of specific scriptural texts, Śankara holds that the jīva is *vibhu* or all-pervading. One *adhikaraṇa* of Vyāsa’s *Brahmasūtra* treats about this question. In Śankara’s opinion, the preceding sūtras 19 to 28 in this *adhikaraṇa* represent the *pūrvapaksha* or *prima facie* view, according to which the jīva is *anu* or minute in

1. हृदि ह्येवायमात्मा तत्रैकशतं नाडीनां । Prasnopanishad.
हृदि सर्वस्य विष्ठितं (B.G. 13-17) स वा एष आत्मा हृदि । Ch.Up. 8-3.3
योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः । Brih. Up. 6.3.7.
2. उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनां Br. Sūt. 2-3-20.
3. एषोऽणुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यः । Mun. Up. 3.1-9.
स्वरूपमणुमात्रस्यान् । Vishvaksena samhita.
4. कालप्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च । भागो जीवस्स विज्ञेयः ।
Sv. Up. 2-5-9.

size, while sūtra 29, formulates the siddhānta or the conclusion namely, that the jīva, which is a reality, is all-pervading, but is spoken of as aṇu in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ, buddhi, which itself is aṇu, constitute the essence of the jīva as long as the latter is entangled in saṃsāra. Says Sankara: "We must not hold that the ātma is aṇu. Since the origination of the jīva is not stated anywhere, since Brahman is said to enter into the jīva, and since the Brahman and jīva are said to be identical in expressions of co-ordination, such as 'Thou art Brahman', the jīva is Brahman itself. Therefore, the size of the jīva must be the size of Brahman. As Brahman is said to be all-pervading, the jīva must also be all-pervading. Why, then, do scriptural texts say that he is aṇu? Because, the qualities of the internal organ, buddhi, constitute the essence of the jīva. Its qualities are desire, aversion, pleasure, pain and others, while it is in saṃsāra. The size of buddhi which is aṇu or minute, is imposed on the jīva. The departure, going and returning of the buddhi, are also imposed on the jīva but really they do not belong to him."¹ But, according to Rāmānuja, the first sūtra of the adhikaraṇa (sūtra 19) lays down the siddhānta view according to which, the soul is of minute

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1. नैतदस्ति अणुः आत्मेति परमेव ब्रह्मजीव इत्युक्तं । तस्मात् यावत् परं ब्रह्म तावानेव जीवो भवितुमर्हति । परस्य ब्रह्मणो विभुत्वमाप्नातं तस्मात् विभुर्जीवः । कथं तर्हि अणुत्वादिव्यपदेशः ? तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्व्यपदेशः । तस्याः बुद्धेः गुणाः तद्गुणाः । इच्छाद्वेषः सुखं दुःखं इत्येवमादयः तद्गुणाः सारः प्रधानं यस्यात्मनः संसारित्वे संभवति सः तद्गुणसारः तस्य भावः तद्गुणसारत्वं । न हि बुद्धेर्गुणैर्विना केवलस्य आत्मनः संसारित्वमस्ति । तस्मात् तद्गुणसारत्वात् बुद्धिपरिमाणेनास्य परिमाणव्यपदेशः । तदुक्तान्त्यादिभिश्चास्योक्तान्त्यादि व्यपदेशः न स्वतः ॥ Sankara's Commentary on Br. Sut.—Jñādhikarāṇa. 2-3-19.

size, and sūtras 20 to 25 confirm that view and refute the objections raised against it. In regard to Śankara's view, what strikes one most is the unusual length to which a mere pūrvapaksha view is carried, the view which, after all, has to be rejected in the end. Rāmānuja's view faithfully follows the scriptural texts and sūtras. According to Rāmānuja, the discussion about the size of the jīva ends with sūtra 26 of this adhikaraṇa, and from sūtra 27 onwards another discussion, namely, whether the self or ātman is mere intelligence or the abode of intelligence, is started. Rāmānuja gives an entirely different meaning to sūtra 29 referred to above. The *prima facie* view, that the jīva is mere intelligence, not an intelligent agent, based on texts such as "He who resides in vijñāna or intelligence", "Vijñāna performs sacrifice", "The substance jñāna, pure and bright" is refuted in sūtra 29. Says Rāmānuja: "Since vijñāna or intelligence constitutes the essence of the jīva, the jīva is spoken of as vijñāna or intelligence. Just as prajāña or God is spoken of in some scriptural texts as bliss or intelligence on account of the fact that bliss constitutes His very essence, so also, the jīva is described as 'intelligence' as intelligence constitutes his essence."

1. यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन् । विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते । ज्ञानस्वरूपमत्यन्तनिर्मलम् ।

2. "तद्गुणसारत्वात् तु तद्व्यपवेशः प्राज्ञवत्" । तद्गुणसारत्वात्-विज्ञानगुणसारत्वान् आत्मनो विज्ञानमिति व्यपदेशः । विज्ञानमेवास्य सारभूतो गुणः यथा प्राज्ञस्यानन्दः सारभूतगुणः इति प्राज्ञः आनन्दशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते—“यदेव आनन्दो न स्यात्”, “आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्” इति । प्राज्ञस्य हि आनन्दस्सारभूतो गुणः “स एको ब्रह्मणः-आनन्दः” “आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न विभेति कुतश्चन” इति । यथा वा “सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म” इति विपरिक्तः प्राज्ञस्य ज्ञानशब्देन व्यपदेशः “सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता” “यत्सर्वज्ञः” इत्यादिषु प्राज्ञस्त्व ज्ञानं सारभूतो गुणः इति विज्ञायते ॥ Ramanuja's Sri Bhashya on Br. Sut. 2-3-19 et. seq.

It may be asked : if the jīva is aṇu or minute in size and is seated in the heart of the body, how can it experience pain or pleasure in other parts of the body? We say: I have pain in my head, I have pain in the leg, etc. How can this be accounted for? The answer is as follows. Although the individual soul is minute in size, its attribute, namely, knowledge or consciousness, is infinitely extendable or pervasive, just like a source of light spreading its light all through space, and just like the fragrance of a drop of sandal ointment, though applied to a particular portion only, spreads all over the body and refreshes it. The jīva is, like the sun, a diamond or a lighted lamp, fixed to a particular place. The knowledge of the jīva is like light or rays radiating therefrom. Like the diverging rays of light belonging to a particular source the knowledge of the soul pervades outside the object of which such knowledge is an attribute.

It may again be asked : If the jīva is minute in size, how do you account for texts such as: "By whom all these things are pervaded"¹ which refer to the individual soul? To avoid conflict with specific scriptural texts and the sūtras which establish the minute size of the jīva, we have to interpret those passages in one or other of the three following ways, namely, (1) the jīvas collectively pervade the material objects collectively, or (2) each soul is pervading everything through its consciousness which is its attribute, or (3) each soul is capable of penetrating other substances as it is subtler than they. That the soul

1. येन सर्वमिदं ततम् । B. G. 2-17.

सर्वमावृत्य तिष्ठति । B. G. 13-13.

experiences pleasure and pain all over the body, through the all-pervading knowledge or consciousness is described thus: "By means of that consciousness, called, *dharma-bhūtajñāna* or attribute-consciousness, the soul, by developing its yogic powers, is able to assume several bodies".¹ By means of his yogic powers, sage Saubhari is said to have assumed fifty bodies simultaneously for the sake of fifty wives. The soul of Saubhari pervaded all the fifty bodies through his consciousness.

The ārhats or Jains maintain that the soul does not possess any definite size but that it assumes the size of the body which it enters, be it the body of a man, elephant, bird, ant or any other creature, as otherwise, we cannot explain our experiences, that we feel pain in the leg, pleasure in the head, and so on. This view is untenable as it conflicts with scriptural texts and śrutis which declare that the soul is immutable and that it is, by nature, minute in size. Moreover, in the case of yogins like Saubhari, who, by their yogic powers, assume several bodies at the same time, the indivisible soul would have to be split into several parts to enable each part to enter into each body. And, further, when a soul embodied in an elephant's body, assumes an ant's body, in the following birth as an effect of karma, the soul of the elephant's size cannot contract itself into that of an ant's size, and so, only a small portion of the soul would have to enter the ant's body casting off the major portion.

6. The Atman is avyakta or imperceptible.

The soul cannot be cognised by those means of knowledge by which the body, jars and other objects capable of being cut or destroyed, are cognised. But it

1. प्रज्ञया वाचं समाख्य वाचा सर्वाणि नामान्याप्नोति ।

प्रज्ञया शरीरं समाख्य शरीरेण सुखदुःखे आप्नोति ॥ Kau.Up. 2-3-5. et. seq.

is cognised by itself, by the experience such as 'I know', as it is self-luminous. If you say that it is not cognisable at all, then the ātman would become *tuchha*, a nullity, like the horn of a horse. By means of śāstras we cognise the ātman as possessing the attributes of eternity, etc. The meaning of the word *vyakta* and *avyakta*, perceptible and imperceptible, is given as follows in the Moksha Dharma. "Whatever is cognisable by the senses is called *vyakta* or perceptible and whatever is beyond the reach of senses and is knowable only by other means is called *avyakta* or imperceptible." The soul can be cognised by the internal organ only but not by the external organs.

7. The atman is acintya, inconceivable.

The ātman cannot be conceived of as belonging to the same kind as acit or material substance. Since it is different in kind from objects capable of being cut, burnt and destroyed, it cannot be conceived of as possessing the qualities and characteristics peculiar to such material objects. If you should interpret the term 'inconceivable' as meaning not conceivable by any means at all, then that would revolt against scriptural texts which enjoin hearing, knowledge and contemplation in respect of the same, and such texts would become meaningless. Speaking about the jiva, Lord Krishna says "it is imperceptible and inconceivable" using the words in the above sense only.

8. The atman is niravayava, indivisible or partless.

The ātman is said to be only vijñānamaya or vijñāna-ghana. Intelligence constitutes its substance. The

1. इन्द्रियैः गृह्यते यद्यत् तत् व्यक्तमिति स्थितिः ।

अव्यक्तमिति विज्ञेयं लिङ्गप्रात्यमतीन्द्रियम् ॥

2. अव्यक्तोऽयमचिन्त्योऽयं - B.G. 2-25.

soul is never cognised as possessing several parts. The soul of minute size even while experiencing pleasure or pain in the various parts of the body, as when we say, "I have pain in the leg", "pleasure in the head", does not cognise itself as possessing several parts.¹ It experiences invariably as the cognising agent of its own body and other objects. The soul embodied in any kind of body is not anywhere recognised as having parts.² If really it possesses parts, it must be cognised as such at some time or other.

9. The *ātman* is *nirvikara*, changeless.

The *ātman* is changeless unlike *acit* or matter which is ever changing. The *ātman* is called *akshara* because it does not change. We have already observed while discussing about its eternity that the *ātman* does not undergo any change in its *svarūpa* or essential nature, but that its attribute-intelligence alone undergoes change, *saṅkocha-vikāsa*, contraction or expansion. The changeless nature of the *svarūpa* of *ātman* is meant here. Therefore, the *ātman* is incapable of being cut, burnt, drenched or dried, by weapon, fire, water or wind.³

10. The soul is the abode or substratum of consciousness.

Consciousness is an attribute which, through its own being, is capable of manifesting itself and its object to its substratum and is the cause of the *vyavahāra* of itself and those objects. It is a function of the ego or self which is *jñāna-svarūpa*, intelligence in essence. This consciousness is luminiferous and is called *attribute-jñāna*

1. cf एवं चात्मा कर्तृर्न्य । Br. Sut. 2-3-2.

2. cf. न च अनेकोपचयात्मकः आत्मोपलभ्यते । सर्वत्र देहे अहमिदं जानामीति देहस्य अन्यस्य च प्रमातृत्वा एकरूपेण उपलब्धेः ॥

3. अज्ज्ञेयोऽयमदाख्योऽयमज्ञेयोऽज्ञोऽय एव च ॥ B. G. 2-24, — 31

and must be distinguished from its substratum called svarūpajñāna or substantive intelligence. Take the example of a flame and its light. Both are luminous substances. But the flame is the substratum of its own light which is inseparable from it and which cannot independently exist without it but which can also extend outside the substratum. Similarly, the ego or the jīva is the substratum of consciousness which is inseparable from it and cannot exist independently of the ego or conscious self. Several scriptural texts such as "this jīva is the seer, hearer, taster, smeller, thinker, knower and doer"¹ declare that the self possesses consciousness as its attribute.

If you hold with the Buddhists and others that the ātman or self without being the substratum of consciousness is consciousness itself, then our experience must be 'I am consciousness', but not 'I am conscious', or 'I have consciousness'. The subject of experience is not consciousness, but a conscious subject who possesses consciousness as a means of functioning in the act of cognising objects. From our experience, therefore, we cannot deny the existence of consciousness as an attribute of the self.

It may be asked, if the soul is the abode of consciousness and not consciousness itself, why do Vedic texts such as, "He who resides in vijñāna or consciousness", "vijñāna performs sacrifice," "mass of intelligence really pure"² etc., describe the self as mere intelligence or jñāna? The answer is as follows: The soul is so described for two reasons, firstly because, the soul which is

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1. एष हि द्रष्टा श्रोता रसयिता घ्राता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञानात्मापुरुषः ।
 2. यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन् । विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते । ज्ञानस्वरूपमत्यन्तनिर्मलं परमार्थतः ।

the substratum of consciousness cognises itself independently of its attribute-consciousness that is, without the aid of its attribute which is also self-luminous. That is to say, in respect of cognition of *objects other than the self*, the self needs the help of its own attribute-consciousness as in the waking state; but in respect of cognition of *its own self*, it does not require the help of this attribute as in perfectly dreamless sleep. And secondly, because attribute-consciousness is the essential characteristic and distinguishing feature of the soul just as *prājña* or Brahman is described as *ānanda*, bliss and as *jñāna*, intelligence, merely for the reason that it possesses bliss and intelligence as its essential feature and distinguishing characteristic, so also, the individual soul is described as *vi-jñāna* or *jñānasvarūpa*, as mere intelligence.¹ Just as a cow bereft of either one horn or both horns, or bereft of a leg or ear is still said to be a cow because its essential and distinguishing characteristic or *gotvam*—(cowness if we may coin a word)—is permanent and persisting throughout in the object; in the same way, since consciousness persists in the soul as its permanent attribute, the individual soul is called *jñāna* or mere intelligence. Do we not say in English “Frailty! thy name is woman”, owing to the essential quality of weakness of resolution being peculiar to that sex? It may be asked again, if consciousness is the soul’s permanent attribute, how is it that there is no consciousness during deep sleep? The answer is, in the state of deep sleep and swoon, consciousness is present but it is only dormant as a result of karma. Take the example of the body of a man. The body consists of seven *dhātus* or constituent elements or essential ingredients, namely

1. तद्व्युत्पत्तिस्तत्त्वात् तद्व्यपदेशः प्रज्ञवत् । Br. Sut. 2-3-29.

blood, humour, flesh, fat, marrow, bone and semen. The last of the seven ingredients, namely, the virile power, does not manifest itself in childhood in the infantine body. So also consciousness though present, does not manifest in deep sleep and swoon. This point has been dealt with by Vyasa in his *Brahma sūtras*.¹

If we hold with the *Bauddhās*, *Kāpilās*, and *Sāṅkhyās*, that the soul is mere intelligence, or that it is all-pervading as *Kaṇāda* does, we cannot escape from another absurdity. The irresistible conclusion from their theory is that experience, which is synonymous with luminosity, is eternal, since it is the nature of *jñāna* or intelligence to be luminous. During the existence of *jñāna* or intelligence, as there is no cause for producing non-experience (*anupalabdhi*) other than *jñāna*, this *jñāna* itself must be deemed to be the cause for non-experience. And *jñāna* is always present. So, *jñāna* itself must be deemed to be the cause of both experience and non-experience at the same time.² This is absurd. If, to avoid this absurdity of *jñāna* causing two opposite results, you hold that it is the cause of experience alone or of non-experience alone, then there will be either experience only or non-experience only. And if we hold with *Kaṇāda* that the self is a *jaḍa*, non-luminous object, like a stone, and

1. cf. पुंस्त्वादेवत्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् । Br. Sut. 2-3-31.

2. ज्ञानात्मपक्षे तावत् ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशस्वभावत्वात् प्रकाशपर्यायोपलब्धेः नित्यत्वं प्रसक्तिरनिवार्या । ज्ञाने विद्यमानेति हेत्वन्तरेणानुपलब्धि जननायोगात् ज्ञानमेवानुपलब्धेरपि हेतुरित्यास्येयम् । ज्ञानस्य सर्वदा वर्तमानत्वात् सर्वदोभयप्रसक्तिः । अथ युगपत् विरुद्धकार्यजननायोगात् ज्ञानमुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योरन्यतरहेतुरास्थीयते तदाऽन्यतर नियमः स्यात् । सर्वगतत्वपक्षे, यथा ज्ञानात्मवादिनां तथैव हेतुजन्य ज्ञानवादिनोऽपि सर्वेषामात्मनां सर्वगतत्वे सर्वस्यात्ममनस्संयोगादेः हेतोः सर्वेषां साधारणत्वात् उक्तरीत्या तथैव प्रसक्तिः ॥ *Vedanta Dīpa of Ramanuja—II-3-32.*

is all-pervading, we are driven to the same absurdity. Since all souls are all-pervading, and since all materials and instruments required for the resultant consciousness, such as the contact of the soul with the mind and sense-objects, are always present, and since they are all common to all souls alike, our experience must be always present in all souls. There is no such absurdity in the Rāmānuja school. Since the soul is *anu* or atomic in size and resides in the individual body, the particular experience belongs only to the particular soul and not to others. Thus, we see that the soul is not the body as the atheists say, is not *jada* or non-luminous matter like a stone as Kaṇādas say, is not mere consciousness or intelligence as Bauddhas, Kāpilas and Sankhyās say, but it is *jñānasvarūpa* or substantive intelligence, *dharmi jñāna*, possessing at the same time attribute-intelligence *dharma jñāna* as its inherent attribute or characteristic.

When we say that the self is knower, *jñāta*, the necessary corollary therefrom is that the self is also the doer and enjoyer. The state of being a doer and enjoyer are only varieties of consciousness. Consciousness is the basis for discriminating good and evil, and the desire to adhere to good and to avoid evil is based on the self being the doer. It is the doer that can have the desire to do, and that desire to do is a kind of consciousness. Owing to the close connection of this desire, to the *kartṛtvam* or state of being a doer, the latter is said to be a kind of consciousness. Since every overt act or physical effort is the outcome of consciousness, desire, and determination or decision, (*jñāna-chikirsha-prayatna*), and since the effort qualifies the doer, the state of *kartṛtvam* being a doer is said to be a kind of consciousness.

The state of being an enjoyer, *bhoktṛtvam*, refers to the substratum of enjoyment, and enjoyment means consciousness of experiencing pleasure or pain. So, the state of being an enjoyer is also a kind of consciousness. As there is thus close connection between the states of being a doer and enjoyer, on the one hand, and consciousness on the other, the term 'knower' implies doer and enjoyer.

The view of the Sankhyas.

The Sāṅkhyas deny to the self or *puruṣa* doership or state of being a doer and attribute the same to *prakṛti* or matter. They argue as follows. They rely on Vedānta sayings such as: "The person who thinks that the self can hurt or kill and the person who thinks that the self can be hurt or killed, both of them know not, for the self neither hurts nor is hurt."¹ "In respect of acts done by the three *gunas*, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* of *prakṛti* or matter, the person or self being confounded by *ahankāra* i.e. by his erroneous identity with *prakṛti* or matter, (the term *ahankāra* means the *abhimāna* or identity of the self with the non-self) and therefore, being unable to know himself aright, thinks that he is the doer of acts of which the *gunas* are the doer. But the person who understands the *tatva* or truth, knows to discriminate the *gunas* and their workings, and is certain that these *gunas* do their respective acts. Hence he does not identify himself with *prakṛti*, i.e. he does not think that he is the doer."² "He

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1. हन्ता चेन्मन्यते हन्तुं हतश्चेत् मन्यते हतं । उभौ तौ न विजानीतः नायं हन्ति न हन्यते ॥ *Kāṭhā II-2-19*. Also see *B.G. 2,19*.
 2. प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः । अहंकारविमूढात्मा कर्ताऽहमिति मन्यते । तत्त्ववित् तु महाबाहो गुणकर्म विभागयोः । गुणा गुणेषु वर्तन्ते इति मत्वा न सज्जते ॥ *B. G. II-27-28*.

who knows that the doer is none else than prakṛti and understands the self differently, i.e. as non-doer, attains salvation"¹. "Prakṛti is the cause of the activities of the body and the senses, and the soul is the cause of the enjoyment of pleasure and pain."² These and similar texts assert that the self is the non-doer and that prakṛti alone is the doer and that the self is only the enjoyer and not the doer.

Refutation of Sankhyas's view.

This argument is unsound. For, if doership is denied to the self, then his obligation to the śāstras (i.e.) his being bound by the rules of śāstras, and the state of being an enjoyer as result thereof will disappear. The śāstras will, in that case, become meaningless. The śāstras enjoin on the would-be enjoyer certain duties, sacrifices or upāsanas, as the case may be, for the attainment of respective goals, svarga or moksha, the world of gods or final beatitude. If non-sentient matter were really the self, the doer, no injunction of any kind, positive or negative, can be enjoined on the self. The word *śāstra* is derived from the root, *Śās*, meaning that which teaches, informs, governs, corrects, advises.³ Enjoining means rousing to activity through making one understand. It is not possible to make the non-sentient or non-intelligent prakṛti, matter, understand anything. The śāstras can have any meaning only if the would-be enjoyer becomes a doer. The argument that the above

1. नान्यं गुणेभ्यः कर्तारं यदा दृश्यनुपपद्यति । गुणेभ्यश्च परं वेति मद्भावं सोऽधिगच्छति । (B. G. 14-19).

2. कार्यकारणकर्तृत्वे हेतुः प्रकृतिरुच्यते । पुरुषस्सुखदुःखानां भोक्तृत्वे हेतुरुच्यते ॥ (B. G. 13-20).

3. शासनात् शास्त्रं ।

sayings of Kathopanishad and the Gita teach that the self is not the doer, is faulty; for, the sayings only mean that the self cannot be hurt or killed as it is eternal. A soul can be a killer only if another soul is capable of being killed. As no soul is capable of being killed by virtue of its eternity, no soul can be a killer. The Gita stanzas mentioned above which seem to teach that prakṛti is the doer, do really mean that in respect of worldly activities, doership is the result of the intimate connection of the self with prakṛti, and that it (doership) is not natural to the self. An iron ball, for instance, does not burn your finger if you touch it. But if you heat the iron ball, it burns your finger, owing to its intimate connection with fire. Heat is not the natural property of iron but acquired by contact with fire. Similarly, doership is the acquired quality of the self owing to its close connection with prakṛti. While admitting doership for the self, the Gita says that since the body, the self, the senses, the five breaths and Destiny or God—all combined are the cause of the action of the self, the principal cause being the all-pervading omnipotent Being, controlling everything and the rest being only instruments, the person who thinks that the self alone is the doer, does not really understand the truth. We are thus forced to admit doership for the self as a corollary from consciousness.

Doership of the Self depends on God

Is this doership of the self independent or dependent on God? The Vedas declare that the doership of the soul is dependent on God.¹ The all-pervading universal Soul, Brahman, entering into the jivas controls their

1. परात् तच्छुतेः । Br. Sut. 2. 3-40.

action and inaction.¹ Lord Krishna also says in the Gita that Iśwara resides in the individual souls and His seat is in their hearts.² He controls the souls who are mounted on the machine of prakṛti, since consciousness, desire, and decision or determination which are the attributes of the soul depend on God for their very existence. Here an objection may be raised: if really, the doership of the jīva depends on God, the whole range of śāstras with positive and negative injunctions would become meaningless as the jīvas are not responsible for actions beyond their control, and it is absurd to foist responsibility on them for actions controlled by God. This objection is met by Bhagavān, Vyāsa in his sūtra. In all activities of the jīva, God having regard to the jīva's mental determination or decision, furthers the act by giving him sanction which means helping him in the furtherance of an act which has already been started by taking the first step.³ The second, third and further steps cannot be taken without God's sanction. Although other steps except the first, need God's sanction and furtherance, the person who takes the first step is alone responsible, and he alone reaps the fruit of the action, good or bad, but not the person who helps the other in the promotion of the activity. Take for example, the wealth owned by two persons in common. A gets the sanction of B and takes B's share of the money and buys with it presents to be given to the king. Pleased with the presents, the king showers favours on A alone. A alone reaps the fruit of the action, but not B who gave

1. अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा । Taitt. Aran.

य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् य आत्मान्मन्तरोयमयति । Bri. up. 5-7-22.

2. cf. B. G. 18-61.

3. कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः । Br. Sut 2-3-41.

him sanction to take away his share. Take another example. A father divides his self-acquired properties equally between his two sons who were paupers before. With this wealth given by their father, one son falls into evil ways and acquires sin while the other acquires virtue by doing good deeds. The ability in general to do good or evil, is given by their father by the grant of his wealth. Out of their own freewill the two sons use this ability differently. You don't hold the father responsible for their acts. In the same way, God has given all souls the power of intellect, the power of activity, and instruments such as body and organs without which no action is possible. Thus doership in general depends upon God, and doership with reference to individual acts also depends on God, as it needs the sanction of God for the furtherance of the prayatna, mental determination or decision for a desired end. Within this limited sphere the jiva is given independence, discretion and freewill and, therefore, he is bound by the rules of śāstras and becomes responsible for his actions. Here, by independence is meant the absence of any obstruction to his capacity to put forth activities as he likes. A person who needs the help of another in the commission of theft, and a person who needs the help of others in drawing a chariot with a deity on it, are bound by the laws of positive and negative injunctions and must reap the fruits of their respective actions. Since God gives sanction having regard to the freewill and decision of the soul in respect of an overt act, the responsibility of the act, good or bad, merit or sin, rests only on the soul. Lest śāstras should become meaningless it is said that God moves the soul to activity on the basis of his first mental effort to do the act. Since consciousness is common to all

souls, they are generally capable of action or non-action. God is within the jīva as its permeating spirit. And the jīva who derives his natural powers from God, has naturally, his consciousness, desire and decision, produced and directed towards various objects of the world. During that stage of the jīva's mental effort or decision, God is like an indifferent person. He remains neutral. In respect of the activity of the jīva obeying or disobeying the positive or negative injunctions of the śāstras—his activity in accordance with the previous inclination vāsana or impression remaining unconsciously in the mind due to past actions, good or bad,—God gives His sanction (*anumati*) if the action is good and is indifferent if the action is bad. If the act is good, God showers his favours and disfavours the doer if the action is bad. As a result of God's favour, otherwise called puṇya or merit, the jīva enjoys happiness; and as a result of His disfavour, otherwise called sin, pāpa, the jīva suffers misery.

It may here be asked: How can you reconcile this view with the Kauṣītiki text¹ which says "God makes that person do good acts whom He wants to lift up from these worlds; He makes that person do bad acts whom He wants to hurl down"? The answer is that these texts are not of universal application, but they apply only to special cases. If a jīva with intense devotion to God is determined to be extremely favourable to Him and accordingly directs his activities vehemently for good, then God favours him by Himself standing as a means for His own attainment, and by creating in the particular jīva a keen taste or acute desire for doing most auspicious deeds. But if a jīva with deter-

1. एषेद्यैवेनं साधुर्कर्म करयति यमेभ्यो लोकभ्य उन्निनीषति । एषेद्यैवेनं असाधुर्कर्म करयति यमघो निनीषति । Kau. Up. II. 14-15.

mination to be hostile to God, so directs his activities, then God will goad him on to those deeds which are positively against His own attainment and which are the surest means of retrogradation of the individual soul. This idea is expressed by Lord Krishna : "Knowing that I am the origin of all these things and that the activities of all are due to me, wise men worship me with intense longing."¹ "To those who, with great longing for union and communion with me, worship me, I gladly give good sense by means of which they approach me."² "By favouring them, I make myself the object of their consciousness, manifest my auspicious qualities to them, and by the torchlight of knowledge about me, I dispel the darkness, namely, acute attachment for sense objects due to previous acts or karma."³ "But the asurās deny that the cosmos is pervaded, permeated, supported and controlled by Me, the supreme Ātman. They also deny that the cosmos is created by me, and they say that except the intercourse of man and woman there is no other cause for the creation of man and other beings. There is no being visible to us born without such intercourse. Therefore, the whole world is the result of that organic craving called sexual appetite."⁴ "They hate Me—Me who am within their own bodies and also within the bodies of others. By sophistry they

1. अहं सर्वस्य प्रभवः मत्तः सर्वं प्रवर्तते ।

इति मत्वा भजन्ते मां बुधा भावसमन्विताः ॥ B. G. 10-8.

2. तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।

ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन माम् उपयान्ति ते ॥ Ibid-10-10.

3. तेषामेव अनुकम्पार्यं अहं अज्ञानजं तमः ।

नाशयाम्यात्मभावस्थः ज्ञानदीपेन भास्वता ॥ Ibid-10-11.

4. असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदादुरनीश्वरम् ।

अपरस्परवृभूतं किमन्यत्कामहैतुकम् ॥ Ibid 16-8.

deny my very existence, for they are envious of me. They are the worst of human beings. They hate me and they are cruel. Therefore I generate cruel ideas in them as a result of which they will direct their activities in bad ways and will be reborn taking only āsura births.”¹ The texts of Kauṣitaki upanishad, therefore, apply only to special cases of intense love or of intense hatred towards God. Thus we see that the mental determination or decision of the jiva and his first step for an overt act fixes him with responsibility for the act and the consequent liability to eat the fruit of his karma. In this way, the states of being a doer (doership) and enjoyer are necessary corollaries from the soul's possessing consciousness as its essential attribute.

Freewill and Determinism

This question of doership takes us on to the consideration of ‘Freewill’ and ‘Determinism’. The real scope of freewill and determinism is not properly understood by many people. They think that the two are diametrically opposed to each other. The followers of freewill school think that by our power of directing our own actions without any constraint by necessity or fate, we can surely avoid misery, get the desired happiness, and can shape our own future. The followers of determinism school, on the other hand, think that every action of ours and the result thereof is determined and controlled by a superior force or power called Fate or Destiny, that we have to do nothing but meekly to

1. अहंकारं बलं दर्पं कामं क्रोधं च संश्रिताः ।

मामात्मपरदेहेषु प्रद्विषन्तोऽभ्यसूयकाः ॥

तल्लहं द्विषतः क्रूरान् संसारेषु नराधमान् ।

क्षिपाम्यजस्रमशुमान् आसुरीज्ज्वेव योनिषु ॥ B. G. 16-18-19.

submit to whatever good or evil that comes to us and that we have no control over our actions. The tenets of both these schools are not the whole truth and are not therefore wholly correct. It is not correct to say that we can avoid every evil and can get all good in the future. With reference to a particular point of time there are our past actions which are bound to bear fruit in the future. We cannot escape the result of those past actions which must produce reactions. As we have already observed, the first part or mental determination or decision followed by further steps in the right or wrong direction, will certainly bear fruit, good or bad, in the future. We cannot escape the reaction. But regarding our future mental determination or decision, we can exercise our volition and can shape the future. Let me give you a simple illustration. Suppose a person is addicted to drink for five or six years. His drinking habit, continued during these years, produces two distinct results in him. One is a tendency, impression, inclination or craving (*samskāra* or *vāsana*) to drink again, produced in the soul through the mind. The other is the physical or physiological effect produced in the body, say, a certain disease which is incurable. By strong volition, he may eradicate the mental effect or tendency. By his strong determination he may overcome the bad tendency and one fine morning he may give up drinking once for all and for ever. Here freewill has its full scope and play. Freewill gets the better of the tendency and can completely annihilate it if the volition is sufficiently strong. But unfortunately, in spite of strong volition, it is not possible to overcome the incurable disease which has taken its root in the body by continued drinking, although by abstinence he can take care that the disease does not get worse. Here

determinism has its scope and play. That one should be a victim to the incurable disease is already determined by one's continued drinking. No amount of freewill can alter this 'determinism'. Similarly in the continuity of our existence, with several births and rebirths, tendencies of varying degrees, good or bad, are formed in our minds as the result of good or bad actions—tendencies which are really difficult to overcome. If, in obedience to your bad tendencies, you have done bad actions in the past, those bad actions will certainly produce reactions in you. You cannot escape them. The reaction will be manifest in our thousand miseries—poverty, disease, bereavement and so on, determined by our previous actions. The theory of determinism is correct in the sense that our inexorable miseries or happiness are determined by our past actions and that we cannot escape them. But determinism has no scope or play where a strong volition overcoming bad tendencies is exercised. If your volition is so strong as to overcome your powerful bad tendency, and if, in obedience to the dictates of your good conscience, you refrain from decision in the wrong direction, you can certainly avoid the evil or misery which would otherwise fall on you. It is in this sense that man is said to be the architect of his own future. Thus by the exercise of our freewill, we can mould our character and conduct, good or bad, which will determine our future.

We have thus seen that consciousness implies the states of being a doer and enjoyer.

Dreams

We have already observed that there is consciousness in dreams. One *adhikarana* of Vyāsa sutras (III-2 (1 to 6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. Considerably

diverging interpretations are given of this *adhikarana* by Śankara and Ramānuja. According to Śankara, the question is whether the creative activity ascribed to the jīva in some scriptural passages, such as—“During dreams there are no chariots, no horses, no roads, but He creates chariots, horses and roads”¹—whether such creative activity produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded or not? The third sūtra of this *adhikarana* is the *siddhānta sūtra* and settles the point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere ‘māyā’, unreal objects, since they do not fully manifest the character of real objects.’ But according to Ramānuja, the question is not whether the creations of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the individual soul or of the supreme soul, paramātman, acting within the individual soul. The *prima facie* view according to Ramānuja is as stated in sūtra 2 of this *adhikarana* that the creations of dreams are the work of the individual soul, for, scriptures declare so. The followers of some śākhās declare the soul to be a creator.’ But the *siddhānta sūtra* above referred to declares that the creations of dreams are real and māyā (i.e.) are of wonderful nature and therefore cannot be created by the individual soul, since in this life the nature of the soul and his powers are not fully manifested.

The word ‘māyā’ means ‘wonder’ as in the stanza of Rāmāyana: “Born in Janaka’s family as if the

1. स यत्र स्वप्निति न तत्र रथा न रथयोगाः न पत्न्यान् भवन्ति । अथ रथान् रथयोगान् पयः सृजते ॥ Bri. Up. VI.-3-10.

2. मायामात्रं तु कात्स्न्येन अनभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् ॥ Br. Sut. III.-2-3.

3. निर्मातारं चैके । Ibid. III-2-2.

4. माया शब्दो हि आश्चर्यवाची ।

wonderful power of God is personified.¹ We shall have to discuss in detail about the meaning of the word 'māyā' while dealing with prakṛti or matter. For the present, it will suffice to know that whatever is wonderful is denoted by the word 'māyā'. The wonder consists in the fact that the creations of dreams are experienced only by the dreaming soul and only as long as the dream lasts, as distinguished from other worldly objects. This wonderful creation cannot be the work of the jīva, but of the paramātmā or God only, who is able to achieve anything at will. Although the individual soul is also a satyasankalpa in his pure state (i.e.) state of liberation, yet his powers of creation are not manifested but are obscured in the state of bondage in the saṃsāra or material existence. By the will of God the real nature of the individual soul is concealed by the stream of bad karma or action flowing from unknown time. The bondage and release of the jīva are caused by the paramātmā. The creations of dreams are real and are made by God for the short experience of pain, pleasure, fear and other feelings commensurate with the small acts of virtue or sin, committed before. They are real for two reasons. Those feelings of pleasure, pain, fear etc. are really produced by God and they are real. Secondly, those feelings rouse us to some action. In pursuance of the fear, we suddenly get up and really run away with the lying body. Nocturnal emissions result from intercourse in dreams. The creations in dreams are such that the dreaming soul alone experiences them as the fruit of his own actions and that they last only as long as the dream lasts.

1. 'अनस्य कुले जाता देव मायेव निर्मिता' (Val. Ram. Balakanda, I-27)
इत्यादिषु तथा दर्शनात् ॥ Sri Bhashyam on Br. Sut. III-2-3.

There is a further reason for holding that the creations of dreams are not the work of the jiva. The images of a dream are produced by the Supreme Being and have therefore a prophetic significance.¹ Some dreams forebode good or evil. "If during acts performed for some desired end, a jiva sees a woman in his dream, he must know from this that he will get prosperity in the future; but if he sees a black man with black teeth, he must know that he is nearing his death."² If the creations of the dream are made by the individual soul, he would not create such things as will bring about his own ruin. As only good results are desired by him, he will create only such images as will foretell good. But bad dreams with bad prophetic significance are experienced in spite of us and against our desire. Therefore creations in dreams are beyond our control and are made by the Supreme Being only. It may be asked, how then do you account for the fact that the dreaming soul experiences with the body lying in a chamber, his long journey in distant parts of the world, sometimes his own coronation or even his being beheaded and other things? The answer is that in accordance with the soul's merit or demerit done in the past, God himself creates a body resembling the one lying in the chamber in all respects for the soul's enjoyment of the fruits of his past karma or deeds.

Deep sleep (susupti)

We have observed that consciousness is dormant in perfectly dreamless sleep. Although the resting place of

1. सूचकश्च हि श्रुतेः आचक्षते च तद्विदः ॥ Br. Sut. III-2-6.

2. यदा कर्मसु काम्येषु खियं स्वप्नेषु पश्यति सन्निधिं तत्र जानीयात् तस्मिन्स्वप्न निदर्शने । यः स्वप्ने पुरुषं कृष्णं कृष्णदन्तं च पश्यति । स एनं हन्ति ॥
Ch Up. 5-2-9.

the individual soul during deep sleep is variously described in various texts as the veins, pericardium or Brahman, there is really no conflict among them. Just as we make three statements—A is sleeping upstairs, A is sleeping on a cot, and A is sleeping on a velvet bed—and there is absolutely no conflict among them; in the same way, there is no conflict among the scriptural texts. The veins and the pericardium are like the upper storey and the cot. Brahman is like the bed. Therefore, the direct resting place for the jiva is Brahman. It may be argued that if really the resting place for the jiva in deep sleep is Brahman, then, having joined the Brahman the jiva is in no way different from a mukta or released soul and is therefore freed from his connection with his previous body, senses and so on, and hence he has become entirely different from what he was before going to sleep. This argument is met by Vyasa thus: 'The jiva is the same for four reasons, Karma, recollection, Śabda or scriptural texts and positive injunctions for the attainment of release.'

Firstly, the fruit of actions of merit or sin committed before sleep must be enjoyed afterwards by the individual soul until the acquirement of knowledge of tatwas or truths. Action cannot go without reaction.

Secondly, our experience of recognition and recollection such as, 'I who went to sleep early last night do now wake up only after sun-rise', proves the identity of the soul.

Thirdly, scriptural texts declare the identity of the person who went to sleep with the person who wakes up.

1. स एव तु कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्यः—Br. Sut. III-2-9,

Says the Upanishad "What the jīvā is before going to sleep, be he a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a hog, a worm, a bird, a gad-fly or a mosquito, that he becomes again after sleep."¹

And lastly, the injunctions which enjoin certain acts for the sake of final release would become purportless, if the soul merged in deep sleep, attained release. Therefore the jīva that goes to sleep, having put off all the instruments of knowledge which get very much tired, and being unable to understand or enjoy wordly objects in consequence, finds shelter in the paramātmā where he takes rest, gets refreshed and then wakes up again for further enjoyment.

Swoon (murcca)

The state of swoon is different from waking state, dreaming state and deep sleep. As there is no consciousness in swoon it is different from waking and dreaming state in which the soul has consciousness fully manifested. The cause of swoon is different from that of deep sleep, a severe stroke or attack or infliction of injury with some hard substance, etc. But the cause of deep sleep is only fatigue. Hence swoon is different from deep sleep. Swoon is also different from death; for death is total absence of all breaths from the body, but subtle breaths and heat are present in swoon. Heat and subtle breaths are absent in death. By the process of elimination, we have to conclude that swoon is half way to death².

1. त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा क्रीटो वा पतङ्गो वा दंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तथा भवन्ति । Ch. Up. VI-10-2.

2. cf. मुग्धेऽर्धसम्पत्तिः परिशेषात् । Br. Sut. III-2-10.

The soul is the relation of body to God.

The jiva or individual soul is the body of Iśwara who is its soul or life principle. Here a strong objection may be raised. It is against Vedantic texts, against our experience and against common sense to hold that the jiva is the body of Brahman. For, Brahman is said to be free from karma or action, old age, hunger, thirst, death and so on; but shining without enjoying the fruit of karma.¹ He is said to run fast and seize objects without legs and hands; to see without eyes, to hear without ears and so on; He is said to be devoid of mind and breaths.² Brahman is thus said to be without a body, senses, mind and breaths.³ So long as there is a body, you cannot escape experience of pleasure or pain.³ It is our common experience that we get pleasure when the dhatus (constitutional elements or essential ingredients) of the body are in a state of perfect equilibrium and that we get pain when that equilibrium is disturbed. Moreover, Brahman has no karma whose fruit He has to enjoy. And He does not enjoy objects of enjoyment through senses like us. He has no breaths like us. Therefore Brahman cannot possess a body like the individual soul. Neither the sentient jiva nor the non-sentient matter can be His body. For a body necessarily possesses senses; and to be a body, the individual soul must possess senses. But the soul has no senses. Therefore, the jiva cannot be the body of Brahman. If you hold that Brahman has a body, you cannot escape from the inevitable consequence that Brahman is liable to all the defects due to the possession

1. अपहृतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युः विशोक्ते विजिगत्सोऽपिमत्तः । Ch. Up. VIII-1.

2. अप्राणोद्यमनाः । Mun. Up. II-1-2.

3. न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति ॥

of a body. Neither the collection of gross matter like grass, block of wood or stone etc., nor the elements in their subtle state can be the abode of sense organs. The elements in their subtle state are not a collection of earth and other elements in the gross state which can constitute a body; they are not, therefore, the abode of senses. The soul which is homogeneous intelligence, can have none of these. *A fortiori*, it cannot be the body. You cannot define the body as the abode of enjoyment; for, houses and other objects which are the abode of enjoyment are not called bodies. And God, by nature of eternal and unsurpassed bliss, cannot depend for his enjoyment on matter or souls. By parity of reasoning, you cannot also define the body as a means of enjoyment. Nor can you define the body as that which depends on another's will for its existence, sustenance and activities and argue thereupon that since everything in the cosmos depends on God for its existence, sustenance and activities, everything constitutes his body. For what we know as bodies, such as human bodies or animal bodies, do not exist at the will of the individual. In spite of the individual's will to the contrary they are thrust on him. And in the case of bodies attacked by diseases such as paralysis and so on, their activities do not depend on their will. The individual is not able to control them. They do not obey him. And further, in the case of a dead body, its sustenance does not depend on the jiva which had tenanted it. Moreover, the definition is one of too wide application, as it will apply to dolls or puppets, whose existence, sustenance and activities depend on our will, and they will have to be called our bodies. It would be absurd to call them our bodies. Further, the soul which is eternal does not depend on the will of God for its existence. If it does, it ceases to be eternal. Therefore,

the soul and matter cannot be the body of God as otherwise, He would become tainted with their impurities.

Refutation of objections to body-soul relationship.

This argument is not sound. There is no harm in holding that God being the all-pervading soul, pervades also the individual soul which forms His body and that God is connected with the two states, subtle and gross (i.e.) cause and effect. For, the two states, namely, contraction and expansion really belong to the individual souls and matter which constitute his bodies. The impurities of the body do not attach themselves to the pervading soul, nor do the auspicious qualities of the supreme soul attach themselves to the body. Just as the qualities of our bodies, namely childhood, youth, old age, do not belong to the individual souls which tenant them and just as the qualities of the jīvas, namely, knowledge, happiness and so on, do not belong to the physical bodies, in the same way, the impurities of God's body (Cit) do not belong to the all-pervading spirit. When we use expressions such as, 'A man is born,' 'a beast is born,' 'a god is born,' he was a child before but now he has become an adult, an old man, etc.', we use them only in the primary sense, not in the secondary sense; for the states of being a god, a man, a beast etc. are attained by a jīva or kshetrajña already bound in a subtle body of elements. When a jīva casts off one gross body, he departs with subtle elements with which he is enwrapped, and then takes another gross body¹. The statement that there is great inconsistency in holding that everything,—matter and souls, gross or subtle,—forms the body of God, betrays one's ignorance of Vedantic texts and the rules of interpretation thereof; for all Vedanta texts assert that

1. cf. तदन्तःप्रतिपत्तौ रहति संपरिष्कृतः प्रश्ननिरूपणाभ्याम् । Br. Sut. III-1-1.

everything—matter and soul, gross or subtle—forms the body of paramātmā. The Brihadāranyaka says: “He who resides in the Earth, whose body is the Earth. He who resides in jīva...whose body is jīva”¹. All non-sentient matter such as Earth, water, fire, air, ether, the Sun, the Moon, stars, breaths, organ of speech, mind and other senses as well as the individual souls are separately enumerated and are said to be pervaded and controlled by Īśwara and are declared to constitute His body. Likewise the Subalopanishad says in the seventh kāṇḍa—“He who pervades the Earth, whose body is the Earth:” and enumerates the various non-sentient objects as well as the individual souls and asserts that “the spotless, supreme, divine Nārāyaṇa is the pervading life principle and that all of them form His body.”² In Rāmāyana, the four-headed Brahmā addressing Lord Rama says, “The whole universe is your body.”³ Parāśara says in his Viṣṇupurāṇa, “The whole cosmos is the body of Hari or Viṣṇu”⁴. The law-giver Manu in his Smṛti says, “God thought and wanted to create various kinds of beings from His own subtle body.”⁵ In the gloss to this stanza, Kullūkabhaṭṭa says, “The Brahman itself in its unmanifested state is the cause of the universe. The author

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1. यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् ... यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम् यः आत्मनि तिष्ठन् ... यस्य आत्मा शरीरम् । यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन् ... यस्य विज्ञानं शरीरम् ।
 2. यः पृथिवीमन्तरे सञ्चरन् यस्य पृथिवीशरीरं ... एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मन् । अपहृतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः । Sub. Up.
 3. जगत्सर्वं शरीरं ते । Ramayana-Yuddha Kāṇḍa-121-26.
 4. यदम्बुवेष्णवः कायः तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः । V.P. I-22-38.
तानि सर्वाणि तद्वपुः ॥ V.P.I-22-36.
 5. सोऽभिध्याय शरीरान् स्वात् सिद्ध्युः विविधाः प्रजाः ॥ M. Sm. I-8.

Manu seems to favour the doctrine of tridandī Vedāntins¹ (i. e.) the school of Viśiṣṭādwaita, as opposed to ekadandī Vedāntins. (The ascetics of Viśiṣṭādwaita school like Rāmānuja and his followers have three sticks knotted together as one of the emblems of the holy order as distinguished from those of adwaitins who have only one stick as such emblem). In the famous Sahasranāma adhyāya of Mahābhārata, it is said, 'I bow to Lord Viṣṇu whose body is the cosmos of three worlds'.²

The word 'body', unlike the words 'jar', 'pot', 'horse', etc. does not invariably denote an object of uniform shape, but denotes objects of utterly different shapes such as a worm, snake, bird, beast, man and so on and is used in the primary sense. The body may have two legs, or four legs, or several legs or no leg at all. One species of creatures differs totally from another species in shape and other respects. Therefore, the definition that we give to the word 'body' must be determined by the uniformity of the application thereof to the various heterogeneous objects above mentioned. If you define the body as that which is the cause of enjoyment of the fruits of karma or action, the definition will be one which is too narrow in application, that is to say, it is vitiated by the fault called avyāpti for, the definition is not applicable to the earth, water, fire and so on which are said to be the body of Iśwara. They are not the cause of the enjoyment of the fruits of Iśwara's karma and nevertheless, they are His body. Moreover, the definition does not apply to the bodies assumed at will

1. ब्रह्म अव्याकृत शक्त्यात्मना जगत्कारणमिति त्रिदण्डिवेदान्तसिद्धान्त एवामि-
मन्तः प्रतिभाति ॥ P. 6-Manu Smrithi, Nirnayasagar Press
Edn.

2. त्रिस्तुवनपुर्व विष्णुमीशं नमामि ॥

by God and to those assumed by *muktas* or liberated souls; for they are not bodies forced upon God or *muktas* for the purpose of enjoying the fruits of karma. The bodies assumed at will by *Iśwara* are not made of the collection of earth and other elements. Says the *Mahābhārata*: "The body assumed at will by God is not a collection of elements".¹ Therefore, the definition that a body is a collection of elements is one of too narrow application. And if you define the body as one sustained by the five breaths, taking your stand on texts such as—"Prāṇa is in the heart, apāna is in the anus, samāna is in the navel, udāna is in the throat, and vyāna pervades the whole body."² Apāna, the downward breath which pulls against prāna, governs the excretory functions. Samāna kindles the bodily fire and governs the processes of digestion and assimilation. Vyāna or diffused breathing is present throughout the body effecting division and diffusion, resisting disintegration and holding the body together in all its parts. Udāna, the ascending vāyu, is the upward breathing—if you so define it, such a definition is not applicable to the vegetable kingdom for, trees and other allied bodies though possessing prāna are not sustained by the five-fold breaths with their respective functions as mentioned above. In the case of bodies of wood, stone, etc., taken as a result of curse due to karma, such as those of *Ahalyā*³ and others, the definitions of body as 'that which is the abode of senses', and 'that which is the cause of pain or pleasure' are not

1. न भूतसंघसंस्थानो देहोऽस्य परमात्मनः । M.B.

2. हृदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिं संस्थितः । उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थः व्यानः सर्वं शरीरगः ॥

3. For the episode of *Ahalya*, See *Ramayana-Balakāṇḍa*-48-49,

applicable and are faulty as they are of too narrow application. The correct definition of body would, on the other hand, run as follows:—‘That substance which can be invariably controlled and sustained by a cetana or soul for its own sake and whose nature is to subserve that soul, is the body of that soul.’¹ This is the definition given by Rāmānuja. In the case of bodies affected by any disease and therefore gone out of control for the particular jiva, the power of control over the body does really exist, but that power is only obstructed in the same way as the heat of fire is not perceived as long as its obstruction like an amulet-gem is present. The dead body begins to disintegrate as soon as the embodied soul leaves it, and nevertheless it is loosely called a body merely because it is a portion of the collection of elements which constituted the body before. Therefore, everything—matter and soul—forms the body of God and is invariably controlled and sustained by Him and is intended to subserve Him (i.e.) everything is intended for the glorification of God. In ordinary life we experience that a body is not only dependent on the soul which tenants it for its very existence, but also controlled at will by the individual soul. The body is dependent upon the soul for its very existence because it is intact only so long as the soul is within it and begins to disintegrate as soon as the soul departs from it. This aspect will be clearly understood when we consider our state of deep sleep when we have no consciousness (i.e.) when our volition is not present to control our body. The body exists because the soul exists within it. The existence of the body, therefore,

1. यस्य चेतस्य यत्द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियन्तुं धारयितुं च शक्यं तच्छेयतैक-
स्वरूपं च तत्तस्य शरीरम् ।

depends on the swarūpa, being of the soul. And the body is said to be sankalpāśrita, (i.e.) controlled by the jīva during our waking state when we, by our volition, take care that it does not fall down. This resting of the body on the soul swarūpāśrita is called ādheyatva, (i.e.) state of being supported, and the state of being controlled by the soul in the waking state, sankalpāśrita is called niyāmyatva. God is said to be the supporter and controller of matter and soul, inasmuch as by His swarūpa, being, and by his sankalpa, volition, He is the cause of their existence, sustenance and activities. God is directly the supporter of all substances except Himself, by his very swarūpa or being and He is the supporter of the qualities inhering in those substances, not directly but through the medium of those substances. The existence of soul and matter is said to depend on the sankalpa i.e. volition of God, because transient objects are generated by some transient desires of God, and eternal objects exist because of some eternal desires of God. In other words, God by his volition wills some objects to be transitory and creates them accordingly, and He wills other objects to be eternal and so they are eternal. This definition of body is irrefutable and is applicable to all souls and matter which form the body of Īśwara and into which He pervades as the life principle and universal spirit. The passage in the Kathopanishad, 'He who has no body and He who is eternal in all transient bodies'¹—means that God has no such body as is the result of karma. That passage does not deny bodies taken at will by Īśwara to satisfy His devotees, or His universal body in subtle or gross state. The denial

1. अशरीरं शरीरेषु अनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम् । Kat. Up. 2-22.

in the passage is not in respect of every body but only in respect of a body like ours due to karma.

Part-whole relationship between jiva and God.

This body-soul relationship between the jiva and God is also called part-whole relationship between them.¹ Some texts such as: 'Know that individual soul is quite different from its controller, the paramātma'; 'One of the two, namely the individual soul, eats the fruit of karma, and the other, the Supreme Soul shines forth without eating it', teach that paramātma is the creator, controller, omniscient, independent, pure, possessed of countless auspicious qualities and is the Lord or Śeṣi having everything subservient to Him, and that the jiva is the created, controlled, ignorant, dependent, impure, possessed of inauspicious qualities and is the servant, śeṣa and is subservient to God. Those texts thus teach the total difference between jiva and God. Whereas, other texts such as: 'Thou, (the individual soul) art That (Brahman),'² 'This individual soul is that (Brahman),'³ seem to teach identity between jiva and God. Both kinds of teachings are in the primary sense and not in a figurative sense. To fit in with the primary sense of the expressions used in both kinds of teachings, we have to admit, says Vyasa, that the jiva is a part, amśa, of God. Scriptural texts also directly teach that individual souls or jivas are part of Brahman. 'All beings, i.e. all souls or jivas are a fourth part of

1. cf. अक्षो नानाव्यपदेशान् अन्यथा चापि । Br. Sut. II-3-42.
2. पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च नत्वा । Swet. Up. I-6.
3. तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति अनन्नन्नन्यः अभिचाकशीति । Swet. Up. IV-6.
4. तत् त्वमसि ।
5. अयमात्मा ब्रह्म ।

Brahman, the remaining three-fourths being in the aprākṛta or divine world”¹ In this text, the word pāda means a portion. Lord Krishna also says in the Gita: ‘The jīvas are part of myself.’² The jīvas are part of paramātmā just like the light of luminous objects, such as the Sun, fire etc. Just as cowness, horseness, (if we may coin such words), whiteness, blackness are attributes or adjuncts of the cow, the horse, and of coloured objects and are parts thereof, and just as the body of a man, a god, or a beast is a part of the soul embodied therein, in the same way, the jīvas are parts of paramātmā; for, the word amśa means part of a whole. The attribute or adjunct of an object is its part. People who have the sense of discrimination use expressions, such as, in this viśiṣṭa, qualified object, this is the qualifying part viśeṣanāmśa and that is the qualified part viśeṣyāmśa. Although the attribute or adjunct and the qualified object are related as part and whole, they have natural difference or distinction existing between them. In the same way, the soul and God, though related as adjunct and qualified object, and as part and the whole, yet have natural difference or distinction existing between them. The being and characteristics of jīva and paramātmā are quite distinct. God is spotless, pure, omniscient, all-pervading and so on, while the jīva is diametrically opposed to God in nature and its characteristics. Just as light is different from the source of light such as the Sun etc., so God who is the amśi, whole, is different from His part, amśa, namely, the jīva who stands in the place of light. In the light of the relationship discussed above between part and the whole, we can now

1. 'पादोऽस्य विश्वभूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि । Puruṣa Sukta,

2. ममेवांशो जीवल्लोके जीवभूतः सनातनः । B. G. XV-7

understand the import and significance of scriptural texts which teach difference between the soul and God and of those which teach identity between the two. The texts which teach difference are based upon the natural difference existing between jivas and paramātma by virtue of their being related as adjunct and qualified object. And the texts which teach identity are based upon the principle that adjuncts which are inseparable from their objects and which cannot therefore have an independent existence must necessarily look to, embrace and include the objects which they qualify. In both these teachings words are used only in the primary sense but not in the figurative sense, lakṣana. In the sentence 'Thou art That (Brahman)', the word 'That' denotes the omniscient Brahman, Creator of the universe, and the word 'Thou' used in co-ordination with the word 'That' also denotes Brahman qualified by the embodied soul. The co-ordinate expression or identical proposition denotes one and the same object having two different aspects or modes. Parāśara also declares the part-whole relationship existing between the cosmos and Brahman in terms of (1) light and luminous object, (2) power and powerful object and (3) body and soul. 'Just as the light of a luminous object fixed to a place like fire, spreads through space, the power of Brahman spreads all over this whole cosmos. The objects of creation being animated and pervaded by the Supreme Soul constitute His body.' From the above observations we have to conclude that just as light, the adjunct and body are inseparable attributes respectively of a luminous object, just as the cow, an object qualified by cowness and the

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1. एकदेशस्थितस्याग्नेः ज्योत्स्नाविस्तारिणीयया । परस्य ब्रह्मणश्शक्तिः तथेद-
मखिलं जगत् । यत्किञ्चित्सृज्यते येन सत्त्वजातेनवै द्विज । तस्य सृज्यस्य संभूतौ
तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः ॥ V. P. I-22.

soul within it are parts of those objects, in the same way, individual souls and matter are part of Brahman.

Body-soul relationship reconciles conflicting texts

This relationship of body and soul existing between the cosmos and God when properly understood, solves many perplexing problems of Vedānta and reconciles seemingly conflicting texts which the adwaitin, as well as the dwaitin are unable to reconcile. To the adwaitin like Śaṅkara the bhedaśruti, i. e. texts which teach difference are really a bug-bear. He wants to establish that Brahman alone is real and that the whole cosmos around us with varieties of heterogeneous objects is unreal, *Brahmasatyam jaganmithyā*. Thousands of scriptural texts assert difference: "If one understands that the jīva and paramatma are really distinct, one ingratiates oneself into the good graces of the Supreme Being and thereby attains liberation."¹ "Know that matter and the individual souls are eternal and beginningless".² Such texts which unmistakably assert that God, individual souls and prakṛti or matter are really distinct and separate entities, are a real bug-bear to the adwaitin. Being unable to reconcile texts which teach difference with those which seem to teach oneness or identity, the adwaitin, in despair, asserts that the texts which teach difference are not authoritative at all. Similarly, the dwaitin holds that texts which teach oneness or identity are not authoritative as they are a bug-bear to him. Both the adwaitin and the dwaitin hold that the seemingly conflicting texts are opposed to each other like light and darkness and that they are therefore irreconcilable. To the adwaitin, those portions of Vedānta texts which teach

1. पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति—Svet. Up.

2. प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्वयनादी उमावपि । Bh. Gita, XIII.19.

difference are meaningless, and to the dwaitin such portions as teach oneness and identity are likewise meaningless. The adwaitin and the dwaitin are not able to find a mediator in order to bring together texts warring with each other. But to the viśiṣṭādwaitin the texts which teach difference and those which teach oneness or identity are equally authoritative. To him in fact, no portion of the Vedic texts is without authority. To the adwaitin, there is another bug-bear, namely, the saguṇaśruti, i.e. Vedantic texts which declare and assert the existence of auspicious qualities for Brahman. Being unable to reconcile those texts with the nirguṇaśruti texts which teach absence of qualities for Brahman, the adwaitin in despair, again asserts that the texts which teach the existence of qualities are not authoritative at all. But to the viśiṣṭādwaitin both the texts are equally authoritative, as the denial of qualities merely means the denial of bad qualities only. We shall have to deal with this point at length later on. The saguṇaśruti and nirguṇaśruti are casually referred to here merely for the purpose of emphasising the fact that to the viśiṣṭādwaitin all texts have equal force and are equally authoritative. He is able to find a mediator for reconciling the conflicting texts. The mediator is what is called the ghataka śruti, reconciliatory texts of Vedānta, which remove the apparent conflict. The peace-maker or reconciliatory text is that which declares the body-soul relationship between God on the one hand, and matter and jīvas on the other. The body-soul relationship solves many difficulties which seem to be insuperable. We shall take some simple illustrations. When we say 'I know, I understand', what do we mean by the word 'I'? By the word 'I' we mean not our body for, it cannot

know or cognise as it is non-intelligent. We mean only the self or ego or the soul which can cognise. But when we say, 'I am lean, I am stout', what do we mean by the word 'I'? Here we mean not the self or the soul which is invisible, minute and changeless and which cannot have any dimensions; but we mean only the body which can become stout or lean. And again, when we say 'I speak', what do we mean by 'I'?; not the self only, nor the body only, for a soul without a body cannot speak, nor can a body without a soul (a dead body, for instance) speak. Here we evidently mean both, i.e. the soul connected with the body. In ordinary language, we very often identify the self with the body and say 'I have come, I have gone', etc. Sometimes we purposely differentiate the soul from the body and say, 'I have severe pain in the head and I am not able to apply my mind to the subject and understand the matter'. Take another illustration. I lend you a clock to be returned tomorrow. How many things have you to return to me tomorrow, one or many, which is correct? The answer is, both are correct. You have to return to me thousand and one things, the glass, the wooden portion, the hour-hand, the minute-hand, the second-hand, several wheels, hair spring, pendulum and so on and so forth; in short, all the various constituents or parts, big and small, which go to make up a clock. And it is equally correct to say that you have to return to me only one object, namely a clock. Viewed as a whole, as a clock, there is only one object; but viewed as various parts constituting the whole clock, there are many objects. In the same way, some Vedantic texts such as 'Sat alone was in the beginning, one Brahman without a second'¹ view God and his subtle

1. सदेकसोम्येदमग्र आसीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म—Ch. Up. VI-2-1.

body, i.e. matter and souls in their subtle state as a whole, without reference to the parts constituting the whole. That passage does not mean that Brahman does not possess, rather did not possess, his body or parts or even his auspicious qualities. When we say, 'King George is one without a second', we evidently do not mean that he has no empire or kingdom, parliament subjects, relations, palace or other objects. The sentence only means that he has no person superior or equal to him. When we say that the Sun shines forth in the sky, one without a second, we don't deny his myriads of rays or splendour, but we mean that no luminary can be compared to the Sun. In the same way, the Vedic text only means that Brahman had, has or will have no equal or superior to Him. It does not deny, by the expression 'without a second', the existence of matter and souls at that time in their subtle state. The passage means that except Brahman, the Omnipotent, there was no other universal life-principle permeating and controlling both matter and soul. The state of Brahman having subtle matter and souls without names and forms as His subtle body is called the state of deluge, causal state or unmanifested (avyakta) state. If we scrutinize the passage we find that it means: 'This gross cosmos which we see around us with heterogeneous objects of various kinds was in the beginning as 'sat' (īdam agrē sat āsit). The passage thus views Brahman as a single whole without reference to parts constituting the whole. The above text refers to Brahman in the causal state (kāranāvaṣṭa) and views it as a single whole. Similarly, there are passages in Śruti which refer to Brahman in the state of effect (kāryāvaṣṭa) and likewise view it as a single whole. 'There is no duality here'.¹ The passage denying

1. नेहनास्ति किञ्चन ।

the existence of duality has to be examined. What does this passage deny? Does it deny the existence of the universe with its inconceivable, orderly arrangement, with its heavenly and terrestrial bodies of wonderful laws, functions and regular seasons, with innumerable enjoyers and objects of enjoyment which we experience at every moment of our existence? Does it deny the existence of all these, having first asserted that God willed, 'Let me become many', and then created this cosmos with names and forms, i.e. unfolded Himself into this wonderful universe of movable and immovable objects? No, certainly not. If it did so deny, it is in no way different from the ravings of a mad man. What then does it deny? Since Brahman Himself by His own will, unfolded Himself into this marvellous cosmos of movable and immovable objects, the very opposite of it is alone denied.¹ The existence of various objects which are not pervaded and animated by the vital principle, namely, Brahman, abrahmāthaka is denied, but not the existence of variety of objects with names and forms as a result of God's will, expansion and pervasion. The Vedic passages which teach oneness evidently mean prakāri-aikya oneness of the prākari or qualified object, viewed as a whole. And the passages which deny distinction, being auxiliaries to those which teach oneness, must be interpreted in the light of and in conformity with the passages which teach oneness. Interpreted accordingly, the denial-passage denies only the distinction or duality of prakāri or qualified object. That is to say, the existence of a vital principle animating the universe,

1. cf. ब्रह्मैव स्वसंख्यया विचित्रस्थिरवसरूपतया अवस्थितमिति तत्प्रत्यनीक
अब्रह्मात्मकमस्तु नानात्वमतत्वमिति तत् प्रतिषिध्यते ।

other than Brahman or the supreme soul is denied in those passages as is clearly laid down in Śrutaparakāśika, the gloss on Rāmānuja's Sri Bhaṣya.¹

Thus we see that texts which teach oneness and those which deny distinction, view Brahman as a whole whether in the causal state or effect-state and deny the duality of prakāri or qualified object, but do not deny the duality or heterogeneity of prakāras or modes or adjuncts or parts which are inseparably inherent in the whole. Similarly, there are other texts which seem to teach identity between the soul and God, such as 'Thou art that (Brahman)', O! Śvētaketu' 'This soul is Brahman'.² In these passages, the words 'that' and 'thou' are used in co-ordinate expression in an identical proposition and denote identity between the objects expressed by those words. We have already remarked that the expression of co-ordination denotes one and the same object having two different aspects or modes. Take, for example, the sentence: 'The collector of the place A is the district magistrate of A'. Here the designations are used in a co-ordinate sense. Collector means a person in authority exercising revenue powers, and district magistrate means an officer exercising magisterial powers. The two functions are quite different. The revenue aspect is different from magisterial aspect. But the officer who has these two distinct capacities or aspects is one and the same person. And hence the two words 'collector' and 'magistrate' are used in co-ordinate expression denoting identity of the person exercising

1. ऐक्यश्रुतीनां प्रकर्यैक्यपरत्वात् ऐक्यश्रुतिशेषभूतमेदनिषेधोऽपि तदनुरोधेन प्रकारिमेदनिषेध एव भवितुमर्हति ।

2. तत् त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो इति । Ch. Up.

3. अयमात्मा ब्रह्म ।

revenue powers with the person exercising magisterial powers. In the same way, the word 'that' means the omniscient Brahman who is the Creator of this universe, and the word 'thou' also denotes the same Brahman qualified by the embodied soul. Both the words denote one and the same Being, namely, Brahman having different aspects. In the one case, the omniscient, omnipotent, pure, creative and other aspects of Brahman are connoted by the word 'that', and in the other case, the aspect of having the ignorant, powerless, impure and created soul of Svetaketu as His body is connoted by the word 'thou.' This co-ordinate expression or identical proposition identifies the being of God with His body, namely, the individual soul, Svētaketu, just as we identify our self with our body in expressions such as 'I have come, I speak' etc. without any reference to the distinction between our self and the body. 'Thou art that' merely means thou art His body. In worldly language as well as in Vedantic or philosophical language, the soul and the body are expressed in co-ordinate expression or identical proposition although we are fully aware of the fact that the one is different from the other and that both are not identical. When we say, 'I am a man', we evidently mean the self or soul by the word 'I' and we mean the body by the word 'man'. Nevertheless, both the self and the body are expressed in an identical proposition or co-ordinate expression as if they are identical, merely for the reason that the body is an inseparable adjunct of the soul. Texts like 'All this universe is Brahman',¹ 'Thou art That (Brahman)' do certainly recognise the difference between the Being Brahman, and the visible and invisible objects comprised in the

1. तत् त्वमसि ।

2. सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म ।

universe, between Brahman and the individual soul, and nevertheless, speak of Brahman and all this universe in co-ordinate expression or identical proposition as if Brahman is identical with the universe which we see around us and as if He is identical with Swētakeṭu, only because this cosmos and Swētakeṭu are inseparable adjuncts or modes or prakāra or body of Brahman. Every substance in the universe becomes a substance and becomes expressible by words only by the entry of the jīva animated by the supreme soul. 'Let me, with the individual soul as my body, enter everything and create names and forms'—so says Chandogya.¹ Everything therefore, except the swarūpa being of Brahman becomes a substance only by virtue of being Brahman's body, and hence the words denoting those substances, eventually and virtually denote Brahman. Therefore, every word ultimately denotes Brahman qualified by the particular substance ordinarily meant by the word in common parlance. The basis or essential *sine qua non* for expressing two different objects in co-ordinate expression or identical proposition is the body-soul relationship existing between them. In ordinary common parlance and in Vedantic language, identical proposition is used, as the body is the mode or prakāra of the soul. We have expressions such as 'Devadatta is born a man by his good karma or act. Yagnadatta is born a beast by his bad karma, and another jīva is born a god by his extraordinary merit.' That which exists only as a mode or adjunct or prakāra of a substance, dravya, and which is hence inseparable from it, may be appropriately expressed in co-ordination

1. अनेन जीवेन आत्मनाऽनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि । Ch. Up. 6-3-2
जीवशरीरकेण मया इत्यर्थः ।

in an identical proposition. It is immaterial whether the adjunct is an abstract quality or a substance or jathi, genus or species, as in: 'The cloth is white', 'I am a man', 'That is a cow', etc. All objects, movable or immovable, visible or invisible, being the body of Īśwara and existing only as His mode or prakāra, Īśwara who is the prakāri or the possessor of the mode, prakāra or adjunct is connoted by the word expressing the prakāra. It is but proper therefore to express the substance and the adjunct in co-ordination in identical proposition. Thus we see there are three sets of Vedāntic texts. One set of texts which teach oneness, identify the universal soul, namely, Brahman, with His body, the cosmos, just as we identify ourselves with our body as when we say 'I am a man'. Another set of texts which teach difference declare that objects other than Brahman are also real and distinct entities. And a third set of texts which teach body-soul relationship between Brahman and the universe, remove the seeming conflict between the first two sets of texts by declaring that the soul and the body are sometimes expressed as one, i.e. as identical and at other times as being distinct entities in accordance with the viewpoint taken with reference to the context. The Viśiṣṭadwaitin alone is able to reconcile the seemingly conflicting texts of difference and oneness, with the help of the ghataka śruti or reconciliatory text which teaches the body-soul relationship between Brahman and the cosmos.

Definition of body and sesha or subservient aspect.

We have already defined body as that substance which can invariably be controlled, sustained by a chetana or soul for its own sake and which is intended to subserve that soul. Everything is controlled by God,

as the activities of every object—matter or soul—depend on God's will and as God, pervading in and residing within every object, unknown by the object pervaded, causes its action or inaction. Although every jīva being God's body, depends on God for all his activities, yet he is unlike matter which is absolutely incapable of putting forth any activity. Since the jīva is a knower, doer and enjoyer and puts forth activities as a result of his possessing consciousness, desire and determination or decision (jñānacikirṣhaprayatna) as his natural attributes, and as God gives him sanction on the basis of his first mental effort, the śāstras with positive and negative injunctions have not become meaningless. The jīva is said to be sustained by Īśwara as the being of the jīva depends both on the being (swarūpa) and on the volition saṅkalpa of God. Every jīva is said to be a seṣa - subservient to God. The definition of the word seṣa is given in Pūrvamīmamsa sūtra as, 'What subserves another is seṣa'. Rāmānuja expands this idea and gives a definition of the word in his Vedārthasangraha as follows:—'That which is intended for the glorification and excellence of another is called a seṣa, and the other which attains the excellence is called a seṣi'. Let me explain this definition. In this world, our house, land, cloth, flowers etc. are used for our benefit and for our glorification and excellence. They do not exist for themselves. The house, land, etc. are called subservient objects (seṣa) and we are their seṣi. The subservient object may be taken and utilised in one of three ways—(1) by the desire or will of the subservient object, (2) by the desire or will of the seṣi or

1. शेषः परार्थत्वात् । Sutra 3-1-1.

2. परगत अतिशय आधान इच्छया उपादेयत्वमेव यस्य स्वरूपं सः शेषः परः शेषी ।

object which derives excellence, and (3) by the desire and will of a third object. In a sacrifice, paddy and other objects are subservient to the sacrifice. The sacrifice is the *śeṣi*. Here there is no desire or will for the paddy or the sacrifice as they are non-intelligent objects. The paddy is taken by the desire and will of a third object namely, the person performing the sacrifice. The desire to reach the goal prompts a person to undertake the sacrifice, the effort needed and other necessary objects are taken by him with the desire to complete the sacrifice. In the same way, it is the nature of all objects, eternal and transient, intelligent and non-intelligent, to be undertaken for the excellence and glorification of God, and hence, all objects are subservient to God who is their *śeṣi*. Scriptural texts declare that the nature of all jivas is to be subservient to God. 'I will not swerve from God to whom I am subservient by nature. Being what I am by nature, i.e. being His servant by nature, I will worship Him by the sacrifice called knowledge'. 'Always remember that, by nature, the self is the servant and the God is the Lord'. 'By nature all souls are servants of God'.

Here, an objection may be raised. It is said that to serve God alone is the real and unbounded bliss for the jiva. This is against all our worldly experience. All jivas, as a matter of fact, desire and strive for independence. Dependence on another is really painful and miserable. Manu, the lawgiver, also says: "Every dependence is misery and every inde-

1. यस्यास्मिन्तमन्तरेणि योद्धमस्मि स सन् यजे ।

2. आत्मदास्यं हरेस्त्वाम्यं स्वभावं च सदा स्मर ।

3. दासभूताः स्वतस्सर्वेद्यात्मानः परमात्मनः ।

pendence is bliss. Wise men say that service is the life of a dog, by all means it must be avoided."¹

Refutation of the objection.

This objection is not sound. For, it is the result of ignorance of the real distinction between the soul and the body, and of the false knowledge that the soul is identical with the body. The body being the substratum of attributes such as manhood, beasthood, etc., is a mass of flesh, bone, etc., and appears to be an independent object. The samsārins or journeymen in the cycle of births and deaths, think that the body is the self. The knowledge of puruṣārtha or the goal to be reached, and the food taken in to nourish the self will be in accordance with what one considers the self to be (ātmābhimāna). If one considers one's self to be a beast, the food for the self will be grass and the like. If one considers one's self to be a man, the food for the self will be rice and the like. If one considers one's self to be a god, the food for the self will be nectar. And if one considers one's self to be a servant of God, then the food for the self will be service to God. For those who identify their selves with a lion, tiger or a hog, a man, a yakṣa or a demon, or a male or a female, happiness also will accordingly be determined differently and at variance. All this is the result of false identification of the self with the body. We have to judge everything by the goal set up in accordance with the varying identification of the self (ātmābhimāna). What is the correct criterion for happiness? The criterion is favourableness to the self. What is really favourable to the self is happiness, and what is un-

1. सर्वपरकं दुःखं सर्वमात्मवत् सुखं ।

सेवा श्रुतिराख्याता तस्मात् परिर्वयेत् ॥ Manu. 4. 6. 2.

favourable to the self is pain or misery.¹ As long as the false knowledge, namely, the knowledge that I am independent, lasts, dependence is felt as painful. But dependence by itself is not painful. We have already observed that the self is different from the body, sense-organ, etc. and is knowledge in essence. Its nature is to be subservient to God. If what the self considers itself to be is the really correct and true knowledge, i.e. if the self knows itself aright, the goal set up before it will accordingly be correct. Just as the knowledge about one's own self such as: 'I am a lion, I am a tiger, I am a man' is false knowledge, in the same way, the knowledge about one's own self such as 'I am independent' is equally false and it is due to karma or previous action. The one is false knowledge about the being (swarūpa) of the self and the other is false knowledge about the (swabhāva) real nature of the self. The knowledge that objects other than God are bliss or give bliss is the result of karma, and the pleasure due to enjoyment of sense-objects is only momentary and infinitesimally small. On the contrary, God is by Himself bliss by nature. Hence, as the Vedas say 'He is eternal and infinite bliss'.¹ That objects other than God are not by themselves bliss, and are not conducive to bliss is declared by Parāśara: "One and the same object in the world causes pain to one, pleasure to another, jealousy to a third, anger to a fourth and so on, and the same object which gave pleasure to a person before gives pain or anger to the same person afterwards. There is no object which invariably gives pain or pleasure for all persons and at all times. It is not in the nature of worldly objects therefore either to

1. cf कं ब्रह्म सं ब्रह्म आनन्दो ब्रह्म ।

give pain or to give pleasure.”¹ As a result of his karma, a particular jīva finds pleasure in a particular object and pain in another object and at the end of that karma the pain or pleasure will disappear. As a result of karma, therefore, the mentality of a jīva towards an object varies. If due to merit, a jīva finds an object favourable to him, then he gets pleasure, and if due to sin he finds an object unfavourable to him, then he gets pain. And since among objects other than Brahman no two objects (jīvas) are by nature related as master and servant, the imposed relationship namely, subservience to another or dependence, necessarily gives pain. The saying of Manu that service is dog’s life refers to service to a person who is unworthy of service. For, the Vedānta texts enjoin service to God who alone is worthy of service. “All persons of every varṇa and āśrama ought to do service to God and worship Him, and especially persons possessing knowledge of the real nature of the self or ātman”.² “He who, discarding other deities worships Me with unswerving devotion to Me, crosses this prakṛti or material existence, and attains self-realisation. This devotion is a kind of service to God”.³ Therefore, service to the worthy Lord, i.e. God, is bound to give happiness and happiness only. The general remark that every service and dependence gives only pain and misery is not correct. Have we not seen Kings who, infatuated

1. कस्त्वेकमेव दुःखाय सुखायेष्वोद्भवाय च । कोपाय च यतस्तस्मात् कस्तु
कस्त्वात्मकं कृतः । तदेव प्रीतये भूत्वा पुनर्दुःखाय जायते । तदेव कोपाय यतः
प्रसादाय च जायते । तस्माद् दुःखात्मकं नास्ति न च क्वचित् सुखात्मकम् ।
मनसः परिणामोयं सुखदुःखादिलक्षणम् ॥ V. P. II. 6. 47-48.

2. स हि आश्रमैः सदोपास्यः ।

3. मां च योऽप्यभिचारेण भक्तियोगेन सेवते ।

स गुणान् समतीत्येतान् ब्रह्म भूयाय कल्पते ॥ (B. G. 14. 26)

with love or lust of concupiscence, abandoned their throne and took great delight and pleasure in serving the object of their love? A man who is independent in the worldly sense is often seen to take pleasure in assuming dependence and in serving another person however low the latter may be. Nammalwar, the foremost Vaiṣṇava saint says: "Emperors, at whose feet, vassal kings prostrate and pay their tribute, place their object of love on a raised bed of soft down of duck or swan, and sitting underneath, entreat the object of their love to express her desire which, they swear, they would carry out at any cost."¹ It is a matter of experience, therefore, that some persons take pleasure in imposing on themselves dependence, while they are themselves independent and in serving other persons instead of being served by them. Kings, in history, have placed themselves and their kingdom at the disposal of the object of their love, eager to serve the same. On the other hand, have we not seen philanthropic people of a high order who, being prompted by noble ideals serve their country and humanity at large with great pleasure? To serve the highest Being, namely God, is the be-all and end-all of our existence, as the service itself is the highest bliss. Wise men have declared, "the service of God gives the highest happiness".² If you are wedded to worldly objects, you get no happiness or, at best, infinitesimally small happiness; but if you are wedded to God, you get infinite happiness. The quantum of a person's happiness may be mathematically expressed by a fraction of which the numerator is 1 and the denominator, the number of worldly objects which he desires.

1. Tiruvaimozhi in Tamil—4. 1. 5.

2. 'दास्य महारसज्ञाः'—'तव दास्य सुखैक सन्नितान् ।'

If he desires one thousand objects in the world, his happiness will be only $1/1000$ of the unit of human happiness ; if he desires a hundred objects, his happiness will be $1/100$ of the unit ; if he desires ten objects, his happiness will be $1/10$ of the unit, if he desires only one object, his happiness will be a unit. But if he desires no object in the world and directs all his desire towards God, his happiness will be $1/0$, one upon zero, which is infinity in mathematics. In proportion to the attachment to God, one has disattachment to worldly objects.¹ A (virakta) jiva must, by nature, be attached to some object, whether it is worldly or divine. The attachment has only to be diverted from worldly objects to God. A (virakta) disattached person means a person who has transplanted his attachment from worldly objects on the soil of Brahman. Every jiva must covet God and service to Him, to the exclusion of all worldly desires. The service must be by mind, word, and deed. We must long to do service to God in every way, in all places, at all times and in all conditions, like his couch, Ananta. "The Lord's couch, Ananta, transforms his body into a house, bed, throne, seat, a pair of sandals, pillow, cloth or umbrella, as occasion demands, for the purpose of serving the Lord. Since he is the personification of service, he is called śeṣa".² Lakṣmana entreated Rama to allow him to follow Rama into the forest in order to enable him to do all service to Rama in waking and sleeping states.³ We shall treat of this aspect of service

1. परमात्मनि यो रक्तः, विरक्तः अपरमात्मनि ।

2. निवास शयनपादुकांशुक्रोधान कर्तृपवारणादिभिः ।

शरीरमेदैस्तत्र शेषतां गतैः यथोचितं शेष इतीरिते जनैः ॥

(Yamunacharya's Stotra Ratna.)

3. अहं सर्वं अर्पयामि जाग्रतः स्वपतश्च ते ।

(Rāmāyana—Ayo. 31-27)

to God in greater detail when we deal with *puruṣārtha* or the goal to be reached. The objection, therefore, that dependence on God and service to Him must be painful as dependence on man and the service to Him is painful, is untenable; for, the cause of dependence and service in one case is different from that of the other. In the case of service to God the dependence of the *jīva* on God is natural and in the case of service to man, the dependence of one *jīva* on another is the result of *karma*. Thus, the self or individual soul is *śeṣa*, subservient to God, and is inseparable from his *śeṣi*, unlike other subservient objects, such as house, land, servant and so on, which have independent existence apart from their *śeṣi*. Since the *jīva* is a *śeṣa* of God and is controlled and sustained by Him, invariably the *jīva* is God's body.

To recapitulate the preceding discourse, the *jīva*, the self or individual soul is—

- (1) distinct from the body, sense-organs, the mind, *prāṇa* or breaths, and intellect,
- (2) *ajāḍa* or self-luminous,
- (3) *ānandarūpa* or blissful in essence,
- (4) eternal,
- (5) atomic in size,
- (6) *avyakta* or imperceptible,
- (7) *acintya* or inconceivable,
- (8) *niravayava* or partless,
- (9) *nirvikāra* or changeless,
- (10) the abode of *jñāna* or consciousness, and
- (11) in the relation of body to God who is his soul and hence is controlled, and sustained by God and is subservient to Him.

END OF CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

THEORIES ABOUT THE SOUL

The jīvas or individual souls are of three kinds—(1) embodied souls (baddha), (2) liberated souls (mukta) and (3) eternally liberated souls (nitya).

(1) By embodied souls are meant those souls who have their real nature eclipsed by the beginningless māya of God, called prakṛti, and who are indistinguishable from prakṛti like the oil in sesame, and like fire in a species of wood—indistinguishable in the sense of ununderstandable as different from prakṛti by persons of little learning, indistinguishable in the sense of imperceptible as different from it by persons not possessing yogic powers, and indistinguishable in the sense of inseparable from it by a person other than the Almighty. These souls are enwrapped by countless karma or actions of merit or demerit due to beginningless nescience or avidya. They have entered into varieties of wonderful bodies of god, man, beast, tree, stone and so forth, in accordance with their actions, and by identifying their selves with the bodies which they tenant falsely consider as their own the objects connected with their bodies. These souls are overpowered by their bad tendencies and cravings and enjoy or suffer series of happiness or misery as results of their karma. The whole hierarchy of gods from the fourheaded Brahma downwards, Rudra, Indra and so on, all human beings, all animals, beasts etc., and all winged creatures, all creatures which live in water, all tiny creatures like the ant, mosquito, etc., and all

immovable objects and the whole of Vegetable kingdom, stones, rocks and so forth, in short, all the objects having names and forms are embodied souls.

(2) By mukta are meant liberated souls. They are those souls (i) who, while remaining in samsāra or material existence, due to beginningless flow of karma, have ended those actions which were an obstacle to the origination of desire for liberation either by eating the fruit of karma or by expiatory ceremonies enjoined generally in śāstras, or by extraordinary good actions of high order, without any desire for fruit thereof, (ii) who have thereby received the graceful and divine looks of God at the time of birth, resulting in the preponderance of satwa quality and in the origination of acute desire for liberation, (iii) who have consequently resorted to worthy preceptors and have acquired true knowledge of ātman and Brahman derivable from the philosophical lucubrations of Vedāntic lore, (iv) who have thereupon performed duties cast on them according to varṇa and āśrama (i.e.) caste or order without any attachment to doership of the act or the fruit thereof, (v) who have washed away by their good deeds all their previous sins which hitherto prevented the origination of true knowledge as stated in the texts: 'He annihilates all sins by good acts'. 'When sins are burnt by good deeds, true knowledge originates' (vi) who consequently get their minds purified and get true knowledge of Brahman, (vii) who by virtue of their true knowledge and acts of duty done during several lives unprompted by wordly desires, practise unbroken concentration on God called bhakti or

1. धर्मेण पापमपनुदति । Taitt. Up. II. 2-6.

2. कृपाये कर्मभिः पक्वे ततो ज्ञानं प्रवर्तते ।

devotion, and (viii) who have, by the grace of God, burnt all sins due to material existence and have attained their real nature and happiness by doing everlasting service to Him. The word mukta also means another set of souls whom God has graced with His divine looks after totalling their accidental and unintentional deeds of merit, in whom He has generated gradually non-hatred and inclination towards Himself, in whom He has caused generation of true knowledge and unbounded faith in Himself by throwing them in the company of ātviks, worthy preceptors, who as a result of such faith, finding other means of liberation difficult to accomplish, resort to the surest means of complete surrender to God called prapatti, and who, by His grace, get rid of all their sins, shine forth in their true nature and get the boundless bliss of perpetual service to Him.

(3) The nityas are those souls who, like Ananta, Garuda, Viṣvaksena and others, never tasted samsāra or material existence. They are distinguished from muktas who, at one time, had been entangled in samsāra before attaining liberation.

While several texts declare the eternity of souls, some texts declare that a soul which does not know Brahman is considered not to exist and that a soul which knows Brahman is considered to exist.¹ What is the significance of the latter texts? The significance of these texts is that they merely censure the souls which do not possess knowledge of Brahman and praise those

1. असन्नेव स भवति असत् ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् । अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्देव सन्तमेन ततो विदुः । Taitt. Up.

souls which do possess it. Although all souls, whether baddha, mukta or nitya, are eternal, a particular set of souls only are technically called nitya, because their knowledge of Brahman, as distinguished from that of the other two sets of souls, is eternally expansive without any contraction whatsoever. The muktas, while in bondage, had knowledge of Brahman in a contracted state; and their knowledge is infinitely expanded only after liberation. The baddhas or embodied souls are still in bondage and they have either no knowledge or only a contracted knowledge of Brahman. In respect of nityas, their knowledge of Brahman was never in a contracted state; it has always been in an expanded state and will be so for ever. Owing to the eternally expanded nature of their knowledge, they are technically called nityas. And on account of this eternal expansion of their knowledge, they are praised in some texts: 'Where (in the divine world) the eternal seers, ever youthful, serve God in boundless bliss'.¹

How the Jiva, though pure, gets nescience?

It may be asked 'how did the jiva being blissful, pure and knowledge in essence, get nescience and other impurities? The answer is as follows: Just as water, by nature, cold and devoid of sound and foam, becomes hot, foamy and frothy by contact with a heated jar, in the same way the individual soul, by nature blissful, intelligent, and pure, gets nescience, (avidyā), action, (karma), tendency (vāśana), taste (ruci) and misery (duhkha), by contact with acit or matter, i.e. body,

1. यत्र पूर्वे साध्यास्तसन्ति देवाः । Puruṣa Sūkta.

यत्रर्षयः प्रथमजाये पुरुषाः । (Yajurveda 3-8-9)

which is the abode of three qualities, satva, rajas and tamas¹. This is declared by Parāśara.

By contact with acit or matter the soul becomes tainted with 'I' and 'mine', falsely identifies with prakṛti, and imposes on itself the qualities or attributes of prakṛti. When your wife, son, father, mother or any other close relation is ill or is in distress, you identify yourself with those close relations and feel that you yourself are ill or in distress, although they are different from you and your body and their characteristics are totally different from those of yourself. You first identify yourself with your body and then impose on yourself the characteristics of your body, namely relationship of your son, wife, father or mother and so on. In the same way, you impose on yourself the other characteristics of your body—stoutness, leanness, standing, sitting state, etc. when you say 'I am stout', 'I am lean', 'I stand', 'I sit', and so on. Likewise, you identify the characteristics of your senses, blindness, deafness and so on, with those of yourself and say 'I am blind', 'I am deaf.'

By avidyā is meant nescience which may be absence of knowledge or false knowledge or diametrically opposite knowledge. Action means that which is done by mind, word or body. It may be either merit (puṇya) or sin (pāpa). Merit or puṇya is of various kinds and is the

1. निर्वाणमय एवायमात्मा ज्ञानमयोऽमलः ।

दुःस्वाज्ञानमलधर्मा प्रकृतेस्ते न चात्मनः ॥

जलस्यचाग्निसंघट्टस्यालीसङ्गात् तथापि हि ।

शन्दोद्रेकदिकान् धर्मान् तत्करोति यथा मुने ॥

तथात्मा प्रकृतौ सङ्गात् अहं मानादि दूषितः ।

मजते प्राकृतान् धर्मान् अन्यस्तेभ्योपि सोऽव्ययः ॥ V.P. 6-7-22.

cause of various kinds of enjoyment here and hereafter. And sin (pāpa) is likewise of various kinds, sins of omission, sins of commission, sins against God, sins against His devotees, and heinous sins. Vāsana or saṁskāra is the tendency to fall back upon the deeds done before. This tendency is of various kinds according to its causes which vary. Ruci or taste is that acute desire or violent craving to enjoy an object—a craving which cannot be diverted by other desires. This taste also varies with its objects.

These three kinds of jivas or individual souls are infinite in number in each kind.

Single-soul view or Atmadwaita vada

The exponent of single-soul view assert that there exists only one single soul that the existence of multiplicity of souls is unreal and that the appearance of multiplicity of souls is due to limiting adjuncts such as body, mind, etc., in the same way as the moon reflected in myriads of waves appears many and in the same way as the soul of Saubhari though only one, appeared to be fifty in fifty different bodies. In support of their view, they quote the following and other vedāntic texts : "There is no duality here ; he who sees multiplicity of souls revolves in saṁsāra."¹

"Though existing in his own body and in the body of others, the ātma or soul is really one homogeneous intelligence in essence and those who see duality do not see the truth."²

1. नेहानास्ति किञ्चन मृत्योस्समृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।

Bṛihad. Up. 6-4-19

2. तस्यात्मपरदेहेषु सतोप्येकमयं हि यत् ।

विज्ञानं परमार्थो हि द्वैतिनोऽज्ञाय दर्शिनः ॥ V. P. 2-14-31.

“ If there were any other person different from myself, then we can say ‘ this myself ’ and ‘ that other ’¹.

“ Such myself and such thou, and he and all the rest, is ātman. Therefore abandon the illusion of difference. ”²

Refutation of the single-soul theory.

This view is untenable and unsound as it is based on the ignorance of the two kinds of adwaita expounded in śāstras, namely brahmādwaita and jīvādwaita. The former is called prakāri-adwaita and the latter, prakāra-adwaita. The former means that the prakāri or qualified Brahman is one without a second, having neither superior nor equal; and the latter means that Brahman has countless individual souls similar to one another as his prakāra or mode. A significant factor which we have to notice in scriptural texts wherein Brahman and the cosmos are expressed in co-ordination in identical propositions is that the reason for so expressing them, consistent with all other texts and authorities is also generally given in those texts themselves. The reason given is that Brahman permeates and pervades the whole cosmos as its animating vital principle. Texts such as : “ By entering and pervading, Brahman unfolded itself into all sentient and non-sentient objects with various names and forms ”³ “ By permeating and pervading inside and outside every cetana and acetana-

1. यद्यन्योस्ति परः कोपि मत्तः पार्थिवस्तम ।

तदैषोहमयं चान्द्रो कक्नुमेवमपीष्यते ॥ V. P. 13-90.

2. सोहं स च त्व स च सर्वमेतत् आत्मत्वरूपं त्यज मेद मोहम् ॥

-V. P. 16-23.

3. तदनुप्रविश्य सञ्चत्यञ्जामक्त् । Taitt. Up.

sentient and non-sentient object, Brahman expanded itself into illimitable space meaning all objects. Therefore all these objects present, past and future are Brahman."¹ "You pervade all; therefore you are all"². "Since the infinite God is all-pervading, I am He."³ "All this universe, being animated by the universal soul has Him as its life principle".⁴—texts such as these ascribe the permeating, pervasive and animating aspect of Brahman as the reason for the co-ordinate expression of Brahman and the cosmos in the above identical propositions. Since such identical propositions signify Brahmādwaita and refer to one and the same object, prakāri, qualified by two different modes or prakāras; since multiplicity of prakāras or modes are specifically and unmistakably taught by several texts;⁵ since the denial-texts such as: "there is no duality here", being only auxiliaries to the above-mentioned texts of oneness or identity, deny only that duality which is the very opposite of the aforesaid oneness, namely, prakāri-aikyam; since every denial refers to cases other than those already asserted; since, in the present case, the denial refers to cases outside the qualified object, that is, refers to the duality or multiplicity of prakāri other than the Brahman already asserted in unmistakable language such as: "It willed, 'Let me become many' and it

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1. स भूमिं विश्वतोवृत्वा अत्यतिष्ठत् दशाङ्गुलम् ।
पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं । भूमिः—भवतीति भूमिः सकलचेतनाचेतनजातम् ;
दशाङ्गुलं—अनन्तयोजनं प्राह दशाङ्गुलवचस्त्वित्त्वदम् । Puruṣa Sūkta.
 2. सर्वं समाप्नोषि ततोऽसि सर्वः । B. G. 11-40.
 3. सर्वगत्वादनन्तस्य स एवाहमवस्थितः । V. P.
 4. ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं ।
 5. एकः सन् बहुधा विचारः ।
 6. नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन ।

became many",¹; and since specific texts such as: "there is no being superior or equal to Brahman"—deny the existence of a being superior or equal to Brahman,—Brahmādwaita means prakāri-adwaita.

Similarly, jivādwaita does not mean the non-existence of a second jīva or individual soul. It does not deny the existence of multiplicity of souls asserted by several texts such as: "the chief among the eternal sentient beings, who satisfies their desires."² If you do not admit the existence of multiplicity of souls asserted by several texts, you are driven to several absurdities. The texts which teach the existence of several classes of souls, embodied souls, liberated souls, etc., and those which enjoin on the embodied souls, several acts and injunctions for the attainment of liberation would become purportless and vain like the roarings of the ocean. The texts such as: "The jīva or soul is neither a god, nor a man, nor a beast nor a tree, etc. They (godhood, manhood, beasthood, treehood, etc.) are varieties of bodies,"³ specifically deny to the self only the state of being a body, śarīratva or prākṛta aspect as aforesaid. These texts do not deny the existence of several souls embodied in those bodies. Moreover, even after liberation the liberated souls are said to attain not identity but perfect similarity with God.⁴ For the above

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1. तदेकं बहुस्यां प्रजायेय ।
 2. न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते ।
 3. नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानां एको बहूनां यो विदधाति कमान् । Svet. Up. 1. 9.
 4. पुनश्चदेवो न नरः न पशुने च पादपः । शरीराकृतिभेदास्तु भूयते कर्मयोनयः ॥ V. P. (2-13-68).
 5. मम साधर्म्यमागताः (B. G. 14-2).
निरञ्जः परमं साम्यमुपैति (Mun. Up. 3-1-3).

reasons 'jivādwaita' means only prakāra-adwaita, i.e. similarity of countless souls which form the prakāra or mode of Brahman, in the same way as similarity of grains of paddy are collectively referred to as : 'this is paddy'. In such cases, the use of the singular 'paddy' means 'belonging to the same class, variety or species'. In the texts quoted by the advocates of the single-soul view, e.g. 'there is no duality here', etc., what is really meant, is this ; Since the whole cosmos or universe is the effect of Brahman and is as such, pervaded and permeated by Brahman as its animating inner principle, it is considered as a single whole animated by it ; and what is denied is that duality or multiplicity which is the very opposite of what has been asserted, but not the same duality or multiplicity which has been asserted by texts such as : 'God willed, let me become many, and He became many'. Otherwise, it would be childish to teach first what is not knowable by other means of knowledge and then to deny the same thing afterwards. That Brahman by its will unfolded itself into this cosmos of multiplicity of souls and matter is not knowable by any means of knowledge other than Vedantic texts.

As regards the stanzas quoted from Viṣṇupurāṇa, the context in which these stanzas are expressed, will throw a flood of light on their real meaning. Ādi Bharata, or Jaḍa Bharata as he was afterwards called, was once a king. He gave up all worldly desires and his kingdom, retired into a forest, became a true ascetic and devoted his life to the worship and contemplation of God and practised yoga. On the banks of a river he saw a kid of an antelope and its dying mother, took pity on the motherless kid, carried it home and brought it up

like his own child. He forgot his meditation on God and while dying, thought only of his foster-child, as a result of which he was born an antelope in the next birth but with all the recollections of his previous birth. In the third birth he was born a Brahmin in a pure family well-versed in yoga. He had full knowledge of his previous births and was proficient in all branches of knowledge. He realised that he was different from his body and saw all creatures as equal. He possessed extraordinary knowledge of all kinds, untaught by anybody. Since he had reached the height of yoga, and was immersed in it, he did not perform actions like others according to varṇa and āśrama. He would laugh within himself and mutter words like an idiot. He purposely concealed his powers from ordinary mankind for, if he manifested them, people would respect him and such adoration would cause his downfall in yoga. He pretended to be an idiot and covered his body with dust and dirt all over. At that time, one day, King Sauvīrarāja being carried on a palanquin, was going towards sage Kapila to learn mokṣa dharma. This yogi was commanded to bear the palanquin. While the other bearers of the palanquin took fast steps, this yogi took very slow steps. The other bearers complained to the king. The king asked the yogi: "You appear strong and stout. Are you fatigued by carrying the palanquin only a short distance?" The yogi replied: "I am not stout; nor do I bear the palanquin, nor have I fatigue. I am different from the body. Myself, yourself and likewise other selves are carried by the elements transformed into our bodies. This false identification of ātman with the body is common to all beings (souls) from Brahma downwards to the lump of grass. In the case of all creatures (souls), as in the case of my own self, which are not collections of

parts, there is no increase or decrease. Therefore, my self is neither visible, nor is stout, nor does it carry a palanquin." We thus see that from the very beginning, the sermon is based on the real distinction between the one self and other selves or jivas which are spoken of as separate entities and the further teaching is carried on with a view to inculcate the difference between body and soul. Consistently with the above teaching and consistently with other Vedantic texts, we have to interpret the stanzas contained in the succeeding portions of the teachings. In the end, the king was advised to give up the illusion of dissimilarity among souls based on the real dissimilarity among bodies.

Now, we shall examine the first stanza quoted at page 87 *supra* : "Though existing in his own body and in the body of others, the ātman or soul is really one homogeneous intelligence in essence; and those who see duality do not see the truth". Since all ātmas or individual souls are alike in being homogeneous knowledge in substance, (jñānaikākāra), the notion that they are different in kind as man, god, beast or tree due to their connection with material bodies is false. The denial of duality means the denial of duality in species or kind. The collection of similar jivas is denoted by the word ekamayam, one homogeneous substance in the singular; and the various kinds of bodies are denoted by the word deheṣu, 'bodies' in the plural. The reason for expressing the souls in the singular is that the species is only one; and the reason for expressing the bodies in the plural is that there are varieties of the species of bodies. The stanza thus means that all souls tenanting varieties of wonderful bodies of god, man, beast, tree, etc., are all similar to one another. Since multiplicity of souls is taught by Vedānta texts and since similarity of souls is

also asserted by them, it is not proper to deny the fact that the souls are different as entities. Lord Kṛṣṇa holds only this view when he says: "Wise men of discrimination possessing knowledge of the real nature of ātman see similarity in the being (swarūpa), of all souls alike and dissimilarity in their material bodies of dog, dog-eater, cow, elephant, Brahmin and a man of learning and modesty: they see that all souls are similar in being homogeneous knowledge in substance."¹ Those who see similarity in souls as mentioned above, while practising the means for liberation, conquer samsāra or material existence. When their minds are riveted on the similarity of all souls, their minds are riveted on the pure soul, brahman, purged of all impurities due to material connection. And the conquest of samsāra is nothing but dwelling in pure ātman. Those who meditate on the above similarity of souls, get liberated. In the light of this stanza of the Gitā, we have to interpret the stanza of Viṣṇu Purāṇa. The words 'in his own body' and 'in the body of others' occurring in this stanza are very significant. They mean that though existing in his own body and in the bodies of others, i.e. though existing in dissimilar bodies, the soul is one i.e. similar. In respect of individual souls, apart from their bodies, the distinction of 'one's own' and 'of another' is clearly made in this stanza. Therefore, the expression, ekamayam, must necessarily mean similar in kind (samāna).

The second stanza quoted there at page 88 *Supra* literally means: "If there were any other person different

1. शुनिचैव श्वाके च पण्डिताः समदर्शिनः ।

इहैव तैर्जितः सर्गः येषां साम्ये स्थितं मनः।

निर्दोषं हि समं ब्रह्म तस्मात् ब्रह्मणि ते स्थिताः ॥ B. G. V. 18-19.

from me, Oh ! King, then we can say 'this myself' and "that other". Even here, oneness of soul is not meant ; for we do not use the different words *para* and *anya*, 'other' and 'another', together referring to the same object. Here *para* means a soul different from oneself ; for, while admitting the existence of an ātman or soul different from his own self, the speaker, namely, Yogi Bharata, denies *anyatva*, otherness to the other soul. And since the other soul is also of homogeneous knowledge-substance, the word 'anya' ('other') means 'different from the homogeneous knowledge-substance. The stanza, therefore, means: If there were any ātman or soul other than myself which is differently constituted, which is different in substance from me, that is to say, not homogenous knowledge unlike myself, then it will be possible for us to say, 'I am constituted of this substance and the other is constituted of a different substance. But, it is not so; for all souls are constituted of the same substance, knowledge.

The third stanza quoted above at page 88 *supra* closes the sermon. "Such myself, i.e. myself of that kind, such thou, i.e. thou of that kind, and he, and all this rest, is ātman ; therefore, abandon the illusion of difference". The words 'of that kind' repeated thrice as an epithet of 'myself', 'yourself' and 'of the rest', refers to the aforesaid homogeneous knowledge-substance, and 'myself', 'thou', 'he' and the 'rest' used in co-ordination in identical proposition refer to substances which are constituted of the same homogeneous knowledge-substance. The king is taught to abandon the illusion of dissimilarity among individual souls based on the dissimilarity really existing among heterogeneous bodies tenanted by those souls. If you do not interpret in this way, the expressions 'I', 'thou', 'he', 'this' and

'all the rest' (aham, twam, sah, sarvametat), terms used in the course of the teaching of the soul as being different from the body, would be inconsistent.

If you hold that there is only one soul, you cannot explain the actual fact that while one person is happy, another person is miserable. If happiness and misery were to abide in the same abode at the same time, one and the same person should experience both pleasure and pain together. Since happiness and misery are determined, i.e. happiness is for some and misery is for others, there must be multiplicity of souls. And if you argue that difference in bodies is the cause of the different experience, by one and the same soul, of pleasure and pain at the same time, then your argument must apply to the case of Saubhari and others, who assumed fifty bodies at the same time. But in their case, the experience through one body was the same as the one through other bodies. They experienced either pain alone or pleasure alone through the fifty bodies, but not pleasure through some bodies and pain through other bodies. The difference in bodies is not, therefore, the cause of determination of pleasure or pain. You may here ask, if the difference in bodies is not the cause of determination of pleasure or pain, should we not remember in this birth our experiences of previous birth, though that body is different from the present body. The answer is that the absence of recollection is due either to the non-origination of impressions (samskāra) or annihilation of the same.

There is another absurdity in holding the single-soul view. The phenomenon, that some souls are revolving in the wheel of samsāra taking thousands of births and deaths and that other souls like Śuka and Vāmadeva are liberated from bondage, would become untrue.

Moreover, one person should not approach another person as his guru or preceptor. There should be no disciple and no preceptor. And further, the creation of this world with inequalities would become meaningless. You are confronted with this phenomenon in the universe that some persons are happy, while others are very miserable, and yet others have mixed experience of pain and pleasure. This phenomenon cannot be explained by the advocates of the single-soul view. The basis for the creation of inequalities in life is the existence of multiplicity of souls and the difference in their karma.

Moreover, this single-soul view is in conflict with several texts which assert multiplicity of souls. You cannot argue that the texts refer to artificially existing difference (*aupādhika bheda*) or limiting external adjuncts in *samsāra*, such as god, man, beast, tree, etc., and internal adjuncts, such as mind, desire, anger, etc.; for, there is difference even in the state of liberation. Texts such as—“The eternally liberated souls always enjoy Him”¹ “By this means they attain my similarity”² “He is the ultimate goal for all released souls.”³ “In that divine world those souls shine forth being freed from all bondage of material existence.”⁴—teach the existence of multiplicity of souls even after liberation. The state of liberation is that state in which all limiting external adjuncts (*upādhi*) of godhood, manhood, beast-

1. सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः । *Puruṣasūkta*.

2. मम साधर्म्यमागताः । *B. G. 14-2*.

3. मुक्तानां परमा गतिः । *Mahābhārata Ānuśāsanikaparva 150-16*.

4. साद्युष्यं प्रतिपन्ना ये यस्मिन् पदे विराजन्ते मुक्ताः संसारबन्धनैः ।

hood, treehood, etc., and internal, of desire, anger, aversion, etc., are got rid of, and the souls shine forth in their natural qualities, with perfect similarity among one another and without cause for becoming dissimilar, but remaining for ever as separate entities. They shine forth as separate entities without any dissimilarity whatsoever, like golden cups, diamonds and grains of paddy which have perfect resemblance in shape and weight entitling them to be called as one in collective expressions such as 'this is one golden cup', 'this is one diamond', and 'this is one paddy'. For the above reasons, the single-soul theory is untenable.

Jiva-Brahma identity theory

The above discussion about the single-soul theory takes us on to the consideration of jiva-Īśwara identity theory with which it is very intimately connected. The advocates of this theory, in utter disregard of perception and quite against actual experience, impose on themselves Godhood and fancy that they themselves are God or Īśwara. Nay, they preach this identity to others as gospel truth. Since we have established difference in general and also multiplicity of souls, this theory *ipso facto* stands condemned. Nevertheless, we shall examine this theory in detail. We ask the advocates of this theory: "How do you know the existence of Godhood in or for the individual soul? Is it by virtue of sensuous perception, or is it by virtue of strong irrefutable reasoning, or is it by virtue of Vedāntic texts?" And there is no fourth alternative.

You cannot say it is known by sensuous perception; for the experience of all of us is that our selves are perceived as different from God. And if you ask us, how can you, without the knowledge of God, establish

the self as the very opposite of Godhood or Godhead as non-Godhood or non-Godhead, we answer as follows : The persons who have known God through scriptural texts have established that the self is different from God. Moreover, you need not necessarily cognise an object by direct perception beforehand in order to cognise in your self the difference or non-identity of that object. For example, you do not perceive Mount Meru by your senses. Nevertheless, you can safely assert that your self is different from Mount Meru. Naiyāyikas also say "In the perception of mutual non-existence, the substratum or adhikaraṇa must be perceptible. Hence the difference from ghouls etc. that exist in a pillar and so forth is also indeed perceived by the eye".¹ In the same way the difference from God (i.e.) non-Godhood, that exists in the individual soul is also perceivable, as the self is perceivable to the self. Even those who do not know God, know themselves to be impotent and powerless, non-Īśwara, non-God i.e. different from God, as and when their desires are not fulfilled and, as and when their miseries are not got rid of at their will. And you cannot argue that our experience is not, 'I am not God.' For, in respect of matters impossible to be accomplished by us, we do certainly experience that we are impotent and that we are not Almighty and therefore, different from God or, at any rate, that we do not possess the qualities of the Almighty. Thus we, embodied souls, entangled in karma, having several obstacles preventing the fulfilment of desires, being always affected by ills of body and mind, or by distress caused by beasts, birds, men, serpents, demons, etc. or by elements, water, fire, wind, lightning

1. अन्योन्याभावप्रत्यक्षे अधिकरण योग्यतैव अपेक्षिता ।

अतः स्तम्भादौ पिशाचादिभेदोऽपि चक्षुषा गृह्यते ॥ Muktaivali,

and so forth, hoping to get rid of them by wordly means or by means laid down in śāstras, do experience at every moment that our non-Godhood is independently and separately established by perception and mutual inference. And there can be no reason or propriety which can establish the identity of the jīva with Brahman.

By the above reasoning, the second alternative, namely, that the existence of Godhead for jīva is known by strong irrefutable reasoning, stands refuted. For, as in one's own body, in other bodies also, the existence of misery, pain and other insuperable ills, proves that the jīva is different from God. The non-Godhood is perceptible by each soul. The syllogism will be: the 'jīva is different from God, as he is a cetana'¹. The jīva-Īśwara identity theory is moreover vitiated by the logical fallacy called *Lādha* (i.e.) being refuted by more powerful means of knowledge. In this case, the knowledge derived from perception that the jīva is different from God being more powerful, the statement or logical proposition that the jīva is God, stands condemned.

The third alternative, namely, that the existence of Godhead or Godhood for the individual soul is known from Vedantic texts, is also untenable. For, some Vedantic texts declare specifically the difference between jīva and God. Some other texts teach the existence in Brahman of qualities diametrically opposite to those existing in the jīva. Yet other texts teach the existence of such relationship between Brahman and jīva as assumes the difference between jīva and Īśwara. And there is a fourth class of texts which teach the difference between them, existing even after the liberation of the embodied soul.

1, जीवः ईश्वरात् भिन्नः चेतनत्वात् ।

Texts of the first kind such as: "The Lord is pleased when the jiva sees the Lord as different from him".¹ "Know the soul to be different from its controller the paramatman."² "Two birds of inseparable companionship, namely the jiva and Iswara embrace the same tree, namely the body: one of the two, the jiva, eats the fruit of the tree, i.e., the result of karma, and the other, Íswara, shines forth without eating the same."³ "The ānandamaya or Íswara is different from that vijñānamaya or jiva".⁴ "The māyi, wonder-maker, God, creates this world out of this prakṛti or matter; and the other, that is, the jiva, is entangled in this prakṛti of wonderful powers".⁵ "Different from the embodied soul, kṣara, and different from the liberated soul, akṣara, is the supreme puruṣa, paramātman;"⁶—expressly declare the difference between jiva and Íswara.

Texts of the second kind such as: "He who is the knower of all things in all their aspects".⁷ "His superior powers are heard to be various and natural; and so are His knowledge, strength and deeds."⁸ "He

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1. जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशम् । Svet. Up. 4-7.
 2. पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा । ibid. 1-6.
 3. द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥ Mun. Up. 3-1-1.
 4. तस्माद्वा एतस्मात् विज्ञानमयात् अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः । Taitt. Up.
 5. अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वनेतत् तस्मिन्नन्यो मायया सन्निरुद्धः । Sv. Up. 4-9-10.
 6. उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः । B. G. 15-17.
 7. यस्सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् । Mun. Up. 1. 1. 9.
 8. पराऽस्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च । Svet. Up. 6-8.

is the cause of all and the Lord of the jīvas who are masters of their body, sense, organ, etc.”¹ “Him who is the supreme and highest Lord of all lords. Him who is the supreme and highest God of all gods. The highest Overlord of all lords.” “All jīvas are by nature servants of paramātmā.”² “If you desire to rise and evolve, and if you desire your own well-being, always remember that you are a servant and that God is your master.”³—teach that God is possessed of characteristics which are diametrically opposed to those of the jīva.

Texts of the third kind such as: “Just as your soul is within your heart, the all-pervasive soul is within your soul”.⁴ “He who resides in the jīva, whose body is the jīva”⁵—teach the body-soul relation ship between the jīva and Īśwara, which assumes the existence of difference between them.

Texts of the fourth kind such as: “The liberated soul enjoys both Brahman and its qualities”.⁶ “When the jīva realises Brahman, he casts off merit and demerit becomes pure, freed from the taint of prakṛti or matter and, after liberation, attains extreme likeness or similarity of Brahman”.⁷ “By this knowledge they

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1. स कारणं करणाधिपतिः । Svet. Up. 6-9.
 2. तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरं तं देवतानां परमं च दैवतम् । पतिं पतीनां परमं
ibid. 6-7.
 3. दासभूताः स्तुतः सर्वे ह्यात्मानः परमात्मनः । Pāṇḍarātra.
 4. स्वो जीवनेच्छा यदि ते स्वसत्तायां स्पृहा यदि ।
आत्मदास्यं हरेः स्वाम्यं स्वभावं च सदा स्मर ॥ Viṣṇuṭattva.
 5. एष ते आत्मान्तर्हृदये एवमयमन्तरात्मन् ।
 6. य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् यस्य आत्मा शरीरम् ॥ Br. Up. 5-7.
 7. सोऽस्तुते सर्वान् कर्मान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता । Taitt. Up.
 8. तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निरंजनः परमं साम्यमुपैति । Mun.
Up. 3-1-3.

attain my complete similarity”¹ teach the difference between jīva and Brahman after the jīva’s liberation.

When the truth, namely the difference between jīva and Brahman, is thus ascertained by perception and inference and is also supported by Vedantic texts as aforesaid, all expressions of co-ordination of jīva with Brahman in identical propositions and expressions of identity between the two, must be understood to mean, in the secondary sense, viz., the relationship between the owner and the object owned or body-soul relationship. If you do not admit this position, several texts which appear to declare identity of matter (prakṛti) with Brahman (like those which declare identity of jīva with Brahman) will, likewise, force you to accept the absurdity of identity of matter and Brahman. You have no escape. Vyāsa himself faces this point, namely expression of co-ordination of jīva and Brahman in identical proposition, and gives out the view of Kāśakṛtsna as his own with full approval.² “Since paramātmā abides within the jīva who forms His body, as his animating life principle, the words denoting the jīva really connote Brahman. So opines ācārya Kāśakṛtsna”³ We have already seen that the word ‘jīva’ denotes not the individual soul only but goes so far as to connote paramātmā. The sūtrakāra, Vyāsa, adopts the view of Kāśakṛtsna since he finds that only when interpreted in the exclusive sense of body-soul relationship, the jīva-Brahman identity is consistent with all texts

1. इदं ज्ञानं उपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः । B. G. 14-2.

2 & 3. अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः । स्वशरीरभूते जीवात्मनि आत्मतया अवस्थितेः जीवशब्देन ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनं इति काशकृत्स्नः आचार्यः मन्यतेस्म ॥

whether they teach omniscience and other auspicious qualities of Brahman, or whether they teach the means of liberation for the depressed jiva groaning in grief and ignorance, or whether they teach creation or re-absorption, or whether they teach the identity of the cosmos with Brahman.

The solitary stanza of the Gītā which appears to favour the jiva-Brahma identity theory and on which the advocates of that theory confidently rely, namely, “Oh! Bharata, know that all kṣetrajñas (individual souls) in all bodies also to be Myself¹” does not, in fact, favour them. For, in the light of the above discussion, the stanza means as follows: Know that the individual souls called kṣetrajñas, residing in all bodies of god, man, beast, tree, etc. having knowledge as their essence or chief characteristic, *are* Myself, that is to say, know that they are animated and permeated by Me as their life principle. Just as the body, by nature, being only an adjunct of the soul, is inseparable from it, and can, therefore, be expressed only in co-ordination with it in an identical proposition (sāmānādhikaranyā) so also the body and its soul, being by nature My adjuncts are inseparable from Me and can, therefore, be expressed only in co-ordination with Me in identical proposition. This residing of Brahman in all jivas as their permeating soul and life principle, is the basis for expression of co-ordination in identical propositions. A significant factor which we have to notice in respect of expressions in co-ordination in identical propositions in Chapter X of the Gītā, called vibhūtiyoga adhyāya is this. From stanzas 21 to 38 of

1. क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत । B. G. 13-2.

this chapter we find that the best objects of God's vibhūti are enumerated as specimens thereof and they are all expressed in co-ordination with Him. Before and after these stanzas, the ground for so expressing in co-ordination is stated: "I abide within all creatures who form My body, (i.e.) I reside in their hearts as their animating life principle."¹ This occurs before stanzas 21-38. And again, the stanza: "There are no creatures which are not animated by Me who am their life principle"² occurs immediately after these stanzas. Thus the ground stated, before and after, is that God is the antaryāmin or inner life of the things illustrative of His vibhūti. It is clear from this analysis that whenever Lord Kṛṣṇa identifies himself with another object, He does so as He is its inner life principle, that is to say, as that object is His body. Now, applying the same principle to the solitary stanza cited above, we find that the sentence: "Know that the kṣetrajña is also Myself"³ can only mean that the kṣetrajña or the soul is My body controlled by Me. It cannot mean, as the advaitin thinks, that Brahman is really identical with the soul. The jiva-Brahma identity theory cannot find any support in that stanza of the Gītā.

On the contrary, the whole teaching of the Gītā is based on the existence of multiplicity of souls. In the very beginning of the teaching, which commences from stanza 12 of Chapter II, a death-blow is given by Lord Kṛṣṇa to the above-mentioned two theories, namely, the single-soul theory and the jiva-Brahma identity

1. अहमात्मा गुडाकेश सर्वभूताशयस्थितः । B. G. 10-20.

2. न तदस्ति विना यत् स्यात् मयाभूतं चरचरम् । B. G. 10-39.

3. क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि । B. G. 13-3.

theory. The śloka means: "It is *not* true that I, the Overlord of all, did not exist in the past, before the present time, during beginningless time; it is not true Oh! Arjuna, that yourself and, these kings (i.e.) the rest of jīvas or kṣetrajñas controlled by Me, did not so exist in the past. And it is *not* true that I, yourself, and the rest of you (i.e.) all of us, will not, in future, exist during all time to come".¹ Just as it is indubitable that I, the Supreme Soul and Lord of all am eternal, in the same way, it is equally indubitable that you kṣetrajñas or individual souls are also eternal". We have closely to examine this śloka. Lord Kṛṣṇa Himself teaches that the multiplicity of souls is different from the Lord Himself and they are also different from one another. We have to bear in mind the context. Instead of having righteous indignation towards his enemies, towards ātatāyins, (villains, who sank into the lowest depths of moral degradation by trying to kill the Pāṇḍavas by fire, poison, etc., and by secret means), Arjuna had misplaced his affection and struck with pity, got himself confounded, and thought, in his ignorance, that fighting, which was really a duty cast on a kṣatriya (warrior) was a sin (adharma), and that it should be avoided at any cost. He became bewildered. He broke down in mind and body, and not knowing what to do, fell at the feet of the Lord to enlighten Him. To dispel the darkness of ignorance which spread over His disciple, Lord Kṛṣṇa begins to enlighten him from this śloka onwards. Lord Kṛṣṇa is omniscient, not ignorant. He teaches truth, not falsehood. He guides,

1. न त्वेवाऽहं जातु नासं न त्वं नेमे जनाधिपाः ।

न चैह न भवियामः सर्वे जयमतः परम् ॥ B. G. 2:12, ..

not misguides. The first point in his teaching is the eternity of individual souls as distinguished from the perishableness of their bodies. In the teaching of the eternity of souls, souls which are real entities and whose eternity is likewise real, the expressions "I", "you", "these souls", "all of us", aham, tvam, ime sarve, vayam, are used to emphasise the real distinction between Lord Kṛṣṇa and the individual souls and the real distinction among the individual souls themselves. The advaitin cannot argue that the distinction taught is one resulting from upādhi or limiting adjunct like the body, mind, etc.; for, according to him the multiplicity of souls is unreal. And, therefore, while teaching the existent truth, reference to non-existent and multiplicity of souls is improper. That the distinction of souls spoken to by Lord Kṛṣṇa is real, is borne out by texts such as : "The chief among the eternal souls, the intelligent among intelligent beings, chief (one) among many, who fulfils their desires".¹ It cannot be argued that the teaching of distinction is based on the appearance of distinction due to nescience, ajñāna, for, the Teacher is the parama-puruṣa, Supreme Being Himself, who sees things as they really are. Therefore, according to the advaitin, He has realised His own self to be 'attributeless', changeless, eternal knowledge', nirviśeṣa kūtastha nitya caitanya. By 'attributeless' (nirviśeṣa), the advaitin means, absence of distinction of any kind, i.e. distinction within oneself, distinction from allied things, and distinction from foreign or alien things. The distinctions existing within a tree, as root, branch, trunk, leaves, flowers, fruits are distinctions within oneself (svagata).

1. "नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानां एको बहुनां यो विदधाति क्रमान् ।

The distinction existing in one tree from another tree is distinction from allied things (sajātiya). And the distinction existing in a tree from stone, rocks, etc., is distinction from alien things (vijātiya). These three kinds of distinctions do not exist in Brahman. If Brahman were to possess attributes, it would be different from its own attributes. There would be distinction within itself. Since Brahman has no attributes, it is devoid of distinction within itself. If there were any soul other than Brahman, then Brahman would be different from that other soul and Brahman would have distinction from allied things. Since Brahman is the only soul, it is devoid of distinction from allied things. If there were any object other than Brahman, matter and the like, (i.e.) a non-soul substance, then Brahman would be different from that substance, i.e. it would have distinction from alien things. Since the whole universe or cosmos is unreal and since no substance other than Brahman really exists, Brahman is also devoid of distinction from alien things. By the above self-realisation, the Lord has risen from and shaken off all nescience and the effect thereof, and it is preposterous to say that the Lord sees difference consequent on His nescience and thereupon preaches difference to Arjuna. You cannot argue that the Lord, though possessed of the knowledge of oneness of self, ātmaikatvajñāna, may still, owing to vāsanā or tendency, continue to see the difference although the difference is sublated, as per the advaitin's theory of bādhita anuvṛtti (continuance of what is sublated or destroyed), in the same way as a man affected by cataract of the eye continues to see two or more moons in spite of his unshakable superior knowledge that the moon is only one; and in the same way as a

black cloth of ten yards folded into a book size and burnt afterwards, though appearing like a cloth with all its folds, does not serve the purpose of a cloth, the continuance of the sublated knowledge of difference does not entail bondage. This argument is untenable. For, mirage, etc., first mistaken for water and correctly known afterwards as mirage, though still deceptive in appearance does not induce a person to fetch water therefrom in a pot. In the same way, knowledge of difference though continuing even after sublation or destruction, cannot entail preaching to others as there is unshakable certainty that it relates to unreal things. But the phenomenon of cataract as an analogy is entirely different. In the case of a cataract, though the knowledge of oneness of the moon is unshakably certain, the cause of the appearance of double or treble moon, namely the cataract, is real; and it is a physical or physiological cause which cannot be sublated or destroyed by any amount of preaching or knowledge except by a physical operation of the eye. If the doctrine of 'continuance of what is sublated', *bādhitānuvṛtti*, were to be applicable to *Īśvara*, then, He must first be deemed to be an ignorant being who afterwards gained knowledge of *śāstras* and of oneness of self. It would be absurd for, it does violence to texts such as: "He who is the knower of all things in all their aspects"¹: "His knowledge, strength and powers are natural and are in a variety of ways:"² "Oh! Arjuna, I know all things of the past, present and future; but nobody knows Me."³

1. य सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद् । Mun. Up. 1.1.9

2. स्वामाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च । Svet. Up. 6.8.

3. वेदाऽहं समतीतानि वर्तमानानि चार्जुन ।

भविष्याणि च भूतानि मां तु वेद न कश्चन ॥ B. G. 7-26, 77

Moreover, even supposing for the sake of argument that the doctrine of 'continuance of what is sublated' is correct, and that the knowledge of multiplicity of souls still continues even after the attainment of unshakable knowledge of oneness of ātman in the case of Īśvara or in the case of the present hierarchy of advaitic preceptors who profess to spread the knowledge of oneness, the jiva-Brahman identity theory lands one in another absurdity. To whom does the preceptor, god or man, preach this wonderful theory? Remember that the preceptor is absolutely certain about his doctrine, namely that there is only one soul and that a second soul does not exist. If you answer that the preceptor preaches this doctrine to the reflections of his own image, namely Arjuna and others, disciples as they are called, the answer is absurd. For unless a person is insane he will not so preach. The preceptor in the case of the Gītā is not insane. He is aware that the reflections in the mirrors, etc. are *not* different from his own image. The doctrine of 'continuance of what is sublated' which we granted for the sake of argument, cannot be seriously maintained by the advocates thereof. The knowledge of difference must be destroyed *only* by the knowledge of oneness, just as light alone destroys darkness. If light cannot destroy darkness, nothing else can destroy it. If knowledge of oneness cannot destroy the illusion of difference nothing else can destroy it. According to the advaitin, the cause for the continuance of the (illusion) knowledge of difference after generation of unshakable knowledge of oneness, is the old bhēdavāsanā or tendency to see difference. This tendency being admittedly unreal, it has already disappeared by the origination of the knowledge of oneness.

According to him, illusion and other unreal things can be destroyed only by knowledge. If it is argued that even after the origination of the knowledge of oneness, this unreal *vāsanā* or tendency to see difference does not disappear, then nothing can destroy it and it must continue for ever. It is childish to argue that the knowledge of difference, which is the result of the *bhēda vāsanā*, the tendency to see difference, though uprooted, yet continues to exist; for it would be like trying to establish a result without a cause. The destroyer knowledge and the illusion cannot co-exist. The right knowledge and wrong knowledge about the same thing, cannot exist together. But in the case of the cataract analogy the false appearance of double and treble moon co-exists with the destroyer-knowledge, namely, that the moon is only one; for, the cause of the false appearance of two or more moons is a real, physical or physiological phenomenon called cataract, as opposed to the unreal nature of the cause of the knowledge of multiplicity of souls, viz. the *vāsanā* or tendency to see difference. The physical cataract, is not destroyable by any amount of knowledge, and therefore, it continues to exist, and to produce the false appearance of moons and it is co-eval with the true knowledge of oneness of the moon. In the case of the cataract, therefore, the continuance of false appearance of moons is not inconsistent; but the knowledge of false appearance of moons being affected by more powerful means of knowledge, does not produce a sentimental fear or any other result. In the case of the advaitic preceptor, the knowledge of multiplicity of souls having been completely destroyed by the knowledge of oneness along with the object of such perception (i.e.) manifold objects, and

along with its cause, namely, the tendency to see difference, all of them being unreal, — the doctrine of ‘continuance of what is sublated’, cannot be maintained. Therefore, in case of Īśvara and other modern preceptors who profess to teach jiva-Brahman identity, we have to conclude that if they possess knowledge of oneness, the seeing of multiplicity of souls and the resultant preaching to one of them cannot happen; and if they do not possess knowledge of oneness, then their nescience and its cause still subsist (i.e.) they being ignorant, they cannot preach the truth to others. Moreover, in the case of the preceptor, since he and his disciple are one, and since the true knowledge of oneness has already destroyed nescience and its effect, the preaching to a disciple is purposeless. For the above reasons, the jiva-Brahman identity theory is untenable even on the basis of the Gītā.

If we tackle the question as to the relation of the individual soul to Brahman in the light of the Vedānta sūtras of Vyāsa, we are driven to the same conclusion, namely that the jiva-Īśvara identity theory is untenable. Do the sūtras indicate anywhere that their author held Śaṅkara’s doctrine according to which the jiva is in reality identical with Brahman and is separated from it, as it were, only by a false surmise due to avidyā, or do they, rather, favour the view that the souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, constitute elements of its nature, and yet enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it? This question is, in fact, an aspect of the māyā question with which we shall deal at length later on. At present we shall deal with this aspect alone. To sum up :

(1) The sūtras in which the size of the soul is discussed, II. 3-20 onwards, can hardly be understood in

Śaṅkara's sense. They can hardly mean that the jīva is identical with Brahman. We have touched this point before.

(2) We have seen that the important sūtra¹ in which the jīva is distinctly said to be a part of Brahman, aṁśa, only deals with body-soul relationship. Śaṅkara most arbitrarily explains it to mean 'like a part', (aṁśa iva,) while Rāmānuja is able to take the sūtra as it stands. Part-whole relationship would be inconsistent in Śaṅkara's doctrine; for, according to him, both jīva and Īśvara are falsely imposed on the substratum of Brahman which is mere existence, by avidyā, like the illusion of a snake or floor-cleavage imposed on the substratum of a rope or earth. The part-whole relationship cannot exist between two things which are unreal. Although jīva and Īśvara may be said to spring from limiting adjuncts, small and big, they cannot be related as part and whole in the same way as a big pot and small pot are not related as part and whole. In that view, the śruti text: 'All creatures in this universe form a fourth part of Brahman',² and the Gītā text: 'the eternal jīvas are a part of me'³ will be inconsistent. The attributeless Brahman of homogeneous intelligence cannot be the whole of which jīvas are a part; for a pillar which is, by illusion, mistaken for a man cannot be considered to be a whole of which the man is a part. The context deals with the actual relationship existing between the jīva and Īśvara. The interpretation of the

1. अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकृत्तवादित्वमधीयत एके । Br. Sūtr. II, 3-42.

2. पादोऽस्य विश्वभूतानि । Puruṣa Sūkta.

3. ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः । B. G. 15-7.

word *aṁśa* as *aṁśa iva* to mean like a part, by giving a secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) while the primary meaning is possible, is not allowed in *śāstras*. Śaṅkara interprets the *sūtra*¹: 'And it is a mere apparent argument' [as translated by George Thibaut, Vol. XLVIII Sacred Books of the East Series]² as setting forth *pratibimbavāda* according to which the individual soul is merely a reflection of Brahman. But how can such an interpretation be reconciled with *sūtra* 42 *ibid* which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman? This *pratibimbavāda* in its turn presupposes *māyāvāda* for which there is no warrant anywhere in the whole range of Vedāntic texts. Invisible substances like Brahman can have no reflections; and invisible souls cannot be reflections.

(3) There are indications to be met with here and there in the *sūtras* which disprove the doctrine of absolute identity of Brahman and the individual soul. An important *sūtra* distinctly enunciates that Brahman is *adhika* (i.e.) additional to, or different from the individual soul, since scripture declares the two to be different.³ And analogously another *sūtra* lays stress on the fact that the individual soul, *śārira*, is not the *antaryāmin*, because the *Mādhyandinas* and the *Kaṇvas* speak of him in their texts as different.⁴ Yet another *sūtra* refers to the *śārira*, individual soul, and the *pradhāna* (matter) as two others (*itarau*) of whom the text

1. आमास एव च । Br. Sūt. II-3-49.

2. परमात्मनः आभासः प्रतिबिम्बभूतो जीवः ।

3. अधिकं तु मेदनिर्देशात् । Br. Sūt. II. 1-2.

4. उभयेऽपि हि मेदेनैवमधीयते । Br. Sūt. I. 2-21.

predicates distinctive attributes separating them from Brahman or the highest Lord.¹ The word 'itara,' 'the other one', appears in several other sūtras, viz. I-1-17; I-3-17; II-1-21 denoting the individual soul in contradistinction from Īśvara.² Śaṅkara's school wants to maintain that all these passages refer to an unreal distinction due to avidyā. But this is what every one should like to see proved, and the so-called proof offered in no case amounts to more than an arbitrary statement. In fact, in the beginning of his bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtras, at the end of Adhyāsa bhāṣya, Śaṅkara makes a very bold assertion: "All the Vedānta texts are studied and discussed for the attainment of knowledge of identity of Brahman and jīva. In this treatise, Śārīraka Bhāṣya, I shall interpret (and twist) passages in such a way as to fit in with my theory."³

(4) There is another important passage in the Vedānta sūtras concerning the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Three sūtras state the views of Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, and Kāśakṛtsna,⁴ as to the reason why in a certain passage in Bṛhadāraṇyaka

1. न च स्मर्तुमतद्धर्मामिलापाञ्छरीरश्च । Br. Sūt. I. 2-20.

2. नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः । Br. Sūt. I. 1-17.

इतरपरामर्शात् स इति चेत् न असंभवात् । Br. Sūt. I. 3-17.

इतरव्यपदेशात् हिताकरणादि दोषप्रसक्तिः । Br. Sūt. II. 1-21.

3. आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ताः आरभ्यन्ते । यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः ।

Śaṅkara Bhāṣya.

4. प्रतिज्ञा सिद्धेलिङ्गमाद्भ्यः । Br. Sūt. I. 4-20.

उत्कमिष्यत एवम्भावादित्यौडुलोमिः । Br. Sūt. I. 4-21.

अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः । Br. Sūt. I. 4-22.

Upaniṣad,¹ the characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed to the highest self. The siddhānta view is enunciated in the last of these sūtras. Kāśakṛtsna accounts for the denotation of Brahman by terms denoting the individual on the ground of the Brahman's permanent abiding in, or being the permanent abode of, the soul. By this permanent abiding, Śaṅkara understands the Lord's abiding as (i.e.), existing as, or in the condition of, the individual soul and thus wants to extract or extort from the sūtra an enunciation of his own view that the individual soul is nothing but the highest Self.² On the other hand, Rāmānuja, accepting Kāśakṛtsna's view as the siddhānta view, explains *avasthiti*, as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul as described in the *antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa*³. Rāmānuja's interpretation of the word *avasthiti* is uniform; for in five other places in the sūtras where the word occurs, it uniformly means "abiding within or permanent abode of, something."⁴

I do not propose to tire the readers by taking them through the labyrinths of various relevant *adhikaraṇas*

1. न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति आत्मा वा अरे दृष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः । मैत्रेय्यात्मनि स्वसरे दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञाते इदं सर्वं विदितम् ॥ Br. Up.
2. अविद्वत्तः परमेश्वरः जीवो नान्यः ।
3. य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् ... यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन् ... आत्मनोऽन्तरोयमयति ।
4. (i) अनवस्थितेरसंभवाच्च नेतरः । Br. Sat. I. 2-18.
 (ii) व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् । Br. Sat. II. 2-3.
 (iii) समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः । Br. Sat. II. 2-12.
 (iv) अवस्थिति वैशेष्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमात् हृदि हि । Br. Sat. II. 3-25.
 (v) यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् । Br. Sat. III. 3-31.

of the sūtras to disprove the theory of Śaṅkara. The above rapid survey of some of the important sūtras must be sufficient to convince them that the jīva-Īśvara identity theory is untenable even according to the Brahma sūtras.

There is a śloka¹ in Viṣṇupurāṇa which the advaitins try to interpret in favour of their theory. The sloka is interpreted by the advaitin thus : "Since the identity of the individual soul and paramātman or Supreme Being or Supreme Soul, is considered to be real, it is false to say that one substance does not become another substance." But this interpretation assumes the very same thing which has to be proved. We have already seen that perception, inference and scripture prove the very opposite of this theory. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitin interprets the śloka consistently with all means of knowledge as follows : "Since one substance, namely the individual soul cannot become another substance (i.e.) the Supreme Soul, it is false to assert that there is real identity between the two ātmas, jivātma and paramātma."² The above discussions establish beyond doubt that the jīva-Īśvara identity doctrine cannot be maintained.

We thus see that the individual souls are infinite in number in each kind and that they are different from God and from one another. The definition

1. परमात्मात्मनोर्योगः परमार्थ इतीष्यते ।

मित्येतदन्यद्द्रव्यं हि नैति तद्द्रव्यतां यतः ॥ V. P.

2. परमात्मात्मनोर्योगः=ऐक्यं परमार्थः इतीष्यते - अतः अन्यत् द्रव्यं तत् द्रव्यतां नैति इत्येतन्मिथ्या ॥

3. यतः अन्यत् द्रव्यं=जीवभूतद्रव्यं, तत् द्रव्यतां=परमात्मद्रव्यतां नैति, अतः परमात्मात्मनोः योगः परमार्थः इतीष्यते इति यद् एतन्मिथ्या ।

common to all the three kinds of souls, namely, embodied souls, liberated souls and eternally liberated souls will be, "being subservient to God and being a knower".¹ If you omit "being a knower" and say only "subservient to God", the definition will apply to matter also and would become one of too wide application; and if you omit "being subservient to God" and say only "being a knower", the definition would again become one of too wide application, as it would apply to God who is also a knower. Hence both the epithets must form the definition. These three kinds of souls have consciousness called *dharmabhūtajñāna*, attribute-intelligence, which resembles its abode *dharmijñāna*, called substantive intelligence or *ātmasvarūpa* on three points, (1) in being an eternal substance, (2) in being *aśaḍa* or self-luminous, and (3) in being blissful. If that be so, what is the difference between the two? The difference between them is as follows: (1) The *ātmasvarūpa* (being of the *ātman*) is *dharmi*, qualified substantive, (2) it is incapable of contraction or expansion, (3) it is self-luminous or luminiferous for its own sake, (i.e.) the benefit of luminosity is for the *ātman* alone. It is not able to illuminate objects other than its own self. (4) It is atomic in size, *aṇu*. On the other hand, the attribute-intelligence is (1) *dharma* or attribute, (2) is capable of contraction or expansion, (3) is not luminiferous for itself, but it is so, for the *ātman*: that is to say, the benefit of its luminosity is not for itself, but for the *ātman* in which it inheres, and (4) is all-pervading. "Just as a flame illuminates only itself, and its light illuminates itself and other objects, in the same way, there are points of similarity and dissimilarity

1. शेषत्वे सति ज्ञातृत्वम् ।

between the attribute consciousness and substantive consciousness".¹

The consciousness of some souls is always all-pervading, the consciousness of some others is always limited, and the consciousness of yet others is sometimes limited and at other times unlimited. The consciousness of the eternally liberated souls always comprehending the being (svarūpa) form, qualities and the vibhūti or glory of God, is always all-pervading. The consciousness of embodied souls, being liable to contraction and expansion according to karma, is always limited. The consciousness of those souls who are liberated by the grace of God, is limited before liberation and all-comprehending after liberation.

Consciousness is eternal

If consciousness is eternal, how do you explain, it may be asked, our experiences and consequent expressions in words such as, 'consciousness is produced in me now'; 'my consciousness disappeared at that time'? The answer is that we say so, because of the ebb and flow of consciousness through the senses, by spreading over and receding from objects of sense (i.e.) because of the expansion and contraction of consciousness. When consciousness expands, we say it is produced and when it contracts, we say it is lost or has disappeared. Since scriptural texts such as: "He (the liberated soul) sees everything (i.e.) becomes infinitely intelligent"² referring to the liberated soul, say that all souls are by their very nature capable of comprehending all things

1. स्वस्यैव भासको दीपः स्वात्मनोन्यत्र च प्रभा ।

एवंमेदोस्ति साम्येऽपि ज्ञानयो धर्मधर्मिणोः ॥

2. 'सर्वे ह पश्यः पश्यति' । 'स चानन्त्याय कल्पते' ।

and substances, i.e., consciousness of all souls is by nature all-comprehensive. And why it becomes very limited in the case of embodied souls is explained in Viṣṇupurāṇa: "The third power called avidyā or karma enwraps the second power called kṣetrajñā or jīva. Overpowered and eclipsed by karma, the embodied souls, are of varying degrees of intelligence and are subject to the miseries of material existence. The intelligence or consciousness in stones, rocks and blocks of wood which have no breaths, is the lowest. It is great in vegetable kingdom, it is greater in reptiles or creeping creatures and, greater still, in birds. It is still greater in quadrupeds; still greater in human beings, and is greater still in gods of several grades".¹ As we have already noticed, the words, śakti, śarīram, and amśa are synonymous. Consciousness spread² through the gate-ways of knowledge, namely the senses. And as Manu says: "In the case of embodied souls, if one of the senses flows away, intelligence also flows away correspondingly, like water from the bottom of a leather bag",³. Since consciousness ebbs and flows through the senses, its contraction or expansion is the basis for saying that it is produced or that it disappears. Consciousness, therefore, is eternal.

1. अविद्या कर्मसंज्ञान्या तृतीया शक्तिरिष्यते । यया क्षेत्रज्ञशक्तिः सा वेष्टिता नृपसर्वग ॥ संसारतापानखिलान् अवोप्नोति हि संततान् । तयातिरोहितत्वाच्च शक्तिः क्षेत्रज्ञसंज्ञिता ॥ सर्वभूतेषु भूपाल तारतम्येन लक्ष्यते । अप्राणवत्सु स्वल्पासा स्थावरेषु ततोधिकः ॥ सरीसृपेषु तेभ्योपि हि अतिशक्त्या पतत्रिषु । पतत्रिभ्यो मृगास्तेभ्यः तच्छक्त्या पशवोऽधिकः ॥ पशुभ्यो मनुजाश्चातिशक्त्या पुंसः प्रभाविताः ॥ (प्रभाविताः—ग्रभूताः कृताः) तेभ्योपि नाग-गन्धर्वयक्षस्था देवता नृप ॥ V. P. VI. 7. 61-66.

2. इन्द्रियाणां हि सर्वेषां यथेकं करतोन्द्रियम् ।
तेनास्य कुरुति प्रज्ञा एतेः पादादिवोदकम् ॥ Manusmṛti.

Consciousness is one.

While consciousness is only one, it appears to be many because of its radiation through several senses. It does not proceed through one gateway alone. It proceeds through the sense of sight, hearing, smell, touch and taste and cognises colour, sound, and so on. As sensuous perception varies, consciousness also appears to be many.

Is consciousness a substance or a quality?

Consciousness may be said to be a substance (dravya) because it is the abode of activity (kriyā) and qualities (guṇas) and because it is self-luminous (ajāḍa). By kriyā or activity is meant here expansion and contraction: and by guṇa or quality is meant contact with and separation from objects of sense, etc. The definition of dravya (substance) is given by śāstrakāras as follows: "That which is the abode of kriyā or activity is dravya or substance". "That which is the abode of guṇa or quality is dravya or substance".¹ Since consciousness is the abode of activity and quality, this will satisfy the requirements of both the definitions. And added to them is self-luminosity which, by itself, will independently establish substancehood. For, among jaḍa things, there are substances as well as non-substances; but among ajāḍa things, there is no non-substance or adravya. Therefore, we may prove that consciousness is a substance by the syllogism: "Consciousness is a substance (dravya) because it is self-luminous; whatever is self-luminous is a substance, as, for example, the soul".² And you may ask: "If consciousness is a substance, how can it be said to be a quality or adjunct of another substance, namely, the soul?". "The answer is

1. क्रियाश्रयो द्रव्यम् । गुणाश्रयो द्रव्यम् ।

2. ज्ञानं द्रव्यं अजडत्वात् । यत् अजडं तत् द्रव्यं । यथा आत्मा ।

that it can be said to be a quality or adjunct of the soul, because it is eternally inherent in the soul. Yāmunācārya says : "Since consciousness exists outside its substratum, namely the soul, it may be said to be a substance ; and since it is inherent in the soul and supported by it, it can be said to be a quality or adjunct of the soul,¹ in the same way as the light of luminous objects which exists both outside the luminous objects and which is also inherent in and supported by those objects, may, on that account, be called both a substance (dravya) and a quality or adjunct (guṇa.)

It may be asked : if consciousness is self-luminous, should it not manifest itself in states of deep sleep and swoon ? The answer is that since there is no radiation of consciousness in those states, it does not manifest itself ; for consciousness manifests itself to its substratum only when it cognises external objects. During those states of deep sleep, swoon, etc., consciousness gets contracted by the influence of tamoguṇa, like the obstructed rays of gems, and does not, therefore, manifest itself.

Consciousness is favourable (anukula).

When consciousness manifests itself (i.e.) when it comprehends external objects and shows them to its substratum, the soul, it is favourable, that is to say, since the objects comprehended or cognised by consciousness appear as favourable, the cognising consciousness is said to be favourable to its substratum. It may be asked : if the nature of consciousness is to be always favourable, then, how is it that it is unfavourable or unpleasant when it comprehends or cognises objects such as poison, enemy, sword, and other dreadful objects ?

1. आश्रयादन्यतो वृत्तेः आश्रयेण समन्वयात् ।

द्रव्यत्वं च गुणत्वं च ज्ञानस्यैवोपपद्यते ॥ Siddhitraya.

The answer is that unpleasantness or unfavourableness of consciousness is not natural, but it is the result of the false identity of the soul with the body due to previous karma and to the absence of true knowledge, namely, that everything is animated by the universal soul and that everything is His body and *vibhūti*. By nature, all substances are really favourable to the self and unfavourableness is only imposed, since the whole cosmos is the body of *Īśvara* as stated already. When viewed as the body of *Īśvara*, all objects will be cognised as favourable. This natural favourableness of all substances is due to the will of God. Therefore, all substances are favourable for *Īśvara*, for eternally liberated souls and for liberated souls. To the embodied souls, they will be either wholly unfavourable, or only slightly favourable, according to their *karma* with the variation of time, place and person. Fire is favourable in cold season and in cold countries; and for the same person it is unfavourable in hot season, and in hot countries. The same object, a cow or a horse becomes favourable to one from the moment when it becomes one's own. Just as milk which was unfavourable to a person while affected by jaundice becomes favourable to him after cure. Just as a prison-house which was once unfavourable to a King's son, becomes favourable after his release and after his knowledge that the whole kingdom, including the prison-house, now belongs to his father and is his *vibhūti*, in the same manner, the *mukta*, after his release, realises that the cosmos is his Lord's universe and His *vibhūti* animated and sustained by Him and therefore finds the whole cosmos favourable to him. The self (one's self) i.e. the being of the self (*ātmasvarūpa*) on the other hand, is by the will of God, always favourable to itself. Hence, we say love of self is instinctive in every being. It is owing to the false identity of the always favourable self

with the body and owing to the influence of *karma*, that ignorant persons find this detestable body favourable to them. Worldly objects, therefore, viewed in the aspect of being unfavourable under the influence of *karma*, are fit to be abandoned by a *mumukṣu* or one desirous of liberation; and viewed in the aspect of natural favourableness are fit to be taken by a *mukta* or liberated soul. If overpowered by the two demons, egoism (*aḥamkāra*) or 'I-maker', and mine-maker or *mamakāra* "I covet and I acquire anything for my own sake," it is certainly unfavourable; but if, after getting knowledge of truths, I consider all objects to be subservient only to the Lord, and to be His *vibhūti*, then they become favourable to me. One and the same object in the world causes pain to one, pleasure to another, jealousy to a third, anger to a fourth and so on; and to the same person, the object which gave delight before, gives pain afterwards. There is no worldly object which invariably gives pain or pleasure for all embodied souls at all times. If the effects of things depended on their own nature, all things would always be either favourable or unfavourable. Therefore, for the embodied souls, things become favourable or unfavourable according to their previous *karma* and by the will of God, although by the same will of God all things are by nature favourable and although all consciousness is naturally favourable in consequence.

We have thus seen that the individual souls are of three kinds, that they are infinite in number in each kind, that the soul though pure by nature, gets nescience by contact with *acit* or matter, that the single-soul theory is untenable, that consciousness of all souls is eternal and one only, that consciousness is both a substance and quality, and that it is, by nature, favourable to the self.

CHAPTER III

ACIT OR MATTER

We have enumerated the three-fold truth as (1) cit (bhoktā) (2) acit (bhogyam) and (3) Īśvara (preritā) the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the controller of both.¹ In the foregoing two chapters we have examined the being (svarūpa) and characteristics (svabhāva) of the cit, ātmā, jīva, jīvātmā, self, cetanā, kṣetrajñā, pratyagātmā, or individual soul, as he is called. Now, we shall examine the being (svarūpa) and characteristics svabhāva of the acit tatva. Like the cit the acit tatva is also of three kinds—(1) combined satva (miṣra satva) (2) pure satva (śuddha satva) and one devoid of satva (satvaśūnya). Combined satva is that species of acit, (1) which is possessed of three qualities, satva, rajas and tamas and which is a veil to the knowledge and bliss of embodied souls, (2) which causes their nescience, (3) which is eternal, (4) which is, as it were, a toy for Īśvara to play with, (5) which produces changes (vikāra) similar or dissimilar with variation of place and time, and (6) which is denoted by various names, prakṛti, avidyā, māyā, pradhāna and avyakta.

1. Prakṛti veils knowledge.

Combined satva is possessed of three qualities, satva, rajas and tamas. It is without a cause, without origination and without dissolution, but is the cause of

1. मोक्ष भोग्यं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा ।

this cosmos.¹ The body of an embodied soul is possessed of three qualities and is a transformed condition of prakṛti.²

“The three qualities satva, rajas and tamas are the inherent, inseparable and essential characteristics of prakṛti”.³ They are not substances (dravyas) as Sāṅkhyas say. they are not identical with prakṛti as Śaṅkara says. According to Śaṅkara, “the word ‘guṇa’ is a technical term and does not denote a quality like colour, taste etc. inherent in a substance (draya). The usual difference between a substance and its quality is not meant here. Like qualities they are always dependent.”⁴ But, according to Rāmānuja, they are the inherent essential characteristics of prakṛti peculiar to it.⁵ Misery etc., though peculiar to an embodied soul are not his essential characteristics as they are due to karma; and substancehood (dravyatva) and other qualities are common to souls and non-souls and are not peculiar to souls only. But these three qualities of prakṛti are peculiar to prakṛti alone and are its essential characteristics. It may be objected that the qualities of satva, rajas and tamas are not perceived by sense-perception like sound, colour, etc., and are beyond the reach of inference, as they are always

1. त्रिगुणं तत् जगद्योनिः अनादि प्रमवाप्ययम् । V. P. 1-2-21.

2. त्रिगुणं कर्मिणां क्षेत्रं प्रकृतेः रूपमुच्यते ।

3. सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति गुणाः प्रकृतिर्जम्बाः ।

निवर्धन्ति नद्वयो देहे देहिनमव्ययम् ॥ B. G. 14-5.

4. गुणाः इति परिभाषिकः शब्दः न रूपादिकन् द्रव्याश्रिताः गुणाः न गुणगुणिनोः अन्यत्वं भवति विवक्षितम् । तन्नान् गुणा इव नित्यपरतन्त्राः ॥ Com. on B. G. 14-5.

5. स्वस्यानुबन्धिनः स्वभावविशेषाः ।

beyond the reach of the senses. And the teaching of guṇas of prakṛti which are not knowable otherwise is vain like the teaching of the teeth in the crow. This objection is met as follows : Although the three qualities are not knowable by perception, they can be generally inferred from their respective results namely, intelligence activity and inertia which are knowable by preception, for there is no effect without a cause. And the special causes of those results are known by *āgamas* (authoritative texts) or *śāstras*. The teaching is not vain ; for, like the teaching of the peculiar properties of an antidote for poison, it is intended for the taking or rejecting of things. The qualities are dormant in the praḷaya (deluge) state of prakṛti and at that time, they do not produce their respective results, happiness, misery and so on. But in the transformed condition of prakṛti they manifest themselves and produce happiness, misery etc. just as smell etc. manifest themselves in flowers, fruits and so on. They entangle souls in bodies.

This prakṛti veils or conceals the intelligence, bliss etc. of the embodied souls only, by virtue of two of its three guṇas, namely rajas and tamas. But it does not veil the intelligence and bliss of liberated souls and of the eternally liberated souls who assume, at will, material (prākṛta) bodies for helping humanity and for serving God on earth. 'Enamoured of and bewildered by the object of enjoyment (i. e.) prakṛti, he (the embodied soul) grieves ;'¹ "Under the influence of beginningless avidyā, he is entangled in samsāra".² Prakṛti veils or conceals the intelligence or consciousness and bliss of embodied souls, more or less as kinds of body vary. Some beings appear to be more conscious and some beings appear to be less

1. अनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः । Muṇḍ. Up. 3-1-2.

2. अनादिमायया सुप्तः ।

unconscious. This is due to the fact that caitanya or jñāna which is never absent in anything, yet manifests itself in various ways and degrees. The degree of this manifestation is determined by the nature and development of the mind and body in which the soul is bound. Soul remains the same; the mind and body change. The manifestation of consciousness is more pronounced as ascent is made from the mineral kingdom to man and gods. In the mineral world, caitanya manifests itself as the lowest form of sentiency. The sentiency of plants is more developed though it is dormant consciousness. This is further manifested in those micro-organisms which are in intermediate stages between the vegetable animal kingdoms and have a psychic life of their own. In the animal world, consciousness is more centralised and complex. It reaches a very high development in man who possesses all psychic functions such as cognition, perception, feeling, will and so on. It is higher still in gods. Even the whole hierarchy of gods from the four-headed Brahman downwards possess only this prakṛta body and therefore, have their intelligence and bliss clouded. Thus it is in the nature of prakṛti to veil the intelligence of all embodied souls. As Browning says "Some think creation is meant to show Him forth, I say it is meant to hide Him all it can".

The above passage of Browning will help us in understanding the veiling nature of prakṛti or the world about us. Although in a certain sense we may, from the wonderful creation of God, vaguely understand and admire His glory, omniscience, omnipotence and other powers, yet our knowledge is only a drop in the infinity and our ignorance of the unexplorable infinity will ever remain the same, so long as we are entangled in saṁsāra. The inspired saying of Browning correctly depicts

the nature of prakṛti as described by Rāmānuja. "She hides from us the real nature of God, causes false knowledge and ever tempts us to enjoy her."¹

Prakṛti causes nescience.

Prakṛti not only veils correct knowledge but also causes nescience in the embodied soul. Nescience is misapprehension or false knowledge (viparīta jñāna). Prakṛti causes the false knowledge that the body is the self or ātman, that the ātman is independent while he is really dependent, that the ātman is subservient (śeṣa) to beings other than Iśwara, that beings other than Sriman Narayana are lords, that power, riches, wealth etc. are the ultimate goal (puruṣārtha) to be reached, and that what is really not the means is the means for the goal to be attained. Besides concealing true knowledge, Prakṛti causes the above false knowledge in embodied souls.

Prakṛti is eternal.

Prakṛti is eternal (nitya). It has neither beginning nor end; for scriptural texts so declare. "The beginningless and endless prakṛti is the mother of all creatures and the world".² "The beginningless prakṛti".³ "The non-intelligent and subservient prakṛti which is eternal and ever-changing".⁴ "Prakṛti of eight forms which produces changes, which is without intelligence and which is beginningless and eternal."⁵

1. भगवत्स्वरूपतिरोधानकरी, विपरीतज्ञानजन्तो स्वविषयायाश्च भोग्यबुद्धेर्जननीम् ।
Gadya traya.

2. गौरनायन्तवती सा जनित्री भूतमाविनी । (Mātrika Upaniṣad).

3. अजमेकम् । Taitt. Up.

4. अचेतना परार्था च नित्या सततविक्रिया ।

5. विकारजननीमज्ञां अष्टरूपामजां ध्रुवाम् ।

Prakṛti is God's plaything

Prakṛti is a toy for Īśwara to play with, that is to say, it is an instrument for Īśwara for his play, namely, creation, sustenance and reabsorption of the universe unto Him. "Look at the activity of Īśwara who plays, as it were like an infant"¹. "The inconceivable and unquestionable Īśwara sports with the elements like a child with toys"². "Oh : Hari, you sport with play-balls of jīvas, made of threads of karma, which bound and rebound"³. "This prakṛti with three qualities of satwa, rajas and tamas, is set on foot by Me engaged in sport and hence it is insuperable by all."⁴ The word daīvi is derived from the root 'div', to sport.

This aspect namely that God sports by the creation etc. of the universe is dealt with by Vyāsa.⁵ The objection raised against God's creation of the world, is that He can have no motive in the strict sense of the word.⁶ An ordinary being with commonsense is seen to do an act, prompted by some motive. The motive may be two-fold, to benefit himself or to benefit others. Since Īśwara has no desire to satisfy, He cannot create the world to benefit himself; nor can He benefit others by so doing.

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1. क्रीडतो बालकस्येव चेष्टां तस्य निशमय ।
 2. अप्रमेयोऽनियोज्यश्च यत्र कामगमो वशी ।
मोदते भगवान् भूतैः बालः क्रीडनकैरिव ॥ (V. P. 1-2-20).
 3. त्वं न्यञ्चद्विरुद्धञ्चद्विः कर्मसूत्रोपादितैः ।
हरे विहरसि क्रीडाकन्दुकैरिव जन्तुभिः ॥ (Mahābhārata).
 4. दैवी वृक्षा गुणनयी मन माया दुरत्यया । B. G. 7-14.
ममैवा गुणमयी सत्वरजस्तनोमयी माया यस्मान् दैवी देवेन क्रीडा प्रवृत्तेन
मयैव निर्मिता तस्मान् सर्वैः दुरतिक्रमा ।
 5. लोक्त्वा तु लीलाकैवल्यम् । Br. Sū. 2-1-33.
 6. न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् । Br. Sū. 2-1-32.

For, benefiting others is an act of love, mercy and pity. Here, it may be objected that the creation of this miserable universe with births, disease, old age, poverty, deaths, hell and other ills, is no act of mercy. If it were an act of mercy the universe would be one of unalloyed bliss. Therefore, there is no motive for this creation. This objection is answered by the next sutra.¹ Although God has all His desires satisfied and He shines forth in fullness, sport or play is the only motive for creating at will this wonderful universe of manifold souls and matter. Sport is that kind of activity, pleasant for the time being, undertaken without intention of any special fruit resulting therefrom. The motive for God in creating this universe is no other than sport which is pleasant for the time being, like gambling, card play, chess-play, etc. for kings, and like the building of houses of sand for children. The objection raised and the answer given by Vyāsa would be quite inconsistent if you hold the view of Śankara that the creation of the world is not real, and that Brahman under the influence of avidyā creates the illusion of this cosmos with various names and forms.² If really, as Śankara says, the universe is caused by illusion, the answer to the objection ought to be that the act, done without any motive by a person in illusion, is unobjectionable. The hallucination of silver in pearl oyster or oyster-shell or of several moons in a single moon and other similar hallucinations are not actuated by motives. A man affected by jaundice does not tear his cloth or burn his house prompted by motives. But, according to Scriptures, God, in His sankalpa, wills: 'Let me become many', and then creates this universe. In Śankara's case,

1. लोक्वत्तु लीला कैवल्यम् । Br. Sut. 2-1-33.

2. न चेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिभ्रुतिः अविद्याकल्पितानामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वात् ।

that should not occur; for no person first proposes to himself: 'Let me become deluded' and then gets into an illusion. Moreover, if *Īśvara* is omniscient, he would not consider as sport the creation of *samsāra* which is an evil of his own creation and if you say He is ignorant, that would do violence to the texts which preach His omniscience. You cannot argue that He creates the universe in order to get rid of the evil by attaining true knowledge. For in that case, the creation of the world is no sport. The action of a patient to get at some medicine for the cure of his disease, cannot be considered as sport; because a sport is an end in itself, but not a means for an end. It is improper to say that *Īśvara* who is million times wiser than the Vedas promulgated by Him, would get *viveka* or discriminating knowledge consequent on his creation, for, the *śrutis* declare that God in His omniscience created this universe. "He is the knower of all in every aspect. He unfolded himself into this gross cosmos with varieties of souls and matter with names and forms."¹ If *Īśvara* should create this world for getting rid of his own bondage and hallucination, let Him by all means create only those objects which are conducive to the break-down of his own bondage; but why should He create objects like wealth, desire and so on which only strengthen the bondage. Moreover, (i) is sport the cause of hallucination; or (ii) is sport the effect of hallucination; or (iii) is sport itself hallucination?

The first alternative cannot be maintained; for it is improper to say that one acquires illusion as a result of sport.

1. यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् तस्मादितत् ब्रह्म नामरूपमज्ञं च जायते । Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-9.

The second alternative is also untenable ; for the original proposal (prathama saṅkalpa) to create is not to sport, and similarly subsequent activities may be illusions without being sports.

The third alternative is likewise untenable ; for the delusion of seeing several moons is not considered to be a sport. And you cannot argue that Īśvara without Himself being deluded sportively deludes others, for according to your doctrine, Īśvara cannot see duality and multiplicity without delusion ; and even if He sees others, He is sure they are not different from Him. And Brahman cannot have any sport, because it is mere attributeless existence. If He is Īśvara, the Overlord and Supreme Soul, He sees other souls not different from Him, and therefore, His activities in causing births, deaths, diseases, old age, and entry into hells are certainly not sports. For the above reasons, this adhikaraṇa of Vyāsa dealing with creation of this universe and assigning no motive for God except sport, is inconsistent in Śaṅkara's doctrine.

Prakṛti produces changes.

Prakṛti produces changes similar or dissimilar (sarūpa pariṇāma or virūpa pariṇāma), with variation of place and time. Variation of place means places where there is inequality of guṇas in differing proportions, and places where there is no inequality but equal proportions of guṇas. There is inequality of guṇas in places where prakṛti is gross and ready to produce effect. In other places the guṇas are equal. In places where there is no inequality of guṇas, prakṛti undergoes changes which are similar, and where there is inequality it undergoes changes which are dissimilar. By similar changes are meant subtle changes incapable of being

expressed for want of names and forms; and by dissimilar changes are meant gross changes capable of being expressed owing to the presence of names and forms¹. The changes of prakṛti in its subtle state are similar, and the changes from mahat downwards are dissimilar.

Variation of time means time of dissolution and time of creation. During the time of dissolution or deluge, prakṛti is indistinguishable (avibhakta) tamas and as there is no inequality of guṇas during that time, the changes which it undergoes are everywhere similar. But at the time of creation, being regulated and controlled by God, it becomes distinguishable (vibhakta) tamas, and becoming ready to produce results gets unevenness of qualities and begins to undergo dissimilar changes. As prakṛti is by nature ever-changing, its changes are inborn. Distinction is made on the basis of subtle and gross states. Therefore there is no state or condition of prakṛti when it does not undergo any change whatsoever.

Prakṛti has various names.

The various names given to prakṛti are significant, as each name connotes each characteristic.

It is called prakṛti as it produces changes. The word prakṛti in Sanskrit means 'cause'. The primordial prakṛti, unmanifest avyakta, potentiality of natural power, '*Natura Naturans*', is the cause of results, but is not caused by anything. In Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* also, the word is used to denote cause². The *Sūtrakāra*, Vyāsa, uses the word in the sense of 'material cause'

1. गुणसाम्यमनुद्रिक्तमन्यूनम् ।

2. मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः ।

3. अनिर्गुणः प्रकृतिः । 1-4-30.

of the universe' in the sūtra where Brahman is said to be the material cause.¹ Prakṛti is so called, as it produces mahat and other changes, vikṛti, from itself.

Prakṛti is also called avidyā. The word 'avidyā' is usually used in different meanings. One is a negative aspect, absence of vidyā or knowledge (vidyā abhāva.) The second is non-vidyā, other than vidyā (vidyā itarat). This is a positive aspect. The word 'avidyā' is used in the sense of karma or action in Īśāvāsyopaniṣad. "The person who knows both vidyā and avidyā, i.e. the requisite knowledge for reaching the goal of Brahman and also the duties enjoined according to caste and order, transgresses, by his avidyā i.e. by performing the said actions, the mṛtyu (prācīna karma) or the obstacle for the origination of the said knowledge, and by that knowledge, attains Brahman."² The second meaning of the word is thus karma or action. The third meaning is 'what is hostile to' or what causes hindrance to knowledge. Any of these three meanings must be determined by the context. Here the word avidyā denoting prakṛti is used in the third meaning as it is a hindrance to knowledge. We have already remarked that Prakṛti is a veil to the knowledge and bliss of embodied souls.

Prakṛti is called māyā only because it causes wonderful creations, but not because it is unreal as Saṅkara says. The māyā doctrine is a favourite theory

1. प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञा दृष्टान्तानुपरोधार् । Br. Sūt. 1-4-23.

2. विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सः । अविद्या मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्या-
मृतमश्नुते ॥ अत्राविद्याशब्दाभिहितं वर्णाश्रमविहितं कर्म । अविद्या कर्मणा,
मृत्युम् ज्ञानोत्पत्तिविरोधिप्राचीनं कर्म । तीर्त्वा अपोह्य, विद्या-ज्ञानेन,
अमृतम् ब्रह्म, अश्नुते प्रप्नोतीत्यर्थः ॥

of Śaṅkara on which he bases his whole theory of the universe. In order to understand the doctrine of māyā of Śaṅkara, we have to peep into his chief tenets for a while.

Saṅkara's view of maya is unreal.

In Śaṅkara's doctrine, we have to distinguish a two-fold knowledge about Brahman, a higher knowledge which leads to immediate absorption, on the death of the individual soul, in Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner to an exalted state of individual existence. In his doctrine the solemn words of the upaniṣad: "From whence there is no return"¹ and the solemn words² with which Vyasa's treatise concludes are meant to describe not the ever-lasting condition of him who has reached final release, the highest goal of all souls, but merely a stage on the way of the soul which is engaged in the slow progress of gradual release – a stage which is indeed greatly superior to any mundane state of existence but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious saṁsāra and as such, remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti. This presupposes the existence of two Brahman – a lower and a higher Brahman. Intimately connected with this doctrine of two Brahman is the doctrine of māyā or avidyā or principle of illusion, by association with which the highest Brahman, in itself transcending all qualities, appears as lower Brahman or Īśvara. The attributeless, homogeneous intelligence namely Brahman is alone real. And the rest, (i.e.) this universe with multiplicity of souls and matter, as knower, known and knowledge, are all superimposed on Brahman, i.e. they are unreal (mithyā). And unreality

1. न च पुनरावर्तते । Ch. Up. 8-15-1.

2. अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् । Br. Sū. 4-4-6.

is defined as "that which first appears and is afterwards sublated by correct knowledge of the object,"¹ as a serpent appearing in the substratum of a rope. Owing to a fault or defect, the unreality of the cosmos with variety of soul and matter is superimposed on the substratum of Brahman; and this unreality becomes sublated by the correct knowledge of Brahman. The fault or defect is the beginningless avidyā which veils the real nature of Brahman. This veiling avidyā cannot be said to be being (*sat*) existing, or non-being (*asat*) non-existing. It is not *sat*, being or existing, because it becomes sublated by correct knowledge of Brahman, and what becomes sublated is not *sat*, being or existing.² Neither is it *asat* non-being, non-existing, because it appears³; that which appears cannot be said to be absolutely non-existing. This avidyā, is therefore indefinable (*anirvacaniya*). It is got rid of by the knowledge that the attributeless, homogenous knowledge-substance, namely, Brahman, is absolutely identical with jīva or soul, that Brahman alone is real, and that the cosmos is unreal, *māyā*, or fictitious. In support of this *māyā* doctrine, the school of Śaṅkara quotes the text of *Svetasvataropaniṣad*⁴ and interprets it as follows: "Since *māyā* is the material cause of this cosmos, since *māyā* means unreal, and since the object, whose material cause is unreal, cannot itself be real, it follows that this cosmos is unreal, *mithyā* or *māyā*."

Refutation of avidya and maya doctrine—No two-fold Brahman.

The theory of two Brahman, higher and lower, and the doctrine of avidyā and māyā are untenable. The

1. मिथ्यात्वं नाम प्रतीयमानत्वपूर्वक्यथावस्थितवस्तुज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वम् ।

Śrī Bhāṣya on Br. Sū. 1-1-10.

2. सत् चेत् न बाध्येत ।

3. असत् चेत् न प्रतीयेत ।

4. माया तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् । Svet. Up. 4-10.

second of Vyāsa's sūtras¹ which itself is based on the text of Taittirīya² and which undertakes to give a definition of Brahman as, "Brahman is that whence the origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of this universe proceed" really settles the question. What is defined in the second sūtra is that Brahman whose cognition the first sūtra³ declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedānta and that Brahman is defined as the one whose cognition is the only road to final release. We must certainly hesitate to swallow the arbitrary statement of Śaṅkara that the second sūtra: "That from which the cosmos originates, etc." is not a definition of the higher Brahman, but is only a definition of Īśvara, of the lower Brahman, which by association with māyā is enabled to project the false appearance of this universe. For, it is quite improbable that the sūtras should open with a definition of that inferior principle from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit, and it is equally improbable that they should conclude with a description of the state of those who know the lower Brahman only and who are thus debarred from attaining true release. On the other hand, as soon as we discard the idea of a two-fold Brahman and conceive Brahman as one only, as the all-enfolding Being which sometimes emits the universe from its own substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining one in all its various manifestations, the definition of Brahman given in the second sūtra becomes perfectly intelligible. Besides, there is no warrant anywhere in the whole range of Vedānta for the assumption of a two-fold Brahman.

1. जन्माद्यस्य यतः । Br. Sut. 1. 1, 1.

2. यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते केन जातानि जीवन्ति यत्प्रयन्त्यमिहं विद्वन्ति ।

Taitt. up.

3. अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा । Br. Sat. 1-1-1.

That avidya is indefinable is illogical.

When you say avidya is indefinable, what do you mean by the term 'indefinable' (anirvacaniya)? If you say that it is different both from *sat* (being), and from *asat* (non-being), then since such a thing is not known by any means of knowledge, perception, inference or scriptures, you cannot establish the existence of such a thing in the assembly of learned men. The existence of every object in the world is determined by the knowledge or cognition about it. Every knowledge has for its object either *sat* (being), like pot, jar etc, or *asat* (non-being) like the horn of a horse or a sky-flower. The *sat* is always different from *asat*; and *asat* is always different from *sat*. But there is no object which is different both from *sat* and *asat*. While the nature of all knowledge is to apprehend either *sat* or *asat* if once you grant that a knowledge can apprehend an object different from *sat* and from *asat*, then, everything becomes the object of every knowledge; that is to say, in the apprehension of a pot, other substances like cloth and so on will become objects of cognition. And that is absurd. Therefore, the existence of a substance called avidyā which is indefinable cannot be established as it is illogical.

Objections against avidya doctrine

When Brahman is concealed by avidyā, is there a total eclipse of Brahman or only partial veiling? On the first alternative, the nature of Brahman being self-luminosity, when Brahman ceases to be luminous, it ceases to be an entity (i.e.) it is reduced to nothingness (*tuccatā*). On the second alternative, you have to say which portion of Brahman, which is itself partless, homogeneous bliss, intelligence and existence, is concealed and which portion shines. It is absurd to assume two opposite things, namely eclipse and luminosity,

simultaneously for a substance which is partless, attributeless intelligence in essence.

Which is the seat of avidyā? Seated where does it cause illusion? You cannot say that avidyā is seated in the jīva or the soul; for according to you, jīva is only a product of avidyā. Nor can you say that Brahman is the seat of avidyā; for Brahman, being by nature self-luminous intelligence, is antagonistic to avidyā and therefore cannot be its seat. Moreover, you hold that avidyā is destructible by knowledge, as darkness by light. If the unreal avidyā which is destructible by knowledge, should eclipse the being (svarūpa) of Brahman whose essence is knowledge or intelligence, then who will be able to destroy such an avidyā? None. When you say that by avidyā Brahman, whose nature is self-luminosity, is eclipsed, you must at the same time admit complete annihilation of Brahman. For, concealment of luminosity may be either an obstacle for the origination of luminosity or destruction of the existing luminosity. Since you admit that the luminosity, namely, Brahman does not originate, the concealment or eclipsing of the luminosity must necessarily mean its total destruction.

There is another argument against avidyā:² What is this avidyā? Is it illusion (false knowledge) or some-

1. ज्ञानरूपं परं ब्रह्म तन्निवर्त्यं मृषात्मकम् ।

अज्ञानं चेतिरस्तुत्यात् कः प्रभुस्तन्निवर्तने ॥ Nyayatatva of Nathamuni.

2. का नामाविद्या? किं भ्रान्तिज्ञानम्? किं वा भ्रान्तिज्ञानकारणभूतं कस्त्वन्तरम्? यदि भ्रान्तिः सा कस्य? न ब्रह्मणः तस्य स्वच्छविद्यारूपत्वात् - न हि भास्करे तिनिरस्त्यावकाशः संभवति - न जीवानाम्, तेषां ब्रह्मातिरेकेणाभावात् वे भ्रान्त्यभावादेव च तत्कारणभूतं कस्त्वन्तरमपि अनुपपन्नमेव । ब्रह्मातिरेकेण भ्रान्ति ज्ञानम् । तत्कारणं च अभ्युपगच्छतां अद्वैतहानिः । किं कृताच्च ब्रह्मणो अविद्या । न हि कारणान्तरमस्ति । स्वाभाविकी चेत् कथं विद्यास्वभावात् अविद्यास्वभावात् स्यात्?

thing else which causes the illusion? If it is illusion, whose is it? Brahman's or the individual soul's? It cannot belong to Brahman, for Brahman's nature is pure intelligence. There is no place for darkness in the Sun. Nor can it belong to the jīva or the individual soul, for it is not distinct or different from Brahman. Since such a thing as avidyā cannot exist, another thing which is its cause cannot likewise exist. For those who hold illusion and its cause as additional to Brahman, non-duality (advaitam) disappears. Whence arose this avidyā of Brahman? There is no other cause, for, Brahman is the sole and solitary entity, and there is no other entity apart from it. If you argue that the illusion or avidyā is natural to Brahman, how can nescience or ignorance or avidyā be the nature of Him (Brahman) whose very nature is intelligence? Moreover, you say that Brahman is pure intelligence and that nothing else exists besides it. How then is the activity of avidyā which is like a dream caused? By what cause? If you say that some cause which is other than Brahman and which is different from it causes it, then your non-dualism (advaita) vanishes. And if you argue that it is its nature, then, this avidyā can never be destroyed.¹

Advaitins have no settled views about the concept and the exact meaning of avidyā and māyā. Śaṅkara uses the words indiscriminately. But his followers make a distinction between the two. The universe of multiplicity of souls and matter is the product of avidyā. Avidyā is said to produce the māyā, names

1. स्वयं च शुद्धरूपत्वादभावाच्चान्यवस्तुनः ।

स्वप्नादिवदविद्यायाः प्रवृत्तिस्तस्य किं कृता ॥

अन्येनोपप्लवेऽमीष्टे द्वैतवादः प्रसज्यति ।

स्वभाविकीमविद्यां उ नोच्छेत्तुं किञ्चिदर्दति ॥

and forms, through which the world is produced. Some say that *māyā* is the *upādhi* (limiting adjunct) of *Īśvara*, and *avidyā* is the *upādhi* of the individual soul. According to other *advaitins*, the reflection of Brahman in *māyā* which is made up of pure *satva* is *Īśvara*, and the reflection of Brahman in *avidyā* which is not pure *satva* but combined *satva* having also *rajas* and *tamas* in it, is the *jīva* or the individual soul. Some say that *mūlaprakṛti* (primordial Nature) is *māyā*, but its concealment (*āvaraṇa*) and projection (*vikṣepa*) are *avidyā*. Some others say that *mūlaprakṛti* with pure *satva* is *māyā*, and that with combined *satva* is *avidyā*. Yet others say that *avidyā* consists of three qualities, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* and constitutes the *upādhi* of *Īśvara*.

Import of the word Maya

Next, we have to examine the word *māyā* and its import. We have to ascertain first the logical subject and the logical predicate (*uddeśya-vidheya*) in the *Svetasvatara* passage, quoted by the *advaitin*, "Know that 'maya' is *prakṛti*, and that 'mayin' is the lord of all"¹. The logical subject is not *prakṛti*, and unreality is not predicated of it. But the subject is *māyā* already referred to in the previous sentence; and *prakṛtīva* matterhood, quality or state of being *prakṛti*, is predicated about *māyā*. The word '*tu*' also favours this interpretation. In the passage immediately preceding this one, the two words *māyā* and *māyin* occur. "From this, the *māyin* (controller of *māyā*) creates this universe, and the other is entangled in it by *māyā*."² What is meant by the unfamiliar terms, *māyā*

1. मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।

2. अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत् तस्मिन्नन्यो मायया सन्निरुद्धः ।

and māyin, is taught by the following sentence. The term māyā means nothing else than prakṛti with which we are familiar, from the previous passage of Śvetāśvatara Upanishad itself¹, from the Taittiriya passage², and from other texts. And the term māyin means the controller of prakṛti and the overlord of all, having intelligent and non-intelligent substances as his body. In logic as in grammar, the subject which we already know is expressed first and then something unknown is predicated of it afterwards. In Sanskrit grammar, the subject is called uddeśya and the predicate is called vidheya. The sentence, māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt, read with words which are omitted but understood, runs as follows :

“That which is spoken of in the previous sentence by the word ‘mayā’ is no other than the well-known prakṛti.”³ The words yā and sā, relative pronouns, ‘which’ and ‘that’ though omitted, must be understood. The definition of uddeśya is given by Sanskrit grammarians as : ‘the noun clause containing the relative pronoun, ‘which’, is the subject and must be expressed first.’⁴ You cannot contend as follows : ‘Let the construction of the sentence be so, i.e. as you say, that is to say, let māyā be the subject, and let prakṛti be the predicate. Nevertheless, since it is granted that prakṛti is denoted by the word ‘māyā’, prakṛti’s unreality is thereby established.’ For, though the word māyā, as a courtesy term, may mean unreality, i.e. though by courtesy (upacārataḥ) may be applied to unreality, nevertheless, you cannot establish that it invariably denotes unreality,

1. अजामेकं लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सजमानां सरूपाः । Svet. Up. 4-6.
2. अजामेकं लोहितशुक्लकृष्णं बह्वीं प्रजां जनयन्तीं सरूपाम् । Taitt. Up. 6-10.
3. यद्वस्तुयोगः प्राथम्यम् ।
4. माया इति तु या पूर्ववाक्ये प्रोक्ता सा प्रसिद्धा प्रकृतिः इति विद्यात् ।

and that unreality is invariably denoted (vācya) by the word, māyā. The purport of the Śvetāśvatara passage is not that prakṛti is denoted by the word māyā, but that prakṛti is meant (vivakṣitā,) by it. Nor can you contend that since there is no objection to the primary sense of the word, the meaning by courtesy is improper; for, there is every objection to the primary sense of the word, as prakṛtitva cannot be established in that case. The Chāndogya texts in the sixth prapāṭhaka dealing with sadvidyā and the Vyasa sūtra, based on the above texts¹ establish by illustrations that the effect, namely the cosmos, is not different in substance from its material cause, the Brahman. The illustrations are thus given. Just as, by knowing the nature of a lump of clay, you know all the articles made of that clay, and the various forms, shapes and resultant names, such as pot, jar, cup and so on, assumed by the same clay, are merely to enable people to get water and so on, and are known and perceived to be indeed only clay substances but not non-clay substances; just as by knowing the nature of a nugget of gold you know all the articles made of that nugget of gold and the various forms and shapes and resultant names as ring, chain, bangle etc., assumed by the same nugget of gold are merely to enable people in wearing them in different parts of the body, and are known and perceived to be indeed only gold substances but not non-gold substances; just as by knowing the nature of a block of iron, you know all the articles made of that iron, and the various forms shapes and resultant names such as as axe, hammer, chain etc., assumed by the same iron block are merely to enable people to use them for different purposes and are known and perceived to be indeed only

1. तदन्यत्समाश्रयण इन्द्रादिभ्यः । Br. Sat. 2-1-15 .

iron articles but not non-iron substances; in the same way, by the knowledge of the cause of this cosmos, namely Brahman, the effect will be known, as the effect is not different from its material cause. These illustrations are meant to teach merely that this whole cosmos has Brahman for its causal substance just as clay is the causal matter of every earthen pot and gold, of every golden ornament, but not that the process through which the causal substance becomes an effect is an unreal one. We, including the student, Uddālaka, to teach whom these illustrations are given, may certainly say that all earthen pots are in reality nothing but earth, the earthen pot being merely a special modification (vikāra) of clay which has a name of its own, without thereby committing ourselves to the doctrine that the change of form, which a lump of clay undergoes when being fashioned into a pot, is not real but a baseless illusion. The instances of cause and effect given in the Chāndogya are very significant. It is clear from these illustrations that the cause of the cosmos, material cause in particular, is real but not unreal as Śaṅkara thinks. The illustrations of rope and snake or shell and silver would have been given by the Upaniṣads if they really meant the māyā doctrine of Śaṅkara.

Moreover, from several other texts: "The non-intelligent, subservient and eternal prakṛti, mother of all creatures."¹ "Know that prakṛti and puruṣa (soul) are eternal",² it is evident that prakṛti is eternal and its unreality is thereby refuted. You may ask,

1. अचेतनापरार्था च नित्या सततविक्रिया ।

गौरनाद्यन्तवती सा जनित्री भूतभाविनी ॥ Mantropaniṣad.

2. प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्वयनादी उभावपि । B. G. 13. 19,

if prakṛti or cosmos is real, why should it be spoken of by courtesy as unreal, in which aspect and for what purpose. The answer is that as prakṛti achieves for us enjoyments which are very transient and which may be likened to objects of enjoyments in dreams, it is spoken of by courtesy as unreal. The purpose for so expressing it is to teach that it is fit to be abandoned and that it ought to be abandoned.

The word, māyā, does not denote unreality, but it denotes an object which is an instrument for wonderful creation. It is not proper to give several meanings for the word māyā when it is possible to understand the various contexts in which the word occurs, in one and the same meaning. You cannot say that the word is employed to denote unreality only, for it is used to express also real objects as in the passage: "All the millions of particles of dust in the earth are counted by devamāyā, 'divine intelligence'." Following the Vedic dictionary,¹ the words, māyā, vayunam and jñānam or intelligence, are synonymous, the word 'māyā' has to be interpreted here in the sense of intelligence, as you cannot count the innumerable particles of dust by unreality. And similarly, in the passage: "By His māyā He knows always the good and bad deeds of beings"² the word māyā only means intelligence as before; for, good or bad deeds cannot be known by means of unreality. Moreover, Viṣṇupurāṇa says that when a demon, Śambarāśura by name, put forth 'thousands of māyā' to inflict pain on and to put an end to the life of devotee Prahlāda, the disc

1. वाक्यन्तः पाञ्चवो भूमेः संख्याता देवमायया ।

— 2. माया क्युनं ज्ञानम् ।

3. मायया सततं वेति प्राणिनां तु शुभाशुभम् ।

(cakra) of Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa, called Sudarśana, ordered by Him to protect the child-devotee, came fast with garlands of flames and annihilated each and every one of thousands of the māyā of the demon.¹ In this passage also, the word māyā cannot certainly mean or denote unreality, for there is no need to annihilate, by a weapon, what is unreal. Unreality can be got rid of only by correct knowledge. And further, the word māyā is not commonly used as synonymous with unreality. In cases of individual illusions due to defective vision mistaking a rope for a snake or pearl-oyster for silver and so on, though we use the expression 'unreal' we never use the word 'māyā' in its stead. Therefore, even in cases when the word is used to mean illusion' due to juggling or conjuring, the criterion on which the word is used may be determined to be other than unreality. And what is that criterion? Since we use the word 'māyāvi' to mean a conjurer or a juggler, and also to mean Indrajit (son of Rāvaṇa) and others, and since unreality is not meant in those cases, the word, māyāvi must necessarily mean a person possessing power either to make only appear or to really create wonderful objects, whether real or unreal. It must be borne in mind that that power is real, not fictitious. That power may be a charm, spell, herb or some occult power connected with them. Since even unreal objects are cognised by knowledge caused by that mysterious power, it is not improper, by the word māyā, to express figuratively, by transferred epithet, those unreal objects cognised by knowledge caused by mysterious power. Here the result is used for the cause. For example, in the sentence, 'Pulpits shout'

1. ततो भगवता तस्य रक्षार्थं चक्रमुत्तमम् । आजगाम समाज्ञप्तम्
ज्वालामालिखुदर्शनम् ॥ तेन माया सहस्रं तत्र शम्बरस्याशुनाभिना । बालस्य
रक्षता देहं एकैकस्येनसूदितम् ॥ V. P.

(mancāh krośanti). the container is used for the contained. Similarly, the effect may be expressed by the word denoting the cause. Śrī Vedānta Deśika says, "It is but proper to express figuratively the objects cognised by knowledge caused by wonderful power, by the word 'māyā', but it is improper to use the word 'māyā' when we mean a real cause, such a weapon and so on, quite unconnected with unreality of any kind".¹ It is improper to employ the word by courtesy to mean wonderful and mysterious weapons which cause mountains, oceans and fire and which have not even the slightest connection with unreality.

Even if we grant Śaṅkara's position that the unreal māyā is the material cause of this universe, it does not necessarily follow that its effect must also be unreal. For applying the principle laid down by Vyāsa, in the sūtra': "No, because this (the word) is dissimilar; and this is taught in the upaniṣads", we have to admit that a cause may produce an effect entirely different from itself. Moreover, Śaṅkara specifically asserts in Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa of the sūtras (II-1-15) that an unreal object may produce a real object. Therefore, even on the supposition that the material cause of the universe is unreal, it cannot be established that the universe, its effect, is also unreal. But the illustrations of clay, nugget of gold and mass of iron given in sadvidyā and other vidyās, the refutation of the asatkāryavāda, the doctrine of Vaiśeṣikas, namely, that the effect does not exist before in any form, coupled with the establishment of satkārya-

1. मायोत्यज्ञानवेद्येऽयं युक्ता मायेतिलक्षणा ।

मिथ्यासंबन्धरहिते नास्त्रादौ सत्यकरणे ॥

2. न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं न शब्दात् । Br. Sat. 2-1-4.

vāda, namely that the effect and the cause are not different but the same substance, establish beyond doubt that the material cause of this universe must be a reality. Rāmānuja says, "those who hold the non-difference of the effect from the cause, basing their argument on the unreality of the effect, cannot establish the non-difference sought to be proved by them ; for, the real and the unreal cannot be identical. If what they try to maintain were true, either Brahman is unreal, or the world is real".¹ Thus even granting that the material cause of this universe is taught in the Vedas to be unreal, māyā, it does not follow that its effect, the world, must also be unreal. And by parity of reasoning an effect though unreal may have a real material cause. Therefore the argument, that an unreal effect must necessarily have an unreal material cause and that an indefinable avidyā or nescience must be granted, stands condemned.

Do Vyasa's Sutras favour Maya doctrine?

A survey of the relevant sūtras of Vyāsa will show that the māyā doctrine of Śaṅkara was never present in the mind of the sūtrakāra. In the latter part of the fourth pāda of the first adhyāya, called prakṛtyadhikaraṇa, it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative or efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) but also the material cause (upādānakāraṇa) of this universe. If the sūtrakāra had held Śaṅkara's view, he would certainly have indicated there, that being the fittest place, that Brahman is the material cause of the world through māyā only and that the world is unreal. But the sūtras do not contain a single word to that effect. On the other hand, the sūtra: 'Brahman produces

1. ये तु कार्यकारणयोः अनन्यत्वं कार्यस्य मिथ्यात्वाश्रयेण वर्णयन्ति न तेषां कार्यकारणयोः अनन्यत्वं सिद्धयति सत्यमिथ्यार्थयोः ऐक्यानुपपत्तेः । तथा सति ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वं जगतः सत्यत्वं वा स्यात् ।

this world by means of a modification of itself, significantly uses the term 'parināmāt'. A later sūtra-replies to the Sāṅkhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot spring from an intelligent principle by the remark : " Thus it is seen ".¹ That is to say, it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence and *vice versa*, hair and nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from cow-dung. An argument of this kind is altogether out of place from the point of view of Śaṅkara. For, according to him, the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with māyā. Māyā is the (upādāna) material cause of the universe and māyā itself is of non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is identified with prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas. Similarly, the illustrative instances adduced in the Ārambhapañdhikarapa also refer to earthen pots, golden ornaments and physical bodies of beings not imparting their imperfections to their material causes when being reabsorbed into clay, etc., for the purpose of showing that the effects when being reabsorbed into their causal substances do not impart to the latter their own qualities and that therefore the material universe also when being refunded into Brahman does not impart to it its own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connection with the doctrine of māyā according to which the material universe is no more in Brahman at the time of praḷaya or deluge than during the period of its subsistence. For, according to Śaṅkara, the universe is not merged in Brahman, but the special forms into

1. परिणामात् । Br. Sat. 1. 4. 27

2. दृश्यते तु । Br Sat. 2. 1. 6.

which the upādāna or material cause of the universe namely māyā, had modified itself are merged in non-distinct māyā whose relation to Brahman is not changed thereby. The illustrative instance given in the sūtra of the mode in which Brahman, by means of its inherent power transforms itself into this universe without employing any extraneous instruments of action, as milk of its own accord turns into curds¹, would be absurdly chosen indeed, if it were meant to teach the mode in which Brahman projects the illusive appearance of the world; and also the analagous instance given in the next sūtra: 'as gods and the like create'² palaces, chariots, etc., by mere power of will, the instance which refers to the real creation of real things, would hardly be in its place if it were meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the universe. Śaṅkara's favourite illustrative instance of the magician producing illusive sights is significantly enough not adduced by the sūtrakāra. With special reference to the doctrine of māyā, one important sūtra, one in which the term māyā itself occurs,³ one which we considered while treating of dreams, has to be considered again. We have seen that according to Śaṅkara, the sūtra signifies that the environments of the dreaming soul are not real but māyā i.e. unsubstantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. We have also seen that Rāmānuja gives a different interpretation of the term māyā, namely, one of wonderful nature. From Śaṅkara's interpretation, it clearly follows that objects seen in dreams are to be called māyā (illusion), because they do not

1. उपसंहारदर्शनामेति चेन्नक्षीरवद्वि । Br. Sūt. 2. 1. 24

2. देवादिवदपि च लोके । Br. Sūt. 2. 1. 25

3. मायामात्रं तु कास्त्वेनानमिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् Br. Sūt. 3-2-3.

evince characteristics of reality. The objective world surrounding the waking soul must *not* be called *māyā*. But it is an undoubted tenet of Śaṅkara that the world perceived by waking men is *māyā* (illusion) even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming consciousness. And the sūtra, therefore, proves either that Vyāsa did not hold the doctrine of the illusive character of the world or else, that if after all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term *māyā* in a sense altogether different from that in which Śaṅkara employs it. If, on the other hand, we, with Rāmānuja, understand the word *māyā* to denote a wonderful thing, the sūtra, of course, has no bearing whatever on the doctrine of *māyā*.

Does Gita favour maya doctrine ?

The term *māyā* occurs in five places in the *Gitā*. The Lord says : "Out of My own free will I create Myself with My divine body".¹ Here the term, *māyā*, means *jñāna* or intelligence (i.e.) free will. Śaṅkara comments on this śloka as follows : "I appear as if I possess a body, as if I am born, by virtue of My *māyā*, but I am not born *in reality* like beings in the world."² Here, Śaṅkara forgets his favourite *māyā* doctrine according to which the whole universe of matter and souls is unreal and fictitious. He contrasts Lord Kṛṣṇa's birth with that of the other souls. The point of difference is that the birth of Lord Kṛṣṇa is unreal while that of the other souls is real. When he refers to the reality of the births of other souls Śaṅkara gives up his *māyā* doctrine. Śaṅkara's followers cannot argue that the birth of other souls is only *vyāvaharika satya*, real

1. प्रकृतिं स्वमधिष्ठाय संभवाम्यात्ममायया । B. G. 4-6.

2. मुम्भवामि देहवनिच भवामि जतः इव आत्ममायया आत्मनः मायया न परमार्थतः लोकजम् ।

for practical purposes, and that of Lord Kṛṣṇa is not so. The one is as much real as the other. Scriptures assert that the births of God (i.e.) His incarnations, are real. "Without being born subject to karma like other souls, God is born several times; and each time He is born, His glory is enhanced as His birth, unlike that of other souls, is not due to karma, but is due to His divine mercy."¹ The next stanza in the Gītā in which the term 'māyā' occurs is in chapter VII.² In this stanza the word 'māyā' occurring twice does not mean even according to Śaṅkara a fictitious object for he says māyā is the insuperable and enchanting prakṛti of three qualities which can be surmounted only by absolute surrender to Lord Kṛṣṇa. The third instance in the same chapter is stanza 15³. In this stanza, Śaṅkara does not specifically assert that an unreal fictitious object is meant by the word māyā. That māyā is a real object capable of depriving sinners of their intelligence is evident from his commentary; for a fictitious object cannot take away our intelligence. Lord Kṛṣṇa says later on, 'I give all beings memory and knowledge and withdraw them'.⁴ The fourth instance is stanza 25⁵ of chapter VII. Even here, Śaṅkara does not mean unreality by the word māyā. "I am not understood by all persons except by few devotees, as I am concealed by combination of qualities or by māyā caused by concentra-

1. अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते स उच्छ्रेयान् भवति जायमानः ।

Pāruṣa Sūkta.

2. देवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया ।

मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायानेतां तरन्ति ते ॥ B. G. 7. 14.

3. माययाऽपहतज्ञानाः आसुरं भावमाश्रिताः । B. G. 7-15.

4. मत्तः स्मृतिः ज्ञानमपोहनं च । B. G. 15-15.

5. नाहं प्रकाशः सर्वस्य योगमाया समावृतः । B. G. 7-25.

tion of mind.”¹ Again, in stanza 61 of the last chapter, “Isvara resides in the hearts of all beings and revolves them, under some plea or pretext, as if they are dolls mounted on machines”.² Śaṅkara interprets the word *māyā* here as “under some plea or pretext”. Even here there is no room for his *māyā* doctrine. We have already observed that, from start to finish, the philosophy of the *Gītā* is based on the reality of the universe with sentient and non-sentient objects. Thus Śaṅkara’s *māyā* doctrine has no place in the *Gītā*, nor as shown already, anywhere in *Vedānta*.

Tatvas or truths of prakṛti

The word *māyā* has taken us far into Śaṅkara’s *māyā*. Let us come back to our real prakṛti. This acit or prakṛti or combined satva is said to be of twenty four tatvas or truths. Etymologically, tatva is an abstract derivation from the pronoun *tat* and means ‘thatness’. Including the cause and its products the tatvas are twenty-four in number. They are prakṛti, mahat, ahaṁkāra, the five tanmātras or five subtle elements, the five gross elements, the five sensory organs, the five motor organs and the mind. The first of these twenty-four tatvas is prakṛti. This is also called pradhāna and avyakta. This is called pradhāna, as this is the chief instrument of play for God. The word pradhāna means chief or primary. This is called avyakta as its qualities in that primordial state are indistinguishable. This prakṛti attains three different states or conditions in which it is called avibhakta (indistinguishable) *tamas*, vibhakta (distinguishable) *tamas* and *akṣara*

1. योगः गुणानां युक्तिः घटनं सैव माया योगमाया । अथवा भगवतः चित्तसमाधानं योगः तत्कृता माया योगमाया । तथा संछन्नः । Śaṅkara in *Gītā Bhāṣya*.

2. ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।

ब्रह्मयन् सर्वभूतानि यन्त्राहृदानी मायया । B.G. 18, 61.

as the condition varies. Says the Upaniṣad: "During deluge avyakta is reabsorbed into akṣara, akṣara into tamas, and tamas sticks on to the Supreme Being indistinguishable from It as if it has become one with It."¹ During praḷaya, avyakta passes on to a subtler state called akṣara and akṣara passes on into a yet subtler state called tamas, and then tamas passes on into a still subtler state and becomes as it were, one with Brahman without being distinguishable from it by name and form; and hence it is called avibhakta or indistinguishable tamas. And when the time for creation comes, as Manu says,² 'stirred by God' it gets separated from Him and becomes capable of distinction of names and forms and gets ready to produce effect, and is, therefore, then called vibhakta tamas. And then, by the will of God, it leaves the condition of tamas in which it could not be discriminated as non-sentient matter (acetana) pregnant with collective jivas (cetanas), and attains the condition of akṣara in which it can be discriminated as carrying collective souls. Thus avibhakta tamas is that subtlest state of tamas beyond the states of avyakta and akṣara in which it becomes, as it were, one with God indistinguishable by names and forms. Vibhakta tamas is that state of tamas which is ready to produce effects and in which it becomes separate from God and therefore becomes capable of distinction by names and forms. Akṣara is that condition in which its pregnancy with collective souls is knowable as contradistinguished from the previous subtle state in which it is not knowable.

The state immediately preceding the inequality of guṇas in differing proportions is the state of stable equilibrium in which prakṛti is quiescent. The state of

1. अव्यक्तमक्षरे लीयते अक्षरं तमसि लीयते तमः परे देवे एकीभवति । Sub. Up.

2. प्रादुरासीत्सोऽबुद्धः । Manu 1-6.

stable equilibrium of guṇas is avyakta state. And the state in which neither the inequality nor the stable equilibrium of guṇas is discernible but which is pregnant with collective souls is called akṣara state. Here by akṣara, the individual souls are not meant; for the souls are neither the cause of avyakta nor the effect of tamas. Therefore the term akṣara is employed to denote by courtesy¹ the object which is pregnant with cit or individual souls (as the figurative use of the contained for the container). That extremely subtle state of prakṛti in which pregnancy with collective souls and its non-sentient nature could not be discriminated is denoted by the word pradhāna. The state in which it is ready to launch into the states of akṣara and so on, is called vibhakta tamas and the state in which it is not so ready to launch and in which it cannot be even conceived as the body of Isvara is called avibhakta tamas. The primordial state or avibhakta tamas is a state knowable only by the omniscient Supreme Being and may be likened to salt spread all over in the ocean, to water in the candrakānta or moon-stone and to fire in sūryakānta or sun-stone. The second state or vibhakta tamas may be likened to a seed coming out of the earth. The third state called akṣara may be likened to a seed wet with water whose parts or particles have become loosened or unfastened. The fourth state called avyakta may be likened to a seed which has become swollen. The fifth state called mahat may be likened to a sprout. Thus, it will be seen that the states of akṣara and tamas are like the different stages of the bud of a flower, (mukula koraka) contracted stages of prakṛti, and are not, therefore, different tatvas or truths, unlike mahat and so on which are different truths.

From this prakṛti are produced mahat and other results by the inequality or difference in the proportion of guṇas. The guṇas are satva, rajas and tamas and are the natural, inherent, essential and inseparable characteristics of prakṛti, unmanifest in prakṛti (i. e. causal) state, and manifest in vikṛti (or effect) state. There is no state of prakṛti in which it is devoid of these guṇas or qualities. In the state of stable equilibrium of guṇas of prakṛti, the guṇas cannot be discriminated in prakṛti state; they are discriminated only in the vikṛti state, i. e. effect state, by their inequality. That is to say, they can only be inferred from their results. Of these three guṇas, the first is satva, the function of which in relation to other guṇas is to reveal consciousness and bliss and to bind the jīva to them. Satva is without *mala* i. e. is pure. By *mala* is here meant hindrance or obstacle to prakāśa or intelligence, and *nirmala* means the opposite of it.¹ Far from veiling consciousness or intelligence and bliss, satva reveals them as it is its nature to do so. By prakāśa is meant true knowledge of things as they are. Satva is also the cause of perfect health (*anāmaya*). This satva binds a soul to intelligence and bliss; that is to say, it produces in the soul attachment or acute desire to attain intelligence and bliss. When such an acute desire is engendered, the person puts forth activities to get at the means for the attainment of intelligence and bliss, whether the means is known from worldly knowledge or from śāstras. Eventually, the person is born again with such body as is conducive to the enjoyment of the fruit thereof. In this way, satva guṇa binds a jīva in saṁsāra through the production of acute desire or attachment for knowledge and bliss, and then again

1. तत्र सत्त्वं निर्मलत्वात् प्रकाशकमनामयम् ।

सुखसन्नेन वृष्णाति ज्ञानसन्नेन चानघ ॥ B. G. 14-6.

through actual knowledge and bliss and so on. The greater the presence or power of satva guṇa, the greater is the attainment of knowledge. The second, rajas or rajoguṇa produces rāga, tṛṣṇā and saṅga and desire for action.¹ The word rāgātmakam in the text means cause of rāga. By courtesy the effect is put for the cause. Here the word rāga means reciprocal love of man and woman. The compound word (tṛṣṇāsaṅgasamudbhavam) means the origin of tṛṣṇā and saṅga. By tṛṣṇā is meant desire for sense-objects such as sound, smell and so on. By saṅga is meant, in a restricted sense, the company of sons, friends and so on. This quality of rajas binds a jīva by producing desire for action. The deeds performed by the jīva, prompted by desire, are either merit (puṇya) or demerit (pāpa) and he has to take his birth again with such a body as is conducive to the enjoyment of the fruits of those actions. In this way, the guṇa, rajas, binds the soul through attachment for actions. Therefore, rajas is the cause of love, worldly desire, saṅga and desire for action. The third, viz., tamas or tamoguṇa produces false knowledge, negligence, indolence, inertia and sleep.² By producing these results, tamas binds the jīva.

When these guṇas or qualities are in perfect equilibrium without any inequality and no guṇa is predominant and when there is no stirring of the guṇas, the effects of prakṛti without any difference of names and forms in themselves are also in perfect equilibrium and are indistinguishable and unknowable by any means of

1. रजो रगात्मकं विद्धि तृष्णासङ्गसमुद्भवम् ।
तन्निबध्नाति कौंतेय कर्मसङ्गेन देहिनाम् ॥ B. G. 14. 7.
2. तमस्त्वज्ञानजं विद्धि मोहनं सर्वदेहिनाम् ।
प्रमादालस्यनिद्राभिः तन्निबध्नाति भारत ॥ B. G. 14-8.

knowledge. When the guṇas become unequal, in different proportions, and when there is a stirring of them, the effects of prakṛti also become unequal and become knowable. The equality and inequality of the guṇas are the basis for the distinction of similar and dissimilar changes according to variation of time and place to which we have already referred.

Mahat—first of dissimilar changes of prakṛti

The first of the dissimilar changes of prakṛti due to inequality of guṇas is mahat.¹ When passing from the stage of avyakta inhabited by karma-ridden souls, from perfect equilibrium of guṇas into the state of guṇavyaṅjana, a state in which, as the name itself indicates, the guṇas are manifest, the tatva called guṇavyaṅjana or mahat is produced.² This mahat is of three kinds—sātvika, rājasa and tāmasa, by the presence of the three guṇas, satva, rajas and tamas which can be inferred from their results, namely intelligence or consciousness, activity, and delusion of mind respectively. This mahat-tatva is the cause of adhyavasāya, mental effort or apprehension.³ Of these three, sātvika buddhi or sātvika mental effort, as defined in the Gītā,⁴ comprehends correctly pravṛtti, nivṛtti, kārya, akārya, bhaya, abhaya, bandha and mokṣa as they really are. Pravṛtti means the dharma or the means for the attainment of worldly prosperity. Nivṛtti means the dharma or the means for the attainment of mokṣa or liberation from worldly existence. It is said

1. गुणसाम्यात् ततस्तस्मान् क्षेत्रज्ञाधिष्ठितान्मुने ।

गुणव्यंजनसंभूतिः सर्गकाले द्विजोत्तम ॥ V. P. 1-2-35.

2. व्यज्यन्ते गुणाः अनेन इति गुणव्यंजनम् महत् ।

3. महान् वै बुद्धिलक्षणः ।

4. प्रवृत्तिं च निवृत्तिं च कर्माकार्ये मयाभये ।

कथं मोक्षं च या वेति बुद्धिः सा पार्थ सात्त्विकी ॥ B. G. 18-30

that the former dharma was taught by Prajāpati and the latter by Nārāyaṇa. Kārya means what ought to be done and akārya means what ought not to be done by persons whether engaged in pravṛtti dharma or nivṛtti dharma according to the varṇa or caste and āśrama or order. Bhaya is fear and abhaya is fearlessness. Here, by the two words bhaya and abhaya are meant their causes. The cause of fear is transgression of śāstras or divine laws promulgated by God. Wise men who know truths have fear only for God without whose will or motion, nobody in the world undergoes any suffering or is affected in any way. The cause of fear or non-fear, therefore, is the transgression or the non-transgression of His laws. Bhagavān himself says : “ Śrutis and Smṛtis are My command. Whoever transgresses them disobeys My command and is a traitor.” Bandha means the reality of bondage and mokṣa is the liberation from this bondage. Rājasa buddhi, rājasa mental effort, is defined as follows : “ The buddhi which does not correctly and fully comprehend, or misunderstands, the two-fold dharma, kārya and akārya, is called rājasa buddhi. It understands things differently from what they are.” And tāmasa buddhi or tāmasa mental effort is defined as : “ That buddhi or mental effort which apprehends all things as quite the opposite of what they are.” It apprehends adharma as dharma, dharma as adharma ; existent object as non-existent, non-existent object as existent ; the highest truth as low truth, inferior truth

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1. श्रुतिस्मृती गर्मैवाज्ञा यस्तामुब्रंध्य वर्तते । आज्ञाछेदी मम श्रेही ॥

Viṣṇudharma.

2. यया धर्ममधर्मं च कार्यं चाकार्यमेव च ।

अयथावत् प्रजानाति बुद्धिः सा पार्थ राजसी ॥ B. G. 18-31.

3. अधर्मं धर्ममिति या मन्यते तमसा कृता ।

सर्वार्थान् विपरीतांश्च बुद्धिः सा पार्थ तामसी ॥ B. G. 18-32.

as superior truth, and so on. The distinction between rājasa buddhi and tāmasa buddhi is rather subtle. Although in both cases what is not the real truth is imposed on the substratum, the distinction is made in this way: if the delusion is in respect of a substantive object itself as in mistaking a rope for a snake, the delusion is due to tāmasa buddhi, but if the delusion is in respect, only of the quality of the object as in mistaking a white conch for a yellow conch, the delusion is due to rājasa buddhi.' Manu says: "The Smṛtis opposed to Vedas and not founded on Vedas and heterodox smṛtis are the result of tamogūṇa and are, therefore, useless and will only lead you to hell".'

Ahamkara

After having thus examined the first of the dissimilar changes of prakṛti, namely mahat, we shall now examine the other changes. From this mahat are produced three-fold ahaṁkāra called vaikārika, taijasa and bhūtādi. The Viṣṇupurāṇa says: "On the basis of the distinction as sātvika, rājasa and tāmasa, these three kinds of ahaṁkāra are born of mahat." Just as mahat, the off-spring of prakṛti is of three-fold quality like its mother, ahaṁkāra, the off-spring of mahat is also of three-fold quality like its cause. The function of ahaṁkāra is to cause abhimāna or false identity of the soul with the body, and other results. From the first of these, namely, vaikārika ahaṁkāra or sātvika ahaṁkāra as it is called, are produced eleven organs (indriyas) which possess the resultant qualities of satva,

1. धर्मवैपरीत्ये तामसता धर्मवैपरीत्ये राजसता ।
2. या वेदवाद्याः स्मृतयः याश्च काश्च कुद्दृष्टयः ।
सर्वास्ता निष्फलाः प्रेत्य तमोनिष्ठाहिताः स्मृताः ॥ Manu 12-95.
3. वैकारिकस्तैजसैश्चभूतादिश्चव तामसः ।
त्रिविधोऽयमहंकारः महत्तत्त्वादजायत ॥ V. P. 1-2-37,

namely nimbleness and agility. They are, *jñāna indriyas*, five organs of sense, or sensory organs; *karma indriyas*, five organs of action or motory organs, and the mind. The experiencer is affected by matter in five different ways which give rise to sensations which are aroused by sense-objects and which are experienced by means of senses which are the gate-ways through which the individual soul receives worldly experiences. The five organs of sensation or perception are, ear (hearing), skin (feeling by touch), eye (sight), tongue (taste), and nose (smell). The five organs of action are the reactive response which the soul makes to sensation, namely mouth, hands, legs, anus and genitals whereby, speaking, grasping, walking, excretion and procreation are performed, and through which effect is given to the soul's desires. They are afferent (conveying inwards) and efferent (conveying outwards) impulses respectively. The function of the mind is to help both kinds of organs, sensory and motor. It is not correct to say that these organs are *rājasa ahaṁkāra*; they are really *sātvika ahaṁkāra* as decided by *Parāsara*. The enumeration of eleven *indriyas* refers to collective but not to individual creation *samaṣṭi* as opposed to *vyāṣṭi sṛṣṭi*. For, *Manu* says: "Since the *indriyas* are of minute size, God, having placed their subtle parts in their respective *mātras* or immediately preceding causal substances, created all creatures."¹ What is meant by the word subtle parts (*sūkṣmān*) in *Manu's* passage is referred to in the *Vedānta sūtra*². In the *sūtra*, the word *anu* only means that minute size which is not perceivable, but not the extremely minute size of the *jīva* or the

1. तेषां त्वक्चक्षुः सूक्ष्मान् षण्णामप्यमितौजसां ।

सन्निवेश्यात्ममात्रास्तु सर्वभूतानि निर्ममे ॥ Manusmṛti.

2. अणवश्च । Br. Sat. 2-4-6.

individual soul, already discussed by us in the first chapter of this work. The word *avayavān* (parts), indicates that there are several parts in each *indriya*. The phrase 'having placed their subtle parts in their respective *mātras* or causal substances,' clearly indicates that the *indriyas* which had been originally given continue till deluge. And this fact is elucidated and expanded in the *Gītā*. "Whenever an embodied soul departs from one body and takes up another, he goes with the *indriyas* in a subtle state, just as air or a gust of wind takes away subtle particles from sandal, musk, flower, etc., and goes with them elsewhere."¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* refers to the departure of the *indriyas* along with the individual soul.² The chief breath follows the departing soul and the other *prāṇas* namely *indriyas* follow the chief breath. Here *indriyas* are meant by the term *sarve prāṇāḥ*. Since the organs are said to follow the individual and since the organs cannot exist without a body, the body also in its subtle state goes along with the soul.

From the third of these three, namely, *tāmasa ahaṁkāra* or *bhūtādi* as it is otherwise called, springs *śabda tanmātra* or the subtle state of ether, *ākāśa*. From this *śabda tanmātra* or subtle state of ether springs gross ether with its manifest quality, namely sound, and also *sparsa tanmātra* or subtle air. From this *sparsa tanmātra* or subtle air, springs gross air with its quality of touch and also *rūpatanmātras* or subtle fire or *tejas*. From this *rūpatanmātra*, or subtle fire or *tejas*, springs gross fire with its quality of colour and also *rasatanmātra* or subtle water. From this *rasatanmātra* subtle water

1. शरीरं यदवाप्नोति यन्नाप्युत्क्रामतीश्वरः ।

गृहीत्वैतानि संयाति वायुर्गन्धानिवाशयात् ॥ B. G. 15-8.

2. तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणः अनुत्क्रामन्ति प्राणमुत्क्रान्तं सर्वे प्राणाः अनुत्क्रामन्ति ।

springs gross water with its quality of taste and also gandhatanmātra or subtle earth. From this gandhatanmātra or subtle earth springs gross earth with its quality of smell.

By tanmātras, otherwise called aviśeṣa are meant the subtle state of elements, viz. the states in which they do not possess the special qualities of śāntatva, ghoratva and udāsīnatva as described in Viṣṇupurāṇa.¹ Śāntatva is the state of being favourably experienced; ghoratva is the state of being unfavourably experienced; and mūḍhatva is the state of being indifferently experienced. Of the five elements, earth and water are mild (śānta), fire and air are violent (ghora) and ether is neither mild nor violent, but indifferent (mūḍha or udāsīna). All the elements acquire these qualities by admixture. Since tanmātras do not possess these special qualities, they are called aviśeṣa (non-special). Therefore, tanmātra and aviśeṣa are synonymous terms.

In this manner, among the three ahaṁkāras, sātvika, rājasa and tāmasa, the first produces eleven organs or indriyas, and the third produces subtle elements. The function of the second, rājasa ahaṁkāra, is to help generally the other two ahaṁkāras in the production of their respective results in the manner in which water helps the seed to sprout and wind helps fire to blaze. Since activity is a characteristic of rajas,² it co-operates with satva portion for producing the results, namely organs and indriyas, and with tāmasa portion in the production of its result, namely, the elements. This is the general help rendered by rājasa ahaṁkāra to the other two ahaṁkāras.

1. तस्मिंस्तस्मिंस्तु तन्मात्रं तेन तन्मात्रता स्मृता ।
तन्मात्राप्यविशेषाणि अविशेषस्ततो हि ते ॥ V, P.

2. रजः प्रवर्तकं तत्र ।

Now, we shall examine the special help rendered to sātvika ahaṁkāra by peculiar and special substances. With the help of the five tanmātras or five subtle elements, sātvika ahaṁkāra produces the five sensory organs and the five motory organs. It produces the mind independently without any such help. With the help of sabdatanmātra or subtle ether, it creates the organ of hearing, with the help of sparśa tanmātra or subtle air, it creates the organ of touch, with the help of rūpatanmātra it creates the organ of sight, with the help of rasatanmātra it creates the organ of taste, and with the help of gandhatanmātra, it creates the organ of smell. After having created the sensory organs with the help of the five tanmātras, the sātvika ahaṁkāra supplements the sensory organs by associating itself with the objects of sense, sound, touch, colour and form, (being the cause of activity in apprehending colour), taste (being the cause of excretion of water whose quality is taste) and smell (being the cause of excretion of earthy portion of digested food, namely faeces). While creating the motory organs, it creates the mouth with the help of the organ of hearing, hands with the help of the organ of touch, legs with the help of the organ of sight, genitals with the help of the organ of taste, and anus with the help of the organ of smell.

Some persons like Naiyāyikas and others who are ānumānikas, i.e. who try to establish their tenets mainly by inference, assert that the organ of smell and other organs are produced by the elements. They say that the organ of earth is the nose, the organ of water is the tongue, the organ of tejas (fire) is the eye, the organ of air is the skin and the organ of ether is the ear. This view is not correct, as it is opposed to texts which teach that the eleven indriyas sprang from vaikārika or

sātvika ahaṁkāra.¹ The passages in Mahābhārata², which say that the indriyas are caused by the elements, must be interpreted in the sense that the elements are only nourishing factors, āpyāyakas, for the organs, but not causes. The term āpyāyaka means poṣaka, nourishing. That the elements are only nourishing factors of the organs is declared by Śruti³ and Smṛti. Solid food taken in by men is digested and gets transformed into three different substances, gross, middling and subtle. The grossest portion becomes faeces, the intermediate portion becomes flesh and the subtlest portion becomes the nourishing factor of the mind. Water drunk gets transformed into three different substances, the grossest of them becomes urine, the intermediate portion becomes blood, and the subtlest portion becomes breath. Similarly tejas, fresh butter, ghee, oil, golden particles and so on, taken in gets transformed into three different substances, the grossest of which becomes bone, the middling becomes marrow and the subtlest becomes the nourishing factor of speech. In Mokṣadharmā also, in the conversation between Bhṛgu and Bharadvāja, it is stated that the elements are always nourishing substances of the indriyas.⁴ For these reasons, the elements are not the causes but only nourishing factors for indriyas. We have thus seen how mahat and other results are produced.

How God creates the cosmos.

We shall next deal with the question as to how God creates the cosmos with these substances. Parāśara says :
 “Since these substances, namely, mahat and its effects,

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1. एकदशं मनश्चात्र देवा वैश्वरिकाः स्मृताः । V. P. 1-2-49.
 2. See Ānuśāsana Parva, Sarga 223.
 3. अन्नमयं हि सोम्यमनः आपोमयः प्राणः तेजोमयी बह्व । Ch. Up. 6-5-4.
 4. आप्यायन्ते च ते नित्यं घातकस्त्वैस्तु पंचभिः । Mokṣa dharma 184-44.

being separate entities with their various powers and properties due to their mild, violent and indifferent natures, are not able to create this mundane egg unless they combine together. Īśvara combines them all and creates this mundane egg in the manner in which a mason combines earth, sand and water having properties peculiar to each and having separate existence, and makes them one combined substance and then puts up a wall with it."¹ After the creation of the mundane egg and after the transformation of these external elements into the internal ether and so on, with a view to creating several separate worlds with manifold kinds of jīvas, gods, men etc., the Supreme Nārāyaṇa creates, within the mundane egg, the four-headed Brahmā, who is the collective whole of embodied souls (samaṣṭi jīvas), that is to say, in whose body, the karma-ridden souls necessary for the mundane egg are already present, for the purpose of carrying on further creation through the four-headed Brahmā. Thus, Īśvara directly creates the mundane egg which is the result of collective causes and creates those causes themselves. He creates the substances within the egg not directly, but through the medium of other jīvas standing as their antaryāmin or inner life principle. Since God is a satyaśaṅkalpa, one who accomplishes everything by His mere will, He creates the mundane egg and its causes, directly by His will. As Manu says: "God wanted to create manifold creatures from His body (i.e.) from subtle elements and by His mere will created water and other gross elements and animated them; and thereupon created the golden mundane egg which is shining like the

1. नानावीर्याः पृथग्भूताः ततस्ते संहरति विना ।

नाशकनुक्त्वा प्रजाः संप्लु अस्मागम्य कृत्स्नशः ॥ V. P. 1-2-53.

Sun.¹ God creates objects within the egg, presiding over the minds of individual souls like Brahma and others. Lord Kṛṣṇa himself says: "I reside in the hearts of all. I cause memory and knowledge and I withdraw the same."² He thus produces will and knowledge in the minds of Brahmā and others and through them, creates objects within the mundane egg. That God creates all the objects within the mundane egg as the antaryāmin or animating life principle and inner soul of individuals who form His body, is declared by Viṣṇupurāṇa.³ The eggs thus created are several in number having fourteen worlds and are surrounded by seven enclosures (āvaraṇa) each outer enclosure being ten times bigger than the inner enclosure. They are like play-ball for God and are created simultaneously like bubbles in water. The eggs are innumerable, countable by crores as stated by Parāśara.⁴ The fourteen worlds are, the seven down worlds situated below ours, namely, *Atala*, *vitāla*, *nītāla*, *talātāla*, *mahātāla*, *sutāla*, and *pātāla*, situated on the causal waters above the bottom of the shell of the mundane egg, each world being fourteen thousand yojanas in height and in extent, and inhabited by daityas, dānavas, pannagas (snakes) and suparṇa and others. The seven worlds situated above are, our world inhabited by human beings, called

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1. सोमिध्याय शरीरात् स्वात् सिद्धुः विविधाः प्रजाः ।
अप एव ससर्गादौ तस्य वीर्यमपावृजत् ॥
तदण्डमभवत् हेमं सहस्रांशु सप्तप्रभम् ॥ Manu. 1-8-9.
 2. सर्वस्य चाहं हृदि सन्निविष्टः भूतः स्मृतिः ज्ञानमपोहनं च ॥ B. G. 15-1:
 3. यत्किञ्चित् सृज्यते येन सत्कजा तेन वैद्विज ।
तस्य सृज्यस्य संभूतौ तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः ॥ V. P.
 4. अण्डानां तु सदृशाण्ययुतानि च ।
ईदृशानां तथा तत्र कोटि कोटिशतानि च ॥ V. P. 1-12-38.

bhūloka, bhuvarloka inhabited by gandharvas and others, the world of officers, planets, stars and gods, Indra and others, called swarga loka, the world of retired officers called mahar loka wherein they expect higher appointments, jana loka where the highest yogis, Sanaka and others, sons of Brahma live, tapoloka where Prajāpatis called Vairajas live, satya loka where Brahma, Viṣṇu and Siva and their devotees, who have attained that loka as a result of their upāsana, live.

Thus, between the top and the bottom of the shell of mundane egg measuring sixty crores of yojanas in height, lie the aforesaid fourteen worlds. This mundane egg is surrounded by water, an enclosure ten times bigger. The jala tatva is surrounded by an enclosure tejas tatva ten times bigger, again. The tejas tatva is surrounded by its own enclosure vāyu tatva, likewise ten times bigger. The vāyu tatva is in its turn surrounded by its own enclosure ākasa tatva, similarly ten times bigger. In the same manner ākasa tatva is surrounded by its enclosure ahamkāra tatva, ten times bigger. Similarly, ahamkāra tatva is surrounded by its enclosure mahat tatva, ten times bigger again. The mahat tatva, in its turn, is surrounded by avyakta which is unlimited in space. The eggs are composed in this way, and are uniform and innumerable in number.

The five elements have different functions to perform. Ether is the cause of space, it is space-giver. Air is the carrier, tejas is the cook, water drenches and causes cohesion, and earth is the supporter. Ether is giving space for all objects and beings for their existence, motion and so on. Air causes distribution and activity or bodily effort, besides being a carrier. Tejas is the cause of cooking and it produces heat and light. Water

drenches and by its cohesive power causes cohesion, besides being cold and soft. The Earth having weight, form and smell. etc. supports all. We have already discussed the different functions of the sensory and motory-organs and of the mind which is common to all the organs. The special qualities of ether, air, fire, water, and earth are sound, touch, colour, taste and smell respectively. Though each of the five elements has the above-mentioned special quality peculiar to itself and absent in other elements, yet each element gets the admixture or combination of other qualities by means of a process called *pancikarāṇa*.

Pancikarāṇa or Quintupling

Pancikarāṇa or *guṇavinimaya* as it is otherwise called, is the process of quintupling or making five-fold. *Pancikarāṇa* means the particular combination of the elements in such a way that in one element you can see the presence of the other four elements. The word *vinimaya* is used in the sense of combination¹. The word *vinimaya* in Sanskrit means exchange or barter. The exchange or bartering by each element, by giving its peculiar quality to all the rest of the elements and by taking in their respective qualities. Since the qualities cannot exist without *āśraya* or substratum, exchange of *guṇas* depends on the exchange of *dravyas* or substances, and in the present case, it means the exchange of portions of the elements. *Pancikarāṇa* is defined as follows. "Each of these five elements is divided into two halves. One of the two halves is again divided into four quarters and the other half is kept undivided. Then each quarter (i.e.) $\frac{1}{8}$ of the original element is combined with each of the other four elements which retain their

1. तेजो वारिमृदां यथा विनिमयः Bhāgavata 1. 1. 1,

halves, so that in each element one-eighth of each of the other elements is present along with half of its own thus retained."¹ In spite of the above combination, each element preserves its own name owing to the predominance within itself of the particular element over the other elements. The combination may be explained as follows:

Ether consists of 1/2 of ether, 1/8 of air, 1/8 fire, 1/8 of water and 1/8 of earth.

Air consists of 1/2 of air, 1/8 of ether, 1/8 of fire, 1/8 of water and 1/8 of earth.

Fire consists of 1/2 of fire, 1/8 of ether, 1/8 of air, 1/8 of water and 1/8 of earth.

Water consists of 1/2 of water, 1/8 of ether, 1/8 of air, 1/8 of fire and 1/8 of earth.

Earth consists of 1/2 of earth, 1/8 of ether, 1/8 of air, 1/8 of fire and 1/8 of water.

Thus we see that after Pancikaraṇa there is no unalloyed element, but only combination of elements in the above proportions.

Quintupling and illusory knowledge

This pancikaraṇa or quintupling plays a very important part in deciding the correct theory among various theories of illusion or illusory knowledge or erroneous knowledge. The various theories of illusion are: asatkhyāti, anyathākhyāti, ātmakhyāti, akhyāti, anirvacaniyakhyāti and satkhyāti.

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1. एवं जातेषु भूतानि प्रत्येकं स्युः द्विधा ततः ।
चतुर्धाभिन्नमेकैकं अर्धमर्धं तथास्थितम् ॥
व्योम्नोऽर्धभागश्चत्वारो वायुतेजःपयो भुवाम् ।
अर्धाणि यानि वयोस्तु व्योम तेजः पयो भुवाम् ॥

Asatkhyāti is the doctrine of Mādhyamikas (a school of Buddhists) according to which everything, even knowledge, is unreal and silver which is absolutely non-existent in the shell or oyster-shell is supposed to appear there.¹ The term asatkhyāti means knowledge of what is absolutely non-existent. This doctrine is, on the face of it, self-condemned, since a substance which is absolutely non-existent (atyanta asat) cannot make its appearance anywhere. This doctrine cannot, therefore, explain the illusion of silver in the shell, the illusion experienced very often by human beings. According to this doctrine, knowledge, objects of knowledge and everything is unreal; and nothingness is established by nothingness. This doctrine does not call for any serious remark or argument or refutation, as it is absurd on the face of it and it denies every means of knowledge.

Anyathākhyāti is the doctrine of Naiāyikas according to which silver existing elsewhere in the silver shop and other places appears to exist in the shell.² This doctrine is untenable, as in this illusion, there is no contact between the eye and the shop silver and the contact is only between the eye and the shell. And no perception is possible without the contact of the object and organ of sight.

Ātmakhyāti is the doctrine of the Yogācāras (a school of Buddhists) according to which knowledge alone is real, and that knowledge is not different from, but identical with, external objects, and the internal

1. अधिष्ठानस्य शुक्त्यादेः विपरीतधर्मत्वच्छृङ्गां विपरीतो विरुद्धो धर्मो यस्य ।
तद्भावं तस्य रज्ज्वादेः अत्यन्तासतः कल्पनामाचक्षे ॥

2. अन्यत्र शुक्त्यादौ अन्यधर्मस्य स्वात्म्यवधर्मस्य देशान्तरस्थरूप्यादेः अध्यासः ।

knowledge of silver appears to exist outside as object of knowledge.¹ This doctrine is also untenable, as the external world which corresponds to knowledge is different from but not identical with the knowledge of which it is an object. Since according to this school, the outside world is unreal the internal silver cannot be superimposed on an unreal substratum outside.

Akhyāti is the doctrine of Prābhākaras according to which the erroneous knowledge is caused by want of apprehension of the distinction between the substratum and the superimposed object and of the distinction between the two apprehensions.² This doctrine is likewise untenable ; for, the presence of apprehension of objects and their difference is really the cause of activities of men but not the absence of apprehension. Otherwise even in deep sleep when there is absence of apprehension of distinctions between shell and silver, there must be activity and the sleeping soul must seize the shell mistaken for silver.

Anirvacanīyakhyāti is the doctrine of Śaṅkara according to which since knowledge of silver appearing in a shell is sublated subsequently and since one object cannot appear as another, an extraordinary kind of silver which cannot be defined either as existent or non-existent must be assumed to appear. We have already refuted this indefinable doctrine. What you are eager to assume as indefinable does not really appear as indefinable silver, but appears only as real silver. If indeed it appeared as indefinable, then, the illusion, its

1. बाह्यशुक्त्यादौ बुद्धिरूपात्मनः धर्मस्य रजतस्य अभ्यासः आन्तरस्य रजतस्य बहिर्वदवभासः । आत्मशब्दः ज्ञानपरः ॥

2. यत्र यस्य अभ्यासः लोकसिद्धः तयोरर्थयोः तद्विद्योश्च भेदाग्रहे सति तन्मूलो भ्रमः इदं रूप्यमिति विशिष्टव्यवहारः ।

subsequent sublation and activity would not have resulted. Moreover, you must ascribe a cause for the production of the extraordinary indefinable silver. You cannot ascribe apprehension of silver as the cause for the production of silver; for the existence of such a silver must be before the apprehension, as the universal law is that the cause exists before the effect. You cannot argue that the defect in the organ of sight is the cause; for the defect in the vision of the cognising person cannot produce an object in the outside world. Nor is the organ of sight the cause of the production of such a silver; for the organ is the cause of such a knowledge only but not of its object.

Satkhyāti is the doctrine of the well-versed in Vedas (vedavidah), according to which all knowledge is of the real.¹ It may be asked: "how is it that sometimes our knowledge does not correspond to things when objects appear in false perception as silver in shell, water in mirage and so on?" The answer is, objects which appear in false perception are real and not illusory, because according to the doctrine of pancikarapa or quintupling all objects in the world are only compounds or compound substances containing all the five elements in differing proportions. We call one substance silver and another substance a shell, because one element preponderates in one substance compared to the other.

In our experience, we observe that shells resemble silver. By perception we learn that some elements of the substance, namely, silver exist in the other, namely, shell. Sometimes, owing to a defect in the vision, a person in quest of silver apprehends the silver portion alone without apprehending the shell portion and attempts to

1. यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानं इति वेदविदां मतम् ।

grasp it. But when the defect disappears, he apprehends the shell portion also and then abandons the substance.¹ Thus we see that the knowledge of silver in the shell is of the real. The subsequent sublation of the knowledge 'that the object in front of you is silver', by the sublating knowledge 'that the substance mistaken for silver is really a shell' is easily explained by the cognition of the relative preponderance of one or other element. The want of cognition of the preponderance of the shell portion is the cause of the mistake and its subsequent cognition corrects the error. Similarity in certain respects is the cause of the partial identity of a substance. In the same manner, we mistake mirage for water. We perceive water in the mirage merely because water exists in combination with light and particles of earth. And likewise, when a man with jaundiced eyes sees the white conch as a yellow conch, as if it were one with gold coating, the yellowness of the eye is transmitted to the conch along with the rays of the eye and hence the white colour of the conch is thereby obscured. We have already observed, while dealing with dreams, that God creates for the dreaming soul, objects for the enjoyment or suffering of the soul in accordance with his merit or demerit. God, while causing the whole of the objective

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1. रूप्यशुक्त्यादिनिर्देशमेदो भूयस्त्वहेतुकः ।
 रूप्यादिसदृशत्वायं शुक्त्यादिरुपलभ्यते ॥
 अतस्तस्यालसद्भावः प्रतीतेरपि निश्चितः ।
 कदाचित् चक्षुरादेस्तु दोषात् शुक्त्यंशवर्जितः ॥
 रजतांशो गृहीतोऽतो रजतार्थो प्रवर्तते ।
 दोषहानौ तु शुक्त्यंशे गृहीते तन्निवर्तते ॥
 अतो यथार्थरूप्यादिविज्ञानं शुक्तिकादिषु ।
 बाध्यबाधकभावोऽपि भूयस्त्वेनोपपद्यते ॥
 शुक्तिभूयस्त्ववैकल्यं साकल्यप्रहंरूपतः ।
 ज्ञातो मिथ्यार्थसत्यार्थविषयस्त्वनिकम्बनः ॥

world as an object of fruition for the jivas in accordance with their previous good or bad actions, creates certain objects of such a nature as to become common objects of consciousness for all souls, and certain other objects in such a way as to be experienced only by the dreaming soul and only so long as his dream lasts. The difference between sublating things and sublated things is based only on this distinction of things which are objects of common consciousness for all souls and of other things which are not so. In the same manner, a white crystal in the proximity of a red japa flower appears red, being overwhelmed of the colour of the flower. The red rays of the flower manifest themselves more clearly by contact with the white and pure crystal. When a fire-brand is whirled with velocity, a circular ring of fire appears since on account of the great velocity, we do not perceive the intermittent space. The perception of our face in the mirror is also real. The rays of our eyes being obstructed by the surface of the mirror, apprehend the mirror and our face in such quick succession that we are not able to see the difference in time. For these reasons, it is a mistake to think that some cognitions have false things for their objects and that other cognitions have true things for their objects. Human knowledge is generally partial and imperfect. When we mistake a shell for silver, we take notice of certain features only and we miss others. In the hallucination of yellow conch, we do not take notice of the whiteness of the conch. In experiences of dreams, we ignore the fact that the sights in dreams are peculiar to the dreaming soul only and not to others. Even in waking states, in respect of the knowledge of the world around us, we overlook much that is unnecessary for our practical purposes. In this way, both true and

erroneous knowledge are incomplete. While true knowledge takes particular note of the features necessary for our practical purposes and satisfies our needs, the erroneous knowledge fails to satisfy the desired end. In our daily life true knowledge is useful. The mirage is an error not because it does not contain the element of water, but because water present in it does not quench our thirst.

The invisible ether appears visible and possessed of black colour as a result of this quintupling (*pancikarāṇa*)¹ because the black colour which is the quality of the earth is present in the combination of elements. The Chhāndogya text, after narrating triplication (*trivṛtkarāṇa*) declares that fire possesses three colours, namely redness, the colour peculiar to itself, whiteness, the colour of water, and darkness, the colour of earth. The Chhāndogya speaks of the origin only of fire, water and earth (*tejo'vanna*) and therefore, of triplication only, but not of the origin of ether, air, *avyakta*, *mahat* and *ahamkāra* spoken of in other Upaniṣads. Just as the origin of fire, water and earth means and includes the origin of other *tatvas*, in the same manner, triplication means and includes quintupling. Since, in the above manner, every element is present in every other element by the process of quintupling, the five qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell, are also present in all the elements, and this is the basis for the exchange or bartering (*guṇavinimaya*) of qualities.

It is also said that since the lower *tanmātras* in conjunction with the upper *tanmātras* produce their gross elements (*viśeṣa*) the number of qualities or *guṇas* increases in the process of evolution of the elements.

1. सत् कृष्णं तत् पृथ्वी ।

Since sparśatanmātra being enwrapped by śabdatanmātra produces its own viśeṣa or gross element namely vāyu or air, this element, air, gets the qualities of sound and touch. Since rūpatanmātra, being enwrapped by sparśatanmātra and śabdatanmātra produces its own viśeṣa or gross element namely tejas, this element namely tejas gets the three qualities of sound, touch and colour. And similarly since rasatanmātra, being enwrapped by the three upper tanmātras, produces its own viśeṣa or gross element, namely water, this element, namely, water gets the four qualities of sound, touch, colour and taste. And since, in the same manner, gandhatanmātra being enwrapped by the four upper tanmātras, produces its own viśeṣa or gross element, namely earth, this last element, earth gets all the five qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. Just as the quality peculiar to each of the five elements gets guṇavinimaya, combination of other qualities peculiar to other elements by the process of quintupling, the acquisition of additional qualities by the lower elements is due to the enwrapping of each tanmātra by the upper tanmātras.

Thus, in the order of enumeration, combined satva or miśra satva, has been dealt with.

II. Suddha Satva or Pure Satva

The second kind of acit, namely pure satva or suddha satva, is, like the first kind, combined (miśra) satva, non-intelligent and ever-changing. The word acit means a substance in which knowledge or consciousness does not inhere. Owing to this non-intelligent nature, acit is said to be bhogya or an object of enjoyment. Acit in general is subject to changes or states or conditions in its very being (svarūpa), unlike cit or individual soul which

does not undergo any change in its being. This pure satva, denoted by various terms, aprākṛta world, vaikunṭha, aparājita, ayodhyā, nāka, pāramapada and so on is possessed of unalloyed or pure satva quality, without any combination of rajas and tamas, is eternal, is the producer of intelligence and bliss, is capable of transforming itself into vimānas (aerial vehicles), gopuras (towers), maṇṭapa (mansions) etc. by the will of God, is of unsurpassed splendour and brightness, is incapable of being understood as limited by nityas, muktas and even by God, is of very wonderful nature, and is ajaḍa, self-luminous.

Pure satva is possessed of unalloyed satva. It is defined as 'that which is different from the substance having three guṇas and which, at the same time, possesses satva quality' or 'that which is self-luminous and which possesses satvagūṇa at the same time;' or 'that which is devoid of tamogūṇa and which possesses the quality of satva.' Scriptural texts such as 'Beyond mūlaprakṛti, high up, lies the heavenly world having the colour of the Sun;' 'Seated in heaven, far beyond the mūlaprakṛti'; 'The Lord of the universe, seated in heaven called parama ākāśa' 'Seated in the eternal heaven called parama vyoma'; 'The highest Lord, the lord of all devas or gods, seated on the throne in the hall of thousand

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1. त्रिगुणद्रव्यव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति सत्त्वत्वं
 2. स्वयंप्रकाशत्वे सति सत्त्वत्वं
 3. तमो रहितत्वे सति सत्त्वत्वं
 4. आदित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् ।
 5. क्षयन्तमस्तु रजसः पराके ।
 6. यो अस्याप्यक्षः परमे व्योमन् ।
 7. तदक्षरे परमे व्योमन् । Taitt. Up.

pillars," assert the existence of an aprākṛta world. Moreover, texts such as 'The eternally liberated souls always see and enjoy the supreme (aprākṛta) world of Viṣṇu.' Residing in aprākṛta world beyond this material world; 'Divine world worshipped by gods' establish the existence of such a world.

Pure satva is eternal as described in various texts such as: 'In that eternal parama ākāśa or parama vyoma'. 'The world of aprakṛita or divine substance, without beginning or end, unlimited by time, and attainable only by persons who with concentrated minds always meditate on me and who journey along the bright path called arcirādi'. 'That eternal world called parama ākāśa, superior to all other worlds, attaining which wise men, knowers of truths are freed from all sins'. 'Time conceived as second, minute, hour, day, night, month, year and so on, is not the cause of transformation of the aprākṛta world' (in contradistinction with the prākṛta world where time reigns supreme.) In prākṛta world like ours, objects are brought into existence and are destroyed by the rule of time, i.e. time controls everything. But in the divine world time has no power. 'The changes in

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1. सहस्रस्थूणे विमिते दृढ उभे यत्र देवानामधिदेव आस्ते ।
 2. तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सूर्यः ।
 3. 'तमसः परमो धाता ।' Rāmāyana Yuddha Kanda 6-114. तमसः प्राकृतमण्डलस्य परमः परस्तात् अप्राकृते वैकुण्ठे विद्यमानः इत्यर्थः ॥
 4. अप्राकृतं सुरैर्वन्द्यं ।
 5. कालातीतमनादन्तं अप्राकृतमचंचलम् ।
प्राप्यमर्चिः पथा सद्भिः मयि सन्यस्तमानसैः ॥
 6. यत्तत्सुराणामाकाशं सर्वस्मात्परमं ध्रुवम् ।
यत्पदं प्राप्य तत्त्वज्ञाः मुच्यन्ते सर्वकिल्बिषैः ॥
 7. कलमुद्भूतादिमयश्च कालः न यद्विभूतेः परिणामहेतुः ।

the divine world are not due to time unlike those in the *prākṛta* world ; but they are due to the will of God.”

Pure satva causes intelligence and bliss. While treating about *prakṛti*, we observed that the characteristic of satva quality is to produce intelligence and bliss. It is, therefore, said that pure satva causes intelligence.¹

Pure satva transforms itself into aerial vehicles, towers, mansions and so on, not as a result of karma of souls, but by the will of God. Unlike *prakṛti tatva* or combined satva, which by the will of God gets transformed into twenty-four *tatvas* or truths for the enjoyment or suffering of *cetanas* or embodied souls according to their good or bad actions, this pure satva transforms itself into various objects, bodies, organs (*indriyas*), breaths and other substances by the mere will of God or of *nityas* or of *muktas* (liberated souls). The form and shape of bodies, etc. are like those of *prākṛta* bodies. The *aprākṛta* bodies have hands, feet and other limbs and also *indriyas* or organs, and mind. The denial in some texts of the existence of bodies and organs for liberated souls means only the denial of those which are the result of karma. The denial does not refer to those assumed at will. The liberated souls can, if they choose, assume bodies or remain without them. The divine world, divine city and other places are mentioned in texts such as: ‘The city of liberated souls is a resplendent treasury shining with brilliant lustre, which contains the most valuable treasure, namely the Supreme Being’;² ‘Since the divine world is not accessible for

1. कालं स पचते यत्र न कालस्तत्र वै प्रभुः ।

2. शुद्धसत्त्वे सुखाकारे ।

3. देवानां पूरयोष्या तस्यां हिरण्मयः कोशः यो वै तां ब्रह्मणो वेद अमृतेनाङ्गतां पुरीं ॥ Āruna,

those who are ignorant of Brahman, the world is called invincible world (aparājita) where the hall or maṇṭapa is chosen by God as the place of His enjoyment ;¹ ' I attain the abode of God.'²

Pure satva is of unsurpassed splendour, grandeur and brightness. It shines flooded with such brilliant lustre as reduces luminary bodies such as the Sun, Fire and so on into glowworms. ' The Sun, the moon, stars, lightning and fire cannot shine there'. "The divine world of the all-pervading supreme Viṣṇu eclipses in splendour and brilliance, the Sun, fire and the gods and dānavas are not able to gaze at it."³ Thomas Gray, speaking of Milton in his progress of poesy, says that Milton, with wings of imagination soared high into regions of resplendent heaven of lightning lustre, and gazed the world and the Almighty seated on the sapphire throne, and blast with excess of light, became blind. The idea contained in this passage will help us in understanding the nature of the brilliant pure satva as described in our scriptural texts.

Pure satva is incapable of being understood by God and nityas as limited in extent, as limited in glory and splendour and as limited in other aspects. If that be so, how can God and nityas be said to be omniscient? The answer is that their omniscience will not be affected thereby. For, omniscience is knowing everything in all respects, that is to say, knowing an

1. अपराजितापूः ब्रह्मणः प्रभुविमर्ते हिरण्यम् ॥ Ch. Up. 8-5-3.

2. प्रजापतेः समा देशं प्रपद्ये । Ch. Up. 8-14-1.

3. न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रस्तारकं नेमा विद्युतो मान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः

Mund. Up. 2-10, also Kaṭopaniṣad. 2-5-15.

4. अत्यर्कानलदीप्तं तत् स्थानं विष्णोर्महात्मनः ।

स्वयैव प्रभया राजन् बुध्नेत्येव देवदानवैः ॥

object as limited when it is really limited, and knowing another object as unlimited when it is really unlimited. When we say even God cannot describe the dimensions of the horns of the horse, our statement is not inconsistent with his omniscience. This idea has been well described by the poet. "Oh! Goddess Lakṣmi, neither you nor Lord Hari can find out the limit to your glory, and this does not in any way affect the omniscience of both of you, for, wise men say that not knowing an absolutely non-existent object is not inconsistent with omniscience. A person who professes to know the size, colour, fragrance, dimensions and other qualities of a sky-lotus deserves his place in the lunatic asylum."¹

Saint Nammālvār says about God that He does not know Himself fully.² The śruti also says: 'God, the Lord of this universe who dwells in heaven may know His own glory, rather, may not know it'.³

Pure satva is of very wonderful nature. Every moment it is capable of exciting our wonder, astonishment and amazement by its novelty, grandeur and inexplicableness. It is ajaḍa or self-luminous. It is of aprākṛta substance, namely intelligence and bliss.⁴

1. देवि त्वन्महिमावर्धिर्न हरिणा नापि त्वया ज्ञायते
यद्यप्येवमयापि नैकयुवयोः सर्वज्ञता हीयते ।
यन्नास्त्येव तदज्ञतामनुगुणां सर्वज्ञताया विदुः
व्योमात्मोजमिदन्तया किल विदन् भ्रान्तोऽयमित्युच्यते ॥
Śrīvatsaṅka Misra in Śrī Stuti.

2. Tiruvaimozhi (Tamil) 8-4-6.

3. यो अस्याप्यक्षः परमे व्योमन् सो अत्रवेद यदि वा न वेद ।

Taitt. Brāhmaṇa, 2-8-9.

4. ज्ञानानन्दमयालोकः ।

A question was asked : "Of what substance is the divine body of God?" A general reply was given that the substance of which God's body is, is the same substance as God's svarūpa (being). Again, a question was asked : "Of what substance is God's being?" And the reply to it is that the substance of God's being or svarūpa is jñāna or intelligence. Therefore, the substance of God's divine body is also intelligence. The substance of God's divine body and the substance of the divine world, not being different, the substance of the divine world must be knowledge or intelligence. The substance of jñāna or intelligence is self-luminous.¹ Since pure satva shines for others (*paraśmai bhāsamāna*) i.e. for the benefit of others like the attribute-consciousness (*dharmabhūtajñāna*) it is said to be parāk as opposed to pratyak. Just as the attribute-consciousness does not manifest itself to the knower or substantive consciousness during deep sleep, in the same manner, this pure satva also does not manifest itself to the embodied soul during material existence. But, to the liberated souls, to the eternally liberated souls and to God, pure satva manifests itself without the medium of attribute-consciousness. Just as the self-luminosity or self-luminous power of attribute-consciousness does not manifest itself when outside objects are not cognised as in deep sleep, as a result of obstruction, namely, karma, in the same manner, the self-luminous power of pure satva is obstructed by the karma of the embodied soul, and therefore, it (pure

1. किमात्मिकैश्वर्यभगवतोव्यक्तिः? इति प्रश्ने यदात्मको भगवान् इति च सामान्यतः उत्तरेकृते पुनः किमात्मको भगवान्? इति प्रश्ने कृते ज्ञानात्मको भगवान् इत्याद्युत्तरमुक्तम् ॥

अतः दिव्यमंगलविग्रहस्य ज्ञानात्मकत्वात् तद्द्रव्यात्मिकत्वाः सर्वस्या नित्य विभूतेः ज्ञानात्मकत्वं उचितम् । ज्ञानात्मकत्वं च अत्र स्वयं प्रकाशत्वमेव ॥

Nyāya Siddhāntajana of Vedānta Deśika.

satva) does not manifest itself to him. The pure satva, though ajaḍa, self-luminous, like the individual soul and like its attribute-consciousness, yet it is different from both of them. The individual soul being pratyak, manifests itself as 'I'. Pure satva, on the other hand, being parāk, appears as 'this'. Therefore, it is different from the individual soul.¹ And pure satva unlike the soul, and its attribute-consciousness, transforms itself into bodies, organs, mansions, etc. The soul being homogeneous in nature undergoes no change in its being (svarūpa); though consciousness undergoes contraction and expansion, it does not transform itself into bodies, etc. Thus the second of the three acits or acetanas, namely pure satva, has been dealt with.

III. Sattvasūnya or acit devoid of Satva

We shall next examine the third of the acits or acetanas, called satvasūnya or acit devoid of satva quality. In the expression, satvasūnya, devoid of satva, the word 'satva' means and includes the two other qualities namely rajas and tamas. The term, therefore means that acit which is devoid of all the three guṇas or qualities and denotes kāla or time.

This kāla or time is the cause for the transformation of prakṛti and its results, prākṛta objects; transforms itself into nimeṣa (smallest unit of time), kāṣṭha and other units of time; is eternal; is an instrument of sport for God; and constitutes His body.

Time is the cause for transformation of prakṛti and its results.

By prakṛti is meant avyakta or unmanifest, and by prākṛta, the vyakta or its manifested results. Time is

1. धियः स्वयं प्रकाशत्वं मुक्तौ स्वाभाविकं यथा ।

कदे कदाचित् संसृद्धं तयात्रापि नियम्यते ॥

Yāmunācārya's Samvit Siddhi,

said to be the cause of transformation of prakṛti and prākṛta, its results, in the sense that God who transforms them into various tatvas by His mere will, awaits particular time, and when the time for action comes, produces changes in them. In this way, time is necessary for the production of those changes and those changes are said to depend upon time. Parāśara says: "When the time for creation came, God, by His mere will, stirred both the changing prakṛti and the unchanging jīva."¹ The stirring of prakṛti means creating inequality of guṇas in it, so that it may become ready for producing results. The stirring of the jīva means causing expansion of consciousness and kindling saṃskāra or impressions to help memory. Since, in this way, God produces, sustains and destroys all objects in the world, giving prominence to time, all objects in this prakṛti are said to undergo timely changes. Perception also teaches us that when time does not come, changes in worldly objects do not take place, and that when time comes, those changes do take place. Therefore, by perception and by āgamas or śāstras we learn that time is the cause for the changes of prakṛti and its results, prākṛta objects.

Time transforms itself into nimesa and other units of time.

Nimeṣa or momentary space of time measured by the twinkling of the eye is the smallest unit of time. Fifteen nimeṣas or twinklings make up a kāṣṭha. Thirty kāṣṭhas make up one kalā. Thirty kalās make one muhūrta. Thirty muhūrtas make one day. Fifteen days make one pakṣa. Two pakṣas or thirty days make one month. Two months make one ṛtu or a season. Three ṛtus make one ayana or half-year. Two ayanas

1. प्रकृतिं पुस्वं चैव प्रविद्यात्मेच्छया हरिः ।

शोभयामासु संग्राहे सर्गकाले व्ययाव्ययौ ॥ V. P. 1-2-31.

make one year. Three hundred and sixty human years make one deva year. Twelve thousand deva years make one caturyuga or cycle of four yugas or ages,—kṛta, tretā, dvāpara and kali ages. Of these four yugas, kṛta yuga lasts for four thousand deva years, tretā yuga, for three thousand deva years, dvāpara yuga for two thousand deva years, and kali yuga for one thousand deva years. The remaining two thousand years form the sandhis, intervals, or pauses, or periods between two yugas or ages. The preceding interval (pūrva sandhi) for kṛta yuga is four hundred years and the succeeding interval (apara sandhi) is also four hundred years. Similarly, the preceding and succeeding intervals for tretā yuga are each three hundred years; those of dvāpara yuga are each two hundred years; and those of kali age are each one hundred years. In this way, two thousand years form periods of intervals between one age and another. Seventy-one caturyugas of this kind form one manvantara. Fourteen manvantaras or one thousand caturyugas form a day for the four-headed Brahma, and an equal period forms a night for him. One hundred years of this measure form the life-time for the four-headed Brahma. The highest measure of time is the life of Brahma called parā. Half of it is called parārdha. We are said to exist in the second half (dvitiya parārdha) of the present four-headed Brahma, several such four-headed Brahmas having been born and having died before. Beyond parārdha Hindus have no number. The number parārdha is one followed by seventeen zeros. The numbers, one, ten, hundred, thousand and so on increasing ten times are denoted by the names indicated in the footnote¹.

1. एकं दश शतं चैव सहस्रमयुतं तथा । लक्षं च नियुतं चैव कोटिर्बुधमेव च ॥
वृन्दं खर्वो निखर्वश्च शंखः पञ्चशतं सागरः । अन्तर्यं मध्यं परार्धञ्च दशवृद्धया
यथाक्रमम् ॥

The life time of every four-headed Brahma is therefore two parārdhas (i.e.) 2 followed by seventeen zeros.

एक = 1 ; दश = 10 ; शत = 100 ; सहस्र = 1,000 ; अयुत = 10,000 ; लक्ष = 1,00,000 ; नियुत = 10,00,000 ; कोटि = 1,00,00,000 ; अर्बुद = 10,00,00,000 ; वृन्द = 1,00,00,00,000 ; खर्व = 10,00,00,00,000 ; निखर्व = 1,00,00,00,00,000 ; शंख = 10,00,00,00,00,000 ; पद्म = 1,00,00,00,00,00,000 ; सागर = 10,00,00,00,00,00,000 ; अन्त्य = 1,00,00,00,00,00,00,000 ; मध्य = 10,00,00,00,00,00,00,000 ; पार्श्व = 1,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,000.

Time is eternal.

Time has neither beginning nor end.¹ The theory that time is created by māyā is refuted by texts which teach the eternity of time. We cannot conceive the beginning or end of time ; for, with reference to a particular point of time, there must be previous and subsequent points of time. Even in nitya vibhūti or pure satva, time exists, but it produces no effect there. "The measures of time such as kalā, muhūrta and so on, do not produce any change or transformation in pure satva."² In pure satva, God renders time powerless. Time does not reign supreme there as it does in prakṛti.³ If you do not admit the existence of time in pure satva, that would do violence to texts such as—"The nityas are always seeing and enjoying God"⁴ in nitya vibhūti.

Time is an instrument of sport for God.

Time or kālā is an instrument of sport for God whose sports are the creation, sustentation and reabsorp-

1. अनादिर्मगवान् कालः नान्तोऽस्य द्विज विद्यते ॥ V. P. 1-2-28.

2. कलामुहूर्तादिमयश्च कालः नयद्विभूतेः परिणामहेतुः ।

3. कालं स पचते तत्र न कालस्तत्र वै प्रभुः ।

4. सदा पश्यन्ति सूर्यः ।

tion of all the worlds Prakṛti, puruṣa (the soul) and time are instruments of sports for Him. Of these three, prakṛti and the soul are not only instruments of sport, but also objects of creation. But time is an instrument of creation and of sport without being an object of creation, since God, according to His plan creates all objects only in their proper time.

Time forms the body of Isvara.

Time constitutes the body of God. We have already examined and discussed the definition of body in general. A dravya or a substance which exists invariably dependent on a cetana or soul, which is invariably controlled by that cetana, and which is ever subservient to that cetana, is his body. Applying this definition of body to time, we find that it forms the body of God. Scriptures also teach us that prakṛti, puruṣa (individual soul) and time constitute the body of Īśvara.¹

We have thus discussed the three kinds of acit, namely, prakṛti or combined satva, śuddha satva or pure satva and satva śūnya or time. The first two of these, prakṛti and śuddha satva form objects of enjoyment, instruments of enjoyment and places of enjoyment, (bhogya bhogopakaraṇa, bhogasthāna) for God and for the individual soul. Since there is no tinge of selfishness for souls in pure satva or divine world, and since there is no thought for them other than service to the Supreme Being in that world, and since that world transforms itself into various objects by the will of God for his enjoyment, the enjoyment there will be primarily

1. परस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं पुरुषः परमं द्विज ।

व्यक्ताव्यक्ते तथैवान्ये रूपे कालस्तथापरम् ॥

प्रधानपुरुषव्यक्त कालास्तु प्रविभागश्च ।

रूपाणि स्थितिसर्गान्तव्यक्ति सद्भावा हेतवः ॥ V. P. 1-2-17 & 19.

for the Supreme Being. On the other hand, since prakṛti transforms itself into various objects by the will of God, according to the karma of embodied souls, since all embodied souls from gods downwards with false identity of self with the body, think that they are independent enjoyers, this prakṛti or līlā vibhūti, is primarily for the enjoyment of the embodied souls. By 'enjoyment for embodied souls' is meant the experience of pain or pleasure. Sound, touch, colour, taste and smell being objects of knowledge, they are said to be objects of enjoyment or suffering. The sense organs being instruments for those experiences are said to be instruments of enjoyment. Pure satva is limited only downwards, and prakṛti is limited only upwards. The lower boundary of pure satva is the Virajā river above prakṛti; and the upper boundary of prakṛti is the same Virajā river below pure satva.

Existence of Time is proved by Perception and Agama

Bauddhas and others deny the existence of Time: and this is against perception and śāstras. Time means a succession of events. Every moment of time owes its determinateness to its relation to other moments of time. All objects in the world, whether moveable or immovable, undergo changes due to time. There can be no 'now' without a 'then'. Time results from the relating of events in the order of 'before' and 'after' by a principle that integrates the events. The representation of time begins with the recognition of two successive experiences as successive. When an event passes away, the idea of it must persist in the mind and it must be brought into relation to succeeding events. Our experience is as follows: Now, there is a jar before me (idānim ghaṭaḥ vartate). If we do not admit the perceptibility of time, then with reference to the jar coming in

contact with our eyes, there would arise a doubt regarding the *present existence* of the jar. And since no such doubt arises, both the jar and the present time are objects of perception. The existence of time is also known from āgamas or śāstras. "The small and big units of time, viz., kalā, muhurta, kāsta, day, and night, etc."¹ "The months of madhu and mādhave constitute the spring season : and the months of śukla and śuchi constitute the summer season."² Viṣṇupurāṇa deals elaborately with time. So, do other purāṇas and itihāsas. Jyotiś śāstra or the science of astronomy and astrology which treat about time and enjoin particular periods of time for study of vedas, performance of sacrifices and so on, is considered to be the eyes of the Vedas. This śāstra (science) reads the future as we read the weather. What this science forecasts we can actually perceive when the time comes. Therefore, time which is thus established by perception and āgamas, cannot be denied by any argument.

Space or direction (dik) is not an independent tatva or truth.

The Vaiseṣikas and others hold that space or direction, dik, is a separate tatva or truth. They say that 'substances are nine in number namely, earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind'.³ It is not correct to say that space is a separate substance; for it is included in ether and other substances. When four persons stand in four directions, the spot in the middle of these four persons, is relatively east to one of them, west to another, north to the third and south to the

1. कल्प मुहूर्तः काष्ठादयः महोरात्रादयः सर्वशः । Taitt. Up. 2-1-8.

2. मधुख माघवख वासन्तिकवत्तु शुक्लख शुचिख ग्रैष्मावत्तु । Yajurveda Ka.4.

3. इव्याणि पृथिव्यतेजोवाक्काशकालदिगात्मनांसि नवैव ॥

fourth person. We experience this at every moment. What is the reason for this? The reason is that there is no absolute substance as space or direction. What we call direction or dik is only relative. With reference to a particular spot, we temporarily imagine a direction, east, west, north or south. But the spot in the middle of the four persons being a substance as earth and so on, is not subject to doubt or variation unlike the space or dik. Space is included in ether and earth. The inclusion of space in ether and earth means the understanding of space in ether and earth according to sun-rise and sun-set. Therefore, space is not an independent or separate tatva or truth. It may be asked, how do you account for the separate enumeration of space or direction in passages such as: 'From the feet of the Lord sprang the earth; and from His ears sprang direction or space'.¹ The answer is that we have to interpret the passage to mean the origination of the respective devatas called abhimanidevatās i.e. the deities presiding over them, just as we interpret the origination of antarikṣa swarga and other worlds. Otherwise, we shall have to enumerate them also as different tatvas or truths. If you hold that space or direction is a created separate tatva, then, before the creation of space and after its annihilation, the distinction of the enwrapping or enclosing tatvas and enwrapped or enclosed tatvas like prakṛti, mahat, etc., the distinction of distance and proximity would not exist. The creation of space is spoken of in śrutis only in vyaṣṭi creation, or individual creation, after collective (samastī) creation.

Ether is not a negative aspect.

Some persons like Buddhists say that ether is the absence of any covering or enclosure. They say that

1. पद्भ्यां भूमिः दिशः श्रोत्रात् । Puruṣa Sūkta.

āvarana is a gross enclosure¹ like the earth and so on, that its absence is ether and that ether is not such a positive entity as can be marked and pointed out as 'this'. Ether is not a non-definable irrational non-entity, as they say. That ether is a real substance follows from scriptural passages such as: 'Ether sprang from the Supreme Self'.² To those who do not admit the authoritativeness of our scriptures, we point out that the real existence of ether is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and other qualities. Moreover, if you declare that ether is nothing but the absence in general, of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow that while one bird is flying, whereby ether is occupied, there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. 'Just as by the existence of a single jar, the non-existence in general of jar is disproved, in the same manner the existence of a single bird disproving the absence of any covering would prove want of space for the second bird.'³ Moreover, we find in Buddhistic scriptures a series of questions and answers in which the following question occurs: "On what is the air founded?", to which it is replied that the air is founded on ether or space.⁴ Now this statement is appropriate only on the supposition of ether being a positive entity, not a mere negation. Its negative aspect is refuted by

1. आव्रियते अनेन इति आवरणं ।

2. आत्मन आकाशसंभूतः ।

3. यथैक घटसत्त्वेऽपि घटसामान्याभावो नास्ति तथा एकमक्षिसत्त्वेऽपि मूर्तद्रव्य सामान्याभावात्मकाकाशः (आवरणान्तराभावप्रत्युक्त्यापि न तद्धानतेति) नास्त्येवेति पक्ष्यन्तरसंचारः न स्यात् ॥

4. वायुः किं संनिश्चयः? वायुः आकाशसंनिश्चयः ।

Vyāsa: "Ether is not an irrational non-entity; for like admitted real entities such as earth and so on, ether is unmistakably perceived in our experience as: 'There a hawk flies, here a vulture flies', as places of flight for those birds."¹ It cannot be said that ether is mere non-existence of earth and so on, as the statement cannot be expressed in definite alternatives.

Is ether (i) the antecedent non-existence (prāga-bhāva) of earth and so on, or (ii) non-existence pertaining to destruction of earth, etc. (pradhvam-sābhāva)? or (iii) mutual non-existence (itaretarābhava, anyonyābhāva or bheda) of earth and so on, or (iv) absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) of earth, and so on? In any of these four alternatives, knowledge of ether can never arise. In the first two alternatives, that is, if the antecedent non-existence or non-existence pertaining to destruction of earth and so on were ether, then during the existence of earth and so on, the knowledge of ether is impossible, and the world would become devoid of ether. As regards the third alternative, since mutual non-existence of earth and so on exists in the respective objects, the cognition of ether cannot arise. The non-existence of earth or difference of earth (pṛthvībheda) is in water; and the non-existence of water or difference of water (jalabheda) is in earth. Similarly, the non-existence of earth or difference of earth is in fire; and the non-existence of fire or difference of fire (tejoabhāva) is in earth. Thus when we take two objects, non-existence or difference of one exists in the other; and we can have the cognition of those two objects only, but

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1. आकाशे चाविशेषात्—आकाशे च निष्पश्यता न युक्ता भावरूपत्वेनाभ्युपगत-
पृथिव्यादिवत् आकाशस्यापि अबाधितप्रतीतिसिद्धसत्त्वाविशेषात् । प्रतीयते-
आकाशः अत्र स्थेनः पतति अत्र गृध्रः इति स्थेनादि पतनदेशत्वेन ॥

not the cognition of ether. As regards the fourth alternative, since non-existence merely means the changed state or condition of an existent object, though ether may be said to be non-existent in this sense, it cannot certainly be said to be an indefinable non-entity. When we say non-existence of pot we only mean either the existence of clay in a state or condition before becoming a pot, or broken pieces of pot, a state after the destruction of pot. Since ether is a substance or a *tatva* or truth existing within the mundane egg, and since according to the doctrine of quintupling, ether possesses colour, there is no harm in holding that ether is visible for our eyes.

**Ether is neither eternal, nor partless, nor all-pervading
nor invisible.**

The Nyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas assert that ether is eternal, partless, all-pervading (*vibhu*) and invisible.¹ Since according to our śāstras, as we have already discussed, ether springs from *tāmasa ahaṁkāra*, otherwise called (*bhūtādi*) and since a substance which originates from another substance has necessarily parts (*sāvayava*), the doctrine that ether is eternal and partless is refuted. An all-pervading substance must have necessary concomitance (*vyāpti*) with every other substance. But ether is not found in its causal substance *ahaṁkāra*, etc., i.e. it has no concomitance (*vyāpti*) with its causal substance. Therefore, ether cannot be all-pervading. We have already observed that owing to quintupling or (*pañcīkaraṇa*), other elements as earth and so on are found combined in ether, and that therefore, ether possesses colour and is visible for the eyes and appears black.

1. आकाशं एकं विमुर्नित्यं च ।

Air is perceptible, not imperceptible.

The Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas hold that air is not known by perception, but is only inferable from touch. They argue that because air is a colourless substance, it is not perceivable by touch and is not known by perception. This argument is unsound, as it is against our actual experience. Possession of touch but not possession of colour is the criterion for being perceived by the sense of touch. The sense of touch perceives not only the quality of touch, but also the object having the quality of touch.¹ If you hold that air is only inferable from touch, then, also earth, water and fire would become not perceptible by touch and would become only inferable by touch.

Varieties of tejas.

Tejas is of four kinds, *bhauma* (earthly), *divya* (heavenly), *audarya* (abdominal) and *ākaraṇa* (sprung from mines or ores). The earthly tejas has only earthly fuel to nourish it, as lamp, light etc. The heavenly tejas has watery fuel to nourish it, as the Sun, lightning and so on. The abdominal tejas has both earthly and watery fuel. And the tejas without any fuel whatsoever is that sprung from mines or ores, like gold and so on. Of these, the Sun and other luminaries are permanent or long-standing, while lamp and other kinds of tejas are transient. The natural colour of tejas is red and its natural touch is hot. The variety of colours of objects of tejas is due to the combination of other objects. The non-manifestation of heat in gold and other objects of tejas is due to its being overpowered by kindred substances.

Water.

The natural colour of water is whiteness, its touch is cold and its taste sweet. A different colour, touch

1. स्पर्शतद्रस्तुविषयत्वात् ।

and taste is due to combination with it of other substances.

Earth.

The earth is the origin of various colours and tastes which we experience in the world. The natural touch of earth and air is neither cold nor hot. The difference in touch in these two is only artificial due to combination with other substances.

Tamas (Darkness) is a positive entity, not absence of light.

The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas hold that *tamas* (darkness) is only absence of light (*tejo abhāva*) but not a positive entity. This view is untenable for various reasons. The arguments are beautifully expressed by Varada Guru: "Since in our experience we find that darkness is studded and very thickly set in some places and is dispersed and dissipated in other places, we have to conclude that darkness has parts (*sāvayava*). Moreover, it is dark or black in colour and has motion. Therefore, darkness is a substance. Whatever has colour and motion is a substance¹."

The argument may be expressed in the form of a syllogism. Darkness is a positive entity, a substance, because it has parts. It is not a negation or a negative aspect that is, it is not mere absence of *tejas*, as it possesses quality (darkness or blackness) and motion (*kriyā*) like a jar and other substances. As we experience it as a substance, as when we say, "Here is darkness", "This is darkness", it is not mere absence of colour. We experience darkness as a black substance in which the

1. तमो नाम द्रव्यं बहुलविरलं मेचकचलं, प्रतीमः केनापि क्वचिदपि न बाधश्च ददृशे । अतः कल्प्यो हेतुः प्रमितिरपिशब्दी विजयते, निरालोकं चक्षुः प्रययति हि तद्दर्शनवशात् ॥ *Tatvasāra*-28.

colour, blackness, inheres. And this experience of ours is not sullied anywhere, at any time, by any means. Darkness is never experienced without the quality of blackness. The experience of blackness in darkness cannot be said to be an illusion. It may be argued and objected that if darkness were a substance, what is its origin? Since it has colour, neither air nor ether which are colourless, can be its origin; and since it is devoid of touch or smell, earth, water and tejas cannot be its origin. Therefore, since darkness can have no origin in any of the elements, it cannot be a substance.

The objection is answered as follows. Since unmistakable and indisputable colour and motion and so on, are established for darkness, its substancehood cannot be denied. As for its origin, we must find it out. Among *prākṛta* substances, the effects down to air have no colour. The natural colour of tejas and water is not blackness. By the process of elimination, we have to fix upon the earth, whose colour is black, as the origin of darkness. When we perceive the colour of darkness, the owl and other creatures do not perceive the same; and when those creatures perceive its colour, we do not perceive it. This is a further argument to prove that perception of colour inhering in darkness is not a mere illusion.

Scriptures, moreover, assert that darkness is a substance. 'During deluge there was no darkness, no light and no other substance.'¹ This sentence teaches the absence of darkness and light at deluge and establishes substancehood for darkness. 'God created darkness'.²

1.- नासीत् तमो ज्योतिरभूत् नचान्यत् ।

2. तमस्सर्ज भगवान् ।

Scriptures assert that like other¹ tatvas or truths God created darkness. If, on the ground of absence of touch in darkness, you argue that darkness is not a substance, then by parity of reasoning, light (āloka) which has no touch, must cease to be a substance. But you admit that light is nevertheless a substance. And you cannot argue that because of the absence of cognising factor, darkness is no substance. The eye cannot be said to be a cognising factor; for the mere eye without the help of light is not a cognising factor. And the eye with the help of light or in conjunction with light does not cognise darkness. Therefore, the perception of colour in darkness is an illusion like the perception of black colour after closing our eyes. This argument is unsound, for, the eye without the help of light cognises darkness. We know by experience that in respect of cognition of colour etc. by owls and other creatures and in respect of cognition of absence of light by men, the eye without the help of light is the cause. That darkness is a positive entity, a substance, and that it constitutes the body of God like other substances such as water, fire, sky, air, Sun, space, moon, stars, ether, tejas, breaths, organ of speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge, semen and so on, is taught by Vyāsa :² “Darkness (tamah) forms the body of God. Like light, darkness is said to form the body of Īśvara.”

Thus, the three kinds of acit have been examined and discussed.

1. अन्तर्याम्यधिदेवादित्येकदिषु तद्धर्म व्यपदेशात् । Br. Sūt. 1-2.19.

2. यस्य तमः शरीरम् ।

CHAPTER IV.

ISVARA (GOD).

Of the three tatvas or truths enumerated in passages such as : “ We must know the three truths, the enjoyer or the individual soul or cit, the enjoyed or acit and the Controller of these two, *Isvara* or God¹.” The first two have been dealt with. We have next to deal with the last in the order but the most important of the tatvas, (i.e) *Isvara*. By *Isvara* is meant the universal soul called by various names, Brahman, Para Brahman, Paramesvara, Paramatman, Purusottama, Nārāyaṇa, Paramapuruṣa, Viṣṇu, God and by other names.

Naiyayikas etc. try to prove the existence of God by inference.

The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas argue that since the earth, mountains, etc. have parts, they are created objects like jar, cart and other objects, and that since oceans, mountains, bodies, etc. are mahat, i.e. big as opposed to atoms, and are abodes of action (*kriyā*) as opposed to ether, they are also created, like jar and so on. The criterion, for determining whether a substance is a created substance or not, is its having or not having parts. If it has parts, it is a created substance like jar, body etc; and if it has no parts, it is not a created substance like ether, atom, soul and so on. Ether and atom having no parts they are not created. When once the created nature (createdness) of an object is determined, we can easily infer that the author of the creation must possess necessary intelligence and capacity to create it. A person who observes a potter and a goldsmith while a jar and a golden ornament are being made, infers

1. भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा । क्षणत्मानौ ईशते देव एकः ।

the necessary intelligence and capacity in the potter and in the goldsmith. He then goes to a King's palace of wonderful architecture and workmanship not seen before, and from the fine structure of every part of the mansion, first concludes that it must be a created object and at once infers the intelligence and capacity of the author necessary for such a creation. In the same way, when once the created nature (createdness) of bodies and of the universe is established on the evidence of their possessing parts, an able and all-knowing Being different from the individual souls who are overpowered by karma and who are very limited in intelligence and ability, a Being who without the help of a body can, by His mere will, create this wonderful cosmos of order and unity, of plan, finality and rationality, must be inferred to be the creator, and that this world must be supposed to be the work of a supreme intelligence of a wisdom and power sufficient to account for the perceived order.

Existence of God cannot be proved by inference.

The argument of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas that the existence of God can be proved by inference, is unsound. Although the earth, mountains, oceans and so on are created objects, yet there can be no proof that they were created by one Being only and created at the same time. For, if all the variety of heterogenous objects of the world were created with a single material (*eka sāmāgrī-pūrvakatva*) like the one with which a jar, for instance, is created, then you can say that this universe was created by a single being like a potter and created simultaneously. Our experience teaches us that in respect of huge objects of creation, they are created by different beings and at different times. Huge temples, high towers, big bridges and fortresses and gigantic buildings etc. are not constructed by a single being or individual at one and the same

time. They have been constructed by thousands of persons in the course of several years. From the created nature (createdness) or *kāryatva* of the earth, mountains, and oceans, etc., the reasonable conclusion drawn will be that they were created by the labour of millions of persons gradually in the course of a very long time. This argument may be expressed in the form of a syllogism. The earth, mountains, oceans and so on are created by several persons; for, they are huge creations as contradistinguished from pot, jar, etc. which are created by a single doer; like the creation of towers, temples, bridges etc.¹ If you argue that commensurate with the magnitude of the creation, the individual souls being utterly incompetent for the task, a single being immensely superior to them in knowledge and power etc. must be inferred to be the creator as it is not proper to assume several creators; then, we reply that among the individual souls themselves, some of them who, by virtue of their accumulated merit (*punya*) and *upāsana* have acquired wonderful powers, may be the creators of this universe. Are we not familiar with purāṇic persons such as Viśvāmitra, who actually created a second *svarga*, as Agastya who drank the whole ocean like a drop of water from the middle of his palm and who dwarfed the Vindhya mountains? And have we not heard of other persons of marvellous powers? Did not Anasūyā, wife of Sage Atri, create during a ten years' famine due to want of rains, fruits and roots? Did she not make the Ganges flow? Did she not convert ten days into one night? Moreover, it is an admitted principle of all *Sāstras* that it is not proper to assume a new entity with new characteristics while

1. महीमहीधरादिकं अनेककर्तृकं यावत्संप्रतिपन्नकर्तृकघटादिभ्यः महाकर्मत्वात् गोपुरप्राकारादिवत् ।

you can simplify the matter by assuming only the characteristics as belonging to an already existing entity¹. In the present case, it is not proper to assume a disputed and unknown being, a new entity called God with supreme intelligence and power etc., while you can assume the necessary characteristics alone for the already known and undisputed individual soul. Further, for all inferential knowledge, consideration is the operation and the knowledge of invariable and necessary concomitance is the instrument². A man who has noticed in a kitchen etc. that smoke is a concomitant (vyāpya) of fire, happens to see afterwards, on a hill or the like, a trail of smoke connected with the surface. He then recalls the invariable and necessary concomitance that smoke is a concomitant of fire. Then he gets the knowledge that the hill is possessed of smoke which is a concomitant of fire. 'This is what is called parāmarśa. Thus parāmarśa means the knowledge that the concomitant or vyāpya exists in the subject, called pakṣa. The knowledge that apprehends the relation of what is possessed of concomitance to the subject is the cause of inference.'³ Smoke is an unconditional requisite to the appearance of fire. This is a perception and a belief forced upon us by constant experience. We thus see that vyāptijñāna which leads us to an inference is derived by constant experience that there is invariable and necessary concomitance between two known objects like smoke and fire. Thus, there are two pre-requisites for every inferential knowledge, one that a sign or liṅga like smoke is in the subject, like a hill etc. called pakṣa,

1. धर्मिकल्पनातो वरं धर्मकल्पना लाघवात् ।

2. व्यापारस्तु परामर्शः करणे व्याप्तिधीर्मवेत् ।

3. व्याप्यस्य पक्षवृत्तित्वधीः परामर्श उच्यते ।

and another, namely, *vyāpti* that there is a necessary concomitance between the sign or *liṅga* and the object to be inferred like fire etc. The sign or *liṅga* and the object to be inferred therefrom must necessarily be objects familiar to us. Otherwise, no inference is possible. Now, we shall apply this general law of inference to this particular case, namely inference of God from created objects of the world earth, mountains, oceans, etc. Here the subject, (*pakṣa*) is the created object such as earth, mountains and so on; the sign or *liṅga* existing in the subject is the created nature, createdness (*kāryatva*) like smoke in the hill; and the thing to be inferred is God. To enable us to arrive at the inference namely existence of God like the existence of fire, the pre-requisite is the knowledge of invariable and necessary concomitance of these two namely, createdness and God. Like the knowledge, "wherever there is fire", we must have the knowledge, "wherever there is createdness there is God". Since the existence of God is the very thing to be proved, we cannot assume his existence and much less, his invariable concomitance with createdness. God is, moreover, an unknown Being whose concomitance with anything in the world cannot be assumed. Therefore for want of a vital principle in inference namely *vyāpti* or necessary concomitance of *liṅga* or sign and the object to be inferred, no inference can be arrived at. And you cannot argue that an individual soul were the creator, he must create objects with the help of his body; and since at the time of deluge all the created objects are destroyed along with the bodies of individual souls, the creator subsequent to the deluge must be assumed to be a being different from the individual soul, a being who does not require a body and who does not depend upon his body for the creation

of the world; and that being is God. This argument is not sound; for there is no proof for the position that all objects are created at the same time and that all objects are destroyed simultaneously. On the contrary, it is opposed to our experience to say that all objects are created at the same time and are destroyed at the same time. It is within the experience of all of us that objects are created by degrees one after another and are likewise destroyed one after another. From the premise of createdness observed in several worldly objects, we have to deduce the origin and destruction of huge created objects at different times only, but not simultaneously. If from created nature or createdness as sign or *liṅga* you wish to infer a single wise creator, your argument is vitiated by the fallacy called *anaikāntya*, that is to say, the reason, *liṅga* or sign being present in both similar (*sapakṣa*) and contrary (*vipakṣa*) instances. A similar instance (*sapakṣa*) is what indubitably has the thing to be inferred, for example, a kitchen is sure to have fire. A contrary instance (*vipakṣa*) is what is other than what has the thing to be inferred, for example, a tank is sure to have no fire in it. A similar instance (*sapakṣa*) is what is definitely known to be possessed of the thing to be inferred. A contrary instance (*vipakṣa*) is what is definitely known to be devoid of the thing to be inferred. In the present case where you try to infer from the sign or *liṅga* namely createdness, a single wise creator, similar instances are jar, pot, golden ornament, etc. wherein the maker is single; and contrary instances are a tower, a huge festival car, a big mansion etc., wherein the makers are many. The sign or *liṅga*, namely createdness, being present both in similar and contrary instances, it is vitiated by the fallacy called *anaikāntika*. Moreover, you cannot infer from 'createdness' an omniscient and omni-

potent being; for, pot and other objects are also created, and from their createdness, you cannot infer their makers, potters, goldsmiths etc. to be omniscient and omnipotent. And further, when you want to infer an omniscient and omnipotent being from 'createdness' of objects, do you mean that the createdness existing in all objects sprung simultaneously, or do you mean that the createdness existing in all objects sprung one after another at different times? In the former alternative, the reason or *linga* or sign does not exist—a fallacy called *hetvasiddhi*—for, all objects are not created simultaneously; and in the latter alternative, the *linga* or sign namely createdness will establish only several creators, quite the contrary to what you wish to establish. Several weavers, potters, goldsmiths and so on, in different parts of the world, are makers of their creations at different times. There is no single maker for all the created objects. It is against our actual experience and perception to assume a single maker for all the created objects. It is also against *śāstras* to assume a single maker; for they say, "a potter is born, a chariot-maker is born."

Moreover, if God were to create the universe, does He create it without a body or with a body? He cannot create without a body; for our experience tells us that without a body no doership (*kartṛtva*) is possible. Even mental acts are possible only if the being possesses a body. For, even assuming that the mind is eternal, the beings without a body namely *muktas*, are not known to perform mental acts. Nor can God create with a body; for it cannot stand the scrutiny of alternatives. If He should create with a body that body must be either eternal or transient. His body cannot be eternal, for it has parts. If you should argue that even if it has parts it is eternal, then the universe also which has parts must

be likewise eternal and there need not be a God to create the universe as it is eternal. Nor can God's body be transient. If it is transient, it must have a cause. Since before the origination of the transient body of God, no other cause could possibly exist, the origination of that transient body is impossible. If you should assume the existence of a body other than God to create the transient body of God, that assumed body being also transient, a third body must be assumed to create the second body, and a fourth body must be assumed to create the third transient body and so on *ad infinitum*. And to avoid the above *reductio ad absurdum*, you cannot say that God himself is the cause of his transient body. For, as we have already said, without a body he cannot create any object. Does God possess activity (*prayatna*) or mental effort or does He not possess mental effort? For the very reason that He has no body, He does not possess activity or mental effort. Nor can He do anything without *prayatna* or mental effort, like a liberated soul (*mukta*).

And you cannot argue that God by His mere will creates this universe for no object in the world is seen to be created by the mere will of a being. Even small objects like jar, pot etc. are not created by the mere will of an intelligent being. Since we have to base our inference on our repeated observations of phenomena, on the laws of thought and on laws of logical inference and since invariable and necessary concomitance between a known worldly object and unknown God cannot be established by any amount of observation and experience, the existence of God cannot be logically inferred as the creator of this universe. Therefore, the only means of knowledge by which we can know the existence of God and all about Him is *āgama* or scripture. This view is

asserted by Vyāsa¹. Since Śāstra or revelation reveals God who is beyond the reach of senses and who is not knowable by perception and inference, and by other means of knowledge, Śāstra is said to be the only authority or means of knowledge about God.

Nature of God according to Sastras

Śāstras declare that God is opposed to all evils, infinite, intelligence and bliss in His being or svarūpa, possessed of omniscience, omnipotence and other auspicious qualities, the creator, protector and destroyer of all the worlds, the resort of four kinds of needy persons, ārta, jijñāsu, arthārthi and jñāni. He is the bestower of four kinds of puruṣārtha or desires called dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa, is possessed of extraordinary or aprākṛta or divine body, and is the lord of Lakṣmi, Bhūmi and Niḷā.

1. God is opposed to all evils (heyapratyanika).

God is opposed to all evils, defects and imperfections. Just as light is opposed to darkness, and Garuḍa to serpent, he is opposed to all changes and defects to which the three kinds of cit, namely embodied souls, liberated souls and eternally liberated souls, and the three kinds of acit, namely combined satva, pure satva and kāla are subjected. As we have already seen, these three kinds of acit are subject to transformations but God's being (svarūpa) is not subject to such transformations. The embodied souls are subject to ignorance, karma, miseries and other ills, i.e, to change of svabhāva though not to change of svarūpa. The liberated soul or mukta though

1. "शास्त्रयोनित्वात्"—शास्त्रं यस्य योनिः कारणं प्रमाणं तत् शास्त्रयोनि तस्य भावः शास्त्रयोनित्वं । तस्मात् ब्रह्मज्ञानकारणत्वात् शास्त्रस्य तद्योनित्वं ब्रह्मणः अत्यन्तातीन्द्रियत्वेनप्रत्यक्षादि प्रमाणाऽविषयतया ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रैकप्रमाणकत्वम् ॥ Br. Sat. 1-1-3.

purged of impurities after release or liberation, may ever afterwards be said to have been "once a jail bird", and the stigma of having once been in bondage will ever cling to him. As for an eternally liberated soul or *nitya*, his size (*svarūpa*) being *anu* or atomic, he is limited, and he is dependent by nature on God. But God's *svarūpa* is unlimited and He is free from the defect of dependence. It may be questioned whether dependence is a defect. Yes, for a really independent being, dependence is a defect like the unnatural protuberance of breasts for a *man*. Unlike the individual soul who, though pure by nature, yet is tainted by impurities due to *upādhi* or artificial cause, God is of uniform nature always free from impurities.¹ He is different from *acit* which ever changes, different from embodied souls which are subject to *kleśa*, *karma* and other impurities, is different from *muktas* or liberated souls who are not eternally pure souls, and is also different from *nityas* who are not the Supreme Soul.² *Paramātman* means the highest Self to whom there is no superior³.

Prima facie argument (purva pakṣa) against God being opposed to all evils.

It is admitted that the existence of the individual soul in detestable bodies, human and other bodies, is the cause of its ills and miseries. God who is said to be the *antaryāmin*, in-dweller in all, also resides in such impure bodies. His residence in those bodies must necessarily cause miseries which He cannot escape. If you should argue that scriptures assert that God is absolutely free from all ills and defects and that He is full of auspicious

1. एकस्वरूपं तु सदा हेयामलाच्च निर्मलम् ।

2. अविकाराय शुद्धाय नित्याय परमात्मने । *Viṣṇusahasranāmam* in *Mahābhārata*.

3. परः यस्मात् नास्ति सः परमः ।

qualities, then, we point out that the individual soul is also known to be likewise free from all ills and defects, from the passages of Prajāpati etc. which teach that the soul is essentially free from all evils, karma and sins, old age, death, grief, hunger, thirst and so on.¹ And if you argue that the embodied soul is nevertheless liable to imperfections owing to his connection with a variety of bodies, since his natural faultlessness and auspiciousness are eclipsed by his karma and avidyā, then we reply that the antaryāmin, God, also is equally affected, nay, much more still, because of His residence within countless bodies at the same time. Brahman or God may not have karma like the embodied soul: yet His very presence in those bodies will suffice to make Him liable to imperfections and impurities. So, you do not improve matters in any way by saying that God is not karma-ridden like the soul. The residence of God in countless bodies full of impurities such as faeces, urine, flesh, purulent matter, blood, etc., like residence in the worst of hells (Raurava), etc., must make Him impure. And if you further argue that God, by His own free will and choice, without being forced by anybody, resides in such bodies and that He is not, therefore, affected by imperfections and impurities, we reply that He cannot avoid impurities and sufferings just like a man who voluntarily, of his own accord, plunges himself into a heap of filth and nightsoil, and just like a man who voluntarily, of his own accord, cuts his own hand. There is no escape from the impurities and pain which are the natural consequences of those acts, however voluntary they may be.

Moreover, the ubhayalingatvam, i.e. absence of impurities and presence of auspicious qualities, for

1. अपहृतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युः विशोकः विजिघत्सः वशिषसः । Chh. Up. 8-

Brahman or God cannot be maintained for the following reasons. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka at first states that the two modes or prakāras or body of Brahman are the gross and the subtle universes;¹ and then, referring to the form of Brahman, states that it is yellow in colour,² and afterwards declares: 'not so', 'not so'³ that is, negatives the two forms of distinctive qualities or modes of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. In 'not so', the word 'so' refers to all the modes of Brahman previously declared; and the word 'not' denies all such modes. Therefore, the substratum of all the declared attributes is the mere existence (sanmātra) namely, Brahman. For, Brahman is in reality devoid of all distinctive attributes which are altogether due to upādhi. Therefore, the twin characteristics (ubhayalingatvam) cannot be maintained for Brahman.

The Siddhanta view of Ubhayalingatvam for Brahman established.

The above argument is untenable. Notwithstanding the abode of the Highest self within the individual soul, the Highest Self is not affected by the soul's imperfections, because everywhere, i.e. in śrutis and smṛtis, the Highest Self is represented as having two-fold characteristics, i.e. being, on the one hand, free from all evils, and on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious qualities.⁴ Śrutis declare that the Highest Self is free from karma, old age, death, grief, hunger, thirst and other imperfections, and is possessed of all auspicious qualities.⁵ And

1. द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्तेऽमूर्तेमेव च । Bṛhad. Up. 4-3-1.

2. यथामाहारजनं वासः ।

3. अथात आदेशः नेति नेति न ह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत् परमस्ति । Bṛhad. Up. 4-3-6.

4. न स्थानतोपि परस्य उभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि । Br. Sū. 3-2-11.

5. अपहृतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युः विशोकः विजिघत्सः अपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः । Chh. Up. 8.

likewise Smṛtis assert the above mentioned two-fold characteristics of Brahman.¹ The argument that the abiding in the body being common both to the highest Self and the jīva, it makes no difference so far as clinging of imperfections and impurities is concerned, and that rather, the imperfections are greater and stronger as the Highest Self abides in countless bodies, is met as follows. The Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa, anticipating such an objection has wisely repeated several times the same expression.² Beginning with "He who resides in the earth and permeates it, whom the earth knows not, to whom the earth is the body and who controls the earth, this immortal being whose immortality is natural and does not depend upon any other being, is also your inner-life principle",³ it devotes twenty-two sentences, one for each of the substances, namely, the earth, water, fire, antarikṣa, air, dyuloka, the Sun, space, the Moon, star, ether, darkness, tejas, all creatures, breaths, organ of speech, the eye, ear, mind, skin, the individual soul, and semen, of all of which God is said to be the antaryāmin or inner life-principle. And in each of the sentences, i.e. for twenty-two times, the words: "This highest Self is your antaryāmin and he is immortal"⁴ are repeated. The antaryāmin is expressly called 'immortal' (amṛta), the Ruler within, for the purpose of showing Him to be free from the shortcomings of the jīva. Therefore, the Highest Self who resides in the individual souls and

1. समस्तदेयरहितं विष्णुस्वरूपं परमं पदं । समस्तकल्याणगुणाकरोसौ ॥

2. एष ते आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृतः ।

3. यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् यः पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति एष ते आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृतः । Brhad.

Up. 5-7.

4. एष ते आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृतः ।

in other substances for the purpose of ruling and controlling them is not tainted by their imperfections. The jail officer who resides in the jail for the purpose of controlling and inflicting punishment on the criminals is not affected by the imprisonment and sufferings of the criminals within the jail. It may be asked, how can the voluntary entrance and residence of God in the detestable body filled with urine, faeces and other impurities, make Him escape the impurities, merely because it is voluntary. The answer is that substances by themselves, not even inanimate ones, do not produce ills by their intrinsic nature. According to the nature of karma or past deeds of embodied souls, by the will of God, substances give pain or pleasure with variation of time, place and persons. If it were the intrinsic nature of a substance to give either pain alone or pleasure alone, it must invariably give pain alone or pleasure alone, to all persons and at all times. But our experience of worldly objects is not so. We have already referred to this point while refuting objections against service to God. "Experiences of pain and pleasure are respectively called hell and svarga. One and the same object in the world causes pain to one, pleasure to another, jealousy to a third, anger to a fourth and so on; and the same object which gave pleasure to a person before, gives pain or anger to the same person afterwards. There is no object which invariably gives pain or pleasure for all persons and at all times. It is not in the nature of worldly objects, therefore, either to give pain or to give pleasure".¹ As a result of his karma, a particular jiva finds pleasure in a particular object and pain in another

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1. नरकस्वर्गसंज्ञे वै पापपुण्ये द्विजोत्तम । वस्तुचेक्रेव दुःखाय सुखायेऽप्यभिगमाय च ॥
 कोपाय च यतस्तस्मात् वस्तु वस्तुत्वात्मकं कुतः । तदेव प्रीतये भूत्वा पुनर्दुःखाय
 जायते ॥ तदेव कोपाय यतः प्रसादाय च जायते । तस्मात् दुःखात्मकं नास्ति न
 च किञ्चित् सुखात्मकम् । मनसः परिणामोऽयम् सुखदुःखादिलक्षणम् ॥

object; and at the end of that karma, the pain or pleasure will disappear. As a result of karma, therefore, the mentality of a jīva towards an object varies. If, due to merit or puṇya, a jīva finds an object favourable to him, then he gets pleasure; and if due to sin or pāpa, he finds an object unfavourable to him, then he gets pain. Therefore, contact with an object is evil (apurusaṛtha) for a jīva due only to his karma. But, for God who is an independent Being (swatantra), the same object serves as an instrument of sport in His wonderful government. On the basis of absence of karma for God, some texts expressly assert that although the Lord and the soul are within one body, the soul alone is imperfect, but not the Lord. “Two birds of inseparable companionship embrace the same tree (body fit to be cut). One of the two, the jīva enjoys or suffers fruition, and the other, God, shines forth without eating the fruit thereof”.¹ If it should be said that, according to the Chhandogya text², Brahman entered together with the souls into the elements, previous to evolution of names and forms, and hence participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in saṁsāra, we reply that although connected with such and such forms, Brahman is in itself devoid of form, as it were, since it is the principal factor, agent, (pradhāna) in the bringing about of names and forms. “Although God (Ākāśa) has entry into all substances, he manages everything, without himself having the effect of names and forms, i.e., pain or pleasure, unlike the jīva”.³

It may be further asked: “Let Brahman be free from impurities; but how can He be said to be

1. द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते । तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति
अनश्नन्नन्योऽमित्राकक्षीति । . Mund. Up. 3.

2. अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकृत्वाणि । Chh. Up. 3-2

3. आकाशो ह वै नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिताते यदन्तरा तद्वद्वा ।

omniscient, satyasaṅkalpa, (achieving everything by mere will), the creator of the universe, the inner life-principle for all etc., while there are specific texts such as satyam jñānam anantam Brahma which teach that Brahman is nothing but pure intelligence and which by *implication* deny any difference or qualities such as will, omniscience, etc. and while there are other texts such as “neti, neti” which *explicitly* deny by the words ‘not so’, ‘not so’, the qualities of omniscience etc. asserted before, thereby teaching that the qualities are not real but only fictitiously imposed on Brahman?” We answer the objection as follows. As, in order *not* to deprive passages quoted from Taittiriya¹ “Existence intelligence and infinite is Brahman” of their purport, we admit that Brahman’s nature is light so we must also admit that Brahman is satyasaṅkalpa (achieving everything at will) satyakāma, omniscient and so on, as otherwise the passages in which those qualities are asserted would become meaningless. Moreover, the Taittiriya passage only asserts so much² namely, the prakāśa swarūpata, nature of being luminous, and does not deny qualities of satyasaṅkalpa and so on, explicitly asserted in other passages. For, the general rule of Śāstras is thus stated: “When specific qualities are *asserted*, the general denial of qualities must be interpreted to mean the denial of qualities other than those explicitly asserted. And when specific qualities are *denied*, a general denial of qualities must be interpreted to be restricted to the specific qualities.”³ In passages such

1. सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।

2. cf. आह च तन्मात्रं । Br. Sut. 3.2.16.

3. गुणविशेषविधाने सति सामान्यनिषेधस्य विहितव्यतिरिक्तविषयत्वं-गुणविशेष-निषेधे सति सामान्यनिषेधस्य तत्पर्याक्सायित्वं ।

as: "He is without parts, without action and without evil",¹ where specific qualities are denied, a general denial such as, 'He is attributeless', must only refer to the specific qualities denied before. Vedānta texts both Śrutis and Smṛtis, moreover, teach us the existence of auspicious qualities, and the absence of evils or impurities, that is *ubhayalingatvam* in Brahman. Because Brahman, although abiding in several places and bodies, is not touched by their imperfections and impurities, the similes of the reflected Sun² and of the ether limited by jar etc.,³ are applicable to it. Should it be said that the illustration is not an appropriate one because the Sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only, while the *antaryāmin* really abides within all things and therefore must be viewed as sharing their defects, we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely that Brahman should, owing to Its inherence or residence in many places and bodies, participate in the increase, decrease and so on of Its abodes.

The illustration of ether which really exists in many impure substances, and the illustration of the Sun which does not really exist in water, etc. would become appropriate if they are meant only to deny the clinging of imperfections to Brahman by its

1. निष्कलं निष्क्रियं निरकृतं ।

2. अत एव च उपमा सूर्यकादिवत् । Br. Sūt. 3-2-18.

3. cf. आकाशमेकं हि यथा घटादिषु पृथग्भवेत् ।

तथात्मैको ह्यनेकस्थः जलाघारेष्विवांशुमान् ।

एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।

एकवा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥ Yājñavalkya-adhyātma

अत्र एक शब्दस्य एक स्वभावः इत्यर्थः ।

abode in the impure earth, etc. Just as ether by separate contact with a small cup, a big jar and a bigger vessel etc. is not affected by the smallness or bigness, and by the increase or decrease of the substances, and just as the Sun is not affected by its reflections in water, big or small, full or mutilated, as the case may be, according to the variations of movements of waves, in the same manner, the highest Self though abiding in various objects of various forms, earth and so on, in intelligent and non-intelligent objects, is really not touched by their increase or decrease, and by other imperfections but shines forth with His pure nature and with His natural auspicious qualities. That is to say, just as there is no touch of imperfections of the water for the Sun which does not really exist in water, because there is absolutely no cause or reason for such a touch, in the same manner, there is no touch of imperfections of the earth and so on for Brahman in spite of its residence in those bodies, merely because, Brahman being by nature opposed to all evils, there is absolutely no cause or reason for the clinging of such imperfections to Brahman. On this view, therefore, both similes are appropriate. In our experience, we observe that analogous similes are employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion. The simile is only in respect of a particular aspect or point or quality which we wish to emphasise, namely undaunted courage, ferociousness and the like, but not in all aspects or points, as otherwise it would be absurd.

Should it be argued that the *ubhayalingatvam* of Brahman cannot be maintained considering that the repetition, 'not so' 'not so' in the Upaniṣad¹

1. अथात आदेशः नेति नेति । Br. Up. 4-3-6.

denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes or prakāras or bodies, namely the two modes or prakāras or bodies, the gross and subtle universe¹, so that it can only be called, that which is mere existence (sanmātra), then we reply as follows. This argument is unsound. The text 'not so', 'not so' does not deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously as otherwise it would be like the ravings of an insane man. For it would be senseless to teach them at first and finally to deny them. Although some of the objects mentioned previously are already known by other means of knowledge, yet that they form mode or prakāra of Brahman is not known by any other means. And both the being (svarūpa) of some other objects and their constituting the prakāra or mode of Brahman are totally unknown otherwise. All the above-mentioned modes of Brahman are known only from scriptures but not from ordinary experience. If they are known by experience, then and then alone, scriptures might at first refer to them as things already known (anuvāda), and then finally negative them. But they are not known by other means of knowledge. Therefore, they are not referred to as things already known. And hence they are taught herein for the first time.' Their denial is therefore, improper. For the above reason what is denied is not the two-fold mode or prakāra asserted before, but only *prakṛtāitāvadvam*, i.e. the previously stated limiting nature of Brahman. That is to say, the passage denies that Brahman possesses only the previously mentioned attributes or qualities. That Brahman is 'only this much', that it is possessed of these attributes alone is

1. द्वेधाव ब्रह्मणोरुपे मूर्तमामूर्तम्— Br. Up. 4-3-1.

2. अत्रैव उपदिश्यन्ते।

denied,¹: 'Not so, not so'. Brahman is not qualified by the said attributes alone. In 'not so, not so', (neti na iti), what is referred to by the word 'so' (iti) is the '*only this much*' of Brahman already stated, as being qualified by the said *prakāra*, and that is denied by the word 'not' (na). For, after this denial or negation, some other attributes are asserted of Brahman in a subsequent passage² namely: "There is nothing greater than the Brahman which has been described by the words 'not so, not so', there is no being superior to it. That is to say in svarūpa (being) and also in svabhāva (qualities) there is no being superior to Brahman. Brahman is called '*the true among the true things*'. The individual souls called *prāṇas* (breaths) by virtue of their connection with breaths are said to be 'true things' (satya) i.e. changeless, as they do not undergo any change in their being as contradistinguished from ether and other substances which undergo change in their being (svarūpa). And Brahman is said to be truer than the individual souls as they have contraction and expansion of their attribute-consciousness." But the highest Self being opposed to all imperfections has no such contraction and expansion of knowledge. He is, therefore, truer than jivas or individual souls. Therefore, by the assertion of new qualities made after the aforesaid denial passage, in the subsequent passage which supplements the

1. (तद्विशिष्टतया ब्रह्मणः प्रतीयमानेयत्ता) नेति नेति नैवं नैवं-उक्तप्रकारमात्रविशिष्टं न भवति ब्रह्म ।
2. न हेतुस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत् परमस्ति—अथ नामधेयं सत्यस्य सत्यमिति प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेव सत्यं । Br. Up. 4-3-6. इति नेति यद्ब्रह्म प्रतिपादितं तस्मादेतस्मादन्यद् वस्तु परं नास्ति-ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत् स्वरूपतः गुणतश्च उत्कृष्टं नास्तीत्यर्थः । तस्य च ब्रह्मणः सत्यस्य सत्यं इति नामधेयं-तस्य निर्वचनं प्राणावै सत्यं तेषामेव सत्यमिति ॥
3. तेषां एव सत्यं=तेभ्योऽपि सत्यम् ।

previous passages, we have to conclude that the denial, 'not so', does not deny the attributes or the two modes of Brahman not known by any other means of knowledge, but denies 'only this much' or previously stated limiting nature of Brahman. That Brahman is not the object of any other means of proof but scripture is confirmed in the sūtra: 'Scripture declares Brahman to be non-manifest,'—based on texts such as: "The form or body of Brahman cannot be perceived by the eye and other organs". A further reason is stated in the next sūtra¹ that the intuition or realisation (sākṣātkāra) of Brahman ensues only upon its samrādhana i.e. upon Its being perfectly pleased with the worshipper's devotion, as śrutis and smṛtis declare. Therefore, the passage: "There are two modes or *prakāras* of Brahman (gross and subtle universe)² teaching the two modes of Brahman not known by any other means for the purpose of the worshipper's concentrated meditation, cannot be said to be *anuvāda* i.e. reference to things already known, and therefore cannot be said to be denied by the subsequent passage, 'not so'.

Thus we see that God is opposed to all evils. Just as the changes, childhood, boyhood, manhood, old age, etc. pertaining to the body do not affect the individual soul within it, so also the impurities or defects clinging to the three kinds of cit and to the three kinds of acit do not affect the highest Self. "Though all pervading,

1. तदव्यक्तमाह हि । Br. Sūt. 3-2-22.

2. न संदृशे तिष्ठति रूपस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनैनम् । Taittiriya Nārāyaṇa. न चक्षुषामृष्यते नापि वाचा । Muṇḍaka 3-1-8.
एताव दिव्यं कृपुः दर्शनाय न संतिष्ठति दर्शनयोम्यता नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

3. अपि संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां । Br. Sūt. 3-2-23.

4. देवावब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्तश्चामूर्तश्च

though pervading all the cit and acit, He conquers all.”¹ The conquest meant here is the control of everything i.e. not being tainted by their impurities in spite of His pervasiveness.

2. God is infinite (ananta).

God is said to be infinite i.e. not limited by space, time and substance (vastu). Since He is all-pervading i.e. pervading all the intelligent and non-intelligent objects, He cannot be said to be present in some places only and absent in other places. He has no limitation in space (desapariccheda). Since He is eternal He cannot be said to exist at one time and not to exist at another time. He has, therefore, no limitation in time (kalapariccheda). Since He is the antaryāmin for all and therefore their prakāri i.e. having everything as His body but without having any prakāri for Himself, and since He has no object like Him, He has no limitation in substance (vastu pariccheda). As He is the inner animating life-principle for all, i.e. as He is the soul of all objects, we cannot say which object alone is God and which not. Śāstras say (sarvam khalvidam brahma) that the whole cosmos is God, and that God is everything as He pervades all.²

3. God is intelligence and bliss in His being (svarupa).

Of what substance is God? He is of the substance intelligence i.e. his being (svarūpa) is intelligence which is favourable, i.e. bliss. In the all-pervading svarūpa nowhere is non-intelligence and non-bliss. Saint Nammālvār beautifully describes the being of God as follows: “The being (svarūpa) of God is an all-

1. cf. विष्णवे सर्वजिष्णवे । •Viṣṇu Sahasranama in Mahābhārata.

2. सर्वं समाप्नोति ततोऽसि सर्वः ॥ B. G. 11-40.

pervading thick blaze of intelligence, boundless upwards, boundless downwards and boundless on all sides, and is the inner soul and life-principle of subtle individual souls and subtle matter.”¹

4. God is possessed of omniscience, omnipotence and other auspicious qualities.

Omniscience, omnipotence and other auspicious qualities are ornaments for the svarūpa (being) of God, blazing it up like ear-rings, etc., ornaments which blaze up His divine body. By auspiciousness of qualities is meant the enjoyableness by His devotees.

Import and scope of saguna and nirguna sruti.

In the Upaniṣads and other Vedānta teachings there are saguṇavāda and also nirguṇavāda with reference to the same Brahman. That is to say, some passages teach that Brahman is possessed of qualities while others deny the existence of qualities in Him.

Passages such as : “He who knows all things in all aspects”²; “Supreme and wonderful are His powers, intelligence, strength etc., exhibited in a variety of ways”³; “He is possessed of all auspicious qualities”⁴; “He who has always objects of enjoyment, instruments of enjoyment and places of enjoyment i.e. he who has both the vibhūti, līla vibhūti and nitya vibhūti; He who has his saṅkalpa or will unobstructed;”⁵ “The liberated soul enjoys the

1. Tiruvoimozhi (Tamil)-I.5.10.

2. यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् । Muṇḍ. Up. 2.2.9.

3. पराऽस्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ॥ Svet. Up.

4. समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकोऽसौ । V. P. 6-6-84.

5. सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः ।

auspicious qualities of Brahman along "with Brahman",¹—thousands of passages such as these teach the existence of qualities for Brahman.

And likewise, passages such as: "He is without qualities, without blemish, without parts, without action and is calm".² "He is without *karma*, i.e. merit or demerit, without old age, without death or *samsāra*, without grief and without hunger and thirst"³; "He who cannot be seen or grasped, He who has no gotra or varṇa or caste, and He who has no eyes, ears, hands or feet";⁴ "He who is neither gross nor subtle"⁵—teach the absence of qualities.

As a matter of fact, there appears to be only an apparent conflict between these two sets of passages. Things to be achieved (*sādhya* *avastu*) may have alternatives. That is to say, going to the railway station may be done by taking this road, or that road or a third road or a fourth road, and that may be done by walking or going in a cycle, in a car or otherwise. But objects which already exist (*siddha* *avastu*) cannot have alternatives. That is to say, in the present case, Brahman cannot be possessed of and devoid of qualities at the same time. Now, we cannot ignore both the sets of passages as both are authoritative and teach truths or *tatvas*; nor can we ignore one of the two as we have no conclusive reasoning (*vinigamana*) in favour of one and against the other. For the above reason, we cannot say that one set of passages

1. सोऽस्तुते सर्वान्कमान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता । Taitt. Up.

2. निर्गुणं निरंजनं निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तम् ।

3. अपहृतपाप्मा विजरः विमृत्युः विशोकः विजिघत्सः अपिपासः । Chh. Up. 8-1-5

4. यत्तद्वेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रं अवर्णमचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादं ।

5. अस्थूलमनणु ।

thwarts or invalidates or overcomes the other. In this matter, some obstinate persons are anxious to establish a real conflict between these two sets of passages and to strengthen the conflict. But wise men are anxious to reconcile the two sets by determining the different scope or province or viṣaya for each set. By applying the principle of 'general rule and exception' (utsargā-pavāda nyāya), we have to determine the scope and province of the two sets. On the application of this principle, we find that the denial passages refer to qualities other than those explicitly asserted in other passages, i.e. to evil qualities (heyaguṇa). The scope or province of denial passages is, therefore, different from that of passages which assert the existence of auspicious qualities. The scope of each set being different, there is absolutely no conflict between the two sets. As there is no conflict between the two sets, one cannot thwart or invalidate or overcome the other. And since one set does not overcome the other, the authoritativeness of both is unquestionable and unshakable. A significant factor which forces us to fix the different scope or province of these two sets is the text Prajāpativākya, the teaching of Brahma in one and the same sentence, wherein eight attributes or qualities are taught, of which the first six are negative attributes and the last two are positive ones.

God is (1) without karma, (2) without old age, (3) without death or *saṁsāra*, (4) without grief, (5) without hunger, (6) without thirst, (7) satyākāma, that is, always having objects of enjoyment etc., i.e. having both the vibhūti, and (8) satya-saṅkalpa, that is, having His will unobstructed. The first six negative attributes mean and include all other bad qualities or imperfections, and the last two positive attributes mean and include all other auspicious

qualities. Thus it is clear that nīrguṇa śruti denies the existence of all imperfections and bad qualities in Brahman. While we can easily fix the different scope of these two sets of passages, it is improper to hold with Śaṅkara that one set, namely, nīrguṇa śruti overcomes and invalidates saguṇa śruti and that therefore the existence of any quality whatsoever in Brahman is unreal (mithyā). Should you argue that the nīrguṇa śruti or denial text occurs later and that therefore it invalidates or overcomes the previous saguṇa śruti and establishes the only tatva, namely an attributeless Brahman, everything else being unreal, then Mādhyamika whose tenet is 'everything is unreal' and who alone has the last word to say on the point, namely, "*everything, including your so-called attributeless Brahman, is unreal*", will alone triumph as there can be no denial statement later than that. If you should argue that the statement of Mādhyamika, "*everything is unreal*", is like the prattling of an insane man and is not therefore authoritative, then we reply to Śaṅkara "According to your own statement made in your 'Śārirakabhāṣya': "all Śāstras with positive and negative injunctions and relating to mokṣa (liberation) are all unreal and have reference to unreal things"—even your assertion, "*The existence, namely Brahman, alone is real*" (sad advitīyam brahma), stands on the same footing as that of the śūnyavādin who denies everything. Nay, the śūnyavādin is on a firmer footing than you, judged by your own standard; for his is the last word of denial, but yours is not the last word. You deny everything except Brahman; and he denies everything including your

1. सर्वान्यपि शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि । अविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव ।

Śārirakamimāmsā.

attributeless Brahman. And both of you agree on one point, namely, that *both of you do not admit the reality of the means of knowledge in support of your position.* Since even, according to you, there is no proof for the existence of your attributeless Brahman, such a Brahman does not exist. In effect, you are at one with the *sūnyavādin*, but yet you fall foul on him for his statement, because it happens to come from his mouth. We are here reminded of a funny incident which has become proverbial. It is called 'Subhagābhikṣuka nyāya' or 'the story of daughter-in-law-mother-in-law mendicant.' A mendicant was crying aloud for alms at the entrance of a house. The mother-in-law had gone to the river for water. The daughter-in-law who was inside the house came out hearing the cry and stoutly refused to give alms to the mendicant in spite of his repeated requests. An altercation was going on between the mendicant and the daughter-in-law. In the meantime, the mother-in-law returned from the river with a pot full of water, witnessing the altercation as she was coming back. On reaching home she got wild and saw the mendicant leaving the house. She called the mendicant and told him, "What right has this wretched girl, my daughter-in-law, to say whether you shall get alms or not, as long as I am alive? Come here." The mendicant thought that the mother-in-law would give him alms and so cheerfully went back to the house. But alas! instead of giving him alms, the mother-in-law said, "She has no right to say that you shall have no alms. I alone have the right. And I tell you, you shall have no alms." And the mendicant went away very much disappointed. In attacking the *sūnyavādin* or *Mādhyamika*, Śaṅkara stands in the position of the queer mother-in-law. Therefore, nirguṇa śrutis deny only inauspicious qualities and imperfections in

Brahman but not the existence of auspicious qualities and attributes.

Attributeless Brahman is inconceivable and opposed to all means of knowledge. There is no proof of non-differenced substance.

Those who hold with Śaṅkara the theory of the existence of an attributeless Brahman or, for that matter, of any attributeless object, cannot say by which means of knowledge (pramāṇa) they apprehend such an attributeless object, as all means of knowledge cognise only objects possessing attributes. If it be argued, for the sake of arguing, that it is one's individual experience to cognise an attributeless object, then that argument is condemned by one's own conscience which dictates to one that only objects possessing attributes are cognised in one's experience. It is the experience of all to say, 'I cognised such and such an object of such a nature.' If, by some sophistry, the experience of an object possessing attributes is sought to be established as one without attributes, even then, since it has to be established by its special characteristics other than mere existence (sattā atireki), the experience will be one of attributes, by virtue of the pre-requisites of such an establishment, namely, its special characteristics other than mere existence. In respect of an object possessing some attributes, some other attributes are denied. Since there can be no denial anywhere of every possible attribute, an attributeless object cannot be established. For, when an agent cognises external objects, his attribute-consciousness (dharmabhūtajñāna) which manifests those objects to him also manifests itself as possessing self-luminosity and knowledgehood (dhītvam) i.e. power to illumine other objects. Even during the states of deep sleep, intoxication and swoon, the experience is one of attributes. Śaṅkara himself admits eternity, oneness, blissfulness,

self-luminosity and other characteristics in *ātman* or Brahman. When he refutes the view that the transient knowledge is Brahman, and wants to establish eternity for Brahman, is he not anxious to establish some characteristics other than the being (*svarūpa*) of Brahman? If he is, he establishes Brahman with attributes. If he is not, he does not want to establish anything; for he has already admitted the being of Brahman. It cannot be contended that those characteristics are mere being (*vastumātra*). While there is absolutely no dispute among the controversialists or disputants regarding the mere being (*vastumātra*) of *ātman*, the dispute is regarding the nature or characteristic of the *ātman*. The Bauddhas want to establish transience or transiency for the *ātman*, the nirviṣeṣa advaitin wants to establish eternity, oneness (*ekatva*) and self-luminosity for the *ātman*, while the Vaiśeṣikas and others want to establish non-luminosity (*jaḍatva*) and many-ness (*bahutva*) for the same *ātman*. All the disputants admit the being (*svarūpa*) of the *ātman*. Therefore in attacking the disputants the advaitin must necessarily try to establish something beyond the common ground of all, namely the being of the *ātman*. He cannot, therefore, say that those characteristics are mere being (*vastumātra*). Therefore, he must admit that the object is possessed of attributes which are known by real means of knowledge.

Sabda proves difference.

Sabda has power (*sāmarthya*) to denote only objects having attributes since it is used as words and sentences. A word becomes a word when a termination is added on to its prakṛti or base which itself is etymologically derived from a root. The base or prakṛti and the termination being different in meaning, a word necessarily denotes not

a non-differenced substance but a substance having attributes. For example, take the word, 'speaks'. It contains several different ideas or concepts, namely, a person belonging to the male or female sex, existing at the present time, having oneness (i.e.) denoted by the singular number and performing the action of speaking. Thus we see that a single word contains several different concepts. The employment of several words in a sentence is based on several different ideas or concepts intended to be conveyed. And a sentence containing a group of words necessarily expresses a combination of several attributes in a certain object, and therefore, it is powerless to denote an attributeless substance. Sabda cannot prove non-differenced substance.

**Perception (pratyaksa), even nirvikalpaka,
proves difference.**

The two kinds of perception namely *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) knowledge and *savikalpaka* (determinate) knowledge prove difference. Ancient logicians of the West held the view that simple apprehension is the act of the mind in so far as it neither affirms nor denies, but merely places an object before consciousness and that concept is the unit of thought. But modern logicians assert that judgment which affirms or denies identity between the objects of concept is alone the unit of thought. An idea in the consciousness cannot be there without affirming its presence and its object, without asserting its affinities to other ideas. *Savikalpaka* or determinate knowledge apprehends an object presented before consciousness with several attributes, such as the particular genus (*jāti*) to which it belongs, its special features within that genus, and so on. And *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate knowledge also has for its object (*viṣaya*), a substance qualified by attributes; for the

attributes cognised in nirvikalpaka are the cause of recognition and recollection in savikalpaka. Therefore, nirvikalpaka or indeterminate knowledge means the apprehension of an object without *some attributes* only; but not without any attribute whatsoever; for, such an apprehension without any attribute is against all experience and opposed to all laws of thought. Whenever you perceive an object, you perceive it as "this is so and so" (i.e.) as something big or small, of some size, of this colour, of some colour, running or standing or sitting or flying, of some posture, as something belonging to some genus or to some species, quadruped or biped, and so on and so forth. You never perceive it as a mere being or as a mere substance without any attribute. When you perceive an object for the first time not knowing to which species it belongs, for example a rhinoceros, and observe it to be a pachydermatous (non-ruminant) animal having three hoofs on each foot and one or two very strong horns upon the nose, and then learn from a zoologist close by, that it belongs to a species of mammals called rhinoceros and other things about it,—there you have nirvikalpaka jñāna, or indeterminate knowledge as the attribute jāti i.e. species is not apprehended by you, in this perception. But when you, having once known it, see another of its kind, for the second, third and fourth time and so on, you have savikalpaka knowledge i.e. determinate knowledge. In the first perception you did not apprehend rhinocerosness, the particular species, as being recognised or recollected (i.e.) as existing in other objects of the same species (anuvṛttaākāratayā). The recognition and recollection of the attributes (i.e.) their apprehension as existing in other objects of the same species is only in the second and subsequent perceptions. Since in the second and subsequent perceptions, the attributes of

jāti etc. (cowness, rhinocerosness, etc.) are apprehended as existing in other objects of the same species, those perceptions are called savikalpaka. And on account of the absence of such an apprehension, the first perception is called nirvikalpaka. For the above reasons, perception (pratyakṣa) can never prove non-differenced substance.

Inference (anumana) also proves difference.

Since perception apprehends only a qualified object, and since inference has for its scope objects known by perception to possess invariable and necessary concomitance like smoke and fire, inference also proves only difference but not non-differenced substance.

Perception does not reveal mere being (sanmatra).

If you hold that perception reveals 'mere being' that would be against our experience of qualified objects such as 'Here is a jar', 'there is a cloth' and so on. If you argue that perception does not apprehend beyond 'mere being', the difference namely the species to which the object belongs, otherwise called the form or structure (vastusamsthāna) of the jar, pot, cow, etc., then why is a man in quest of a horse not satisfied on seeing a donkey, even though he apprehends 'mere being'? You cannot give a satisfactory answer. The real reason is that he sees difference, not 'mere being'; he sees being qualified by attributes, he is not satisfied with 'a being' qualified by donkeyhood but he wants a being qualified by 'horsehood'. Moreover, if the object of all knowledge or consciousness is 'mere being' alone, how is it that we do not remember in every consciousness all the words accompanying respective consciousness of various objects? And further, all admit the difference between anubhava (actual experience) and smṛti (recollection or remembrance). Remembrance is the apprehending again of what had been apprehended

before (gr̥hitagrāhitva) as contradistinguished from experience. If you contend that every perception apprehends only 'mere being', then the perception of a horse and that of an elephant being the same (i.e.) having mere being for their object, the perception of an elephant coming after the perception of a horse, apprehends only what had been apprehended before namely 'mere being'; that is to say, it is not different from recollection or remembrance. To say that perception is not different from remembrance is absurd. When once the difference between one consciousness and another is admitted, the apprehension by perception of a qualified substance is *ipso facto* admitted. If the object of all consciousness were one (i.e) mere being (sanmātra), then, by means of one consciousness all things would be cognised, and there would be no blindness, deafness and so on in the world. Since according to you perception apprehends only 'mere being' and does not apprehend colour, sound, etc., and since blind men and deaf men also apprehend 'mere being' by perception, blindness and deafness should not exist in the world. We apprehend with our eyes not a 'mere being' but a coloured object, its colour and other attributes inherent in the object; with the sense of touch we apprehend the quality of touch and the object in which touch is inherent. Likewise, the other organs do not apprehend 'mere being' but they apprehend also sound, taste and smell. Therefore, there is no organ which apprehends 'mere being' (sanmātra). All means of knowledge teach difference. There is no means of knowledge (pramāṇa) by which non-differenced substance can be proved. Attributeless Brahman is, therefore, opposed to all means of knowledge. Brahman or God is possessed of auspicious qualities such as omniscience, omnipotence and so on.

Nature of God's auspicious qualities.

The auspicious qualities of God namely knowledge, power, strength, supremacy, firmness, energetic opposition and other qualities are — eternal (nitya), boundless (nissīma), countless (nissāṅkhyā), natural and independent (nirupādhika), blemishless (nirdoṣa) and without equal or superior (samānādhikarahita), unequalled and unsurpassed.

i. God's auspicious qualities are eternal (i.e.) have neither beginning nor end, for they are co-eval with and inherent in His being (svarūpa) which is eternal. Chhāndogya says that God's qualities are eternal. *Kāmas* are auspicious qualities of God, so-called because they are desired and coveted; and they are satya, true (i.e.) eternal.¹ Nammālvār says 'Nārāyaṇa who has eternal auspicious qualities'.²

ii. They are boundless (nissīma) i.e. each of the qualities is unlimited. Taittiriya Upaniṣad says that Veda puruṣa or *Sruti devī* at first undertook to measure the quantity of one of God's qualities namely bliss, but, being unable to go beyond the stage of attempt, returned with mind and words.³ Parāśara Bhaṭṭa has finely expressed this idea in a stanza⁴ about Lord Raṅganātha: "Oh! Lord Raṅganātha, the Ānandavalli of Taittiriya Upaniṣad made a mad attempt to measure

1. त इमे सत्याः कामाः । काम्यन्ते इति कामाः = कल्याणगुणाः त इमे सत्याः = नित्या इत्यर्थः ।

2. Irila van puhal nāranan. Tiruvoimozhi (Tamil) 1-2-10.

3. यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्रप्य मनसा सह । Taitt. Up.

4. मर्त्योत्थायं विरिञ्चावधिकमुपरि चोत्प्रेक्ष्य मीमांसमाना रजेन्द्रानन्दकली तव-
गुणनिबन्धं यौवनानन्दपूर्वम् । न स्वार्थं स्पृष्टुमीष्टे स्खलति पयि परं मूकलायं
निलिख्ये, हन्तैवं त्वद्गुणानामवधिगणनयोः क्व कथं चित्तवाचोः ॥

Srirangarajastava 2-35,

your auspicious qualities, bliss, youth, etc. Just as a mad person desirous of measuring all the water in the ocean is attempting to get at the highest measure a gallon and the like, whereby to measure all the water, this Ānandavalli has been in search of the highest measure of bliss". She started from an ideal man who is the lord of all earth and wealth, who is above all needs, who is an ideally strong man, strong in mind and body, who is well-versed in Vedas and all branches of knowledge, who is in perfect health and youth and who has all pleasures at his command, who has nothing more to achieve in this world, and who is, in short, an ideally perfect man, and she imagined his bliss to be the smallest unit or measure. Then the quantity of bliss of other beings superior in gradation is examined. The bliss of a manuṣyagandharva is stated to be hundred times greater. The bliss increases hundred times as we go on from one grade of beings to another, namely manuṣyagandharva, devagandharva, ājanajadeva, karmadeva, Deva, Indra, Bṛhaspati and Prajāpati. The bliss of Prajāpati or four-headed Brahman is conceived to be the highest conceivable measure. But even this highest conceivable bliss of Prajāpati is considered to be a very small measure, say a gallon when compared to the ocean of God's bliss. Thereupon, Prajāpati's bliss is imagined to be the smallest measure or unit like an ideally perfect man's and then greater measures are sought to be found out as before, by going from man to Prajāpati who is again placed in the position of an ideal man, and so on and so forth. Even after repeating this process many a time, she has not been able to find out the highest measure wherewith to measure the bliss of God. She is not able to conceive, and much less to express in words, the

quantity of God's bliss, much desired to be conceived and expressed. Unable to find out and to reach her goal, she totters and tumbles down on the way; and unable to conceive and express in words, she becomes mute and silent. While even Śruti devi confesses her inability to conceive in mind and to express in words the quantity of God's bliss, how can we mortals do it? Each one of the countless auspicious qualities is boundless.

iii. God's auspicious qualities are countless. "Like the gems in the ocean, the qualities of the infinite are numberless".¹ "Even though all the people of the whole world, should join together in enumerating the good qualities of the all-pervading and victorious son of Vāsudeva, and try do so for millions of years, they would be at their wit's end".² "If a man endowed with pure mind and intelligence and with the long life of the four-headed Brahmā, and also with a crore of mouths (tongues), then perhaps he may, rather may not be able to enumerate a millionth part of your good qualities".³

Nammaḷvar briefly says: "Countless natural qualities of God".⁴

iv. The qualities of God are natural and independent (nirupādhika). Unlike the qualities of the individual soul which are dependent on the will of God, in

1. यया रत्नानि जलधेः असंख्यातानि पुत्रक । तया गुणात्मनस्तस्य असंख्येया महात्मनः ॥ Matsya purāṇa.

2. तर्षायुतैर्यस्य गुणा न शक्या वक्तुं समेतैरपि सर्वलोकैः । महात्मनः शंख-चक्रासिपाणेः विष्णोर्जिष्णोः वसुदेवात्मजस्य ॥ M. B. Bhīṣma parva.

3. चतुर्मुखायुर्यदिकोटिकवत्रः भवेन्नरः कापि विशुद्धचेताः । सते गुणानां अयुतैर्कर्मसं वदेन्ना देव वर प्रसीद ॥

4. Iril thol puhal, . . Tiruvaimozhi, (Tamil) 23. 3. 3, 2

their origination etc., the qualities of God are not dependent on anything. "His power, intelligence and control are natural".¹ Here the word *kriya* means control.

v. God's qualities are blemishless (*nirdoṣa*). They are without the contact of any bad quality, i.e. they are unalloyed pure qualities. God is without karma, old age, death, grief, hunger, and thirst; he has always objects of enjoyment, instruments of enjoyment and places of enjoyment, i.e. he has both the *nitya vibhūti* and *līlā vibhūti*.² "God is the supreme Being and is the abode of energetic opposition, strength, supremacy, intelligence, firmness, power and other qualities, in whom *klesā* and other impurities do not exist."³ Patanjali, in his yoga sutra, 1-24 defines God as being untouched by *klēśa* and other impurities, namely, karma, vipaka, and āśaya.⁴ There are five *klēśas*, *avidyā*, *smīti*, *raga*, *dweṣa* and *abhiniveśa*, (ignorance, egoism, attachment, aversion, obstinacy.) They are called *klēśas* because they torment and distress the soul. Karma is good or bad deed done. Vipāka is the fruition or result of those deeds, namely, birth in desirable or undesirable caste, longevity of life or otherwise, and enjoyments or sufferings. Āśaya is tendency or *samskāra* which clings to the mind till fruition.⁵ The said *klesas* and other impurities which torment the soul do not touch *Iśwara* or God.

1. परास्य शक्तिः विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च । Swet. Up.
2. अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युः विशोकः विजिघत्सः अपिपासः । सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः । Chh. Up.
3. तेजो बलैश्वर्यमहाबोधबुधबुधैर्यशक्त्यादि गुणैकशक्तिः । परः पराणां सकल्प न यत्र क्लेशदयः सन्ति परावरेणे ॥ V. P. 6-5-79.
4. क्लेशकर्म विपाकाशयैः अपरामृष्टः पुरुष विशेष ईश्वरः । क्लिभन्तीति क्लेशाः विपच्यन्ते इति विपाकाः ।
5. आफलविपाकाश्च चित्तभूमौ शेते इत्यादिभ्याः वासनाभ्याः संस्काराः ।

vi. God's qualities are unequalled and unsurpassed. Unlike the qualities of the individual soul which are equalled by those of other souls and surpassed by those of other souls and surpassed by those of God, the qualities of God are neither equalled nor excelled by those of others. Like the being (svarūpa) of God which is neither equalled nor excelled by any other being,¹ his qualities which inhere in his svarūpa are likewise without equal or superior.

* All the abovementioned characteristics of God's qualities are contemplated together in one stanza by Parāśara Bhaṭṭa: "Oh! Lord Ranganatha, your six primary auspicious qualities, namely, intelligence, supremacy, power, firmness, strength and energetic opposition which are the fountain source of other qualities of similar nature, i.e. likewise, eternal, boundless, countless, natural, blemishless and without equal or superior—enhance the excellence of your being (svarūpa) and glorify it even as the lustre of a precious gem enhances the excellence of the gem and glorifies it."²

Different functions of God's qualities.

The qualities of God may be broadly classified under three heads:

- (1) qualities exercised in respect of favourable persons, i.e. persons who have resorted to Him,
- (2) qualities exercised in respect of unfavourable persons, i.e. enemies of His devotees, and
- (3) qualities exercised in respect of all.

1. न तत्समस्त्वाभ्याधिकश्च दृश्यते । Swet. Up.

2. दोषोपधावधिसमातिशयानसंख्या निर्लेपमङ्गलगुणौघदुषाण्डेताः । हानैश्वरी शकलवीर्यबलार्चिषस्त्वां रत्नेश भास इव रत्नमनर्घयन्ति ॥

(Srirangarajastava. 2-27).

(1) Qualities exercised in respect of favourable persons are the quality of freely mixing and moving with the lowest and ignorant persons (śowsilya), the quality of being visible in some divine form (soulabhya) the quality of ignoring or conniving at the devotee's faults (vātsalyā), the quality of not enduring the separation of devotees (mārdava), and other qualities.

(2) Qualities exercised in respect of unfavourable persons (i.e.) enemies of His devotees are heroism, valour, prowess, firmness, etc. (sowrya, vīrya, parākrama). God has no direct enemies, for He says: "I am equal and common to all creatures. I have neither foe nor friend. Those who worship Me with devotion are in Me and I am in them."¹ Among the various grades of beings, gods, men, animals and vegetables, there are superior beings and inferior beings totally differing in caste, form, nature, intelligence, etc. But when they want to resort to Me, I am common to all. No being is My enemy because of his inferiority in caste, form, nature intelligence, etc. His inferiority of any kind is no bar to his resorting to Me. I am accessible to all without any distinction whatsoever. I do not shun him because he is inferior. And likewise, except the factor that a being resorts to Me, his superiority of any kind does not count and I am not influenced thereby. He does not become my favourite in the matter of resorting to Me. But those who, with intense love and devotion, worship Me and who cannot live for a moment without worshipping Me, and whose be-all and end-all of existence is My devout worship,—those persons, whether superior or inferior in caste, etc. live with Me freely as if I were their equal, and I move with them as if they were My superiors".¹

1. समोहं सर्वभूतेषु न मे द्वेष्योस्ति न प्रियः । Svet. Up.

ये भजन्ति तु मां भक्त्या मयि ते तेषु चाप्यहम् । B. G. 9. 29.

This reveals God's *sowsilya*, the quality of freely moving with the lowest and the most ignorant, besides informing us that God has no direct enemies. Moreover, when Duryodhana heard that Lord Krishna had taken his meal in Vidura's house, he questioned Krishna: "Leaving Bhisma who is superior to all in knowledge, leaving Droṇa, who is superior in caste, and leaving me who am superior in wealth, why did you go to a Sūdra and take his meal?"¹ And Lord Krishna replied; "One ought not to take an enemy's food and ought not to feed an enemy. Oh! King Duryodhana, you hate the Pāṇḍavas, and Pāṇḍavas are my breaths (life)."² Here Lord Krishna asserts that His devotees' enemies are His enemies. God does not get angry however much persons of asura nature may offend or harm Him. But when a person offends or harms His devotees, he will not be pardoned. Ācharyas say that the elephantine deeds done by God were the result of non-endurance of offences committed against His devotees. That is to say, though God is omnipotent to achieve everything by His mere will, His descent in this world, his incarnations and superhuman deeds of valour in killing Hiranya, Rāvaṇa, Kamsa and others were due to his non-endurance of offences committed against his devotees, namely, child Prahlada, sages, Vasudeva, Devaki and others. We learn from itihāsas and purāṇas that God does not mind offences committed against Him personally, however great they may be, but that He does not forgive the slightest harm done to His devotees. Rāmāyana gives

1. मीष्मद्रोणावतिक्रम्य मां चैव मधुसूदन । किमर्थं पुण्डरीकाक्ष भुक्तं वृषलमोजनम् ।

M.B.

2. द्विषदन्नं न भोक्तव्यं द्विषन्तं नैव भोजयेत् ।

पाण्डवान् द्विषसे राजन् मम प्राणा हि पाण्डवाः । Ibid.

several examples in illustration. When the deity presiding over the ocean did not turn up even after Rāmā's śaranāgati or complete surrender to the deity, Rāmā summoned his anger which was not present with him at that time.¹ But later on, when Hanumān was struck with missiles and wounded by Rāvana, Rāmā saw Hanumān, his bhakta, and at once became a slave to anger.²

These illustrations show that God has no direct enemies and that the enemies of His devotees are His enemies.

(3) Qualities exercised in respect of all are the six-fold fountain - source of qualities, namely, intelligence, power, strength, supremacy, firmness, and energetic opposition (jñāna, sakti, bala, aiśvarya, virya, tejāmsi). Of these, jñāna always apprehends without any aid all things present, past and future in all their aspects by direct perception.³

Strength (bala) means capacity to bear and support all things (i.e.) both the vibhūtis and all the worlds with ease and without any effort.⁴

Supremacy, dominion, (aiśvarya) is the controlling of all the worlds thus supported, without the least obstruction.

1. क्रोधमाहारयत् तीव्रम् । Rāmāyana.

2. ततो रामो महातेजाः रावणेन कृतव्रणम् ।

दृष्ट्वा ह्यवगच्छात्तुलं क्रोधस्य वशमेयिवान् ॥ Ibid. Yudh. Kan. 39-13-6.

3. यस्तत्सर्वज्ञस्तत्सर्ववित् । सर्वदर्शी । यो वेत्ति युगपत् सर्वं प्रत्यक्षेण सदा स्वतः ।

4. सदाधार पृथिवी द्यामुत्तेमां । विष्टभ्याहमिदं कृत्स्नमेकांशेनस्थितो जगत् । एषसेतु-
विधरणः । यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य किमस्त्यन्यत्र ईक्षतः ।

Firmness (virya) is absolute changelessness in spite of being the material cause of the universe and in spite of supporting and controlling all.¹

Power (śakti) is capacity to manage everything and to achieve what is not possible for others to achieve.²

Energetic opposition (tejas) is the capacity to accomplish every result without any aid or instrument and to eclipse or overpower everything.³

In this world of ours no one apprehends His vibhūti or assets or properties during deep sleep and other states. Even though a person may know, he does not support his vibhūti. Although he knows and supports, he is not able to control it always and in every way. Even though he is able to support and control, he cannot do it without fatigue. Even though he may not get fatigue, he cannot be the cause of its existence and sustenance. Even though he may be the cause he will be so only depending on others. But God is not like that. For protecting the favourable persons (i.e.) His devotees, and for punishing the unfavourable persons, the above-mentioned six qualities are necessary, and therefore, they are generally said to be exercised in respect of all.

We have thus reviewed generally the functions of God's qualities. Now we shall examine the special functions of some of His qualities.

(1) *Intelligence* (jñāna) has to be exercised in respect of ignorant persons as it is a quality necessary for the

1. विकारविरहो वीर्यं प्रकृतित्वेऽपि सदा ।

2. स्वेतरसर्वनिर्वाहकत्वं—यत् अन्यैरशक्यत्वात् अघटितमिव भाति तद्वदन-
सामर्थ्यम् ।

3. सहकार्यनपेक्षा मे सर्वकार्यविवौ हि या । तेजः षष्ठगुणं प्राहुः तमिमं तत्त्ववेदिनः ।
न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चंद्रतारकं नेमा विशुतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ॥

discrimination of good and evil. For, ignorant persons have no such discrimination. "Where am I, supremely ignorant of everything, and where is the knowledge which can discriminate what is wholesome for the soul? Oh! Lord of lords, tell me what is good for me and command me to do it".¹

(2) Power (śakti) has to be exercised in respect of powerless persons. Persons who are unable to avoid their ills and other undesirable things and who are not able to achieve their desired end, must be helped to attain their object by power which can achieve what is not possible for others to achieve.

(3) Forgiveness (kṣamā) has to be exercised in respect of sinners who are conscious of their sins as in "I am the abode of all sins".²

Parāśara Bhaṭṭa, in describing the quality of God's forgiveness, says: "Oh! Lord Raṅganātha, although you possess forgiveness, that quality will be exercised only in favour of those persons who really repent for their sins, but not in favour of persons like me who are still obstinate and who do not repent. I have committed countless sins and yet I do not repent in the least. There is absolutely no chance for the exercise of your forgiveness in my favour. But nevertheless, I have hopes, for there is no restriction for your forgiveness. Just as it forbears all sins and crimes, it is capable of forbearing this fault also, namely want of repentance on my part. I am not, therefore, troubled by the thought that repentance does not arise in my

1. काहमात्यन्तदुर्बुद्धिः क चात्महितवीक्षणं । यद्विदं मम देवेश तदाज्ञापय माधव ॥

Jitanta Stotra.

2. अहमस्त्वपराधनां आलयः ।

mind. I am sure that since your forgiveness knows no bounds, it is not proper to restrict its scope by saying that it will flow only on persons who repent and not on persons who do not repent. A boundless quality cannot be bound."¹

The quality of forgiveness will shine most only when exercised in the case of a person full of bad qualities and utterly devoid of any good quality; but it will not shine so much when exercised in the case of a person who has a combination of good and bad qualities. We shall take the instances of two persons, Kākāśura and Śiśupāla who are considered to have committed most heinous crimes and examine how His forgiveness was employed in their cases, whether there was a free and unobstructed flow of this quality on them or whether there was any restraint or check. Kākāśura, after committing an offence against Sitā, i.e. after piercing her breasts with his beak, wandered all over the three worlds in search of shelter, and finding none anywhere, he finally surrendered at the feet of Rāmā and acquired merit thereby.² And likewise, Śiśupāla, though he indulged in abuses against Kṛṣṇa, abuses which were carried to excess and which were unbearable even to persons fond of hearing scandals against Kṛṣṇa, nevertheless uttered the several holy names of Kṛṣṇa in the very act of abusing and thereby acquired merit. "As Kākāśura and Śiśupāla had thus acquired merit," says Parāśara Bhaṭṭa, "your quality of forgiveness had not a free and unobstructed flow in their cases. But in my case you will not find an atom

1. क्षमा सापराधेऽनुतापिन्युपेया, कथं सापराधेऽपि ह्येते मयि स्यात् । तथाप्यत्र राज्ञाधिनाथानुतापव्यपार्यं क्षमेतातिवेत्त क्षमा ते ।

Srirangarajastava II-96.

2. त्रीन् लोकान् संपरिक्रम्य तमेव शरणं गतः । Ramayana.

of merit or good quality even after a thorough search. Therefore, your forgiveness will shine most only when it is exercised in my favour.”¹

(4) *Mercy* or pity (*dayā*) is the quality of not enduring the sufferings of others or is the desire to remove others' sufferings, or sympathetic suffering, as the case may be. These three aspects are different grades of the same quality. This quality of mercy is exercised in favour of persons suffering in the ocean of *samsāra*. When His subjects were in distress, Rāmā would grieve more than they suspecting that their sufferings might be due to His want of care in protecting them.” “People who suffer countless miseries in this *samsāra*, get out of it after surrender to You.”² Lord Kṛṣṇa himself has said: ‘Those who surrender to Me get out of this *samsāra*, but not others.’³ Bhaṭṭar, in describing this quality at first thinks that there is no chance for the flow of this quality on him, but afterwards consoles himself by an after-thought. “Oh! Lord Raṅganātha, mercy or pity is seen to remove the distress of others. I may expect the flow of your mercy on me if I think that I am in distress. As a matter of fact, although I experience all the sufferings due to material existence, I consider all those sufferings to be happiness. Therefore, since there are no sufferings to be removed

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1. बलिमुजि शिशुपाले तादृगागस्करे वा गुणलवसहवासान् त्वत्क्षमा संकुचन्ती ।
मयि गुणपरमाणूदन्तचिन्तानभिज्ञे विहरतु वरदामौ सर्वदा सार्वभौमी ॥

Srirangarajastava II. 97.

2. व्यसनेषु ननुष्याणां मृशं भवति दुःखितः ।

Rāmāyana Ayodya Kānda 2-41.

3. संसारसागरं धोरमनन्तलेशभाजनं । त्वामेव शरणं प्राप्य निस्तरन्ति मनीषिणः ॥

Jitanta stotra,

4. मामेव ये प्रस्यन्ते मायामेतां नरन्ति ते । B. G. 7-14,

from me, there is no scope for the exercise of your mercy or pity. Nevertheless, I hope to have the flow of pity on me. For, although in my ignorance I may erroneously consider as happiness what is really distress and suffering, I am sure that You in Your omniscience know that I am really experiencing sufferings and that You will, in Your mercy, remove all my sufferings. Thus there is scope for the flow of your mercy."¹

{5) *Fondness, tenderness* (vātsalya), is a quality which is exercised in favour of persons who have newly surrendered to God with all their blemishes and impurities. The metaphor is derived from the fondling of the cow when a new calf is just now born to her. The cow which refuses to eat the grass or any other fodder put on a surface having a bad smell, licks with great taste and pleasure all the impurities on the body of the calf. In the same manner, God does not reject a devotee who resorts to Him and who surrenders at His feet, although he has blemishes and impurities, but fondles him, on the contrary, with all his impurities.² Rāmā makes a proclamation of this quality. When Sugriva, the king, and his followers advise Rāmā not to take in Vibhīṣaṇa, brother of Rāvaṇa, who has come from the enemy's camp, Rāmā reveals this quality. Says He: "I will not, under any circumstances, give up a person who resorts to Me *posing* himself as My friend, even though he may be full of faults. Should I give

1. दया परव्यसनहरा भवव्यथा सुखायते मम तदहं दयातिगः । तथाप्यसौ सुखयति दुःखमित्यतो दयस्व मां गुणमय रत्नमन्दिर ॥

Srirangarajastava II, 98.

2. कटुगन्धेन विद्यायां भूमौ नवतृणाङ्कुरम् । यानजिघ्रति साधेनुः स्वयोनिद्वारमार्गतः । सद्यो जातस्य वत्सस्य देहमालिन्यसंपदम् । यथा लिहति सोल्लासं यथा जीवस्य क्लमषम् । भोग्यं मम लक्ष्म्याश्च विद्धि पंकजसंभव ॥

him up under any pretext, wise men will censure me.”¹ And later on, he takes a vow that he will protect him against all the worlds.²

(6) Sowseelyam is the quality of a superior being freely mixing and moving with the ignorant and low persons, low by birth, deed and intelligence, and it is exercised in favour of low and ignorant persons who think that God, the Lord of both vibhūtis, is too great to be accessible to them. But on a consideration of this quality of God they will not, in spite of His greatness and supremacy and in spite of their lowness and ignorance, withdraw and recede from Him but will move with Him freely. Vedānta Deśika describes this quality of God as if it is an offshoot of his mercy. “Oh! mercy of Lord Śrīnivāsa, standing on the cool heights of Tirumalai Hills, it is marvellous that you are able to make equal and even all the ups and downs of the world. By the great flood of your quality flowing up and down and on all directions, you have made equal and even the low level of Guha, the chief of Niṣādas (hunters), of Sugrīva, the chief of the monkeys, of the insignificant Śabari, of the poorest Brahmin Kucela, of Kubja, of the women of cow-herds, and of the garland maker—the low level of these persons, on the one hand, and the great height of Yours, on the other.”

(7) Straightforwardness (*ārjara*) in word, mind and deed, is a quality exercised also in respect of evil-minded and wicked persons, (*durātmas*) who are just the opposite in quality. When Rāmā was seated in his hermitage near the banks of the Godāvārī, Sūrpaṇakā, sister of

1. मित्रभावेन संग्राहं न त्यजेयं कथंचन । दोषा यद्यपि तस्य स्यान् सतामेतदगर्हितम् ॥

Rāmāyana Yuddha Kānda 18-3,

2. अमयं सर्वभूतेभ्यः ददाम्येतन् वदे मम । *ibid.* 18-33

Rāvaṇa, went there and asked him why he had gone over there with his wife, in the guise of an ascetic to the place frequented by Rākṣasas and demons. On hearing her words, Rāmā, in his straightforwardness began to narrate everything truly about himself. For Rāmā, never tolerated falsehood and more especially in the presence of a woman in the hermitage.¹

(8) Mārdava, the quality of not enduring separation from devotees, is exercised in respect of persons who are afraid of his separation. Lakṣmaṇa, while requesting Rāmā to take him also to the forest says, "Without you, Oh! Rāghava, neither Sitā nor myself can live for a moment. If at all, we may live only for a moment like fish taken out of water." The fish can live only so long as the water on them is not dried up, not a moment longer. Similarly, we can live only so long as we know that you really intended to leave us here.

When Hanumān, after his return from Laṅkā, delivered the message of Sitā to Rāmā that she could not bear the separation of Rāmā *for more than a month*, Rāmā, feeling the separation keener still said that he could not bear the separation *even for a moment*.²

(9) *Saulabhya* is the quality of becoming visible in divine form and it is exercised in favour of persons

1. ऋजुवृद्धितया सर्वं आख्यातुमुपचकमे । अदृष्टं न हि रामस्य कदाचिदपि संमतम् । विशेषेणाश्रमस्थस्य समीपे स्त्रीजनस्य च ॥

Rāmāyaṇa Āraṇya Kanda, 17-14

2. न च सीता त्वयाहीना न चाहमपि राघव । मुहूर्तमपि जीवातः अलान्मत्स्या-
विवोद्धृतौ ॥ Ibid Aycdhya Kanda 53-31.

3. ऊर्ध्वं मासान् जीविष्ये । Ibid Sun. Kanda-38, 66.

न जीवेयं क्षणमपि ।

who long to see him. In Gita, the three-fold object is mentioned for the incarnations of God then and there, whenever necessary.¹ The objects are (1) the protection of the good, (2) killing of the wicked, and (3) establishment of dharma. If we closely examine and scrutinize the three objects, we find that the three are reducible to only one object. For the pre-requisites for protecting the good are the annihilation of the wicked and the establishment of dharma. It may be asked, why should God incarnate himself for the protection of the good? Cannot the omnipotent God who, by His mere will, creates, sustains and reabsorbs all the worlds, also protect the good by His mere will? If He, seated on His throne in heaven, wills 'Let the sages and other devotees prosper and let Hiraṇya, Rāvaṇa and other demons die', everything will be accomplished. Why should He incarnate himself and suffer like other beings? Nammalvār has met this objection in his work.² We have to examine what is meant by the protection of the good. Their protection consists in removing their troubles and in granting their desires. Though God can, by His will or saṅkalpa, remove their troubles, He cannot fulfil their desires by His mere will. For, how can He by His mere will or saṅkalpa satisfy His devotees who long to see His divine form, who long to talk to Him, who long to embrace His divine form, who long to hear His sweet words and who long to worship Him in His divine form? He must necessarily incarnate and appear before them. "Oh! Lord who armed with a disc (*cakra*) of sharp edges in the right hand, appeared, mounted on Garuḍa, on the

1. परित्राणाय साधूनां विनाशाय च दुष्कृताम् । धर्मसंस्थापनार्थाय संभवामि युगे युगे॥

B. G. IV-8.

2. See Tiruvoimozhi (Tamil) 3-1-9.

bank of the lake for the purpose of saving from the crocodile the elephant-devotee who was intent on worshipping You, You have done well in appearing before the elephant. If only you had intended to help Your devotees in this wide world with the mere weapon of your saṅkalpa or will, then your glory and lustre would certainly have declined." When the elephant entangled in the mouth of the crocodile cried aloud and called out, 'Oh! root-cause of all the worlds', God came down from heaven in great haste on hearing his cries; and on seeing God, the elephant said, "Oh! Lord, I cried aloud and called out not for the purpose of saving this perishable body, but only for the purpose of placing these lotus flowers in my hand at Your holy feet before the flowers fade and lose their colour and fragrance."¹ While such are the devotees' desires how can God protect them by His mere will or saṅkalpa?

(10) *Audārya*, generosity or munificence, is a quality exercised in favour of persons who resort to Him for getting their desired objects. This quality is beautifully described thus: "Oh God! your divine being is not for you (i.e.) is not for your benefit, but it is for the benefit of your devotees." A really independent being may choose to become dependent on another if the protection of the devotee is thereby secured. Rāmā and Lakṣmaṇa chose to be servants of Viśvāmitra (kiṅkarau samupastītau). In the verse quoted above, rūpa means and includes omniscience and omnipotence, etc. inhering in the being or svarūpa of God. Your divine form (ākāra) is

1. नाहं कलेशस्यास्य त्राणार्थं मधुसूदन । करस्थकमलान्येव पादयोरर्पितुं तव ॥

2. न ते रूपं न चाकारो नायुधानि न चास्पदम् । तथापि पुण्याकारो भक्तानां त्वं प्रकाशसे ॥ Jitanta Stotra 1-5.

likewise not for your own benefit, but is for the benefit of your devotees. In the divine world it is for the benefit of nityas and muktas and is enjoyed by them. In your vyūha form it is enjoyed by the inhabitants of Svetadvīpa and it is a resort to the four-headed Brahmā and others. In vibhava (incarnations like Rāmā and Kṛṣṇa), the invisible form is made visible for all and especially for the good (sādhu) and is made an object of enjoyment for them. Here, the divine form (ākāra) means and includes the ornaments on the divine body. When Rāmā was asked to bathe and deck himself after his exile for fourteen years, he said, "I do not like to bathe or adorn myself before Bharata does all that."¹ The weapons which you hold are also for the benefit of your devotees. They are used against the enemies of your devotees and they appear as ornaments in the eyes of the devotees and are enjoyed as such by them. Here, weapons mean and include your retinue and other paraphernalia. Your retinue in the divine world is also a goal to be reached and enjoyed by your devotees.² Nammālvār has said: "When shall I join your followers in heaven!"³ Similarly, the divine world (āspada) is not also for you, but it is for your devotees. The subservience of the devotees to you is natural for them and is their inherent attribute. But your subservience to them is by your choice and for their benefit. All these ideas are expressed in one śloka by Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra.⁴ We have here to contrast the munificence of other beings

1. न मे स्नानं बहुमतं विना कैकयीसुते । Ramayana, Yuddha Kanda, 124-6.

2. यत्र पूर्वं साध्याः सन्ति देवाः ।

3. Tiruvoimozhi (Tamil) 2-7-11.

4. परिजनपरिवह भूषणान्यायुधानि प्रवरगुणगणाश्च ज्ञानशक्त्यादयस्ते ।

परमपदमथाष्टान्यात्मदेहस्तथात्मा वरद सकलमेतत् सञ्चितार्थं चक्रे ॥

with that of God. Other beings, however munificent, will only give away all their belongings; but will not give away themselves. But God gives away his own being (svarūpa) to his devotees and also strength and capacity to enjoy Him (ya ātmadā baladā). Nammālvār has said: "The unique *kalpaka* tree (God) which has created me, which has accepted me and which has given itself away to me".¹ The famous *kalpaka* tree in Indra's garden does not possess these three attributes (1) of creating a mendicant of its own accord, (2) of accepting him, and (3) of giving itself away to the mendicant like other objects of gift.

(11) *Kṛititvam* is the quality of considering the achievement of another's object as his own. When God accomplishes an act of His devotee, he thinks that he has accomplished his own purpose. Rāmā thought that he had accomplished his own end, only after crowning Vibhiṣaṇa in the kingdom of Laṅkā.² The extirpation of Rāvaṇa and the attainment of Sītā did not satisfy him so much. The idea that if Vibhiṣaṇa was not crowned he would have become a person of empty and false promise was working in his mind and he worked himself up into a fever.³ Now, after Vibhiṣaṇa's coronation that fever vanished and Rāmā became immensely delighted.

5. God is the Creator, Protector and Destroyer of all the worlds.

(i) *God is the cause of all the worlds.*

Among Vedāntic texts, Chhāndogya uses the word 'sat' as the cause of the universe 'Sat alone was in the

1. Tiruvoimozhi 2-7-11.

2. अमिषिष्य च लंकायां राक्षसेन्द्रं विभीषणं ।

कृतकृत्यस्तदा रामो विज्वरः प्रसुमोद ह ॥ Rāmāyana Balakanda, 1-83

3. यन्मया न कृतो राजा राक्षसालां विभीषणः ।

तच्च मिथ्यां प्रलसं मां प्रवक्ष्यति न संशयः ॥ Ibid. ?

beginning.” Vājasaneyā uses the word Brahman as the cause.¹ Aitareya uses the word ātman as the cause² and Mahopaniṣad uses the word Nārāyaṇa as the cause. ‘Nārāyaṇa was alone in the beginning.’³ A doubt may arise whether these four different words denote four different entities as causes of this universe or they mean one and the same thing or entity. By the application of the principle of sāmānyaviśeṣanyāya (general and particular terms), and by the process of elimination, we conclude that Nārāyaṇa is the cause of the universe. The term ‘sat’ is a generic term common both to bṛhat (big) and abṛhat (small). Since the cause of the universe must be big in being (svarūpa) and in qualities (svabhāva) and since it makes big the individual souls in svabhāva, that is, in bliss and in intelligence, etc.⁴ it cannot be abṛhat i.e. small. The generic term sat thus becomes restricted to mean the particular term bṛhat and eliminates abṛhat (i.e.) small. In the same way, the generic term bṛhat or Brahman is common both to cit (ātman) and acit (matter) i.e. sentient and non-sentient, intelligent and non-intelligent substances. The word Brahman also denotes non-sentient prakṛti.⁵ The great prakṛti called also Brahman because of its being the cause of mahat, ahaṅkāra etc. is my womb wherein I sow the seeds of the jīvas. As the Muṇḍaka says : “From the Lord directly springs up this Brahman,

1. सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् । Chh. Up. 6-2-1.

2. ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् ।

3. आत्मावा इदमग्र आसीत् ।

4. एको ह वै नारायण आसीत् ।

5. बृहत्कत्रक्षणत्वगुणयोगात् ब्रह्म ।

6. मम योनिः महत् ब्रह्म तस्मिन् गर्भं दधाम्यहम्—B. G. 14-3.

(अचेतनप्रकृतिः महद्दहंकारादि विकाराणां कारणतया महत् ब्रह्म इत्युच्यते ।)

namely prakṛti, avyakta, unmanifested prakṛti, and through this, the enjoyer and the enjoyed denoted by the word *anna*.¹ Since the cause of the world cannot be non-sentient, the generic term 'Brahman' thus becomes restricted to mean the particular term ātman (i.e.) sentient being and eliminates non-sentient prakṛti. Similarly again, the generic term ātman is common both to the individual soul and to the highest Self. Since the cause of the world cannot be a jiva like the four-headed Brahmā or Rudra, the generic term ātman thus becomes restricted to mean the particular term Nārāyaṇa and eliminates all individual souls.

Objections against Brahman being the cause of cosmos.

Some modern writers following Western Philosophy contend that Brahman, as they conceive it to be, cannot be the cause of the world and write as follows: "We cannot say that Brahman is the cause and the world is the effect; for this would be to distinguish Brahman from the world and to make it into a thing related to another thing." Again, "the world is finite and conditioned, and how can the infinite or unconditioned be its cause? If the finite is the limited and transitory, then the infinite as the limit of the finite is itself finite and not infinite. It is difficult to conceive how the infinite comes out of itself into the finite." "If the absolute is supposed to be a transcendent, changeless existence, it is a problem how such an absolute which has no history includes the time-process and the evolution of the world?"

Refutation of the objection.

We must approach the subject of Brahman or God with awe and reverence, with humility and self-smallness,

1. तस्मादेतत् ब्रह्म नामरूपमज्ञं च जायते । Mund. Up. 1-10.

but not with conceit and self-sufficiency. Lord Kṛṣṇa says: "To understand Me aright from śāstras or revelation, to realise Me by yogic concentration, and to reach Me finally, acute devotion to Me, to the exclusion of other objects, is necessary."¹ In Mahābhārata, Dhṛtarāṣṭra questions Sañjaya how Sañjaya happened to possess knowledge about God which was denied to him. And Sañjaya replies, "With pure mind, free from desire, anger, jealousy, etc. and with intense devotion to God, I approach śāstras and from them I learn God and all about Him."² Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra says, "For those who are devoid of devotion to God, all the śāstras will be of no use; they cannot get a true knowledge about you. A person with jaundiced eyes, notwithstanding powerful vision and broad day light, cannot see the whiteness of a conch unless the jaundice is removed by collyrium."³ Nammālvār employs two different words 'Veda' and 'marai' significantly enough in one and the same sentence to denote śruti or revelation in which God is said to reside.⁴ The word 'Veda' means 'what reveals and teaches', (vedayati iti vedaḥ) and the word 'marai' means 'what conceals or hides'. Since it reveals to the devotee God and all about Him, it is called Veda; and since it conceals God from a non-devotee it is called 'marai' in Tamil. The word 'marai' as a verb means to hide. Moreover, Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad asserts:

1. भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्यः अहमेवं विधोऽर्जुन । ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च परंतप । B. G. 11-54.
2. शुद्धभावं गतो भक्त्या शास्त्राद्वेदि जनार्दनम् । M. B. Udyog parva 68-11.
3. ये तु त्वदंघ्रि सरसीरुहभक्तिहीनाः तेषाममीभिरपि नैव यथार्थबोधः । पितृ-
मंजनमनाप्नुवि जातु नेत्रे नैव प्रभाभिरपि शंससितत्वबुद्धिः ॥ . *Śrīmadbhāgavatam* 10.25.12
4. Tiruvoimozhi (Tamil) 3. 1 10.

“The teachings of the Upaniṣads will be understood only by that great-minded person of intense love and devotion to God and his preceptor.”¹ We have already discussed in the beginning of this Chapter that the existence, and nature of God and all about Him can be known only through revelation or śāstras but not by inference or any other means of knowledge. It is sufficiently obvious that they who have had no access to our śāstras and also those who, having access to them, possess no devotion to Him have commonly entertained very imperfect and incorrect ideas about God.

Some western writers and those who follow them, professing to know by inference what is beyond the reach of senses, argue that if God or Brahman were to create the cosmos ^{He} would be reduced to a relative, finite and conditioned substance and that, therefore, He cannot be the cause of the world. Now, we ask them in reply : when the uncut portion of a half-cut marble (marble with which children play) or of a halfcut lime-fruit is shown to you, are you able to say if the marble or lime-fruit is cut or uncut ? No, you are not. Your knowledge of perception is so very defective even on the simplest of matters. You profess to know more about the unseen portions of the world than about the marble or lime-fruit. You say that the world is finite. How do you know ? By perception or by inference ? Have you explored all the regions of the cosmos ? Have you explored the upper and lower regions and all sides ? What is there beyond the terminus ? Is there no space beyond your so-called terminus ? Will there be end of space anywhere ? Are you not forced to conceive

1. यस्य देवे पराभक्तिः यथा देवे तथा गुरौ ।

तस्यैते कथिता ह्यर्थाः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः ॥

space beyond your so-called terminus? Can you conceive the end of space? If you cannot, then space is unlimited and the cosmos is also unlimited, for space forms part of the cosmos. If you can conceive the end of space you must be able to tell us what is beyond the end. You cannot answer these questions by your knowledge of sense perception: nor can you answer by the knowledge of inference, for you cannot have the required data namely knowledge of invariable and necessary concomitance of seen objects with unseen and unknown objects. Space is unlimited. We have already noticed that prakṛti or līlāvibhūti of the Lord is unlimited downwards and limited only upwards, and that pure satva or nitya vibhūti is unlimited upwards and limited only downwards, so that the two vibhūtis put together form an unlimited whole which cannot be said to be finite. Even granting that the universe is finite, there is absolutely no harm in holding that God, the absolute, the infinite, the unconditioned and the transcendent has created this finite world; for, on that account God will not be reduced to a relative, finite and conditioned substance. Your notion of these terms, absolute, infinite, unconditioned and transcendent, has to be revised. The term 'absolute' according to the dictionary means what is unlimited by extraneous power or control, what is complete in itself, what exists independent of any other cause. The term 'relative' means what does not exist by itself, what depends on, or is incidental to, something else. The term 'infinite' means that which has no limits, that which is not circumscribed; that which is exceedingly great in excellence, degree, capacity and the like, boundless, immeasurable, applied to time, space, the Supreme Being and His attributes, infinite space or extent, the infinite Being, the Almighty. The

term 'finite' means what is limited and bounded. The term 'unconditioned' means that which has neither conditions, limitations nor relations either as regards space or time, the absolute, the infinite; and the term 'conditioned' means the opposite. The term 'transcendent' means superior or supreme in excellence, surpassing others, going beyond or transcending human experience. The absolute spirit, God, the infinite, the unconditioned and transcendent entity, without ceasing to be absolute, infinite, unconditioned and transcendent, may yet become the cause of the cosmos, its animating inner life-principle and controlling agent, may become related to the cosmos of sentient and non-sentient objects which form His body as its all-pervading soul and may be related to its attributes as their substratum. If you say that the absolute God does not create the cosmos, does not permeate and pervade it as its inner life-principle and soul and does not possess attributes, you reduce God to a pure Being which, like the attributeless Brahman of the Nirviśeṣādvaitins, is reduced to nothingness, śūnya of the Mādhyamika, eternal void, everlasting night, subtle unpalpable non-entity which defies every attempt to determine it or give it some definite shape. An infinite which does not manifest itself in the finite is a fictitious abstraction. As Hegel says, "If God be the abstract supersensible essence or Being which is devoid of all difference and all specific character, He is only a bare name and a mere '*caput mortuum*' of the abstract understanding." But the real relation between the absolute spirit, God, and the cosmos, with non-sentient matter and sentient individual souls, is one of cause and effect, organic and intrinsic. As we have often remarked, the universal spirit is the soul and the cosmos is his body. The body cannot exist without the spirit. The

body is whatever a spirit absolutely controls, sustains and enjoys for its own benefit. The body of *lāvara* cannot be physically separated from His being or *svarūpa* like an ordinary body. We frequently make logical and abstract distinctions for our clear understanding between things which do not exist apart from each other. An abstract noun such as whiteness, blackness, etc. is so called because whiteness, blackness, etc. can be abstracted, withdrawn, or separated only by the mind from the substance in which they inhere, but not by any physical means. For the sake of clearness and accuracy of thought and expression we scrutinize the nature and characteristics of each part of a united whole. For correct thinking, analysis is very necessary. One end of a rod may be easily distinguished from the other end; but it is not possible to make any absolute and physical separation between them. You cannot conceive of a rod having only one end. Soul is perfectly distinguishable from the body; but still they exist only in virtue of their mutual relation. An independent and self-sufficient body is as meaningless as a rod with one end only or a circle without a centre. What has been said of the body is equally true of the soul. The one is closely related to and inseparable from the other. The universal spirit God cannot but be related to the world in its subtle or gross condition, which always forms His body. God is not a mere supreme being external to and independent of the world; but He is thus immanent in the world. He does not dwell somewhere behind the universe but manifests himself in the untold wealth of this vast and wonderful creation. He is the essence of the universe, the highest reality for whom and in whom everything else has being and truth as clearly indicated by the definition of 'body'.

To say that the infinite cannot be related to the finite or to any other thing in the world is meaningless. For, is it not a mathematical truth that infinity minus a finite number, infinity plus a finite number, infinity multiplied by a finite number, and infinity divided by a finite number is still infinity itself? Is not infinity related to a finite number without losing its characteristic as infinity? The question how the absolute Brahman can become related to its effect, the cosmos, and how the unconditioned and infinite can be the cause of the finite is tackled by Vyāsa and Parāśara. Creation of the world, being an act exclusively divine, its comprehension is necessarily above the reach of limited human intellect. One of the objections against Brahman being the material cause of the universe is stated as follows: "Does Brahman pass over into this world in its entirety or only in part like a melted piece of sealing wax used for sealing letters? The former alternative is untenable. Since the whole Brahman has become the world, the causal Brahman does not exist, and this would conflict with the texts which teach that Brahman exists always as such and with other texts which for the purpose of realisation, enjoin meditation on causal Brahman (*kāraṇam tu dhyeyaḥ*). The latter alternative is equally untenable. Since Brahman is indivisible and partless, (*niṣkalam, niṣkriyam*), you cannot say that a portion alone of Brahman, passes over into this world. And there is no third alternative. Therefore Brahman cannot be the material cause of this universe".

This objection is met by Vyāsa: "Since Śruti declares that Brahman is partless, and that the wonderful creation of cosmos is made by It"¹.

1. श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् । Br. Sut. 2.1.27.

We must understand the Vedic teachings as they are taught to us. Since these teachings are not known by any other means of knowledge, the transcendent powers of the transcendent object cannot be judged by ordinary worldly standards. If we should import the powers or qualities of an object into another, then the qualities of a non-sentient object will have to be imported into the eternal soul or sentient object. Just as the powers and properties of fire, water, etc. namely heat, cold and so on, are peculiar to themselves and are absent in the rest, in the same manner, thousands of powers and characteristics which are not found in worldly objects are found in the transcendent Brahman.¹ In reply to the question, how can the doership, appropriate only to *karma*-ridden souls who are subject to *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* and desire, aversion etc., be foisted on Brahman who transcends all these souls,² Parāśara says: "Just as the properties and powers of various objects, such as heat of fire, cold of water etc. though beyond our reason are yet experienced and perceived by perception, in the same manner, the marvellous powers of God in creating this universe are known only through scriptures³ and through texts such as, " 'The powers of God exhibited in a variety of ways are natural and inherent and are beyond our comprehension.'"⁴ We cannot judge the powers of God

1. आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि । Br. Sut. 2-1-28.
2. निर्गुणस्याग्रमेयस्य शुद्धस्यामलमनः ।
कथं सर्गादिकर्तृत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगम्यते ॥ V. P. 1-3-1.
3. शक्त्यस्सर्वभावानां अचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचराः ।
यतो तो ब्रह्मगस्तास्तु सर्गाद्याभावशक्तयः ।
भवन्ति तपतां श्रेष्ठ पावकस्य यथोष्णता ॥ V. P.
4. परास्य शक्तिः विविधैव श्रूयते स्वामाविकी ज्ञान बल क्रिया च ।

by common worldly standards. The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas hold that jāti or generic character, for example, cowness (gotva) is eternal, one, indivisible, unpalpable and inheres in all concrete individual cows (nityamekam anekānugatam sāmānyam) and that the jāti (cowness) fully and completely exists (parisamāpyavartate), i.e. exists in its entirety in each individual cow whether with single horn or with no horn. If you ask them the question, if cowness inheres fully and completely in one concrete individual cow, cowness being single and indivisible, it cannot exist in other cows as it is already exhausted in that particular cow; and if it should exist in parts in all individual cows, then no individual cow is full and complete and it is against your doctrine that cowness is one and an indivisible whole, they reply as follows: No doubt, cowness is one and single, and yet it exists fully and completely in each of the innumerable particular cows. It is a mystery beyond the comprehension of our limited intellect. The Sāṅkhyas also have to explain it as a mystery; for according to them pradhāna which is partless and indivisible is the cause of wonderful transformation into mahat and other effects. The partless pradhāna gets transformed into these effects having parts. When pradhāna, the figment of their imagination, and jāti are supposed to possess such wonderful powers, where could be the objection against us who rely on Śrutis which declare that Brahman, by virtue of Its wonderful powers beyond the ken of limited human intellect, though partless and unlimited, passes over in Its entirety into this marvellous cosmos, nevertheless, preserving at the same time, Its unlimited and absolute nature. Nammālvār describes the wonderful powers of God: "God exists in His entirety, manifesting Himself fully and completely in each of the countless, tiniest and

subtlest particles of the vast expanse of causal waters without compressing His all-pervading being (*svarūpa*) as if each particle is a cosmos in itself. He exists similarly in each of the tiniest particles of earth, fire and ether and in the resplendent individual souls unknown by them.”¹

Here it is inconceivable how He exists in His entirety (*svarūpeṇa parisamāpya*) in each of the subtlest and tiniest particles manifesting Himself there fully and completely. With your limited power of ratiocination and knowledge of worldly things you may be arguing till doomsday that if God exists in his entirety in one particle he cannot exist in other particles, so long as you do not care to know His wonderful powers from the divine source, revelation. You have to bow with folded hands before the omnipotent God casting off your pride, conceit and self-sufficiency. It is folly to try to measure the Unbounded with your very limited human intellect. Your high-sounding terms, absolute, infinite, transcendent, relative, finite, etc., and your conceited ratiocination will not help you unless you earnestly and sincerely seek light from Revelation. God is a rock upon which the judgments of many have suffered a wreck, a quicksand where many have been involved in inextricable difficulties. Even śrutis say, “If anybody at all, God only knows His own glory and powers; or rather, He himself does not know them; for there is no limit to His glory and powers. To know an unlimited thing as limited is not to know it.” “He who knows not Brahman as limited in his being (*svarūpa*) qualities, wonderful powers and so on, really knows

1. Tiruvoimozhi (Tamil) 1-1-10.

2. सो अज्ञ वेद यदि वा न वेद ।

him ; he who knows Brahman as limited in being, qualities, powers and so on really knows Him not.”¹

All Vedānta texts assert that the cause of the world must be one which has within itself all the potentialities of all worldly existence. If śūnya or nothingness was in the beginning, as the asatkāryavādins hold, then what springs from śūnya must be likewise śūnya. The effect is no other than the cause modified and therefore, the effect is known when the cause is known fully. The first cause must be the material of which the world is an effect ; and the effect is a process. Since the cause is the ultimate potential of all the real differences around us in this worldly existence, we can know the whole only through the knowledge of the highest principle, the ultimate spirit or Brahman as fully manifested in its unfoldment in the process of evolution. For, creation of the cosmos is an emanation, an evolution, an irradiation, a manifestation, an unfoldment, a projection from God. In spite of the evolution of the world from God, God remains absolutely immutable. We Vedāntins hold that the cause is not different from the effect². There is an identity between the totality of the cause and the totality of the effect. Brahman qualified by subtle cit and subtle acit is the cause, and Brahman qualified by gross cit and gross acit is the effect³. The difference between the cause and the effect is only the difference of condition or avasthā. The undistinguished by names and forms passes into the distinguished by names and forms. The reality of

1. यस्यामतं तस्यमतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः ।

अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानतां ॥ Prasna Up. 2-3.

2. कारणात् अनन्यत् कार्यम् ।

3. सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणम् । स्थूलचिदचिद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म कार्यम् ॥

Brahman considered as a whole, as a totality, is not the mere being, svarūpa or the spirit of Brahman, but Brahman with its modes or prakāras—cit and acit. The effect, therefore, is as real as the cause. Thus we see that the causal condition of the totality of existence is constituted by three entities:—

- (1) Brahman, the Absolute and Infinite in being (svarūpa) or divyātma svarūpa, as it is called;
- (2) the intelligent finites or individual souls or jīvas (cit); and
- (3) matter or acit.

The second and third are regarded as effect of the first. Thus among the entities which constitute the whole of reality, causal relation also subsists. When we view the whole or totality of the causal reality as passing into another condition of avastha, we can easily understand that Brahman is the upādānakāraṇa (material cause) of the universe. And when we view the totality of existence as constituted by three entities, Brahman being the cause of the other two entities, then, the passing into another condition means passing into the condition of the effect, that is, changes of contraction and expansion of consciousness of individual souls from the lump of grass to the four-headed Brahmā in evabhāva only, and the radical changes in the being (svarūpa) of matter as per the will of the Controller of both, namely the transcendent Brahman. Here the totality of cause does not pass into another condition; for the being or svarūpa of Brahman does not pass into another condition, but only acit and cit which are controlled by Him. The relation between the absolute spirit Brahman, i.e. the being, (svarūpa) of Brahman, on the one hand, and cit and acit on the other, is that of soul

and body, pervading and the pervaded, which relation is never absent at any time or condition, creation or deluge causal or effected condition, as we have already remarked. The unchanging nature and perfection of Brahman will be evident as He is the Controller and immanent Sustainer of cit and acit and as He is the incorruptible spirit of both. Brahman is, therefore, the immanent cause as well as transcendent cause of the universe. The objection that the Absolute which has no history cannot include the time process and the evolution of the world, is met by śruti itself which says, "Sat alone, He alone, was in the beginning"; no one could distinguish historically or could cause the distinction of names and forms. Moreover, our reason tells us that no one could separate the inseparable relation (apṛthak siddha viśeṣaṇa) of attribute and substantive from each other and treat them as two separate entities existing apart from each other. We give prominence to the soul, a higher entity, and give a specific name to it alone, as when we say "Rāmā is here" although we mean both the soul and the body related to each other in this way. For the above reasons, the objection that Brahman cannot be the cause of the cosmos is untenable.

(ii) *Theory of atoms being the cause of the universe.*

The Bauddhas, Ārhats, Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas hold that atom (paramāṇu) is the cause of the universe. The first two hold that mere atoms by themselves are the cause, while the latter two hold that atoms are the material cause, and God, known by inference, is the operative or efficient cause. While the Ārhats hold that all atoms are of uniform nature, the other three hold that atoms are of four different kinds, of earth, of water, of fire and of air. Although there are some minor

differences like this, all of them agree in the main in saying that the atoms are the cause of this universe.

**The doctrine of Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas
regarding atomic theory.**

The Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas state as follows: "The atoms which possess, according to their special kinds, i.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water fire or air, the qualities or colour, etc., are spherical in form. (Parimaṇḍala is the technical term for the specific form of extension of the atoms, and secondarily for the atoms themselves.) The atoms must apparently be imagined as infinitely small spheres subsisting during the period of each praḷaya. At that time all the atoms are isolated and motionless without producing any effect. But afterwards when the time for new creation comes, the unseen principle (adr̥ṣṭa) including the activity of the Lord, acting as operative cause, and its conjunction constituting the non-inherent cause (asamavāyi karaṇa) produce the entire aggregate of effected things beginning with binary atomic compounds (dvyaṇuka or dyad). The inherent material cause (samavāyi kārana) of an atomic compound are the constituent atoms; the non-inherent cause is the conjunction (samyoga) of those atoms; and the operative cause is the adr̥ṣṭa and the Lord's activity which make them enter into such conjunction. At the same time, the qualities of the causes, i.e. of the simple atoms produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus when two atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities belonging to the simple atoms (paramāṇu) such as white colour, etc. produce a corresponding white colour in the binary compound. One special quality, however, of the simple atoms, namely atomic sphericity, does not produce corresponding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of extension belonging to the latter, are said to be

(aṇutwa) minuteness and shortness. And when three binary compounds combining produce a ternary compound (tryaṇuka), the qualities such as whiteness, etc. inherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the ternary compounds, with the exception, however, of the two qualities, minuteness and shortness. For, it is admitted that the forms of extension belonging to ternary compounds are not minuteness and shortness, but bigness (mahatwa) and length. This doctrine arises in the following manner. We see that all ordinary substances which consist of parts, as for instance, pieces of cloth, originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunctions co-operating with the parts to form the whole. We, thence, draw the general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from those substances with which it is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction co-operating. Now, that thing at which the distinction of whole and parts, stops and which marks the limit of division into minuter parts is the atom. Everything except atomicity has been spoken of as cause.¹ Atomicity is the dimension of an atom. Everything except that becomes a cause, but the dimension of an atom is never the cause of anything. Because it would then be the originator of the dimension of the substance dyad or binary compound that is formed in its substratum, āśraya, the simple atom; and that is not possible. For, on account of the general rule that dimension gives rise to a superior dimension of its own kind, that produced by an atomic dimension, would like the increased dimension produced by a medium one, be minuter than itself. The whole world, with its mountains,

oceans and so on, is composed of parts; because it is composed of parts, it has a beginning and an end like other things such as a piece of cloth which consists of parts. An effect may not be assumed without a cause. Therefore, the atoms are the cause of this world. Since we observe four elementary substances consisting of parts, namely earth, water, fire and air (wind), we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the limit of sub-division into minuter parts, cannot be divided themselves. Hence when the elements are destroyed, they can be divided down to atoms only.

This state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the *pralaya* (the periodical destruction the world). After that, when the time for creation of comes, motion (*karma*) springs up in the aerial atoms. This motion which is due to the unseen principle, or more particularly to the conjunction of the atoms with the souls to which merit and demerit belong¹, joins the atom, in which it resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, etc., are produced; and finally, the element of air. In a like manner, are produced fire, water, the earth, the body with organs, etc. Thus, the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of threads. We have to assume sphericity in simple atoms, i.e. difference in six sides for the purpose of establishing conjunction capable of producing binary compounds and for the purpose of establishing conjunction of three binary compounds capable of producing a ternary compound.

1. अदृष्टपेक्षं अदृष्टवत् क्षेत्रज्ञसंयोगपेक्षमिति यावत् ।

Refutation of the theory of atoms

As the theory of ternary compounds originating from binary compounds and from simple atoms is untenable, so everything else which the Vaiśeṣikas maintain is untenable. In our experience we see that parts like threads and so on, are able to produce the whole, namely cloth etc. only in conjunction with their six parts. Likewise, simple atoms also must be able to produce binary compounds (dvyaṅka) only in conjunction with their six parts. Otherwise, if you do not admit parts to atoms, the conjunction of even thousands of atoms cannot produce a dimension greater than that of a single simple atom and there could be no difference in extension such as minuteness and shortness on the one hand, and bigness and length on the other. And if you admit parts to a simple atom, each part must have parts of its own and so on and so forth *ad infinitum*. Since, in our experience we see the origin of a compound substance from the conjunction of parts, and since a mustard seed and a mountain must both have infinite number of parts, you are forced to face the absurdity, namely that both the mustard seed and the mountain, each having infinite number of parts, are equal in size. You are now placed between two horns of a dilemma. To establish the difference between a mustard seed and a mountain, namely to establish a mere dharma or difference in mere quality, you have to admit that an atom has no parts; and to establish the two objects themselves (dharmi), i.e. mustard seed and mountain, you have to admit that the atoms have parts. If an atom should have parts, then there should be no difference between a mountain and a mustard seed. And if it should have no parts, the objects themselves, mustard seed and mountain, cannot exist.¹

1. वैश्वान्तरधर्मसिद्धयर्थं निरवयवत्वमुक्तम्—सर्वप्रमहीधराख्यधर्मिसिद्धयर्थं सावयवत्वमुक्तम्—सावयवत्वे वैश्वान्तरसिद्धिः—निरवयवत्वे धर्मसिद्धिः ।

Moreover, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that the world originates after the springing of motion (karma) in the tiniest atoms and consequent conjunction resulting in the formation of binary compounds and so on and so forth. They grant that the first motion in the simple atoms causing the origination of the whole cosmos is due to adṛṣṭa. "The blazing up of fire upwards, the motion of air on sides, and the first motion of atom and the mind, are all due to adṛṣṭa (merit)".¹ Now, as regards the first motion of atoms we ask you this question, "Is it due to the adṛṣṭa inhering in the atom or to adṛṣṭa inhering in the jīva?" It cannot be either. For, the adṛṣṭa inhering in the jīva as a result of good or bad deeds, cannot inhere in the atom; if it does inhere, there would be perpetual creation. The adṛṣṭa inhering in the jīva cannot be the cause of motion inhering in the atom. And you cannot say that motion can spring in the atom by virtue of conjunction of atom with the jīva having adṛṣṭa; for the stream of adṛṣṭa being eternal, the creation of the world would also be eternal. Nor can you argue as follows: "The adṛṣṭa, only when it becomes ripe, will be able to bear fruit. Some adṛṣṭas become ripe then and there, some in the next birth, and some others in another kalpa or age. Since fruition depends on the ripeness of adṛṣṭa, there can be no perpetual creation". For, there is nothing whatever to establish the conclusion that all different adṛṣṭas which spring from manifold actions performed at different times, without any previous agreement by the infinite multitude of individual souls, i.e. selfs, should reach a stage of uniform maturation at one and the same moment of time, so as to give rise to a new creation. For the same reason, the simultaneous destruction of all objects; and

1. अग्नेर्हर्षज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्यग्गमनं अणुमनसोश्वाखं कर्मेत्यदृष्टकारितानि ।

the stay for a period of two parārdhas without fruition would be inconsistent. And you cannot argue that by virtue of the conjunction in atoms of extraordinary or special adṛṣṭa due to God's will, motion is created in them, for we have already refuted the existence of inferential God. Therefore, the cosmos cannot originate from motion inhering in the atoms.

Moreover, since you admit that four kinds of atoms,¹ earth, water, fire and air, possess respectively smell, taste, colour and touch, you are forced to have the very opposite of what you want, the very opposite of eternity, subtlety, and partlessness, namely, perishableness, grossness, and partfulness. For we see in our experience that jars and other substances having colour and so on, are only non-eternal, i.e. perishable and are caused by similarly non-eternal substances. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in accordance with what is actually perceived, we should not ascribe any attribute that would be convenient to us. You ascribe to atoms colour and other attributes in accordance with what we actually experience. And, if to avoid this difficulty you should assume non-existence of colour, etc. in atoms then, you are landed in another absurdity.² For as the qualities of effects are derived from those of causes, the atom of the earth, etc. having no colour etc. its effects, the earth etc., should likewise possess no colour and so on. And if to escape from this difficulty, you should grant colour and other qualities to atoms, you face the former difficulty again. You are thus confronted with absurdity in either case from which there is no escape for you.

1. cf. रूपादिमत्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात् । Br. Sut. 2-2-14.

2. उभयथा च दोषात् ।

The systems of Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika accept clear cut dualism between matter and spirit. They postulate matter in the form of atoms and infinite number of all-pervading ātmans which are capable of consciousness when connected with matter by the will of God who is only the operative or efficient cause of the universe. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is based on asatkāryavāda i.e. view of the non-existence of the effect in the cause unlike the view of the Sāṅkhyas. The principle of adṛṣṭa is brought in as quite different from God. Though God is spoken of as the efficient cause, He is made more an instrument than a real, efficient cause, and that too because He happens to be an intelligent and omnipotent principle to account for the orderly arrangement perceived in the cosmos, as adṛṣṭa is not capable of accounting for the same. It appears as if the world would, after it has been once set in motion, go on like a machine as God is no longer necessary for its working or for controlling it. Such a God is only an external agent but not a God of the world, not an immanent God. God must be not only immanent but also the transcendent cause of the universe. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, God is said to be only an external creator of the cosmos, because according to them the effect is quite different from the cause and is a new object produced which did not already exist. God is not implied in the world process. Even the system of Kapila, the author of the Sāṅkhya system, on account of its satkāryavāda view, of the existence of the effect in the cause, has some approach to our Vedāntic vaidika system in spite of its being opposed to śruti, but the system of Kaṇāda has not even the slightest approach to our śrutis, as it is wholly opposed to them, and therefore, it must be avoided by those who court release or mokṣa.

Thus we see that the atoms which are supposed to be the cause of the world by the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika system are neither perceptible to senses nor acknowledged by āgamas. And since inference cannot establish an object opposed to āgamas and opposed to vyāpti or invariable and necessary concomitance of two known objects, the atoms cannot be established by inference also. In this way, the assumption of atoms is against all means of knowledge and chiefly against Śrutis which declare that Īśvara or Brahman is the cause of the universe. Therefore, the atomic theory must be given up. Moreover, their other tenets that God is only an efficient cause, that Vedas or Śrutis are pauruṣeyas (made by a puruṣa or some being), that liberation or nirvāṇa is a state of absence of happiness and misery like the state of a stone, are also opposed to our Vedas. Therefore, their doctrine is untenable.

(iii) *The Nirisvara Sankhya view that pradhana is the cause of the universe.*

There must be one cause for the whole universe. If you admit several causes, you will not be able to stop anywhere and fix a cause. The parts, threads and so on, in mutual conjunction with their parts, namely six sides, produce their avayavi or the whole. The threads are produced by their similar parts; and they in turn, by their parts and so on and so forth. Atoms also must be deemed to be caused by their parts as otherwise, solid extension (praṭimā) is impossible. The atoms thus having parts are similarly caused by their parts, and their parts are caused in their turn by their own parts and so on and so forth *ad infinitum*. There would be thus no end anywhere. Therefore, to reach and fix a limit for the endless chain of causation, a single substance with wonderful powers of transformation without

any detriment to its being (svarūpa), nevertheless, as the abode of innumerable conditions or changes such as mahat and so on, must be assumed to be the first cause. And that is pradhāna, a single cause, the equipoise of three qualities or guṇas. The whole cosmos with wonderful structure of bodies, earth and so on, must be the effect of a cause, avyakta, of a similar nature. For, all effects are distinguished from their causes and are also non-distinguishable from them. For example, jar, golden crown etc., effects of clay and nugget of gold etc. are distinguished from and are also identical with their causes. In the same way, this world of wonderful form and structure springs from pradhāna of like nature and is reabsorbed into it. The cause of the world, therefore, is pradhāna which is the equipoise of three qualities, satva, rajas and tamas. For, the world is constituted of happiness, misery and ignorance, i.e. satva, rajas and tamas. Just as we see that clay is the cause of earthen pot and has power of activity to produce the same, in the same manner, avyakta, the equipoise of these three qualities, which is infinite in time and space must be the cause of the world on account of the limitedness of particular things such as mahat, ahaṅkāra and tanmātras and so on. Mahat etc. cannot be the cause of the whole universe, as they are limited like jars and other objects. Therefore, the world with three guṇas must be caused by pradhāna which is the equipoise of the three qualities.

Refutation of the view.

Non-intelligent pradhāna cannot be the cause of this wonderful cosmos of order and unity, of rationality and plan. Besides being non-intelligent, it is not controlled by an intelligent being of wisdom and power, able to know and govern it. We see that in the cons-

struction of mansions and chariots, mere wood and stone without any intelligence whatever, and without being controlled by an intelligent being cannot be the cause. In the same way, mere *pradhāna*, without being controlled by a wise being, cannot be the cause of the cosmos, as it has to be set in motion, put into orderly activity and controlled by a wise being. The presence of qualities or attributes such as whiteness and cowness, in the effect, is not an invariable concomitance of the cause. For according to this school *satva* and other qualities are only qualities of substances, but not substances themselves. Like clay, nugget of gold and other substances which are seen to persist and to be present in their effects, *satva* and other qualities are not perceived to persist in their effects. *Satva* and other qualities have only to be inferred from nimbleness, illumination, etc. existing in earth and other substances. Moreover, *satva*, etc. are known to be only *gūṇas* or qualities but not substances in which the qualities inhere. And further, the argument that for the purpose of fixing a limit to the endless chain of causation, a single cause for the universe must be assumed, fails in this case as *satva* and other qualities are not single but many; there is no end to the chain of causation and it does not stop anywhere. For, the avowed doctrine of this school is that the qualities of *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in the state of perfect equilibrium constitute *pradhāna*. Therefore, owing to plurality of causes, the chain of causation does not stop anywhere. Since causation of plurality of causes is seen only in the condition of inequality in differing proportions, and as inequality is observed only regarding objects of limited nature, only objects of limited nature in the condition of inequality in conjunction with their special sides, can cause effects of magnitude. And they, in their own turn, being also effects, and being, therefore, unequal and

limited, are caused by other similar causes and so on and so forth. Thus, there is no end to this chain. And you cannot try to put an end to this endless chain of causation by arguing that these qualities are infinite in nature. For, if they are infinite, they are all-pervading and are in perfect equipoise without any inequality of differing proportion whatsoever, and are consequently incapable of beginning any action. Thus, you must only assume finiteness for the purpose of getting inequality, as inequality is a pre-requisite for producing an effect. Since in this way you cannot but grant finiteness for the qualities, they must have a cause of their own and so on and so forth, and thus you cannot escape from the endless chain of causation.

If you should argue that just as milk, of its own accord, turns into curd and that just as uniform rain water turns, of its own accord, into different, varieties of the juices of coconut, palm, mango, tamarind, and so on, with different tastes, in the same manner, *pradhāna* of changing nature, though of similar changes during *pralaya* or deluge, undergoes of its own accord, dissimilar changes during creation without being controlled by any external intelligent agency, then we reply, that even in the instances of milk and rain water, etc. cited by you, they do not of their own accord undergo transformations without being animated and controlled by an intelligent principle, but they do so under the control of the all-pervading spirit as taught by the *antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa*. "He who animates, pervades, resides in and controls water etc."¹

Moreover, if *pradhāna* should transform itself, of its own accord, into the cosmos without being animated by

1. सो अक्षु तिष्ठन्..... । Br. Up. 5-7-4.

the satyasaṅkalpa, *Īśvara*, then, the effected state would continue for ever, and there would be no state of *pralaya* or deluge. But, if you grant that it is animated and controlled by a wise being then, as He is a satyasaṅkalpa, (one whose will is unobstructed) deluge and this wonderful creation by turns would become possible. Should you argue that just as grass and other fodder and water consumed by a cow, etc. turns of its own accord, into milk without any external agency, in a like manner *pradhāna* or *prakṛti* also turns of its own accord into this cosmos without being animated by a wise being then, we reply¹ that your analogy is wrong: for you cannot get any analogous instance, as there is no object in the world which is not animated and controlled by the wise being, God. If you can show that grass etc. consumed by a *bull* or not consumed at all, turns of its own accord into milk, then it would become possible for you to argue that *prakṛti* turns of its own accord into this cosmos without the control of a wise being. It is not possible for you to show that. Therefore, the all-pervading wise being alone causes transformation of grass, etc. consumed by a cow into milk.

And further, it is argued that although the *puruṣa* of pure intelligence in being (*svarūpa*) is without any action and *pradhāna* is destitute of all power of thought, yet by the proximity of the *puruṣa*, the non-intelligent *pradhāna*, is set in motion and becomes active in the same manner in which a blind man without power of vision but with power to walk, puts forth activities being helped and directed by a cripple without power to walk but with power to see, and in the manner in which iron is set in motion by the proximity of a magnet, the creation of the world is caused by the conjunction

1. अन्यत्राभावात् न तृणादिवत् । Br. Sat. 2-2-4.

of prakṛti and puruṣa ; for, it is said, “for the sake of enjoyment of pradhāna by the puruṣa and for kaivalya, pradhāna moves into activity for creation etc. in the proximity of puruṣa”.¹ The reply to this argument is as follows. Even then, the position is the same regarding the impossibility of activity for pradhāna. For, though a cripple is unable to walk, while being carried by a blind man he is by himself able to see the way and direct the blind man and is full of occasional vyāpāra or action in thousand and one ways. Likewise, the blind man being also intelligent, moves into activity under the direction of the cripple. Similarly, the magnet has activity by going near the iron and by standing in front of it. But your puruṣa who is always without action has never even occasional vyāpāra or action, unlike the cripple who sees and directs. Nor has your prakṛti the power to understand instructions unlike the blind man. It is but proper that the cripple who is able to see the way and to give directions, as well as the blind man who is able to hear and understand the directions and to put forth activities accordingly, should, with mutual help, complete a journey and undertake other activities. But here you yourself admit absence of knowledge both to prakṛti and puruṣa and therefore, mutual instructions and mutual help and the foisting of one's attribute on another is inconsistent. Your puruṣa has no vikāra or change unlike the magnet which goes near the iron and so on. And if you should argue that puruṣa, being all-pervading (vibhu) has no need to go near, as he is always near prakṛti, then perpetual proximity must result in perpetual creation and there would be no deluge. And as puruṣa is ever liberated, there is no bondage and there is no salvation.

1. पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य । पद्भूवन्धवदुभयोः अपिसंयोगः तत्कृतस्वर्गः ।, Śaṅkha Kārikā 21, ...

Moreover, you admit that creation takes place only when there is inequality in differing proportions of guṇas, that is, when other guṇas are auxiliaries to the primary one. Since during deluge the three guṇas are in perfectly equal proportions and there is no auxiliary and primary relationship (angāṅibhava) among them, since there is no activity of puruṣa to kindle and stir the guṇas into unequal proportions, and since the guṇas themselves are incapable of stirring themselves into such unequal proportions, so as to obtain the primary and auxiliary relationship among themselves, creation of the world can never take place. Should you admit inequality of proportions even at that time, then you must admit eternal creation. And further, there is no purpose achieved by inferring such a pradhāna. For, according to you, the purpose of inferring pradhāna is to secure enjoyment and salvation for puruṣa, and this purpose is frustrated. For, the enjoyment namely the seeing of prakṛti by puruṣa, and apavarga (salvation or mokṣa) which consists in the abandonment of prakṛti by puruṣa are both impossible as puruṣa is pure intelligence in being (svarūpa), is without action, without change and without blemish and is consequently eternally liberated. Should puruṣa of such a nature by virtue of proximity with prakṛti become an enjoyer of happiness and misery, by seeing the transformations thereof, then the proximity of prakṛti being eternal, salvation or liberation can never take place.

The Sāṅkhya school accepts satkāryavāda, namely, the existence of the effect in the cause. According to them, the effect is an entity, because a non-entity can never be caused as there is a determinate relation between cause and effect, and the effect is non-different

from the cause. They infer that the cause of the world is a material substance, subtle and non-intelligent pradhāna. Prakṛti and puruṣa are ultimate reals. The Sāṅkhyas recognise Vedas, but do not recognise God.

Since pradhāna is non-intelligent and consequently cannot, of its own accord, transform itself into this marvellous cosmos of wonderful plan and order, unity and rationality, without being animated and controlled by an all-wise Being as taught by texts such as: "When the time for creation came, Hari by His mere will stirred both prakṛti and individual souls, i.e. made them ready for creation by producing inequality in the guṇas or qualities of prakṛti and by kindling intelligence and dormant impressions or samskāras in the souls". The theory of the Sāṅkhyas that pradhāna is the cause of the world is therefore untenable.

(iv) *Seśvarasāṅkhya or Yogasiddhānta is also opposed to Vedas.*

In this connection we have to make a passing reference to *Seśvarasāṅkhyas*. The *yogasiddhānta* of Hiraṇyagarbha otherwise called *Seśvara sāṅkhya* is opposed to vedic texts in many respects and their tenets must be rejected. Since (i) Hiraṇyagarbha who is an individual soul like us is subject to hallucination, ignorance and so on as per will of Īśvara, (ii) this *siddhānta* views Īśvara, only as the efficient cause of the world against the express texts of śrutis declaring him to be the material cause also, (iii) this school holds that Īśvara is without any action and is devoid of *kriyāśakti-vikṣepa* like the *puruṣa* of Sāṅkhya and that He helps by His mere presence alone, (iv) according to this school *aiśvarya* or

1. प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव प्रविश्यात्मेच्छया हरिः ।

क्षोभयामास संग्रामे सर्वकाले ध्यायन्त्ययौ ॥ V. P. 1-2-31.

control is not natural to God but only due to upadhi, since even in the teachings of Yoga, aiming at the goal of salvation, prominence is given to the realisation of the individual soul instead of aiming at the worship of the highest Self, and (v) it is stated by them that ātmakaivalya, realisation of the individual self or soul is mokṣa or salvation,—for all these reasons that siddhānta must be rejected as declared, by Vyāsa¹ in so far as those points which are opposed to Vedas are concerned. The conflicting claims of the smṛtis can be settled only by resorting to the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Vedas do not confirm the Sāṅkhya or Yoga smṛti but rather those smṛtis such as Manusmṛti and so on, which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause, Īśvara or Brahman.

(v) *An individual soul cannot be the cause of the world.*

The four sects of Pāśupatas, namely, Kāpālas, Kālamukhas, Pāśupatas and Śaivas, assert the difference between the operative cause and material cause of the universe and say that Paśupati is only the operative cause, besides declaring tatvas and means of prosperity here and hereafter, worship and conduct, quite opposed to the Vedas. Vyāsa has condemned this school in four of his Sūtras.² The Vedāntic texts on the other hand, teach that Parabrahman or Nārāyaṇa is both the operative and material cause of the universe and that upāsana or meditation on the highest Self is the means to reach the goal of salvation. Applying the doctrine called Sarvavedāntapratyaya nyāya by which the meaning of a term used in one Vedānta text has to be determined by investigation into all other texts of

1. एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः । Br. Sat. 2-1-3.

2. पत्युरसामंजस्यात् । Br. Sat. 2-2-35 to 38.

similar context where other terms are used, without any opposition to the meaning of terms used in all texts so as to bring all the terms occurring in various texts, under one nyāya (principle) or other, for example, 'general and particular term' (Sāmānyaviśeṣanyāya) and so on, we find that Brahman called Nārāyaṇa is everywhere spoken of as the cause of the universe, though by different words such as Sat, Brahman, Ātman, Siva, Sambhu, Prajāpati, Indra, Ākāśa, Prāṇa and so on. Since the Nārāyaṇānuvāka is exclusively engaged in teaching the paratatva or supreme tatva or the highest truth, the meaning of the terms employed in other upaniṣads and vedāntic texts has to be determined in the light of this anuvāka. Just as in Pūrvamīmāṃsa otherwise called karmamīmāṃsa, the vedic text: "we must do homa with a 'ladle' i.e. we must pour sacrificial oblation into the fire with a 'ladle'" is intended to convey only the general idea of an instrument for offering the oblation, as the generic term 'ladle' applies both to solid and liquid oblations, and as the text has to be supplemented, elucidated, determined and restricted by a more specific passage: "the instrument of pouring is a ladle made of leaf" which determines the liquid nature of the oblation as only liquid can be poured from a leaf-ladle, thus forcing us to interpret the former passage only in the light of the latter passage, in the same manner, texts such as: "Sambhu must be contemplated upon as being present in the middle of 'daharākaśa'" —are intended to convey and teach only the general idea of meditation without specifying the particular deity to be meditated

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1. जुहो जुहोति ।
 2. यस्य पर्णमयी जुहुः ।
 3. शंभुराकाशमध्ये ध्येयः ।

upon, as the specification of the deity to be meditated upon is enjoined by the Nārāyaṇa anuvāka. Although in similar contexts teaching the cause of the cosmos, terms which appear to denote other deities such as Rudra, Śiva, Śambhu, Īśāna, Indra, Hiraṇyagarbha and so on are employed, nevertheless, texts beginning with “Nārāyaṇa was alone in the beginning, no Brahmā, no Īśāna”,¹ and denying the existence of other deities except Nārāyaṇa before creation, and specifying the name of the particular deity as the cause of the universe left unspecified by generic terms in other texts of similar contexts, settle the whole question by declaring that the terms Rudra, Śiva, Śambhu, Īśāna, Indra and so on by their etymological meaning denote only Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Self. Just as among the terms, Sat, Brahman and Ātman, the succeeding term is more specific than the preceding one, as we have already discussed before, in a like manner, among the terms Śambhu, Śiva, Indra and Nārāyaṇa, the succeeding term is more specific than the preceding term. Moreover, unlike the terms, Śiva, Śambhu, Rudra, Indra, etc. which are used in several different meanings, the term ‘Nārāyaṇa’ has only one meaning and means the supreme deity and the highest Self. Therefore, all the different generic terms employed in various upaniṣads and vedāntic texts to denote the cause of the world, finally specify the Supreme Nārāyaṇa to the exclusion of other inferior deities who are, after all, individual souls created by the Supreme Nārāyaṇa.

The Pāśupatas hold that Īśvara is only the operative cause and that too by inference. As we have to proceed from the known to the unknown in

1. एको ह वै नारायण आसीत् न ब्रह्मनिर्णयः ।

inference, we have to grant that Īśvara handles Prakṛti, moulds and shapes it just as a potter handles, moulds and shapes a lump of clay. For moulding and shaping Prakṛti, Īśvara requires a body like a potter, for without a body, no moulding and shaping is possible. If that body has parts, it must be transient. If it is transient it must have a cause; and since before the origination of that transient body no other cause could possibly exist, the origination of that transient body is impossible. Nor can that body be eternal for the body has parts and whatever has parts cannot be eternal. And you cannot say that Īśvara himself is the cause of that body, for a being without a body is not observed in experience to be the cause. If you argue that He is the cause in conjunction with some other body, then you are driven to the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum* (anavasṭā). And you cannot argue that Īśvara without a body can handle prakṛti in the manner in which a soul without a body assumes one; for, a soul assumes a body for enjoying or suffering happiness or misery as a result of karma, and the body is thrust on him quite against his will. Analogously, you will be forced to accept karma for Īśvara or Paśupati, as you may call him. And if you grant adṛṣṭa, merit and demerit, for Paśupati, then he becomes like other individual souls, finite, non-omniscient and is subjected to creation and destruction.

All the deities except the supreme Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu are individual souls created by Him and are subject to karma, ignorance and other ills of samsāra. "The whole hierarchy of gods from the four-headed Brahmā downwards, Rudra, Indra and so on, all human beings, all beasts, etc. are whirling incessantly in the huge whirlpool of samsāra or worldly existence enwrapped by

ignorance. All creatures or beings from Brahmā to a blade of grass are karma-ridden and are overpowered by samsāra or worldly existence".¹ "He who first creates the four-headed Brahmā and teaches him all Vedas"². For the above reasons, individual souls such as Paśupati, four-headed Brahmā, Indra, Agni and so on, cannot be the cause of the universe.

(vi) *Narayana is the cause by mere will but not by avidya, karma or under command.*

It is common for all beings and creatures to be the cause under avidyā or karma. Prompted by organic craving due to avidyā or karma all creatures, by intercourse of male and female, reproduce their species. The causation of beings bound by rules of śāstras will be due primarily to karma, and that of beings not bound by śāstras will be due primarily to avidyā. But the one will not be without the other, i.e., karma will not be without avidyā and vice versa though they may vary in degree. The creation of Brahmā and other officers by Nārāyaṇa with their appointed functions is primarily by His command. "You appointed me as Prajāpati for the creation of creatures"³. "These two gods, the best among gods, Brahmā and Rudra⁴ born respectively of graciousness and anger of the supreme being are the cause of creation and destruction under full instructions from and under the control and

1. ऋद्धायाः सकला देवाः मनुष्याः पशवस्तथा ।

विष्णोर्मयिमहावर्तमोहान्धतमसावृताः ।

आत्रक्षस्तम्बपर्यन्ताः जगदन्तर्व्यवस्थिताः ।

प्राणिनः कर्मजनितसंसारवशवर्तिनः ॥ Viṣṇudharma.

2. यो ऋद्धाणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै ।

3. प्राजापत्यं स्वया कर्म पूर्वं मयि निवेशितम् ।

4. एतौ द्वौ विबुधश्रेष्ठौ प्रसादक्रोधजौ स्मृतौ ।

तदादर्शितफन्यानौ सृष्टिसंहारकारकौ ॥ Mokṣadharma.

command of the Almighty": Unlike these gods, the Supreme God creates the cosmos at will, for He is *nirañjana* (blemishless) and *apahatapāpmā* (without karma) and not controlled by any being (*na tasya iṣe kaścana*). Therefore, except His mere will there is no cause for God's creation of the world. This idea is expressed in a fine stanza by Parāśara Bhaṭṭa. "Oh! boon-giver Lord Raṅganātha! unfolding by your own will, a portion of your wonderful body, cit and acit, i.e. souls and matter, dormant during deluge, you sport in the presence of Lakṣmi like a peacock spreading his fine motley coloured feathers into the sky and dancing in the presence of his consort".¹ We are taught in this stanza that unlike potters and others who are mere operative causes, God is both the operative and material cause of this universe and that creation of the cosmos means nothing more than the unfoldment of His own self, i.e. unfoldment of Brahman or passing from the subtle state into the gross state. The analogy also suggests that Lakṣmi is only a spectator, but not the actual cause of creation.

(vii) *God creates the universe with ease.*

Without any physical effort whatsoever, God creates the world by His mere will (*saṅkalpa*) and therefore, with ease. He willed, 'Let me become many and let me create for that purpose'.² "Need He make any effort to extirpate the enemies when He is able to create and destroy the world by His mere will".³

1. प्रलयसमयमुप्तं त्वं शरीरैकदेशं वरद चिदचिदाख्यं स्वेच्छया विस्तृणानः ।
स्वचितमिव कल्पं चित्रमातत्यधून्वन् अनुशिखिनिशिखीव क्रीडसि
श्रीसमक्षम् ॥ Sriranga Rajastava 2-44.

2. सोऽक्रमयत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति । Taitta Up.

3. मनसैव जगत्सृष्टिं संहारं च करोति यः ।

तत्सारिपक्षक्षणे क्रियानुद्यमविस्तरः ॥ Y. P. 5-22-15.

(viii) *The motive for God's creation is only sport.*

Although the creation of the world may be done with ease and without any effort whatsoever, what is the motive for God's creation? What is the object to be gained thereby? The inconceivable and unquestionable *Īśvara* sports with the elements like a child with toys. This aspect, namely, that God sports by the creation etc. of the universe is dealt with by Vyāsa¹. The objection raised² against God's creation of the world is that He can have no motive in the strict sense of the word. An ordinary being with commonsense is seen to do an act prompted by some motive. The motive may be two-fold either to benefit himself or to benefit others. Since *Īśvara* has no desire to satisfy He cannot create the world to benefit Himself. Nor can He benefit others by so doing; for, benefiting others is an act of mercy, love and pity. The creation of this miserable universe with births, deaths, disease, old age, poverty, hell and other ills, is no act of mercy. If it were an act of mercy, the universe would be one of unalloyed bliss. Therefore, there is no motive for this creation. This objection is answered by sūtra 2-1-33 mentioned above. Though God has all his desires satisfied and shines forth in fullness, sport is the only motive in creating at will this universe of wonderful and manifold souls and matter. Sport is that kind of activity pleasant for the time being undertaken without intention of any special fruit resulting therefrom. The motive for God in creating this universe is no other than sport which is pleasing for the time being, like gambling, card play, chess play, tennis and foot-ball plays for kings and emperors, and like building of sand-

1. लोकास्तु लीलकैवत्यम् । Br. Sūt. 2-1-33.

2. न प्रयोजनकत्वात् । Br. Sūt. 2-1-32.

houses for children. "Oh Hari! you sport with play-balls of jīvas made of threads of karma, which bound and rebound."¹ Nammālvār says: "He sports with creation, etc. of the universe."² It may be asked, how the sportive aspect of creation, etc. of the universe can be reconciled with sayings which teach that the purpose of creation is the up-lifting of the individual souls from this worldly existence? For sayings such as: "This wealth, namely this body with hands, legs, etc. has been created for being offered to God."³ "God creates this world often in the hope that individual souls who are over-powered and oppressed by this body, may at some time or other after many births and deaths, see Him, realise Him and cast off this body once for all and for ever and become free from births and deaths and attain salvation,"⁴ —sayings such as these teach that the object of creation is the salvation of souls.

The answer is that although, as a matter of fact, sport of God and salvation of souls are the two-fold motive for creation, nevertheless, the statement that sport is the motive for creation is based on the fact that the sportive aspect is predominant over the salvation aspect. Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra, has beautifully expressed this idea: "Since You are omnipotent, you can do anything by Your mere will. You can liberate all souls, from this bondage, all at the same time. Nevertheless, You do not wish to exercise your omnipotence in their favour. Under

1. त्वं न्यचद्विरुदंचद्विः कर्मसूत्रोपपादितैः ।

हरे विहरसि क्रीडाकन्दुकैरिव गन्तुभिः ॥ M. B.

2. Tiruvoimozhi (Tamil) 3-10-7.

3. किञ्चिन्ना देहसंपत्तिः ईश्वराय निवेदितुम् ।

पूर्वमेव कृत्वा ब्रह्मन् हस्तपादादिसंचुता ॥ Viṣṇutatva.

4. Tiruvoimozhi (Tamil) 3-9-10.

the pretext of karma, You leave the souls to themselves to work out their own salvation and expect them to approach You by the methods prescribed in the śāstras. Does this not prove that You, in your unquestionable independence, indulge in your sports much more interested in them than in the salvation of souls ?”¹

This prakṛti maṇḍala is fitly called līlā vibhūti, Your play-ground, as distinguished from nityavibhūti which is not created or destroyed at any time. Like creation, destruction or reabsorption of the universe is also a sport for God. ‘The creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe is His sport.’ Like the building of sand-houses, their destruction is also a sport for children.

(ix) *God Himself is the material cause of the universe.*

Since God unfolds Himself into this world, He is its material cause. In the production of an effect there are generally three causes at work namely, operative or efficient cause (nimitta), material cause (upādāna) and instrumental (sahakāri) cause. The operative or efficient cause is the agent or doer who makes the material, turn or transform into the effect. The potter, weaver, etc. are the operative causes for pots, cloths and so on. The material cause is the material or substance which is capable of being turned into an effect. Clay and threads are the material causes for pots and cloths. The instrumental cause is the instrument for producing the effect. The stick and the wheel for a pot and the loom and shuttle for the cloth are instrumental causes. Unlike

1. रूपप्रकारपरिणामकृतव्यक्तस्य विश्वं विपर्यसितुमन्यदसञ्च कर्तुम् ।

क्षाम्यन् स्वभावनियमं किमुदीक्षसे त्वं स्वातन्त्र्यमैश्वरमपर्यनुयोज्यमाहुः ॥

Vaikuntastava 55.

2. अखिलभुवनजन्मस्थेमभद्रादिलीले । Sri Bhāṣya

all these, God is all the three causes for the world. He is the operative cause qualified by His will or saṅkalpa. He willed "Let me become many". He is the material cause qualified by subtle jīva and subtle acit or matter lying dormant within Him indistinguishable by names and forms. He is the instrumental cause qualified by his intelligence and power.

**Objections of Sesvara Sankhyas against Brahman
being the material cause.**

The seśvara Sāṅkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord but postulate, in addition, an independent pradhāna on which the Lord acts as merely an operative cause object as follows: Although, according to texts such as "Brahman willed: 'let me become many,'" the non-intelligent pradhāna cannot be the operative cause, but Brahman alone can be the operative cause, yet, Vedāntic texts themselves appear to declare that pradhāna or prakṛti is the material cause of the universe. The Vedānta texts do not teach the omniscient, changeless and controlling Īśvara to be the cause of the universe without the changing, controlled and non-intelligent pradhāna or prakṛti. Texts such as, "He is without parts, without action, without blemish and is calm",¹ teach that Īśvara is not subject to any change. And texts such as: "The non-intelligent and ever-changing pradhāna"; "Being controlled by Īśvara, prakṛti expands, spreads out and produces the desired end. The beginningless and endless prakṛti begets all creatures"²—teach that prakṛti is

1. निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवयं निरंजनम् । Svetāśvatara 6-19.

2. विकारजननीमङ्गलम् । Brhadāraṇyaka 6-4-25.

3. ध्यायतेऽध्यासिता तेन तन्यते प्रेर्यते पुनः । सूयते पुरुषार्थं च तेनैवाधिष्ठिता-
वगत् । गौरनायन्तवती सा जनित्री भूतमादिनी—Māntrikopaniṣad.

controlled by *Īsvara* and that it is ever-changing. Likewise texts, such as: "Know that '*māyā*' means *prakṛti* and the *māyin*, i.e. controller of *māyā* is *Īsvara*. The Lord creates this world out of this *prakṛti*" "The *prakṛti* creates all beings, movable and immovable, being controlled and presided over by Me"—texts such as these teach that God creates the universe presiding over and controlling *prakṛti*. Even in the absence of specific texts such as these which expressly teach *pradhāna* to be the material cause of the universe, since the texts declaring causation of Brahman with reference to the cosmos, cannot be otherwise explained, the being (*svarūpa*) of *pradhāna*, that is, the entity namely *pradhāna*, its being presided over and controlled by *Īsvara* and its being the material cause of the world, must be assumed. We have to proceed from known analogous instances. We see in the world around us that every operative cause is different from the material cause. The non-intelligent clay and nugget of gold are invariably seen to be the material causes of earthen pots, bracelets and so on, different from their operative causes, potters, goldsmiths, etc. A material cause is that which gets transformed into an effect, but not the support of the substance which undergoes transformation, for, otherwise when clay is transformed into a pot, the earth which is its support would have to become the material cause of the pot. For, the production of the effect invariably involves several *kāraṅkas*, namely doer or agent of an action, the instrument, location or place of action and so on. Therefore, Vedānta texts are not capable of asserting that one and

1. अस्यान् मायी सजते विश्वमेतत् । माया तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिने तु महेश्वरम् ।

Svetāśvatara 4-9.

2. मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते स चराचरम् । B. G. 9-10, . . .

the same substance is both the operative and material cause in defiance of the common law of invariable difference between the operative and material causes observed in every day experience and in defiance of the invariable dependence of an effect on an agent, instrument, location, etc. The argument may be expressed in the form of a syllogism : “*Īśvara* is not the material cause of the universe, for He is its efficient cause. The efficient cause of an effect cannot be its material cause, like a potter for a pot”.¹

Refutation of the objection.

Vyāsa answers the above objections : “God is also the material cause of the universe for, otherwise the promise and the illustration would not fit in.” Sveta-ketu, son of Uddālaka, returned to his father after twelve years’ study, full of conceit for his learning as if he had mastered all the vedas and vedāṅgas. On seeing the son, the father asked him, “You appear to be puffed up and conceited ; have you learnt the cause, ruler and controller of the universe, by knowing whom what is not heard is heard and what is not known is known?”. This is the *pratijñā* or promise that ‘*by the knowledge of one substance everything else is known*’. The illustrations given to elucidate the statement of promise are as follows : Just as by knowing the nature of a lump of clay you know all the articles made of clay, and the various forms and shapes and resultant names as pot, jar, cup and so on, assumed by the same clay are merely to enable people to fetch water and so on, and are known and perceived to be indeed only clay substances but not

1. ईश्वरः न जगदुपादानं जगन्निमित्तत्वात् यो यस्य निमित्तं न तस्योपादानं यथा घटस्य कुलालः ।

2. प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञा दृष्टानुसरोधात् Br. Sū. 1-4-23.

non-clay substances; just as by knowing the nature of a nugget of gold, you know all the articles made of it and the various forms, shapes and resultant names as ring, chain, bangle, etc. assumed by the same nugget of gold are merely to enable people for wearing them in different parts of the body and are known and perceived to be indeed gold substances, but not non-gold substances; just as by knowing the nature of a block of iron, you know all the articles made of that iron, and various forms and shapes and resultant names such as axe, hammer, chain, etc. assumed by the same block of iron are merely to enable people to use them for different purposes and are known and perceived to be indeed only articles of iron but not non-iron substances; in the same way, by the knowledge of the cause of this cosmos, namely Brahman, the effect will be known, as the effect is not different from its material cause. These illustrations are meant to teach merely that the whole cosmos has Brahman for its causal substance just as clay is the causal matter of every earthen pot and gold, of every golden ornament, but not to show that the process through which the causal substance becomes an effect is an unreal one. If Brahman were the operative cause alone, then by its knowledge, the whole universe cannot be known. By the knowledge of the potter and so on, pots and other things are not known. In that case, the promise (pratijña) and the illustrations would not fit in, but would be inconsistent and would conflict with each other. But when Brahman becomes the material cause, by the knowledge of Brahman, the material cause, its effect, namely, the world, is easily known just as by the knowledge of the material cause, lump of clay, nugget of gold and block of iron, their effects namely pots and jars, bracelet and crown, axe and sword are easily known. The

cause itself in a different condition becomes the effect, but the effect is not a new substance different from the cause. The pratijñā or promise is thus explained and proved by illustrative instances of our experience that clay, etc. and their transformed conditions are cause and effect. We have, therefore, to conclude that Brahman is the material cause of the universe.

The argument that Vedāntic texts themselves teach the difference between the operative and material cause of the world is untenable, for they teach only identity between the two causes. "Have you learnt the Ruler and Controller of the universe by knowing whom everything else becomes known": "By the command of this immutable Ruler".¹ Here the word ādeśa in the text means Ruler or Controller.² The text "Sat only was in the beginning, one without a second" says that since before creation only one was present, the expression 'without a second' denies the existence of any other controller. It may be asked how this fits in with texts such as: "The mother which produces changes; prakṛti without beginning or end"—which teach the eternity and material causation of prakṛti in regard to this universe. The reply is as follows. Even in those texts, what is meant by the word 'prakṛti' is nothing but Brahman in its causal condition indistinguishable by names and forms, for there is no substance other than Brahman which has any independent existence. "He who knows that everything has an independent existence without Brahman will be hurled again into saṃsāra".³ Texts such as these

1. उत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यः येना भुतं भुतं भवति—एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्हि । Chh. Up. 6-1-3 ; 6-2-1.

2. आदिश्यते अनेन इति आदेशः ।

3. सर्वं तं पश्यदात् योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद ।

deal with the negative aspect that there is no object which has an independent existence apart from Brahman. And there are texts such as: "All this is Brahman, all this is animated by the Supreme Soul"¹—which deal with the positive aspect and assert that the cosmos, either in its subtle causal condition or in its gross effected condition, is animated by the highest Self called Brahman. The whole text of the *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* beginning with: "He who pervades the whole earth, whose body is the earth and whom the earth does not know,"² declares that the supreme Brahman having the cit and acit as His body always in every condition and always animating them as their vital life-principle is sometimes distinguishable by names and forms and sometimes not distinguishable. When it becomes distinguishable by names and forms, it is said to be many and to be in the effected condition; and when it becomes indistinguishable by names and forms, it is said to be one without a second and to exist in the causal condition. The causal condition of Brahman (which has both cit and acit as his body at all times and in all conditions) which is indistinguishable by names and forms, is spoken of by expression such as "prakṛti without beginning or end, prakṛti begets all creatures", prakṛti produces changes"³, and so on. Even during the time of complete deluge, the existence of matter in its subtlest state animated by the Supreme Soul is declared by Śruti and therefore, matter in its subtlest condition being the prakāra or mode of Brahman is eternal and the prakāri or Brahman is spoken of as

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1. सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् ।
 2. यः पृथिवीमन्तरे संवरन् यक्ष्य पृथिवी शरीरं यं पृथिवी न वेद ।
 3. गौरनाथन्तवती—विकारजननी—अजामेकाम् ।

“Prakṛi without beginning or end.”¹ Therefore, it is said, “Akṣara, subtle state of matter, is reabsorbed in tamas and tamas has become one with the supreme deity”.² Tamas is said to become one with the supreme self but not absorbed (liyate) into it. By ‘becoming one with the supreme self’ is meant the existence of Brahman qualified by the subtlest matter called tamas indistinguishable by names and forms. In the case of an object, though not absorbed into another, its mere existence within the other justifies the employment of words such as ‘one only’ as for instance, before churning of a species of wood when fire is not manifest but dormant in it, we say that the wood alone exists; when semen is just received in the womb, we say that the woman is one although there are two souls within the body; when our body is full of worms and small insects, we say that the person is one.

The argument that as we have to proceed from the known to the unknown, that as we see the difference between the operative and material causes e.g. potter and clay, etc. and that an effect has to be produced by the working of the agent on the material with an instrument, Brahman cannot be the material cause, is not tenable. For, the omniscient and omnipotent Brahman is totally different in nature from all other objects, known and unknown, and therefore, in its case, everything is possible. The ordinary material cause like clay, etc. is not the operative cause because it is non-intelligent; the ordinary efficient cause like a potter, etc. is not the material cause, because he is not able to so transform himself with his body. And the potter

1. गौराद्यन्तवर्ती ।

2. अक्षरं तमसि लीयते तमः परेदेवे एकीभवति ।

needs instruments and so on because he is asatyasaṅkalpa, not able to achieve anything at mere will. Therefore, Brahman which is different in nature from a potter, clay, etc. cannot be judged from a worldly standpoint. But Brahman, with its wonderful powers beyond our comprehension, can be the material cause also. Moreover, since Vedic texts such as—‘Brahman willed, ‘let me become many’¹—teach that Brahman itself willed to become many and became² this wonderful cosmos and that creation follows His saṅkalpa or will. And further, there is a specific text which expressly says that Brahman is both the material and operative cause.³ In answer to the question from which tree this cosmos has been chiselled, tree growing in which forest, it is stated that from the tree of Brahman growing in the forest of Brahman this wooden material, namely, the cosmos is chiselled. Where was this world before? What is its material cause? What were the instruments used by Išvara, the supporter of the world? The world was in Brahman. Brahman is the material cause and it is also the instrument. In answer to the question put from the worldly standpoint, the reply given is that Brahman being different from all known and unknown objects, It is both the material cause and instrumental cause by virtue of Its wonderful powers beyond our comprehension.³ Brahman which, at first, willed to become many created itself, became both the subject and object

1. सोऽकामयत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति—तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति ।

2. साक्षाच्च उभयाम्नात् ।

3. किं स्विद्वनं क उ स वृक्ष आसीत् यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्पत्तुः मनीषिणो मनसा पृच्छते दुतत् यदध्यतिष्ठत् भुवनानि धारयन् । ब्रह्म वनं ब्रह्म स वृक्ष आसीत् यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्पत्तुः मनीषिणो मनसा विब्रवीमि यः ब्रह्माध्यतिष्ठत् भुवनानि धारयन् ॥

of creation, i.e. both the efficient and the material cause.¹ The Supreme Self indistinguishable by names and forms is the subject or agent of creation and the same Supreme Self indistinguishable by names and forms is the object of creation. Therefore, there is no harm or conflict in one and the same substance being both subject and object.² It is also said: "The Lord is the creator and the created; He is the protector, destroyer and also the protected. He also gives Brahmā (four-headed) and others, the power to create the world and so on."³ Should you object that if Brahman were to transform itself into this cosmos, the attributes of Brahman, namely, omniscience, unsurpassed bliss, absence of karma, grief and so on, would conflict with the diametrically opposite qualities of ignorance, misery, karma, etc. of the universe, our reply to such an object is this. "The world springs from Brahman by way of modification."⁴ The modification of Brahman qualified by its body, namely, souls and matter, in their subtle state indistinguishable by names and forms, into Brahman qualified by its body, namely, souls and matter, in their gross state distinguishable by names and forms, is taught by several vedānta texts such as: "Brahman, with subtle souls and matter indistinguishable by names and forms, modified itself into Brahman with gross souls and matter distinguishable by names and forms".⁵ The impurities and imperfections pointed out belong only to the souls;

1. तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत ।

2. आत्मकृतेः । Br. Sūt. 1-4-26.

3. स एव सृज्यः स च सर्गकर्ता स एव पालयति च पाल्यते च ।

ब्रह्माद्यवस्थाभिरक्षेयमूर्तिः विष्णुर्वरिष्ठो वरदो वरेण्यः ॥ V. P. 1-3-71.

4. परिणामात् Br. Sat. 1-4-27.

5. तदेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत् तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत ।

and matter which form His body but not to the Supreme Self. Both in the causal condition and in the effected condition, Brahman, their soul, is free from impurities and imperfections in its being or svarūpa, divyātma svarūpa as it is called. In this way, Brahman gets modification not directly but through its inseparable body namely matter and souls which cannot have an independent existence of their own. As it is in the very nature of Brahman to get modification of this kind, such modification does not entail any defect whatsoever on it, but on the contrary, it proves its unobstructed and unsurpassed supremacy and glory. Therefore, Brahman is also the material cause. And lastly, since Brahman is said to be the womb or uterus for the universe,¹ in texts such as: "Īśvara or Brahman the Maker and Ruler of the universe, is the womb or uterus of it." Wise men know Brahman to be the womb of all creatures"² and since the term womb or uterus is synonymous with material cause, Brahman is decidedly the material cause also of the cosmos.

It may be asked, while Brahman is changeless in Its being, how it can be said to be the material cause of all the effected universe through its attribute which is its body. The question is thus answered. If a tiny creature like a spider should possess such a power in its own limited sphere, as to weave a tangled web is there any wonder that the omnipotent being possesses it on a mighty scale beyond our comprehension? The tiny spider without undergoing any change in its being or svarūpa is seen to be the material cause through its body, of its own

1. योनिश्च हि गीयते । Br. Sut. 1-4-28.

2. कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम् । Mund. Up. 3-1-3.

3. यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः । Mund. Up. 1-1-6.

threads, i.e. the cobweb, the network spun by it from itself to catch its prey. If that be so, cannot the omnipotent and mighty Brahman possess that power in an infinitely larger degree ? For, the power of Brahman is spoken of as supreme and natural and is exercised in a variety of ways.¹ Several texts teach the material causation of Brahman on the analogy of the spider. Like the spider which creates the cobweb from within itself and plays with it and then retracts the same into it, the all-pervading Lord creates this world, i.e. unfolds this cosmos and absorbs it within Himself.² Parāśara Bhaṭṭa expresses this idea in a fine stanza : “Oh Lord ! Raṅganātha ! your independent will or saṅkalpa spreads in all ways and everywhere, transgressing the limit of possibility. That saṅkalpa or will is identified with your power. By virtue of this boundless power of yours, wise men well-versed in Vedas say, that you are the material cause of this unlimited, effected universe through souls and matter which constitute your body. That power is capable of achieving more wonderful results than your supremacy and control which create this wonderful cosmos with ease and without any obstruction. That power is seen in a spider ”.³ For the above reasons, Brahman is the material cause of the

1. परस्य शक्तिः विविधैव श्रूयते ।

2. ययोर्णनामिः सृजते गृह्णते च । Mund. Up. 1-1-7.

ऊर्णनामिर्यथा सृष्ट्वा स्वयं तत् प्रसते पुनः ।

तथा सृष्ट्वेदमस्त्रिलं स्वयं तत् प्रसते हरिः ।

यथोर्णनाभिर्द्वादयात् ऊर्णा सन्तत्य वक्त्रतः ।

तथा विहृत्य भूयस्तां प्रसत्येवं जनार्दनः ॥

3. कार्येनन्ते स्वतनुमुक्तः त्वामुपादानमाहुः, सा ते शक्तिः सुकर्मितरच्चेति वेलां विलंघ्य । इच्छा यावद् विहरति सदा रज्जराजानपेक्षा सैवेशानादतिशयकरी सोर्णनामौ विभाव्या ॥

(Srirangarajastava 2-31)

world besides being its efficient and instrumental cause.

What does creation of the world mean ?

While Vedāntic texts such as : “ Prakṛti, the cause of the world, has neither beginning nor end; ” “ The individual soul is eternal ”¹ expressly declare that both prakṛti and the individual soul are eternal, what does creation of these two things mean ? The creation of the world means making acit or matter undergo transformation, and giving body and sense organs to souls and expanding their knowledge or consciousness. The acit denoted by the word ‘tamas’ had become one with Brahman indistinguishable from it during pralaya or deluge.² Thereupon, as Manu says : “ Iśvara, by His unobstructed power stirred and set in motion the tamas so as to make it distinguishable from Him, then made it assume the condition of akṣara and then the condition of avyakta (unmanifest) and then made it vyakta (manifest) so that it became fit for collective and individual creation.”³ This is what is meant by creation of acit or matter. The individual souls were during deluge without body, sense organs and without intelligence quite unfit for enjoyment or for liberation. Thereupon, the Lord gives them bodies the seat of enjoyment and sense organs, the instruments of enjoyment, and expansion of their contracted intelligence so that they become fit for enjoyment and

1. त्रिगुणं तन् जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवाप्ययं V. P. 1-2-22.

गौरनायन्तवती सा Mantropanishad ; अजो नित्यश्चाश्वतोयं पुराणः-ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशनीशौ - Tait. Up. 10-5.

2. तमः परेदेवे एक्री भवति ।

3. ततः स्वयंभूर्मगवान् अव्यक्तो व्यञ्जयन्निदं । महाभूतादिवृत्तौजाः प्रादुरासीत्तमोनुदः ॥

(Manu Smṛti. 1-6)

liberation. This is what is meant by the creation of souls.

What does sustentation of the world mean ?

Sustentation of the world means favourably entering into all created objects like water into all plants and protecting them in every way.¹ Protection means removal of undesirable things and grant of desired objects. That will vary according to individual souls. The undesirable things for embodied souls are troubles arising from their enemies, etc. Their desires are food, clothing and so on. The undesirable thing for a mumukṣu or one longing for release, is his bondage in this worldly existence, and his desire is the attainment of the Supreme Being. The undesirable thing for liberated souls and eternally liberated souls is the cessation or absence of service to God and their desire is ever-growing service to Him. All kinds of protection which we see in the world are made by the Supreme Self only. Although we see that some souls worship inferior deities like the four-headed Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, Agni and so on and get their desired fruit therefrom, as a matter of fact, it is the highest Supreme Self that protects the worshippers as the antaryāmin or inner life-principle of those deities, and bestows fruits to the worshippers. For, the deities by themselves are incapable of protecting the worshippers and granting their desires. Lord Kṛṣṇa himself says in Gītā : “ Many people, robbed of their intelligence by various worldly desires, resort to inferior deities. But it is I that bestows even the small and limited fruits prayed for by the worshippers, being the antaryāmin or

the inner animating life-principle within those deities".¹
 "But those who worship Me reach Me".²

What does destruction of the world mean?

Destruction of the world means the deprivation of the body and sense organs for the embodied soul addicted to sensual pleasures like the imprisonment, by a father, of a wayward and disobedient son. The soul is endowed with this wealth (sambat) of body for dedication to God, for His worship, for resort to Him and for the evolution of the soul." Instead of worshipping Him with this body and sense organs, the soul became addicted to sensual pleasures, transgressing all the positive and negative injunctions, moral laws and śāstras and straying abroad. In the interests of the straying soul itself, God deprives it of its body and sense organs in the manner in which a father interested in his wayward son puts him in prison and curtails his liberty and thereby, prevents further commission of sins during the period of imprisonment.

The four-fold means or channel.

Each of the three functions, creation, sustentation and destruction of the world is done in four ways as described by Parāśara.³

The four-fold channel of creation.

The Supreme Being creates the world with the quality of rajas as the antaryāmin or inner animating soul of—

(1) the four-headed Brahmā,

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1. कामैस्तैस्तैर्हृत्तनाः प्रयन्तेऽन्यदेवताः ।
लभते च ततः कामान् मयैव विहितान् हि तान् ॥ B. G. 7-20 and 22.
 2. मद्भक्ता यान्ति मामपि । B. G. 7-23.
 3. विचित्रा देहसंपत्तिः ईश्वराय निर्वोदतुम् ।
 4. चतुर्विभागः संवृष्टौ चतुर्धा संस्थितः स्थितौ ।
प्रलयं च क्योत्यन्ते चतुर्मेदो जनार्दनः ॥ V. P.

- (2) the prajāpatis,
- (3) kāla or time, and
- (4) all creatures which procreate.

In the creation of the world, He assumes the quality of rajas necessary for activity and being immanent (antaryāmin), in the four-headed Brahmā, the creator of the fourteen worlds and the collective whole of embodied souls; in the ten prajāpatis who are the creations of Brahmā and who, in their turn, are the creators of nitya sṛsti in time, required for creation; and in all creatures and beings which procreate their respective species. Being the antaryāmin in all these four causes of creation, all their activities become centred in Him.¹

Four-fold channel of sustentation.

The Supreme Being sustains the world with the quality of satva (i) by incarnating himself as Viṣṇu and others, (ii) by promulgating śāstras through Manu and others and by showing the righteous path, (iii) by being the antaryāmin or immanent principle within time, and (iv) by being antaryāmin within all beings who help and protect one another.

In the sustentation of the world, the highest Self assuming the quality of satva necessary for the illumination of intelligence and so on—

- (1) incarnates himself as Viṣṇu among the trinity, the first incarnation amidst Brahmā and Rudra², as god, man, beast, etc.;³

1. एकेनांशेन ब्रह्मासौ भक्त्यव्यक्तमूर्तिमान् ।
मरीचिमित्राः पतयः प्रज्जनामन्यभागतः ।
कालः तृतीयस्तस्यांशः सर्वभूतानि चापरः ।
इत्थं चतुर्थी संसृष्टौ कर्तव्येऽसौ रजोगुणः ॥ V. P. 1-22-24.
2. मध्ये विरिच गिरिज्ञ प्रथमाक्तारः ।
3. सुरनरतिरथामक्तरन् ।

- (2) promulgates smṛtis, itihāsas, purānas and other śāstras through Manu, whose wholesome sayings are like panacea for all ills,¹ Yāgnavalkya, Parāśara, Vālmiki, Saunaka and others, and shows the righteous path to the world to prevent people from going astray and to enable them to get salvation ;
- (3) becomes the antaryāmin within time or kāla required for protection , and
- (4) is within all creatures which help and protect one another, so that their activities may all become centred in Him.²

Four-fold channel of destruction.

The Supreme Being destroys the world with the quality of tamas as the antaryāmin of—

- (1) Rudra,
- (2) of fire, antaka or yama
- (3) of time, and

- (4) of all creatures which destroy one another.

In the destruction of the world, the highest Self assuming the quality of tamas becomes the *antaryāmin* or immanent principle within the primary destroyer, namely Rudra, secondary destroyers namely, Agni (fire) and antaka, Yama: time or kāla necessary for destruction, and creatures which destroy one another-within all these

1. यद्वैकिंच मनुखदत् तद्वेषजं ।

2. एकांशेन स्थितो विष्णुः करोति परिपालनं । मन्वादिरूपीचान्येन कालरूपोऽपरेण च । सर्वभूतेषुचान्येन संस्थितः कुरुते स्थिति । सत्त्वंगुणं समाश्रित्य जगतः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥ V.P. 1-22-26

four, so that their activities may all become centred in Him.¹

While treating of the four-fold channel of creation, sustentation, and destruction of the world, the four-headed Brahma, Rudra, and others, are denoted by the word *amśa*, as they form the mode, *prakāra* or body or *vibhūti* of *Īśvara* as explained in the subsequent stanzas :—"The four-headed Brahma, Daksha and other minor creators, time, all creatures which procreate, are all *amśa*, mode, *prakāra*, body or *vibhūti* of *Īśvara* causing creation of the world; Vishnu, Manu and others, Time and all creatures which protect one another are also *amśa*, mode *vibhūti*, etc. causing sustentation of the world. Likewise, Rudra, Antaka, Agni, Time and creatures which destroy one another are also *amśa*, mode, *prakāra*, body or *vibhūti* of *Īśvara* causing the destruction of the world. While Viṣṇu is identical with the Supreme Being, reference to Him as the *vibhūti* of the Lord means the particular body assumed by the Supreme Being in his incarnation as Viṣṇu."

Creation of inequalities does not entail
partiality or cruelty.

An objection against the causation by Brahman is often raised as follows :—"It is not proper to say that God is the cause of this world. For, if He should

1. आश्रित्य तमसो वृत्तिमन्त काले तथा प्रभुः । रुद्रस्वरूपो भगवान् एकंशेन भवत्यजः । अग्न्यन्तर्द्धारूपेण भागेनान्येन वर्तते । कालस्वरूपो भागेन्यः सर्वभूतानि चापरः । विनाशं कुर्वतस्तस्य चतुर्थैव महात्मनः ॥ V.P. 1-2-26.
2. ब्रह्मादक्षादयः कालः तथैवाखिलजन्तवः । विभूतयो हरेरेता जगंतः सृष्टिहेतवः । विष्णुर्मन्वादयः कालः सर्वभूतानि च द्विज । स्थितेर्निमित्तभूतस्य विष्णोरेता विभूतयः । रुद्रः कालान्नकाद्याश्च समस्तार्चवैजन्तवः । चतुर्धा प्रलये हेताः जनार्दन विभूतयः ॥

be the cause, He cannot escape the charge of partiality and cruelty which must be levelled against Him. He creates some beings like gods and others, who are very happy, He creates other beings like animals, beasts, etc, who are very miserable; He creates some other beings like men who occupy a middle position, i.e. neither very happy nor very miserable. By the creation of such inequalities in life, God behaves like a man of low character and conduct, overpowered by likes and dislikes and by love and hatred. This is opposed to scriptural texts which declare God to be pure and above all bias. By causing misery and destruction to several beings, which even wicked persons will not do as it is detestable even to them, God must reasonably and legitimately be charged with partiality and cruelty. Therefore, to absolve Him from the charge, we have to hold that He is not the cause of the world."

This objection is answered by Vyāsa¹. Īśvara cannot be charged with partiality and cruelty. For, He does not create the world by mere freaks or capricious pranks, with likes and dislikes, without a reasonable basis. If He creates without any reasonable basis, then He may become liable to the charge. But He creates these inequalities on the basis of dharma and adharma, i.e. puṇya and pāpa, merit and demerit. Īśvara cannot therefore be held liable for the inequalities in life, which are based on merit or demerit of individual souls. He is like a cloud or rains. Just as parjanya or rain is the *general* (sādhāraṇa) cause for paddy and other crops to grow and the differences in the crops are due to the intrinsic differences in the seeds and

1. वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्येन सापेक्षत्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति । Br. Sat. 2-1-34.

their potentialities, which are the *special* causes, in the same manner, *Īśvara* is the general cause for the creation of gods, men and so on. But the inequalities existing in gods, men, beasts, and so on, are due to the merit or demerit existing intrinsically in them. *Śrutis* teach that the embodiment of individual souls in various bodies of gods, men and so on is based on their respective karma, merit or demerit. If a person does good deeds, he gets good birth, and if he does bad deeds, he gets bad birth.¹ *Parāśara* also says: "*Īśvara* is only a secondary cause in the creation of beings, for, the primary or principal cause is their karma." Moreover, like a mother who in the interests of her child which eats earth, with a view to prevent disease which would otherwise result, mildly brands its tongue to instil fear into its mind and thereby prevents further eating of earth, the Supreme Being, in the interests of the individual soul, causes misery on the basis of karma and on the ethical maxim of the threefold object of punishment, namely, educative, preventive and retributive.

If you should argue that the individual souls had not existed before creation, as Vedāntic texts such as, "*Sat* alone was in the beginning"² deny the existence of individual souls before creation and *a fortiori* denies their merit or demerit alleged to be the basis for creation, the reply is as follows :

1. साधुकारी साधुर्भवति पापकारी पापो भवति पुण्यः पुण्येन कर्मणा पापः पापेन कर्मणा । Brihad. Up. 6-4-5.
2. निमित्तमात्रेणासौ नृज्यानां सर्गकर्मणि । प्रधानकारणी भूता यतो वै सृज्य-
शक्त्यः । निमित्तमात्रं मुक्तैव नान्यत् किञ्चिदपेक्षते । नीयते तप्तां श्रेष्ठ
स्वशक्त्या वस्तु वस्तुताम् ॥ स्वशक्त्यैव=स्वकर्मणैव देवादिवस्तुताप्राप्तिः ॥
V. P. 1-4-51.
3. सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् । Ch. Up. 6-1-2,

The individual souls and their stream of karma have no beginning.¹ Though the soul has no beginning, his non-distinction from Brahman is quite consistent. For, the souls devoid of names and forms could not be distinguished as they are very subtle although they constitute His body. If you do not admit this position, you are landed in the absurdity that a soul reaps what he does not sow, and that another does not reap what he sows.² That the soul is beginningless is taught by texts such as: "The soul is neither born nor dies".³ That the stream of creation is beginningless is also taught by texts such as: "God created the Sun and Moon and other objects as before." "The unmanifest Brahman with subtle souls and matter, indistinguishable by names and forms constituting His body became manifest and distinguishable by names and forms".⁴ Since the difference between the causal condition and effected condition is stated to be the absence and presence of names and forms, and since at creation, the distinction of names and forms is alone asserted to have been made, the being or svarūpa of individual souls is concluded to be beginningless. The Gītā also says that prakṛti and puruṣa, matter and the individual soul, are beginningless.⁵

1. न कर्मा विभागादिति चेन्न अनादित्वात् उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च । Br. Sūt. 2-1-35

2. अकृताभ्यागमकृतविप्रणाशप्रसङ्गश्च । Br. Sūt.

3. न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित् । Katavalli 1-2-18.

4. सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् । Taitt. Narayana 1-14.

5. तदेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत् तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत । Brhad. Up. 3-4-7.

6. प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्वयनादी उभावपि । B. G. 13-19.

6. God is the resort of four kinds of needy persons.

Sāstras say that the cause of the world must be resorted to and meditated upon¹ “Desirous of liberation, I resort to that Supreme Being and completely surrender myself to Him, the Being who, after creating the four-headed Brahmā, gave him all the vedic lore and power to create the world and who in His grace gives us light to understand Him”.²

Lord Kṛṣṇa therefore says: “Four kinds of needy persons, by virtue of their merit or puṇya done before, resort to Me and worship Me alone. They vary as their merits vary. Those who had power, wealth and objects of enjoyment before, but who have subsequently lost them desire to get back what they have lost. A second class of persons desire to get anew objects of enjoyment, etc. which they did not have before. A third class of persons desire to attain their pure individual self, devoid of the contact with prakṛti. A fourth class of persons with knowledge of the real nature of the self, namely, that it is always subservient to God., i.e. to Me and that service to Me is the *summum bonum* of existence are not satisfied with the enjoyment of their own pure self free from prakṛti, but long to reach Me and enjoy Me as their only goal. For their respective ends these four kinds of persons resort to Me.”³

7. God is the bestower of four kinds of purusartha or desired end.

Sāstras assert that the Supreme Self, Brahman, is alone the bestower of desired ends, whether mokṣa or

1. कारणं तु ध्येयः ।

2. यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै ।
तं ह देवमात्मबुद्धिप्रकाशं मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये ॥ Svet. Up.

3. चतुर्विधा भजन्ते मां जनास्सुकृतिनोऽर्जुन ।

आर्तो जिज्ञासुरसौख्यी ज्ञानी च भरतर्षभ ॥ B. G. 7-16.

liberation from this worldly existence, i.e. attainment of the Lord and service to Him, or inferior ends, here or hereafter, wealth, progeny, prosperity, power and so on, in this world or svarga, the other world. This aspect is dealt with by Vyāsa. As God alone is omniscient, omnipotent, munificent, etc., He, being propitiated by sacrifices, gifts, homa or oblation into fire, and concentrated meditation or upāsanā, showers on devout worshippers all kinds of enjoyment here or hereafter or, attainment of pure self devoid of prakṛti, or attainment of the highest self in accordance with their desires.¹ The non-intelligent karma or deed like sacrifice or homa, i.e. oblation into the fire or upāsanā all of which perish here and now, is not capable of procuring the effect, svarga or mokṣa, at a distant future. For the śrutis say that the Supreme Self alone gives food, wealth, etc. and also unalloyed bliss called mokṣa or *apavarga* or liberation.² Here an objection is raised by Jaimini to emphasise karma. He says: "We see from our worldly experience that cultivation, ploughing, planting and so on, and gifts, etc., are directly or indirectly the means for their respective ends. In a like manner, in matters relating to Veda also, sacrifice, gift, oblations into fire, upāsanā and so on, though they are not the direct means for their ends, they are nevertheless indirect means through apūrva which is produced by the respective acts before they perish."³ Texts of positive injunctions like 'A person desirous of svarga should perform sacrifice; and one desirous of mokṣa should do upāsanā',⁴ which enjoin the performance of

1. फलमत उपपत्तेः Br. Sut. 3-2-37.

2. स वा एष महानज आत्माऽन्नादः कसुदानः । Br. Up. 6-4-24.
एष ह्येवानन्दयाति । Taitt. Up.

3. धर्मं जैमिनिरत एव ।

4. यजेत स्वर्गकामः । उपासीत ।

sacrifice and upāsana for the attainment of the goals of svarga and liberation respectively, cannot be otherwise explained according to Jaimini unless we assume that the sacrifice or upāsana produces apūrva or a new principle through which those acts secure svarga or liberation at a distant future.

This objection is met by Vyāsa, as follows: But Bādarāyaṇa maintains his stand that the Supreme Being alone bestows fruits because in the respective texts of positive injunctions themselves, the respective deities, Agni, Vāyu, Sūrya and others, propitiated by the respective sacrifices are declared to be the bestowers of the respective fruits, as¹ the term yāga or sacrifice etymologically means adoring or propitiating the deity". For example, in the text—"A person desirous of prosperity must perform a sacrifice to propitiate the deity, Vāyu, by offering to him a white animal at the sacrifice; for he is the swiftest of the deities. By one's fortune one resorts to him and the deity Vāyu himself secures him prosperity very swiftly".² Here in the same text or sentence containing the positive injunction of vāyu yāga is prescribed, the mode of securing the desired end for the needy person is also taught. And you cannot argue that the arthavāda or praise of the deity, being only a meaning less praise, does not really mean what it says; for, you yourself admit that the vidhi or injunction necessarily requires the teaching of the mode by which the yāga or sacrifice secures the desired end for the needy person. While the necessary requisite for the vidhi or injunction, namely, the mode of securing the

1. पूर्वं तु कदरायणः हेतुव्यपदेशात् । Br. Sūt. 2-2-40.

2. यज्ञदेव पूजयाम् ।

3. वायव्यं श्वेतमालमेत भूतिक्रमः वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता वायुमेव स्वेन भागधेयेनोप-
धाति स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति ।

desired end by the yāga or sacrifice is expressly taught in the same text, the abandonment of this express mode and the assumption of an unheard of apūrva in its place is unwarranted and quite disapproved by persons well-versed in pramāṇa or means of knowledge. Thus, the words, "Vāyu is the swiftest of gods" and so on, teach that the deity Vāyu (and other deities, for that matter) bestows the fruits. And śrutis and smṛtis assert that the Supreme Being himself as the antaryāmin of Vāyu and other deities is virtually worshipped and that He himself bestows the fruits. "The Supreme Being who is virtually worshipped by vaidic deeds, such as sacrifices and so on and by deeds, prescribed in smṛtis, such as sinking of public tanks, etc., is thereby propitiated and as He is the nābhi (navel) of the world-wheel and supporter of the universe, He bestows the fruits thereof. He is Himself Agni (fire). He is Himself the Sun, He is Himself the Moon. He is their antaryāmin or inner life-principle."¹ "He who resides within Vāyu, He who resides within Agni, He who resides within the Sun, which constitute His body."² Lord Kṛṣṇa also says: "If a person in faith desires to worship any of the inferior deities who constitute My body, I myself kindle and inflame his faith and make it firm and unshakable. With that increased faith, he eagerly worships that particular deity and gets his desires bestowed only by Me."³ "All the sacrifices and forms of

1. इत्यूर्तं बहुधा जातं जायमानं विश्वं विमर्ति भुवनस्य नामिः । तदेवाग्निः तद्वायुः
तत्सूर्यः तदु चन्द्रमाः । Taitt. Up. 1-6.
2. यो वायौ तिष्ठन् यस्य वायुः शरीरं । योऽग्नौ तिष्ठन् । य आदित्ये तिष्ठन् ।
Br. Up. 5-7-7 ; 5-7-5.
3. यो यो यां यां तनुं भक्तः श्रद्धया चितुमिच्छति ।
तस्य तस्यावलां श्रद्धां तामेव विदधाम्यहम् ॥
स तया श्रद्धया युक्तः तस्यानुवनमीहते ।
लभते च ततः कामान् मयैव विहितान् हि तान् ॥ B.G. 7.21-23.

worship indeed reach Me ultimately and I am the bestower of the fruits thereof.”¹ “Those who worship the inferior deities reach them and My devotees alone reach Me.”²

We see in this world of ours, that some persons with money got from cultivation of lands or from trade and so on, please the king directly or indirectly through his subordinate officers and that the king, thus pleased, showers favours on them accordingly. But scriptural texts teach us not only the existence of a Supreme Being, ocean of omnipotence, unsurpassed munificence, grace, and other blemishless and countless auspicious qualities, unknowable by other means of knowledge, but also teach modes of His propitiation, namely sacrifice, oblation into fire, His praise, utterance of His holy names, offerings of flowers at His lotus feet and other forms of worship and the resultant attainment, through His grace, of desired ends, enjoyment of worldly objects or liberation from bondage as the case may be. The stand taken by Vyāsa, therefore, is the only correct position.

8. God is possessed of extraordinary or *aprakṛta* body.

We have already observed that an attributeless absolute Brahman or a mere being which does not manifest itself in the finite is a fictitious abstraction. Likewise, an impersonal God is too little in sympathy with the wants of the human heart. Nobody can rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence of Śaṅkara and others, in which their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, and nobody will think it sweet to be wrecked on the ocean of the

1. अहं हि सर्वज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव च । B.G. 9-24.—

2. देवान् देवयजो यान्ति मद्भक्ता यान्ति मामपि ॥ B.G. 9-25.

Infinite. The Brahman which transforms itself into a being between which and the devotee, there can exist a personal relation, love and faith on the part of man, and justice tempered by mercy on the part of the divinity, is taught in all Sāstras, but not an absolute Brahman inaccessible to human wants and sympathies, as human hearts love to dwell on the delights of devotion to one all-wise and merciful Ruler who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper. Sāstras assert the reality of God's *avatār*, His descent into form and revelation of Godhead in humanity, beasthood, etc. The idea of God's incarnation is not inconsistent with His omnipresence and all-pervasiveness, according to the law of the sum total of the infinite cosmic energy being the same through all, i.e. being yet the potential impress everywhere and through every atom. Such an idea is not only not inconsistent but is also very necessary. For God in his two aspects, all-pervasiveness (*sarvavyāpakatva*) and immanence (*sarvāntaryāmitva*) is merely the infinite, transcendental but potential impress in Nature, i.e. matter and souls; and therefore, we, small and humble beings on earth, cannot successfully commune with such a Being unless He comes into some functioning state which means the special form and name which He assumes. Those forms are many even as His manifestations and powers are many. They are His own in the sense that His creatures on earth can never assume such forms and they cannot be confused with the forms of earth, etc., which are also His in the sense that He supports them all fundamentally. Even this idea of God having His own special forms is not foreign to scientific thinking. Because when some astronomers describe to-day that the habitability of other planets should mean their habitability by beings with whom we were, are, or

shall never, be familiar on our earth, the logic of that science admits clearly many possibilities of forms which we can never dream of in our world.

FIVE KINDS OF DIVINE FORMS.

God assumes five kinds of divine forms: *parā*, *vyūha*, *vibhava*, *antaryāmin* and, *arcā*, as stated in the Samhitā.¹ All these forms are real of aprākṛta substance or pure satva (śuddhasatvamaya) and of intelligence and bliss in essence (jñānānandātmaka). The Vedāntic texts such as, "He has neither eyes nor ears nor hands nor legs: He sees without eyes and hears without ears",² which deny the existence of body and sense organs etc., for God deny indeed only the body due to karma and the intelligence dependent upon sense organs, but not the body, organs, etc., assumed by the mere will of God and His natural independent intelligence. For, several texts assert the existence of aprākṛta or divine body, etc., assumed by His mere will. "God assumes at will a huge body as He likes. His body is not a prakṛta substance made of flesh, bone, etc., like ours, but it is aprākṛta or divine substance. God's body is not constituted of five elements like ours".³

Such persons as do not understand the real significance of these denial texts and as, in fear of them,

1. मम प्रकृतः पंचेति प्रादुर्बेदान्तपारणाः ।
परो व्यूहश्च विभवः नियन्ता सर्वदेहिनाम् ॥
अर्चावितारश्च तथा दयालुः पुरुषाकृतिः ।
इत्येवं पंचत्रा प्रादुर्मा वेदान्तविदो जनाः ॥ Viṣvaksena Samhita.
2. अचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादं पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः ।
3. इच्छागृहीतामिमतो रुद्धः । V. P. 6-5-84.
न तस्य प्रकृता मूर्तिः मांसमेदोऽहिसंभवा । न भूतसंघसंस्थानो देहोऽस्य
परमात्मनः ॥

abandon the interpretation of divine form, the most auspicious object of concentration, but fantastically interpret them as if they deny existence of real body and postulate only a fictitious appearance of body of *lāvara*, do indeed fall into the mouth of a serpent in their anxiety to escape from a scorpion. For a person of ordinary commonsense, instead of first being involved in mire and then washing it afterwards, it is better to avoid mire altogether. In the same way the scriptures will not first assert the existence of an object and then try to deny it by giving a different interpretation. Vedāntic texts are not so short-sighted.

1. Para form of the Lord.

The *parā* form or body is that extraordinary *aprākṛta* body of the Lord assumed in that self-luminous eternal and divine world of bliss and beauty of unsurpassed splendour, of lightning and grandeur called *paramavyoma*, far beyond this material world¹ uninfluenced and unaffected by time, where time has no power or control², where the first eternal and oldest seers called the *nityas* enjoy the Supreme Being incessantly³ along with the *muktas* liberated from the bonds of *samsāra* or worldly existence, shining forth in their own true colours⁴ surpassing, in lustre, millions of suns and moons.⁵ This *parā* or supreme body of *lāvara*, -dearer to the Lord than His own being or *svarūpa* and his own auspicious qualities, most appropriate to his being eternal, ever uniform, pure *satva* in essence, transparent and revealing

1. क्षयन्तमस्य रजसः पराके ।

2. न कालस्तत्र वै प्रभुः । M. B.

3. यत्रर्षयः प्रथमजा ये पुराणाः । Yajurveda.

4. यत्र पूर्वे साध्याः सन्ति देवाः । Puruṣasukta.

5. सूर्यकोटिप्रतीकशाः पूर्णेन्द्रयुतसन्निभाः ।

यस्मिन् पदे विराजन्ते मुक्ताः संसारकण्ठनैः ॥

the being or svarūpa of the Lord, like a diamond cup revealing its golden contents, and unlike the prākṛta body of an individual soul, concealing the shining soul of intelligence, unsurpassed in lustre, abode of all auspicious qualities, of fragrance, brilliance, softness beauty, youthfulness, etc., fit to be meditated upon by yogins, bewitching in its very nature and thus causing disattachment for all other objects of enjoyments, fit to be enjoyed by the eternally free, and the liberated souls, the root cause of all avatārs and incarnations, the protector and supporter of all, i.e. of both vibhūtis and adorned by weapons and ornaments, - is the body called *Paravāsudeva* wherein are fully manifested the six chief qualities of intelligence (jñāna), strength (bala), supremacy (aiśvarya), firmness (vīrya), power (śakti) and energetic opposition (tejas) and their off-shoots. "The other countless qualities of God are within these six qualities just like the cosmos within the Lord's".¹

The above six qualities are exercised :—

- (i) for the purpose of perceiving directly all things in all their aspects and at all times,
- (ii) for supporting all things thus perceived,
- (iii) for controlling the things supported,
- (iv) for so supporting and controlling with ease and without any fatigue or effort, and
- (v) for achieving extraordinary things, incompatible and beyond our comprehension, and
- (vi) for doing all these things unobstructed and without any aid or instrument and for overpowering everything else.

1. त्वानन्तगुणस्यापि षडेव प्रथमे गुणाः ।

यस्त्वयेव जगत्कुशाकन्येयन्तर्निवेशिताः ॥

The off-spring of these ~~six~~ qualities are *saṁśīlya*, freely mixing and mixing with the ignorant and very low persons, *saṁlabhya* (accessibility to all) and other countless qualities. All the qualities of the Lord may be broadly divided into two classes—those useful for his sublimity and excellence and those useful for his accessibility. For our resorting to the Lord, these two sets of qualities are very necessary; one without the other will not serve our purpose. Mount Meru, a golden mountain, though full of excellence and sublimity, is useless for us, as it is far beyond our reach and therefore cannot, in any way, help or protect us. Likewise, a clod of earth or a piece of stone, though accessible for all, is equally useless for us, as it cannot help us or satisfy our wants in any way. A combination of these two qualities is, therefore, necessary for us. If the Lord in his sublimity, excellence and supremacy does not care for us without being accessible to us, we cannot resort to Him to get our desires. And He cannot help us either, if He is devoid of the qualities of sublimity, excellence and supremacy, though He may be accessible to us like a piece of stone and a clod of earth. Although the chief six qualities mentioned above indeed inhere in the being of the Lord and are, therefore, never absent from Him, nevertheless, as occasion and necessity demand, some of them are manifest in some *avatāra*s and are not manifest in other *avatāra*s. But in the *para* or supreme body of *Vāsudeva* all of them are always manifest.¹

2. Vyūha form of the Lord.

Vyūha form or body of God means that form which springs from *parā* form of Lord with that body. It is of four kinds. *Vāsudeva*, *Pradyumna*, *Śaṅkarṣaṇa* and

1. संपूर्णवद्गुणस्तेषु वासुदेवो जगत्पतिः ।

Aniruddha, which are spoken of in the Vaikhānasa śāstras by terms such as Puruṣa, Satya, Acyuta and Aniruddha. For all avatārs, the mere will of the Lord is the cause, and protection of the devotee is the purpose. The first of these four forms does not differ from its cause, pararūpa, in qualities etc. And hence, the causal form is spoken of as Paravāsudeva and its effect as Vyūhavāsudeva. The casual form is also spoken of as Nityodita and the effected form as śāntodita. The will or saṅkalpa of the former maintains the nityavibhūti and the will of the latter maintains the līlavibhūti of Hari. Pāñcarātra says that the śāntodita form sprang from the nityo dita form.¹ Sometimes, Paravāsudeva and Vyūhavāsudeva are spoken of as if they are identical as there is no distinction of guṇas or qualities in them. In Vyūhavāsudeva all the six qualities of intelligence etc. are manifest as in Paravāsudeva. In Saṅkarṣaṇa form sprung from Vyūhavāsudeva, intelligence and strength alone are manifest, while the other four qualities are only dormant but not manifest. This form, nevertheless, benefits the devotees with qualities whether manifest or unmanifest. It is the abhimānidevata for jīva tatva or individual soul, promulgates śāstras and destroys the world. From Saṅkarṣaṇa springs Pradyumna, with two guṇas or qualities, namely supremacy and firmness alone (aiśvarya virya) manifest. Pradyumna is the abhimāni devatā for the manas tatva, the tatva namely the mind. His functions are, promulgation of dharma, (duty) and creation. Aniruddha springs from Pradyumna with two qualities, śakti and tejas. Power and energetic opposition alone are here manifest. Aniruddha is the abhimānidevata for ahankāra tatva i.e. egoism or 'I'ness. His function is to protect the world and to

1. नित्योदितात् संभूतं तथा शान्तोदितो हरिः ।

teach truths. From these vyūhas have sprung Keśava and other vyūhas who are the conductors of twelve months, *mārgaśīrṣa* and others, and of the twelve ādityas or suns.

[Here ends the author.] In completion of the work, the following pages have been added by the publishers from a different contributor.]

3. The Vibhava form of the Lord.

Vibhava is the incarnation (descent) form of the Lord into mundane regions prompted by overflowing grace, assuming the same divine *suddha satva* form appearing like the bodies of *prāṇis*. It is, says Varavaramuni, "the manifestation of *Īśvara* taking the form similar to man, etc." The *avatārs* are limitless, as the grace of the Lord, the desires of devotees, and the occasions calling for the descent of the divinity are equally limitless. "Who can presume to know *why* You come into *avatārs* in the three worlds, with protective grace? In whatever forms pictured by devotees in their minds those forms You readily and cheerfully assume, exhibit Yourself before them in those forms and fill them with delight."

In the *Bhagavad Gita*, the Lord explains the purpose and occasions of His *avatar* (descent). He comes down here for the protection of *dharma* and *dhārmika sādhus*, oppressed by evil-minded persons. He manifests Himself in human and other forms by the will and pleasure of Himself or of His dear devotees whom He looks upon as His own self. The word, *atmamāyāyā*, in the verse of the *Gītā*¹ literally meaning, by the will and desire of *ātma*, may mean

1. प्रकृतिः स्वामिनिष्ठाय संभवाम्यात्ममायया ॥ B. G. 4—(6)

‘by His own desire’ or ‘by the desire of His ātman’. In the Gītā, He declares that the devotee, jñāni, is His own ātman, is considered by Himself as His own ātman. In interpreting the Lord’s word, ātmamāyayā, in the Gītā, the word ātma may therefore denote Himself of His devotee, Self or both. The fact is that the forms are assumed by the Lord at His own pleasure or at the pleasure of His devotees. The desires of both would naturally coincide. Divinity descending into this world has the fullness of Its divine power and glory and the forms assumed, though seemingly human, are not of the material stuff but they are of the divine essence. God descends into this world to lift up humanity to mokṣa, union with Himself. He comes down to lift us up. Thus Rāma, it will be seen at the close of the *avatār*, lifted up the whole host of carācara—men, beasts, plants, etc. both the vegetable and animal kingdoms—in Ayodhya to the Heavenly kingdom. All lives which came in contact with Him cherished a deep love for Him as was exhibited at the time when Rāma departed to the woods at the bidding of Daśaraṭa and Kaikayī. When He left this world He could not bear their separation, nor they His.

Realising how the entire kingdom of His cannot bear separation from Him, Rāma says to the four-faced Brahmā: “All these creatures have followed Me out of deep love for Me. To all of them vouchsafe a heaven”.¹

1. एषां लोकान् जनौघानां दातुमर्हसि सुव्रत ।

इमे हि सर्वे स्नेहान्मां अनुयाता मनस्विनः ॥

तच्छ्रुत्वा विष्णुवक्त्रे ब्रह्मलोकगुरुः प्रभुः ।

लोकान् सांतानिक्रान्नाम यात्यन्तीमे समागताः ॥

यत्र तिर्यग्गतं किञ्चित् त्वामेवानुचिन्तयन् ।

प्राणांस्त्यज्यन्ति भक्त्या वै तत्सन्ताने निवस्यसि ॥

Rāmāyana-Uttarakāṇḍa 110.

The vibhava form of the Lord is thus mainly for the purpose of lifting the devotees to His abode. Though this is the Lord's intention in all His acts, from creation to annihilation, yet it is in these incarnation forms that His purpose seeks greater fulfilment. The *para* or transcendental form is for the *nityas* and *muktas*, the eternally free and the liberated, who are in, or have attained, eternal union with Him in a far-off world. The *vyūha* form is intended for carrying out His tasks of creation, sustenance and destruction of the Universe, for granting the desires of the worldly and for conferring *mokṣa* or final release for the salvation-seekers. But these three *vyūha* forms are located in an inaccessible Milky ocean out of the easy reach of ordinary mortals. Not satisfied with this manifestation, in His eagerness to come closer to the world of His creation, He descends into it, takes the forms with which His created beings are familiar, an aquatic, a beast, a dwarf and a full man. This is the fuller manifestation of His in which His physical form is exactly similar to that of the genus, though it is not constituted of that *prakṛti* of three *guṇas* and so, is of nature divine.¹

The Vibhavas classified.

These manifestations are countless but they fall into two main divisions, namely *gauṇa*, secondary or *aveśa* and therefore inferior, and *mukhya*, primary or full and therefore of higher value. The main distinction lies in the fact that in *gauṇa*, *īśvara* works out His will through individual souls for a particular purpose, for example, the four-faced *Brahmā*, His agent for creation, the three-eyed *Rudra*, His agent for destruction, *Buddha*,

1. न अत्र प्रकृतिशब्देन त्रिगुणा प्रकृतिः उच्यते । अवतारेष्वपि त्रिगुणोपादान-
त्वाभावात् । Tat: Ch. on B. G. 4-6.

for deluding the unwary, Vyāsa for classification of the Vedas, and Kubera, for the bestowing of wealth. All these are jivas possessed of divine powers for accomplishing specific superhuman purposes. Being selves or individual souls like Agni, Indra, etc., they are not fit for worship (anupāśya) by mumukṣus or God-seekers.

The sākṣāt or mukhya avatārs are wholly divine, Īśvara Himself operating direct here, not through a soul's medium. Such incarnations are the descent of God in His rūpa (form) with a divine or aprākṛta body into this world taking the shape of the genus to which the avatār belongs. That is to say, when a fish or a tortoise, a boar or a man-lion, the carnal form will be exactly similar to that of a fish, tortoise etc.¹. Such primary incarnations, though many, are chiefly ten. The form and the purpose of each are thus described:

(1) Matsya (fish) for restoring the Vedas to Brahmā from the demons who stole them; (2) Kūrma (tortoise) for conferring immortality on the devas through amṛta or nectar obtained by churning the Milky ocean with Mandara (a mountain) as the churning stick; (3) Varāha (boar) to save the world personified as Bhūmī, a consort of the Lord, from the grip of the demons; (4) Narasimha (man-lion) to kill the great giant Hiraṇyakaśipu and save his son, Prahlāda, a born devotee of the Lord, subjected to various tortures by his father on account of his devotion to Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Lord; (5) Vāmana (dwarf-man) for cleansing the world of its sins with the water sprouting from His feet when He assumed the form of Trivikrama (one who encompassed the worlds by one foot, over-reached the higher worlds by his another foot, and for his third step finding

1. विभवो नाम तत्सजातीयरूपेण आविर्भावः ।

no place, pressed His foot on the head of Mahābali, a conceited asura, who claimed ownership of all the worlds); (6) Paraśurāma, for the annihilation of wicked Kṣatriyas who, by their physical might, oppressed the weak and the virtuous; (7) Rāma, for protecting those who took refuge in Him, for establishing righteousness in the world by killing Rāvaṇa, the powerful rākṣasa chief; (8) Balarāma, for killing the asura Pralamba; (9) Kṛṣṇa, to show mankind the means of liberation or final release; (10) Kalki, a future avatār for liberating the world from Kali, the personification of vice and the spirit of the age.¹

Purpose (prayojana) of avatars.

All the above purposes are classified into three by the Lord who explains the purpose, time and manner of His incarnations to the enquiring Arjuna thus: "For the protection of the sādhus (His devotees), for the destruction of their enemies, the evildoers, and for the establishment of dharma (righteousness) in the universe, I take birth time and again."²

1. वेदापहारिदैत्यनिरसनद्वारा ब्रह्मणे प्रमाणप्रदत्तार्थं अवतीर्णो मत्स्यावतारः ।
 देवानां अजरामृतिहेत्वमृतोत्पादने मन्दराधारत्वेन अवतीर्णः कूर्मावतारः ।
 संसारसागरोन्मज्जनोद्धर्तुकामः स्वमहिषीभूम्युद्धरणार्थं अवतीर्णो वराहावतारः ।
 आश्रिततरक्षणार्थं महासुरं हन्तुं स्ताम्भे अवतीर्णो वृसिहावतारः ।
 त्रिविक्रमो भूत्वा स्वपादारविन्दोद्भवेन जलेन अगाधपापहरणेन तद्रक्षणार्थं अवतीर्णः
 वामनावतारः । दुष्टशत्रियनिरसनार्थं अवतीर्णः परशुरामावतारः । शरणागत
 रक्षणधर्मसंस्थापनार्थं अवतीर्णः श्रीरामावतारः । प्रलम्बादिनिरसना-
 अवतीर्णो बलरामावतारः । मोक्षोपायदर्शनार्थं अवतीर्णः श्रीकृष्णावतारः ।
 अधर्मिष्ठाच्चिरसनस्य पूर्णधर्मोत्पादनार्थं कलिनिर्मोचनार्थं कल्क्यवतारः ॥

Yatindramatadipika.

2. परित्राणाय साधूनां विनाशाय च दुष्कृताम् ।

धर्मसंस्थापनार्थाय संभवामि युगे युगे ॥ B. G. 4-8.

Are Incarnations necessary?

The question may be asked here, is it necessary for the Omnipotent to take birth in these forms for achieving the purposes mentioned above. It is true that He can by His mere will (saṅkalpa) or resolve, accomplish these ends from His supreme abode. To do so will, no doubt, reveal His might and majesty but the few devotees in the world suffering under the tyranny of the wicked not only cry for relief but yearn for visualising Him here and now. "They are", says the Lord, "living in Me" (madgataprāṇāḥ) and unable, to bear separation from Me, pray to Me for revealing to them, even while they are alive in this world, My divine form which is the life of their life. The descent of the Divine as a human being is to assuage such devoted souls out of His quality, saulabhya, described already. This is the primary reason for His descent.

The destruction of the wicked comes in as a secondary reason, as a necessary concomitant of the protection of the righteous. This is indicated by the term 'ca' in the verse of the Gītā referred to, which states that the destruction is *also* an additional purpose, secondary to the main which is sādhu-paritrāṇa.¹ The wicked are those who are jealous of His power and supremacy, and conceited as they are, face Him as His enemies and meet their end by the shafts of His arrow.

It may be asked here, if He is all-merciful, how is this act of destruction justified. Can He not save them from their evil deeds and lead them to righteous paths by His guiding power? This He indubitably can but the evil-minded pitch their might against His and would

1. साधवो हि उपासकाः । तत्परित्राणमेव उद्देश्यम् ।

आनुष्मिकस्तु दुष्कृतिनां विनाशः संकल्पमात्रेणापि तदुपपत्तेः ॥

rather be killed by Him than be His willing servants. Even this act of killing them is an act of grace on His part towards His enemies for, it is by severing the soul from the body beyond the possibility of further deeds of sin that He seeks to save them.¹ This is comparable to the cruel kindness of a surgeon amputating a limb stricken with an incurable disease.

To illustrate this from the great epic, Rāmāyaṇa, the destruction of Rāvaṇa by Rāma should be taken as an act of mercy. The poet Vālmiki, the author of the epic, could find no parallel to this fight between God incarnate as Rāma and the Rākṣasa chief, Rāvaṇa. This inability of the poet to find a simile is due to the real fact that this fight is a unique one. The enemies here are not at war for establishing their respective might. For, the Lord is eager to save Rāvaṇa, as much as Rāvaṇa is eager to meet death at the hands of none but an adversary like Rāma, a foeman worthy of his steel. Such a fight in which one is eager to save and the other eager to be killed is indeed unique and finds no parallel anywhere. Hence it is that the poet exclaims; "The sky can be similar only to the sky; the ocean can be compared only to the ocean. Even so, the battle between Rāma and Rāvaṇa bears resemblance only to itself." That Rāma was eager to save Rāvaṇa is evident from the episode of Vibhiṣaṇa's surrender. When ordering Sugriva, the monkey-king, to bring before Rāma, the refugee Vibhiṣaṇa, He says: "Even if he be Rāvaṇa him-

1. रिपूणामपि वत्सलः । Rāmāyaṇa-^{II (206)} मत् शरैः त्वं रणे शान्तः ततः
पूतो भविष्यसि । Tat. Ch. on B. G. 4-8.

2. गगनं गगनाकारं सागरं सागरोपमम् ।

रामरावणयोर्युद्धं रामरावणयोरिव ॥ Rāmāyaṇa-Yuddhakāṇḍa
110-23-24.

self "implying that He would forgive the refugee whether he be Vibhiṣaṇa or even Rāvaṇa, His arch-enemy. Again, in the progress of the battle, on seeing Rāvaṇa laying down his bow and standing still before Him, He says: "Go; you are exhausted by the fight. I allow you to retire for the night. Come back tomorrow for the fight in your chariot and with the bow in your hand".² The Lord's intention here is not to exhibit his righteousness in war so much as to give his enemy, one more opportunity to realise that to surrender and seek refuge in Him would be the better part of his valour.

Thus, the object of killing the wicked is explained not as acts of cruelty but acts of mercy, taken in the wider sense of releasing a soul rooted in wickedness by severing it from its worldly instincts and saving it from further acts of sin. He resorts to this inevitable course only when other peaceful methods fail to win a soul rooted in evil, by terminating its evil tendencies born of the flesh.³ He has like an emperor to lead an army under His personal command to subdue the dominion in which His writs do not run. Hence He comes down as the Supreme Ruler to subjugate the rebels.

The third object, namely dharmasamsthāpana, apparently means the restoration of the worldly order and establishing it on the basis of righteousness. This purpose naturally follows from the protection of the good

1. यदि वा रावणः स्वयम् । Ibid. 18-35.

2. गच्छ अनुजानामि रणार्दितस्त्वं प्रविश्य रात्रिवराजं लङ्काम् । आश्वत्थं निर्याहि रथी च धन्वी । Rāmāyaṇa-Yuddhakāṇḍa 59-143.

3. दुष्कृतामपि विनाशः न कृत्स्नविनाशः । किं तु वैष्णव्यहेतुभूतरक्षस-प्रभृतिशरीरप्रन्ध्यादिविनिर्गतम् । तत्रिहृत्तै च तेषामपि धार्मिकत्वम् संभवेत् । इति सोऽपि धर्मसंस्थापनपर्यवसितः । Tat. Ch. B. G. 4-8.

and the destruction of the wicked.¹ Why this has been separately mentioned as a specific and distinct purpose needs scrutiny. The term 'dharma-samsthāpana' refers not merely to the ethical order on which the progress of the world is based, but in essence, to the divine form of the Lord to please whom all our actions are performed in a spirit of dedication and worship. "I am the worshipped in all sacrifices and penances", He says.² The virtuous have to be vouchsafed His vision even as the wicked should be shown His valour. The real object of avatāra is to show Himself to His chosen souls.³ The ṛṣis of Daṇḍaka forest, for example, endowed as they were with knowledge and devotion, and leading an austere life, felt the concrete fulfilment of their devotion and austerity when they actually saw Rāma, Sitā and Lakṣmaṇa in physical human form of such surpassing beauty that they invoked for them benedictions (against the evils abundant in this world). It should be noted that though by the power of their penance, they could annihilate all enemies, yet they did not arrogate to themselves the task of self-protection, for they realised the Lord as the real and the sole Protector.⁴ Dharma, therefore, means sākṣāt dharma or the perceptible Saviour. It is to establish before the eyes of the world that He is the protector of righteousness that He comes down in human form to live, move and have His being in this world of His.

1. मोक्षारं यज्ञतपसाम् । B. G. 5-29.

2. अनुष्ठानमुखेन उपदेशमुखेन च धर्मप्रवर्तनं व्यासादिद्वारापि शक्यम् ।
आराध्यरूपप्रदर्शनेन भक्त्युत्पादनं अक्षर असाधारणप्रयोजनम् ॥
एतेन धर्मस्य सम्यक् स्थापनं हि स्वपर्यन्ततया स्थापनं इत्युक्तं भवति ॥

Tat. Ch. B. G. 4-8.

3. रक्षितव्याः त्वया शत्रवर्गममृताः तपोवनाः ।

Rāmāyaṇa Araṇyakāṇḍa 1-20.

The mystery (rahasya) of Avatars.

An avatār is thus God in human form, a meeting ground of the divine and the human. As this world is composed of the virtuous and the vicious, divinity is not perceptible to all except the virtuous. The vicious see only the human form as their vision is clouded by conceit. He says in the Gitā: “Men do not see My divine form as they are enmeshed in prakṛti with its three innate qualities”.¹ “Nor do I reveal Myself to the common lot. I conceal my divinity from them by Prakṛti, my handmaid of miraculous powers”.² Because of this strange mixture, an avatār is said to be a mystery or rahasya. While those who “think low of Me because of my human form”³ those who are endowed with insight (mahātmās) see the divine in Me.⁴ The mahātmās, realise that He, though taking births as ordinary mankind, is not born as a karma-ridden soul, but is the Supreme Being descending into this world seeking union with his creatures out of affection and sympathy for them, to lift them to His abode. The Unborn is born, the Immutable is seen as the mutable, the indwelling controller as being controlled, the Supreme Lord as the servant of His devotees, a charioteer and yet, the Almighty turning the wheel of the Universe—a crowning illustration of His condescension to His devotees. This is the mystery of the avatārs realising which the devotees are lost in ecstasy.

1. त्रिनिर्गुणमयैर्भावैः एभिः सर्वमिदं जगत् ।

मोहितं नाभिजानाति मामेभ्यः परमव्ययम् ॥ B. G. 7-13.

2. नहं प्रकृतः सर्वस्य योगमायासभावृतः । B. G. 7-25.

3. अवजानन्ति मां मूढाः मानुषीं तनुमाश्रितम् । B. G. 9-11.

4. महत्मानस्तु मां पार्थ देवीं प्रकृतिमाश्रिताः । B. G. 9-13.

Avatars as exhibiting His qualities.

In dealing with the innumerable qualities possessed by God, it has already been explained and illustrated that the descent of God in human form is to exhibit those qualities to mankind with a view to strengthen their faith in Him, to foster their devotion and feed their ecstasy. Taking the two full avatārs, as Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, let us see this aspect in greater detail. As Rāma, He shows Himself as an ideal son, an obedient disciple, an affectionate brother, a loving husband, a true friend, a righteous warrior, and above all, a popular King. In his next incarnation as Kṛṣṇa, the divinity in human form is more fully revealed. His childish pranks, implicit obedience to His parents, His various superhuman exploits even as a boy, His amorous pursuits with the damsels of Brindāvan, His affection to the unsophisticated cowherd kinsmen of His, His ambassadorial diplomacy, His extreme kindness to the helpless Pāṇḍavas, His manoeuvres to bring about, on the battlefield, the wholesale destruction of the evil forces and above all, His role as a preceptor expounding the supreme wisdom to the world through Arjuna, the great Teacher appearing before devotees like Bhīṣma, Droṇa and to the entire world, as a servant driving the chariot of Arjuna—all these have been and will for ever be the food and drink of the devoted souls. These human traits exalt His supremacy as He does not consider them as derogatory of the divine. They have no scope for display in His supreme abode where the worshipper and the worshipped are in eternal communion, where there is no seeker and sought, no separated souls seeking reunion. So, it is said, that all the Gods, angels and denizens of the celestial regions, assembled in the sky, time and again, to witness

from above, His (Kṛṣṇa's) tending the cows, playing the flute, submitting to punishments for his mischiefs and to see the other human acts of His, indeed, to see the Lord in the service of His devotees and realise to which extent He chooses to condescend in His avatārs.

He incarnates at His will.

It is said in the epics and purāṇas that He takes birth under the curse of saints. This should make Him, like any one of us, born of karma. The truth, however, is that though His birth is as real as that of us, in that He is born of parents like us and that He takes leave of the world in due time, He does not lose His potential divinity. Unlike us, who lose our innate lustre and sink in ignorance at each birth, He adds to His lustre, remembers the previous births and by each birth exalts Himself. The purāṇic account is taken to mean that He submits Himself to being so cursed, by this saint or that, out of His will for the welfare of the world and not out of any overpowering Destiny. Says the Śruti: "The Unborn takes birth in manifold forms. He gains lustre by being born".¹

Are Avatars real?

The incarnations of the Supreme in human and other forms have posed a puzzle to enquiring minds. If even to those born contemporaneously with the avatār, the truth was not comprehensible, to us viewing the truth from the distance of ages, the mystery only deepens. Leaving aside those who have neither the eyes to see nor the faith to believe, even those who, following the scriptures, view the avatārs as a fact, do not concede their reality. For, it is too probable to be true that He should, in His vibhava form, Rama for instance,

obey the behests of others, His friends, ācāryas, parents, and in fact, lower beings like monkey hosts and the like, that He should lose His spouse in the forest, by His indiscretion in chasing the golden deer, pine after Her like a forlorn lover, seek the help of the monkeys for rescuing her and do other such acts which fall to the common lot of mankind. All such human acts and sufferings do not behove the Almighty. They therefore conclude that the incarnation is but an exhibition of the power of creating illusions and that the avatārs are like *indrajāla* or magical shows lacking reality. Reference has already been made to the view of Śaṅkara in his commentary on the oft-quoted verse of the Gītā in which he interprets the term “sambhavāmi ātmamāyayā” to mean “appear as if to possess a body and as if born”¹ not in a real sense as worldly beings are born. There is a second view which takes the incarnations as *abhinaya* and holds that He lives and moves like a human being just as an actor on the stage playing an allotted role.² While this view gives a semblance of reality it reduces God’s actions to those of an impostor. That He experiences sorrow and anger, discontent and despair, that He should rave like an ordinary human being at the loss of His consort, and similar actions of His, should be taken to be acts of pretence while in reality He is divine and only His robes are human.

To a devout mind like Rāmānuja, the above views miss the essence of His descent. When He says to Arjuna: “My births have been many like yours”, Rāmānuja takes it in the illustrative sense and means

1. देहवान् इव भवामि जात इव । न परमार्थता लोकात् ॥

2. यथा नटस्य मायाविडम्बितमवेहि । Bhāgavata: 11. 11

that "even as your births are real, Mine are equally so, with the difference that I remember them while you do not".¹ He wills to be human in His form, feelings and actions, out and out, to prove His supremacy and at the same time His accessibility to the lowly and the humble. It is this quality of *saṁlabhya*, *saṁsilya* and *vātsalya* that He seeks to exhibit and at the sight or recollection of which, His devotees lose themselves in ecstasy. To cast even a shadow of doubt on the reality of avatārs will be to doubt the sincerity of these mystics, who rise to rapturous heights on witnessing or recapitulating the human acts of the Divine and in fact, to doubt His own statements in the avātars, nay, to doubt His teachings in each avatār, in particular, as the Lord of the *Gītā*, and the actual vision of *viśvarūpa* which He vouchsafed to Arjuna. Far from concealing His majesty, He seeks through the avātars to establish, in all humility, His overflowing eagerness to satisfy the thirst and hunger of His seekers, impatient of separation from Him, living in this world and yearning to be reunited with Him here and now. He Himself settles this doubt in His express statements as Rāma and Kṛṣṇa. To those who exclaimed to Rāma, "Thou art indeed Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme"², He replies: "I consider myself as a man". In His incarnation as Kṛṣṇa, witnessing Him as a boy holding up the Govardhana hill with a finger of His, to protect the cows and their herds from the devastating clouds, when the cowherds wondered who he was, He exclaims: "I am born as your kinsman".³

1. बहुनि मे व्यतीतानि जन्मानि तव चार्जुन ।

तान्यहं वेद सर्वाणि न त्वं वेत्स्य परंतप ॥ B. G. 4-5.

2. भवान् नारायणो देवः । आत्मानं मानुषं मन्ये । Rāmāyana.

3. अहं वो बन्धवो जतः ।

The realistic view of avatars assures the meek and the humble that He is the unfailing protector of the Universe, strengthens the bonds of devotion to Him and sustains those who long to see Him and experience the thrill and bliss of His presence in their midst. To treat the avatārs as illusory or histrionic is to miss the core and to ignore the divine purpose underlying them.

4. Isvara as Antaryamin (Indweller).

We have seen how the Transcendental takes various forms to satisfy His devotees. Though He is surrounded in His Supreme abode by the celestials, the nityas and muktas, He feels Himself a solitary Being. "Lonely, He does not enjoy" says the śruti. In His three-fold Vyūha forms, He makes Himself accessible to the four-faced Brahmā and other celestials. As the next step in advance towards His creation, He chooses the vibhava or avatār forms which we have dealt with. There is yet a fourth rūpa or form which He takes for the sake of His devotees and for the worlds created by Him, in general. This is the antaryāmi or indwelling form of the Lord. Here He reveals Himself as the inner guide, the sustainer and friend of all, with the intention of establishing His dominion over His creatures by continuous relationship with them in the very heart of the universe. Like a sovereign seated in His throne in a far-off capital, extending His sway over the entire universe, He is at heart eager to associate Himself with His subjects and to this end, He chooses a second capital, the Milky ocean, where reclining in His couch, He listens to the cries of His regents imploring the aid of the Sovereign Power for protection against the forces of evil. Finding that He is still inaccessibly far away to many and His suzerainty

from a distance weakens His authority, He descends in His avatārs or vibhava rūpas to the level of His creation, establishes His overlordship over those who challenge it and assures those who seek Him of His unfailing protection. Even incarnations of this kind fell short of His objective for He still remained like an external Ruler leading an army at intervals to quell a distant dominion, the mundane world, setting His commands at naught and seeking to get out of His control. He therefore chooses next to be eternally within His creation, as the Inner Ruler exercising continuous and undisturbed authority leaving no room for conceited subjects of His to set up a rival claim over His kingdom, the universe, by right of adverse possession. Continuity being the essence of sovereignty He enthrones Himself within His universe as its antaryāmi, its sustainer and benefactor. It has already been stated that all these forms which He takes are not inconsistent with His omnipresence, as at all times He is in His Heaven, in the Milky ocean, taking births as Rama, Kṛṣṇa and other vibhava rūpas and yet, residing within the cosmos as its eternal life-principle, its ruler and guide. As the verse of the Gītā already referred to says: "Being unborn being changeless in Myself, being the Controller and Guide of the created beings, I enter into My prakṛti in My own form and take birth out of My free will"¹. The termination 'an' in the text has also to be added to the term avyayātmā in the first half of the verse.

Two kinds.

This Indwellership is of two kinds, general and specific. The Subalopaniṣad describes the general

1. अजोऽपि सन् अव्ययात्मा भूतानां ईश्वरोऽपि सन् ।

प्रकृतिं स्वां अधिष्ठाय संभवाम्यात्ममायया ॥ B. G. 4-6.

form: "Whose body is the Earth, who indwells it, activates it, whom the Earth does not know"; "Whose body is the soul, who indwells it, directs it, whom the soul does not know".¹ This general permeation into the world of His creation is to direct the cosmic evolution as the dynamic principle within, to His desired end. Says the Upaniṣad: "Having created He entered into it".² He not only permeates but directs the world of Matter to that "far off divine event to which the whole creation moves" by His governing power. In the same way, He enters into the jivas as their Inner Ruler. Reference has already been made to the manner of His immanence in soul and matter, unaffected by their imperfections and with a special divine form or body, as without a body no functioning is possible.

That He has a form (rūpa) as indweller, for instance in the Sun, is specifically stated in the Upaniṣad: "That golden Puruṣa who is seen within the Sun, with golden beard, with golden hair, and golden in every part of the body up to the tip of His nails, His eyes are like the lotus flower newly opened to the Sun's rays".³ Neither the Earth, as the Śruti says, nor the souls know this inner Governor. This form is thus concealed with-

1. यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् यस्य पृथ्वी शरीरं

यः पृथ्वीमन्तरो यमयति न पृथ्वी न वेद ।

य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् यस्य आत्मा शरीरं

यः आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति यमात्मा न वेद ॥

2. तत् सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् ।

3. य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्यः पुण्यो दृश्यते हिरण्यश्मश्रु हिरण्यकेशः आप्रणखात् सर्व एव सुवर्णः, तस्य यथाऽक्यासं पुण्डरीकमेवमक्षिणी ॥ ... Chh Up.

in the world but perceptible to those who meditate on Him in this form.

Besides being the life-principle within matter and souls, He manifests to Himself, to those who seek to see Him in this form, within their hearts. "Entering within, He is the Ruler of beings"¹ As the Viṣṇu Purāṇa says: "Viṣṇu who resides in the heart is the Governor of the entire Universe."² There are a few who seek to meditate on this Indwelling form. For concentration of their minds, for intensifying their meditation, and for helping them to their goal, He shows Himself to them in this divine and friendly form. He is the "friend of all"³ and "fixed in His seat in the heart of things".⁴ This form is described as "of the size of the thumb, He is lustrous like smokeless fire".⁵ "Full of splendour like a streak of lightning enveloping a dark cloud"⁶ says the Śruti. This is the special form in which He manifests to Himself to the Yogis,⁷ those whose knowledge of Him will not rest content without *seeing* Him meditating on His form till they actually see the Ruler inward, their guide and friend within them and within the whole universe".⁸

(5) The arca or image form

There is yet a fifth form the Lord takes which is the crowning act of His in the fulfilment of His soli-

1. अन्तः प्रविष्टः शस्ता अज्ञानां सर्वात्मा ।
2. शस्ता विष्णुरशेषस्य अगतो यो हृदि स्थितः । V. P.
3. सुहृदं सर्वभूतेषु ।
4. सर्वभूताशयस्थितः ।
5. अंगुष्ठमात्रः पुष्पः ज्योतिरिव अबूमकः ।
6. नीलतोयदमध्यस्था विद्युद्वेलेव भास्करा ॥ Yājñika Up.
7. अष्टांगयोगसिद्धानां हृद्यग्निरतात्मनाम् ।
8. योगिनामधिक्रमस्त्यात् एकस्मिन् हृदयाशये ॥
8. अन्तर्यामिस्वरूपं च सर्वेषां शश्वत् स्थितम् ।

citude for His devotees. To quote a traditional simile, His transcendental (*parā*) form is like the watery expanse enveloping the cosmos; Vyūha, in the Milky ocean heard of in the scriptures and not within our vision; the vibhava manifestations, like seasonal torrents conferring benefits, only for the time being and denied to posterity: the antaryāmin, like deep underground reservoir which helps to quench our thirst only by great effort, though within us not perceptible except by difficult and sustained meditation; and the arcā as the still depths of the running torrents. A merciful Lord, as He is, making advances to His creatures so as to be within their easy grasp, He feels that all the four forms already described do not take Him to this goal, and so, to make Himself extremely accessible to all, He takes the arcā form or the form fit for worship by the entire mankind, here and not beyond in the eternal sphere, now and not in the distant past nor in the future, however near, entering into a body made up of the material of the worshippers' choice. Accepting any substance metal, wood, stone or earth, as His body, in His spiritual fullness He enters into it in any rūpa or form in which the worshipper invokes His presence, subjects Himself to the tender mercies of the arcaka or priest, compassionate to all erring mortals, forgiving their shortcomings and lapses and chooses hill-tops or houses, river-banks or remote spots, cities or villages as His abodes.¹ It should be remembered that this manifestation does not exclude His presence in the other forms already described, as He is Omnipresent and the forms taken by the Lord are intended for different sets of worshippers in different

1. अचकितारः चेतनानां अमिमतेषु द्रव्येषु विभवविशेषवैलक्षण्येन देशकालाधिकारिनियमं विना अपराधानां अपस्यतः अर्चकपराधीनसमस्तव्यापारकतः आलयेषु गृहेषु च स्थितिः ॥

spheres. This arcā form is indeed the vibhava manifestation perpetuated for posterity with the apparent difference that while the vibhava forms are periodical and mobile, the arcās are fixed to a spot for ever. While Rāma lived and moved in Ayodhyā, Daṇḍa-kāraṇya, Kishkindha and other places, and Kṛṣṇa in Brindāvan, Gokul, Mathurā and Dvāraka, their arcā forms can be, and are, installed in any place of His or His worshippers' choice. Thus we find in India (Bharatavarṣa) in particular, many temples and shrines in which arcās have been installed, visited and worshipped by many and festivals held each year attracting lakhs of pilgrims. These centuries-old pilgrim-centres are the glories of this ancient land.

The fullness of arcavatar.

The śruti text: "This is full, that is full, the full exceeds the full. The fullness is taken of the full leaving fulness as residue,"¹ refers to the five forms of the Lord and establishes the complete fulness of the arcā as compared to the other forms. That is, all the countless qualities possessed by the Lord detailed already, find the fullest expression only in this manifestation. For example, it engenders a taste for the divine (ruci janakatva). Even those normally indifferent to His beauty are attracted by the arcā form which they see when they chance to visit the temples. As the sages say, this is the form which *regards* those who *disregard* Him. It fosters concentration (śubhāśraya) by its unsurpassed beauty. Mystics have exclaimed: "Having seen You, my eyes refuse to see any other". Thirdly, it is the refuge for all, irrespective of high and low (aśeṣalokaśaraṇya).

1. इदं पूर्णमदः पूर्णं पूर्णं पूर्णमुद्रिच्यते ।

पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते सर्वं पूर्णं सहोम् ॥ Kāṭh. Up.

In fact, for us, full of impurities and imperfections, this is the God's form which instils hope, fills us with courage and dispels our despair. Fourthly, it enriches our experience of the divine. Because the form which He takes is the one chosen by the worshipper who, therefore, enjoys the divine presence in it in all ways. Again, it is extremely accessible, marks the lowest limit of His condescension towards His devotees. It is said that He is vowed to stay in the spot to which He stands fixed as arcā, eternally till the *entire* suffering mankind is lifted to His presence, relieved, for all times, of the miseries of mundane existence.

Critics answered.

Reference has already been made to the Vedic texts, some asserting, and some others denying, a rūpa or body to God. There are many who believe that a bodily form finds no mention in the Vedas and texts like "He has no form" "He is without eyes, ears, hands and feet", "The Paramātman has no body constituted of the five elements (pañcabhūta), " unequivocally state that He has no form. The term 'pratimā' in the Vedic text only means, in fact, "an equal" and denies the existence of any one equal to Him. The word is used in this meaning in the Rāmāyaṇa⁴ and the Gītā⁵. Moreover, the Vedic text only states: "He has no pratimā", and not He is not in any pratimā. There is another oftquoted but misunderstood verse "for the ignorant, (He exists) in images," which is taken to mean that divinity is *assumed* in a vighraha

1. न तस्य प्रतिमास्ति यस्य नाम महद्यशः । Yajurveda.

2. अचक्षुः अश्रोत्रे अपाणिपादम् ।

3. न मूतसंघसंस्थानो देहोऽस्य परमात्मनः ।

4. ते तस्य वज्रप्रतिमाः शराः । Rāmāyaṇa.

5. लोकत्रयेऽपि अप्रतिमप्रभावः । B. G.

(idol) by the ignorant. This interpretation is unsound. For, the whole of this verse refers to the eternal presence of Godhead and begins by saying "in the fire for Brahmins, in their hearts for the yogins" and ends by saying "everywhere, to the seers of God in all". The reference to idols and the ignorant (*aprabuddhas*) in the middle of the verse, should be interpreted, following the explicit sense, invoking the word "api", so as to mean that God exists in images or *pratimās* even to the *aprabuddhas*, who are not Brahmins (*vipras*) or yogins or *samadarśins* (seers of God equally in all). To take the verse to deny God in images will obviously be inconsistent with the main purport of the verse that He exists in the forms specified. There are innumerable texts of the Vedas in which His physical form is described, its colour, effulgence, beauty, eternality, etc. As these latter texts are to be consistently understood without being explained away as mere figures of speech, it has already been shown that the former are to be taken as precluding the existence of a body as a result of karma, and intelligence dependent on sense organs.¹ The Vedic descriptions cannot refer to the *being* (*svarūpa*) of the Lord as that remains the same in all His shapes and forms. As observed already the Vedas cannot be taken first to assert and then to deny a truth. The different descriptions, therefore, can only apply to the *body* (*vigraha*) which He, at His pleasure, takes and of which there are, according to the texts quoted below, the five *prakāras* or kinds already described.²

Pramanas exist.

There are several texts, especially in Rik samhita, which specifically describe the *arcā* form. "Oh worship-

1. कर्मयत्तशरीरं करणायतद्भानं च प्रतिषिध्यन्ति ।

2. अयं च प्रकारमेदो विग्रहस्यैव फलति । न पुनः आत्मस्वरूपस्य । तत्तु सर्वत्रापि एकरूपमेव ॥

pers ! to please the easily accessible and powerful Viṣṇu who, out of His will, comes to take the shape of the image, who protects you by His graceful look at the food offered by you, place at His feet flowers etc., utter words in praise of Him who, like a horse galloping uphill, stands on the mountain-tops. ”

Apart from the saṁhitas and āgamas where this arcā form, its installation in temples and methods of worship are described in detail, and the many purāṇas which entirely centre round this manifestation, there are instances mentioned in the epics which are elucidatory of the Vedas, and therefore, of equal authority. In Rāmāyaṇa, reference is made to Rāma and Sitā worshipping Śrī Nārāyaṇa.* A further reference which is interpreted so as to refer to the arcā (idol) of Lord Raṅga-nātha can be seen in the verse: “King Vibhiṣaṇa having obtained the *kuladhana*’ (of the Ikṣvākus) set out on his return journey to Laṅkā ”. In the Uttarakāṇḍa of the same Epic, Rāma addressing Vibhiṣaṇa, at the end of His avatār, says: “Propitiate the family deity of the Ikṣvākus whom Indra and other Gods worship day and night ”. In Mahābhārata, in the course of his pilgrimage, Arjuna is said to have visited the shrine at Gokarṇa, a pilgrim centre. In the same epic, many temples and shrines are mentioned in Vanaparva. Kṛṣṇa explaining in the Gītā to Arjuna, the time and purpose of His incarnations, is understood to refer to the arcā form in the verse:

1. प्र वः पान्तमन्वसो धिया यते महे शूराय विष्णवे चर्चित ।

या सानुनि पर्वतानां अदाभ्यामहस्तस्थतुर्वतेव साधुना ॥ Riksamhita.

2. सह पत्न्या विशालक्ष्या नारायणमुपागमत् ।

Rāmāyaṇa—Ayodhyākāṇḍa 6-1.

3. लब्ध्वा कुलधनं राजा लङ्कां प्रायाद्विभीषणः ।

Rāmāyaṇa—Yuddhakāṇḍa 133-90.

4. आराधय जगन्नाथं इत्वाकुलदेवतम् ।

आराधनीयमनिशं सर्वदेवैः संवासवैः ॥

“Oh ! Arjuna, whatever way men choose to worship Me, I vouchsafe to them the form of their choice, and they, in all ways, enjoy my nature (by bedecking me, by holding festivals, by serving Me, etc.).¹ Rāmānuja following his predecessors relying on a similar text of Saint Nammālvar,² has taken this verse of the Gitā to refer, besides His incarnation as Kṛṣṇa, to the arcā or worshippers’ forms assumed by the Lord at the desire of His devotees. To cite only one other authoritative reference, in Bhāgavata, Rukmiṇi in her epistle to Kṛṣṇa praying Him to save her from her betrothed, specifically refers to the traditional yātrā (pilgrimage) to the shrine of Goddess Pārvati, performed by the bride, the day previous to her marriage.” The numerous references to temples and idols in our sacred literature in proof of arcā worship deserve separate and detailed treatment.

In conclusion, it should be stated that He is always with a bodily form and these five forms are, in fact complementary to one another. For, He says: “I who take these five forms come thereby nearer and nearer, and therefore more and more accessible in each successive form, to the souls who are bound to this earthly existence ”.³

9. He is the Lord of Sri Bhumi and Nila.

In all the above-mentioned five forms, the Vedas say that He is everpresent with His consorts, Sri and Her attendants, Bhūmi and Nīlā. The texts declare: “Sri

1. ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम् ।

मम वर्त्मानुवर्तन्ते मनुष्याः पार्श्वे सर्वशः ॥ B. G. 4-11.

2. Tiruvoimozhi (Tamil) 8-1-4.

3. पूर्वेषु रस्ति महती कुलदेव यात्रा यस्यां बहिः नववृगिरिजां उपेयाम् ।

4. एवं पञ्चप्रकारो ह्येव आत्मनां प्रसतामवः । पूर्वस्मादपि पूर्वस्मात् ज्यास्यां चैव उत्तरोत्तरः । सौलभ्यतो नमस्त्वामी सुलभोद्युत्तरोत्तरः ।

and Hri are the consorts".¹ "I bow to Bhū, the lustrous attendant of Lakṣmī and the dear consort of Achyuta".² The śrutis being an infallible authority and the ultimate pramāṇa (means of knowledge) should be deemed to express what they visualise. The Vedāntins, therefore, maintain that the Lord is always with these consorts, never without them. "In the supreme abode, Vaikuṇṭha, Viṣṇu, the Lord of the worlds, the Highest Self beyond words of description, sits with Śrī, surrounded by the devotees and their devoted".³ "In Vaikuṇṭha, the Supreme Lord, Janārdana, aided by Śrī and served by both Bhūmī and Nilā,"⁴—these and similar other scriptural texts proclaim the presence of these Eternal Consorts. The epics confirming the Vedic texts speak of Śrī as the lustre of the lustrous Lord⁵, as inseparable like fragrance from flower, brilliance from a diamond, and so on. In His incarnations⁶ for instance as Rāma, She too incarnated as Sītā; as Kṛṣṇa, She too came down as Rukmiṇī. The divine is thus an eternal couple, especially in Rāmānuja's school of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism.

To those theists, believers in a Personal God, this inseparable combination is literally real and serves the divine purpose in creation, protection and ultimate salvation of those who are involved in the cycle of births and deaths. The intent and purpose of the scriptures is

1. ह्रींश्च ते लक्ष्मीश्च पत्न्यौ । Yajurveda.
2. लक्ष्मीं प्रियसखीं देवीं नमाम्यच्युतवल्लभाम् ।
3. वैकुण्ठे तु परे लोके प्रिया सार्धं जगत्पतिः । आस्ते विष्णुरचिन्त्यात्मा भक्तैः भागवतैः सह ।
4. वैकुण्ठे तु परे लोके श्रीसहायो जनार्दनः ।
उभाभ्यां भूमि नीलाभ्यां सेवितः परमेश्वरः ॥
5. अनन्या राघवेणाहं मात्करेण प्रमा यया । अनन्या हि मया सीता मात्करेण प्रमा यया । Rāmāyana.
6. देवत्वे देवदेहोऽयं मनुष्यत्वे च मानुषी ।
राघवत्वेऽभवत् सीता सविमयी कृष्णजन्मनि ॥

to affirm these forms because the devotees aspire to *see* not merely to know (the Truth). Sri and Her attendants are thus actually worshipped like the Lord in the forms described, for worldly ends and for the supreme end, salvation.

It should be noted that though for purposes of worship, Sri Bhū and Nilā are described in their respective beautiful forms, in truth, they are inseparable from Him and are referred to as clinging to His body. Sri is seated actually in the Lord's chest. This is meant to demonstrate that though He is a self-willed Lord (*svatantra*) He is also the seat of Mercy which is aroused in Him by the Consorts who, though in His *service*, have *sway* over Him by their ideal subservience. Indeed, He serves those who serve Him. The Lord not only administers justice applying His laws, the laws of karma, but also becomes the Lord of mercy (*kṛpā*) through these Consorts who are the intermediaries between the sinning souls and the arbitrary Lord. They are the embodiments of motherly qualities like love and affection to their creatures. To us who are the worst offenders against His law, Sri is said to plead for mercy before Him, by dinning into His ears "To *forgive* is indeed divine"; Bhū, to press on Him the truth: "Always to *err* is human"; and Nilā, to cloud His keen vision by Her fascinating beauty, so that thus blinded, He may not *notice* the errors or lapses of His creatures. These Consorts thus play different roles and being eternally present in the Lord's form, we, the guilty by nature, are assured of His mercy and final pardon.

This is the reason why the term '*Vaiṣṇavism*' acquires special significance in the school of Rāmaṇuja and is called '*Sri Vaiṣṇavism*'.

GLORY TO BHAGVAN SRI RAMANUJA.

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